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
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
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**DOCUMENTS ON
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945**

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III

**DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945**

SERIES D (1937-1945)

VOLUME X

THE WAR YEARS

June 23-August 31, 1940

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VII

PREFACE ¹

In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State agreed to publish jointly documents from captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although the captured archives go back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German foreign policy preceding and during World War II." The editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity." The editors were to have complete independence in the selection and editing of the documents. Publication was to begin and be concluded as soon as possible. Each Government was "free to publish separately any portion of the documents." In April 1947 the French Government, having requested the right to participate in the project, accepted the terms of this agreement.

It was originally intended to complete the entire publication for the period 1918-1945 in some twenty volumes. When, however, the preliminary work on the selections for the years from 1933 to 1945 was completed in 1954 it became apparent that an adequate selection of the documents for this period would require a publication on a scale approximately double the size which had been anticipated at the outset. After considering the length of time it would take to carry out a program on this enlarged scale the participating Governments have decided to limit the publication in English to the years 1933 to 1941—beginning January 30, 1933, when Hitler became Reich Chancellor and ending in December 1941 after the German declaration of war on the United States of America. Three further volumes are therefore planned for Series D, namely Volumes XI to XIII, and six for Series C.

Meanwhile the microfilming of the German Foreign Ministry files for the entire Weimar period is being systematically carried out. It is the intention to microfilm all the documents of importance for the history of German foreign policy, and as fast as is technically possible these microfilms are being made available to the public through the National Archives in Washington and the Public Record Office in

¹ In each of the first four volumes published in the series there appears a "General Introduction" which describes some of the principles which have guided the editors in their work.

London. Each document printed in this publication bears a microfilm serial and frame number in the upper left-hand corner. The microfilm copy of the original German text can be located by reference to Appendix II, "List of German Files Used."

The editors have exercised complete freedom in the selection and editing of the documents falling in the period of this volume, which opens on June 23, 1940, the morrow of the French armistice with Germany, and ends August 31, 1940, with the conclusion of the Vienna Award whereby Hitler and Mussolini imposed a territorial settlement between Rumania on the one hand, Hungary and Bulgaria on the other.

The documents are printed in chronological order. A topical arrangement of the analytical list at the beginning of the volume is designed to help those who wish to read on particular subjects.

The documents have been selected jointly by the United States, British, and French editors, but the United States editors have had full editorial responsibility for this volume. The editors wish to express their appreciation to various officials of the Department of State for cooperation and assistance, and particularly to G. Bernard Noble, Chief of the Historical Division, as well as to members of the American Advisory Committee: Sidney B. Fay, Guy Stanton Ford, Carlton J. H. Hayes, Hajo Holborn, William L. Langer, Conyers Read, Bernadotte E. Schmitt, and Raymond J. Sontag.

The translations were drafted by the Department of State's Division of Language Services, but the editors have final responsibility for the translations as well as full responsibility for the footnotes and other editorial matter. Valuable aid was given by Doris E. Austin and Beverly A. Smith. The technical preparation of edited copy for the printer was done in the Division of Publishing Services of the Department of State under the direction of Bruce Buttles; the editors acknowledge gratefully his assistance and that of Elizabeth A. Vary, Collie E. Halbert, and other members of the staff of that Division.

Readers should bear in mind that these documents are presented as a source book for the study of history, and not as a finished interpretation of history. It has been the aim throughout to keep any interpretative comment out of the footnotes.

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS¹

BALTIC STATES

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Undated	<i>The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary</i> Weissäcker is directed to take steps toward the resettlement of the German nationality group in Lithuania.	22	23
July 3	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports further communication with the Estonian President through an intermediary. Paets again expressed the hope that Germany in order to protect her economic interests in Estonia would take steps against further Soviet penetration.	97	107
July 3	<i>The Reichsführer SS to the Foreign Minister</i> Himmler recommends refusing admittance to Germany of 3 to 4 thousand Germans in the Baltic area who did not opt for Germany during the original resettlement operation; he suggests that exceptions might be made only of mothers with their children.	102	113
July 5	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov is reported to have told the Lithuanian Foreign Minister that incorporation of Lithuania in the Soviet Union was determined on, that Latvia and Estonia would follow, and that preparations for such action were under way.	113	126
July 11	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Repeats instruction to Missions in the Baltic States to inform the Governments there that Germany expects her economic interests in those states to be safeguarded. Instructs Moscow Embassy to be prepared to inform the Soviet Government also that Germany expects her economic interests in the Baltic States to be protected.	153	189
July 11	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Lithuania</i> Quotes instruction to Moscow Embassy to inform Molotov that as in the case of Latvia and Estonia in 1939, Germany was now interested in taking up the resettlement of the German nationality group from Lithuania. The Legation should attempt to prevent panic or confused action resulting in economic loss to the German group in Lithuania.	154	192

¹ The documents in this volume have been arranged chronologically. For the convenience of readers who wish to trace topics through the volume this analytical list of documents has been arranged alphabetically by countries or regions, with the addition of five subject headings: "Danube Navigation," "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Greater German Economic Sphere," "Naval and Economic Warfare," and "Peace Moves."

BALTIC STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 July 12	<i>The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Latvian Minister President expresses optimism on the country's ability to maintain independence, although predicting that post of President will be abolished. Secretary General is more skeptical, and believes degree of Soviet absorption of Baltic States will depend on attitude of other powers.	157	197
July 15	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Lithuanian Minister President expressed desire not only to maintain existing trade with Germany but to increase economic cooperation. He also expressed wish to meet other German desires in so far as it lay within Lithuania's power to do so, indicating doubt that independence of the country could be maintained in face of Soviet pressure.	172	220
July 22	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Lithuanian Minister hands Woermann a strong letter of protest against Soviet activities in Lithuania. Woermann transmits the letter to Ribbentrop with request for instructions.	203	264
July 22	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Latvian Minister presents a letter protesting Soviet actions against Latvia.	204	267
July 24	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann returns their letters of protest to the Lithuanian and Latvian Ministers and refuses to accept a similar letter from the Estonian Minister.	219	286
Aug. 12	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov informs the German Ambassador in Moscow that the Baltic States are now a part of the Soviet Union and that German Legations in Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn must be closed on or before August 25; Consulates must be closed on or before September 1, although a portion of the German Legation staff in Kaunas may exercise consular functions during resettlement program.	328	466
Aug. 15	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to inform Molotov that German Legations in the Baltic States have been converted to Consulates. It is assumed that this will be agreeable to the Soviet Government in view of important German economic interests there. (See also under "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	344	483

BELGIUM

1940 July 14	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Commander in Chief of the Army</i> Communicates the views of Hitler on Belgian questions. The various requests received from the King are to be treated dilatorily and Minister Kiewitz, the King's German Adjutant, is to keep a close watch over developments.	167	212
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BELGIUM—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 July 24	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Portugal</i> Directives from the King to former Belgian officials would assume the existence of a Belgian Government and that the King was in a position to give directives. This was not so, as authority rested with the German Military Commander and the King was not in a position to exercise sovereignty.	222	289
July 26	<i>The German Adjutant With the King of the Belgians to the Chief Wehrmacht Adjutant With the Führer</i> Considers there is no cause for anxiety over the course of political developments in Belgium or the conduct of the King. Control is firmly in the hands of the German Military Commander and most elements of the population are cooperating reasonably satisfactorily with the Germans. Kiewitz describes the situation of the King and his entourage at Laeken.	240	325
Aug. 3	<i>The German Embassy in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Belgian Rexist leader Degrelle is not active politically at present, but has indicated to the representative of the Foreign Ministry his intention to take an active part in the control of several newspapers.	281	406

BULGARIA

1940 June 27	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> On Ribbentrop's instruction, Woermann urged the Bulgarian Minister not to press revisionist demands in the present crisis brought about by the Soviet ultimatum to Rumania. The Minister stressed the difficulties of such a policy in view of public opinion in Bulgaria.	37	37
June 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann told the Bulgarian and Hungarian Ministers that the statement made by him the previous day had been based on a misunderstanding; Ribbentrop did not say that the two countries should remain quiet in the present crisis, since no official position regarding Hungarian and Bulgarian claims had yet been taken in this new situation.	45	47
June 29	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> The King of Bulgaria seeks German pressure for a Rumanian settlement, and seeks verification of a report that Italy, the Soviet Union, and Germany are dividing the Balkans into spheres of influence.	53	54
July 1 ✓	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> The Bulgarian Government is to be informed that Germany has no political interest in the Balkans but wants peace there for economic reasons; Germany is sympathetic toward the Bulgarian wishes and promises to assist in a satisfactory solution of the Dobruja problem after the restoration of peace in Europe.	70	77

BULGARIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 July 13	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports receipt by the Bulgarians of assurances of Soviet support of Bulgarian revisionist demands against Rumania.	165	208
July 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Instructions on what to tell Bulgarian Foreign Minister regarding Munich talks with Teleki and Csáky.	173	221
July 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> The Bulgarian Foreign Minister is to be told that Hitler has advised King Carol to arrive at an amicable settlement with Bulgaria and Hungary.	174	222
July 27	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records conversation of Ribbentrop with the Bulgarian Minister President and Foreign Minister. Germany had advised Rumania to undertake immediately direct negotiations with Hungary and Bulgaria, adding that the Hungarian demands were not fully justified. Popov replied that Rumania had as yet made no move and that Bulgaria must insist on the restoration of southern Dobruja as a minimum.	244	332
July 27	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Hitler tells the Bulgarian Minister President and Foreign Minister that he considers the Bulgarian demands reasonable and that he will support them; he states that Bulgaria is not part of the Soviet sphere of interest; only Bessarabia and the Baltic region have been recognized by Germany as lying within the Soviet sphere.	245	337
Aug. 4	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with King Boris. The King doubts Rumania's sincerity; he considers it unlikely that Turkey will return to the German camp.	286	410
Aug. 17	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Bulgarians, in order to make it easier for Rumania to cede southern Dobruja, intend to offer the Rumanians a nonaggression pact; asks to be informed of Ribbentrop's attitude.	358	502
Aug. 19	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Germany does not object if Bulgaria offers a non-aggression pact to Rumania but prefers not to give any official advice. (See also under "Hungary," "Rumania," and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	365	510

DANUBE NAVIGATION

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 7	<p><i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i></p> <p>Germany wants to see the International Danube Commission abolished in order to eliminate Anglo-French influence there and requests Italian cooperation in that effort; the European Danube Commission, however, could remain in existence if Britain and France were excluded from membership.</p> <p>(See also under "Bulgaria," "Greece," "Hungary," "Italy," "Rumania," "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and "Yugoslavia.")</p>	303	429

DENMARK

1940 July 11	<p><i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports discussion with new Danish Foreign Minister Scavenius, who emphasized his readiness to cooperate with Germany, but expressed the hope that the assimilation of Denmark into the new order in Europe would be allowed to come about by an evolutionary process.</p>	155	192
July 17	<p><i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i></p> <p>Transmits to Ribbentrop a note containing a statement by Scavenius concerning a policy of increased cooperation with Germany.</p>	181	234
July 19	<p><i>Minute by Ambassador Ritter</i></p> <p>Secretary General Mohr of the Danish Foreign Ministry proposed economic discussions reflecting the new Danish-German relationship. Ritter recommended that this initiative be accepted and that negotiations be started aiming at a general economic union.</p>	189	248
July 26	<p><i>Minute by Ambassador Ritter</i></p> <p>Records that Hitler has authorized economic negotiations with Denmark looking toward an economic union and that Ribbentrop has approved Ritter's plans for such negotiations with the Danish Foreign Minister or Minister President.</p>	229	296
Aug. 3	<p><i>Minute by Ambassador Ritter</i></p> <p>Records Ritter's conversations in Copenhagen, July 30-31, in preparation for the conclusion of an economic union between Germany and Denmark. Preliminary agreement was reached, and it was decided that a Danish delegation would proceed to Berlin for further negotiations in preparation for a treaty.</p>	268	385
Aug. 23	<p><i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i></p> <p>The Danish economic delegation announced that, after consultation with the Danish economic organizations, it had been determined that the whole subject needed further consideration, and that they were accordingly not prepared to proceed with negotiations for a treaty. Ritter took note of the Danish statement and recalled that the negotiations were begun at Danish initiative and were now being concluded with negative result.</p>	382	531

DIRECTIVES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 July 16	<i>Directive No. 16</i>	177	226
Aug. 1	<i>Directive No. 17</i>	270	390

FAR EAST

1940 June 24	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> In response to an approach from the Japanese Colonial Minister, Ott said that Germany would probably have no objection to Japanese action in Indochina provided Japan kept the United States occupied in the Pacific; he suggested the possibility of a Japanese engagement to attack Hawaii and the Philippines if the United States declared war on Germany.	6	5
July 9	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> General discussion by Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador on special assignment, Sato, on the courses of their respective foreign policies, and the future possibilities for cooperation between Germany and Japan.	137	162
July 10	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Kurusu told Weizsäcker that Japan was working for agreements with the Soviet Union on fisheries and the Amur border; while he did not mention the possibility of any more far-reaching agreement, he stated that his colleague in Moscow was working in a favorable atmosphere.	147	183
July 23	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> The new Konoye Cabinet, including Matsuoka and Tojo, is certain to follow a policy of seeking closer alignment with the Axis.	212	278
July 26	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> An agent in Tientsin reports that the Japanese regard themselves as masters in China and attempt to exclude all others, including Germans; British bribery has led the Japanese to block raw materials shipments to Germany via Manchuria; only pressure on a high level in Tokyo accompanied by further successes against Britain will bring improvement.	239	324
July 27	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> With recent military successes and the closing of Burma and Indochina, Japan is no longer interested in third power mediation for a peace with China; the German victory in Europe has aroused Japanese ambitions for an advance in East Asia.	241	329
July 30	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Reich Commissar for Occupied Netherlands Territories has indicated to Ribbentrop that the Japanese might agree to keep hands off the Netherlands East Indies in the final settlement in return for economic concessions; Weizsäcker does not think that Hitler would wish to reopen the matter at this time.	260	368

FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Kurusu inquired about the German view as to the next step in German-Japanese cooperation; Weizsäcker was noncommittal, noting that Kurusu appeared to expect that the new Cabinet in Tokyo would incline toward entry into the war and to hope that Germany would discourage this.	271	391
Aug. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> In his first talk with Ott, the new Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, promised to remedy German complaints about transit shipments, China damages, and the Japanese press; he said he intended to develop the policy of close association with Germany which he had long advocated; Ott told him Japan had much to make up for in her relations with Germany.	273	393
Aug. 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Kurusu outlined the Japanese project for a Greater East Asia sphere, including the South Pacific, and asked for the German view, knowledge of which, he said, was necessary for Cabinet decisions in Tokyo; Weizsäcker was noncommittal, and Kurusu said he hoped for an early discussion of these problems with the Foreign Minister.	304	432
Aug. 8	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> The French delegate with the Armistice Commission asked for German support against new Japanese demands in Indochina, arguing that neither war in the French colonies nor further reverses for the white race in Asia were in the German interest.	310	439
Aug. 9	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> To the Chinese Ambassador who urged that Germany back up France to prevent the incursion of the Japanese into Indochina, Weizsäcker replied that Germany had no diplomatic relations with France and that the armistice under which their relations were regulated did not cover Indochina.	319	452
Aug. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> The withdrawal of British troops from Peiping, Tientsin, and Shanghai is welcomed in Japan as evidence of progress in driving British influence out of East Asia.	321	455
Aug. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Japanese Foreign Minister sees German influence in the quick compliance of the French Government with Japanese demands on Indochina. The United States continues pressure to keep Japan from a rapprochement with the Axis Powers.	339	476

FINLAND

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
June 26	<i>The Head of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Foreign Ministry</i> Instructions for Schulenburg to tell Molotov that in view of the importance of nickel to Germany, it is assumed that the Soviet Union will raise no objections to the allocation of the major part of Finland's nickel production to Germany.	24	25
June 29	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> A discussion with the Finnish Minister on the nickel and Aland Islands questions in which the Minister revealed strong Soviet pressure on Finland in both matters.	62	65
July 1	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> A discussion of various aspects of the German-Finnish trade agreements concluded on June 29, 1940.	74	83
July 2	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Molotov regarding Soviet negotiations with Finland for replacing the Anglo-Canadian nickel concessions by a Soviet-Finnish company.	77	87
July 3	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Refers to document No. 77 and states that Molotov's reply in the nickel question is unsatisfactory. German demand for participation in the concession had been recognized by the Finnish Government. Acceptance of the Soviet proposal would make future production dependent on the good or bad will of the Soviets.	98	108
July 4	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> In response to the Finnish Foreign Minister's statement that a government oriented exclusively to Germany was being formed, Blücher replied that in view of the German agreements with the Soviet Union, a Finnish government which cooperated secretly, but outwardly displayed reserve, would be more acceptable.	109	121
July 6	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Finnish Foreign Minister maintains that the German demands in the negotiations at Berlin were not for participation in the concession but for a share of the output; he outlines a plan for distribution of the Petsamo nickel output.	122	136
July 8	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Finland</i> The British-Canadian attempt to dispose of the concession to third parties to Germany's disadvantage cannot be accepted without opposition. Any Finnish collaboration in such a transaction will be viewed with disfavor.	136	161
July 11	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Soviet Government has stated that its purchases of nickel ore in 1940 will be limited to 40 percent of the output with the remainder going to Germany. The Finnish Foreign Minister expressed satisfaction that Germany was interested in a concession.	150	185

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 July 17	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet Government regards the Petsamo region as its exclusive domain and wants no third power to appear there. Molotov showed displeasure at the German expectation to share in the concession, and said that the information regarding German-Finnish negotiations on the subject was something entirely new.	182	237
July 24	<i>The Chairman of the Finnish Government Committee to the Chairman of the German Delegation</i> The oral agreement providing for regular delivery of nickel ore from the mines at Petsamo to Germany is confirmed.	221	288
July 25	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> A Soviet draft treaty on the Ålands is reported to provide that Finland will not cede the islands to any other power. The Soviet Consul at Mariehamn is to have the right to supervise compliance with the treaty provisions. Molotov attributed the anti-Soviet attitude in Finland to the influence of Tanner, and wished him replaced.	223	289
July 27	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet attitude toward Finland is marked by continuous pressure. The Soviet Government's ultimate intentions are obscure.	242	331
July [30]	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to inform Molotov that Germany will waive participation in the Petsamo concession and restrict herself to obtaining 60 percent of the nickel ore production.	259	368
Aug. 2	<i>Minister Blücher to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> The Finnish Foreign Minister has suggested the possibility that he and Minister President Ryti visit Berlin.	280	405
Aug. 6	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Minister Blücher</i> No proposal for a visit of the Finnish Ministers has been broached by the Finnish Minister to Germany. Weizsäcker does not consider the time opportune for such a visit.	297	424
Aug. 6	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Although the Soviets have consented to delivery of 60 percent of the Petsamo ore to Germany for the year 1940 only, the Germans have assumed in their negotiations that a time limit was not at issue. The Ambassador should inform Molotov accordingly, in case he considers it necessary.	301	428
Aug. 10	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Captain Bürkner of the OKW conveyed the view of Keitel that the OKW was disturbed over the possibility of a new Soviet-Finnish war; suggested that a restraining word be spoken in Moscow. Weizsäcker thought little more could be done than to make inquiry there about any new developments affecting Finland.	325	460

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Keitel said that Hitler had approved an arms deal between a Danish firm and Finland; he seemed to be considering further indirect support and encouragement of Finland.	330	467
Aug. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Finnish Minister again sought promise of at least diplomatic support in case of future trouble with the Soviet Union. Woermann was evasive and stated he assumed the German attitude in a new Finnish-Soviet conflict would be the same as in the last one.	341	478
Aug. 19	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Discussion by the Foreign Minister, the Finnish Minister, and a Finnish economic delegate of economic questions and Finnish requests for arms deliveries. The Foreign Minister was generally accommodating. (See also under "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	366	511

FRANCE

1940 June 23	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Ciano on French-Italian armistice negotiations and on the ceremony at Compiègne.	1	1
June 26	<i>The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary</i> Directs Weizsäcker to send a circular message to all Reich Government departments, stating that the Foreign Ministry has in hand preparations for a peace treaty with France and that other departments should forward their suggestions regarding such a treaty and name representatives with whom discussions might be undertaken.	23	24
June 29	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports terms of agreement between General Roatta and the German Armistice Commission on implementation of the Armistice Agreement.	54	55
July 2	<i>The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Göring notes that he has reserved for himself the conduct of discussion of economic questions connected with the peace negotiations.	82	93
July 3	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by General Huntsiger regarding orders given to French naval forces; Hitler's reaction.	93	103
July 3	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Outlines proposals for dealing with the Jewish question in the peace treaty.	101	111

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 July 4	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports decisions by the Chief of the OKW regarding the employment of French industry in the German war effort.	106	118
July 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> Gives the text of the communication from the German Armistice Commission to the French delegation containing Hitler's decision to suspend the provisions of article 8 of the Armistice Agreement which might contravene defensive measures taken by the French Navy to resist attack.	111	124
July 5	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> The French have been informed that Armistice provisions on demobilization and disarmament of the French air forces in the unoccupied area have been suspended so far as required for defense against British attacks in the Mediterranean. The decision as to what units are needed for defense is to be made by the Armistice Commission, and prior notice must be given the Italian High Command which will make the decisions regarding North Africa and Syria. Use of the air forces in the Atlantic is not included.	115	127
July 5	<i>Circular of the Office of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan</i> Gives views on the legal position created by a number of the terms of the Armistice affecting the economic field and notes the creation of the new special commission on French economic questions, to which Göring, in agreement with the Foreign Ministry, appointed Minister Hemmen as chairman.	116	128
July 5	<i>The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of the French Delegation to the German Armistice Commission</i> Informs the French delegation of the establishment of the Special Commission on Economic Questions, headed by Minister Hemmen, to deal with economic questions arising from the Armistice terms which cannot be handled by the military administration. It is suggested that the French appoint a corresponding commission empowered to deal with such questions.	117	130
July 9	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The French Foreign Minister has requested the Spanish Government to transmit to the German and Italian Governments an appeal for more moderate application of the Armistice terms and, if possible, to aid in arranging a meeting between the French Foreign Minister and Ribbentrop.	140	168
July 11	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records the position of the Italian Government, as stated by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, to the reported intention of Germany to demand of the French Government bases in the areas of Oran and Casablanca.	151	186

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
July 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records telling the Italian Ambassador that the OKW had given up the plan for a base at Oran but wanted a base at Casablanca for which a request would be made in the Armistice Commission. An Italian plan for a base at Oran would be regarded favorably.	158	198
July 13	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Sums up the work of the Armistice Commission to date with respect to each article of the Armistice terms, showing to what extent each has been carried out and the disposition made of the principal French requests relating to each.	163	202
July 15	<i>The Director of the Legal Department to the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Gives the text of a message from Ribbentrop to Göring regarding the competence of their respective ministries on economic questions affecting foreign countries.	168	213
July 15	<i>The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports dispatch of a note from the Armistice Commission to the French delegation with demands on the French in North Africa.	169	215
July 15	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in France to the Chief of the Military Administration in France</i> Describes the contacts and activities of Abetz' staff and evaluates the possibilities for influencing the French political development.	170	215
July 17	<i>The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses the question of relaxing the restrictions on traffic across the demarcation line and encloses a memorandum of the Armistice Commission on the subject.	184	238
July 19	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records a message stating that Hitler did not yet want the elimination of the demarcation line.	192	251
July 22	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> A general statement of the contents of Marshal Pétain's letter to Hitler regarding German demands in North Africa.	208	274
July 25	<i>The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Brinon has a commission from Laval to examine all questions relating to the resumption of relations with Germany. He reports that Pétain is in full agreement with Laval; that Daladier, Gamelin, Reynaud, Mandel, Blum, and Cot will be tried; that the Jews have been ordered out of Vichy.	226	292

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
July 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> A report on the current work of the Armistice Commission.	227	292
July 26	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Summarizes the contents of a memorandum based on reports from the Spanish Ambassador in France on the political situation there.	231	299
July 27	<i>The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service to the Foreign Minister</i> Encloses record of a meeting held in Paris on July 24 between representatives of the Sicherheitsdienst and Coustau, Chef de Cabinet of the French Minister of Interior Marquet.	247	342
July 31	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Minutes of a meeting of the Commercial Policy Committee; discussion of economic issues relating to France.	267	381
Aug. 1	<i>The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Georges Bonnet in a 2-hour interview declared his good will and readiness to cooperate.	269	390
Aug. 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Hitler has named Abetz as Ambassador in France; his functions are listed.	282	407
Aug. 8	<i>The Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gives the text of the note presented to General Huntsiger dealing with occupation costs.	309	438
Aug. 12	<i>The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the German Armistice Commission and the High Command of the Army</i> Summarizes the principles, approved by Hitler, for the future treatment of the demarcation line.	331	468
Aug. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Summarizes the disagreements between German and Italian negotiators over the control of the French economy and the French borders and recommends the line along which a solution should be sought.	337	474
Aug. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> A supplementary memorandum to document No. 337.	338	475
Aug. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Notes that Abetz had told him that Hitler, in a conference two weeks previously, had said that it was his intention after the war to remove all Jews from Europe. Abetz had stated further that the entire files of the Freemasons of France had been seized.	345	484

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to Ambassador Abetz</i> Instructions to continue to treat the transfer of the French Government or of individual ministries to Paris in dilatory fashion.	351	491
Aug. 16	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> It is recommended that two French notes regarding Alsace-Lorraine be handled in dilatory fashion.	354	498
Aug. 17	<i>Confidential Protocol</i> Text of German-Italian agreement on establishment of controls in France over foreign exchange, imports and exports, and transit.	360	503
Aug. 20	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests approval of certain anti-Semitic measures, which might also serve as the basis for later removal of Jews from unoccupied France.	368	513
Aug. 20	<i>The Chairman of the French Delegation to the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission</i> Supplies information as requested regarding holdings of the Bank of France on June 22, for its own or foreign accounts and on the account of banks or governments of German-occupied countries, and the changes in those accounts to July 25.	371	516
Aug. 22	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Lists countermeasures which might be considered in case the French persist in refusing to pay the amounts demanded of them for occupation costs.	378	526
Aug. 23	<i>Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Georges Bonnet concerning the position he had taken at a conference of French officials on August 23, 1939.	380	528
Aug. 30	<i>Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversations with Laval, General de la Laurencie, and Flandin. (See also under "Belgium," "Far East," "Great Britain," "Italy," and "Spain.")	411	580

GREAT BRITAIN

1940 June 23	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Foreign Minister requests German advice on the treatment of the Duke and Duchess of Windsor soon to arrive in Madrid.	2	2
June 24	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Inquiry as to whether it would be possible to have the Duke and Duchess of Windsor detained a couple of weeks in Madrid by delaying an exit visa. German interest must not appear.	9	9

GREAT BRITAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 30	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The heads of the departments in the Foreign Ministry are to be notified that Germany is not considering peace, but is concerned exclusively with preparing for the destruction of England.	65	68
June 30	<i>The Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry</i> Instructions that the Duke of Windsor is to be informed through an intermediary that the Foreign Minister is looking out for the protection of his residence in Paris.	66	68
July 2	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys intelligence from the Spanish Foreign Minister concerning the Duke of Windsor's intention to go to Portugal and statements alleged to have been made by the Duke.	86	96
July 5	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys statements, alleged to have been made by Sir Stafford Cripps in conversation with the Swedish Minister in the Soviet Union, concerning British prospects in the war.	114	126
July 11	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Transmits text of telegram from German Minister in Portugal with intelligence concerning the Duke of Windsor; asks for expression of views on the possibility of getting the Duke of Windsor back to Spain from Portugal.	152	187
July 12	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 152 and reports that matter has been discussed with Spanish Minister of Interior who will take it up with Franco.	159	199
July 12	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys intelligence concerning statements alleged to have been made by Sir Samuel Hoare to the Spanish Foreign Minister on the possibility of a Spanish mediation in the war.	160	200
July 16	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys intelligence concerning statements alleged to have been made by the Duke of Windsor regarding his appointment as Governor of the Bahamas.	175	223
July 19	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Expresses interest in all well-grounded reports on British morale, capacity for resistance, and internal and foreign politics, especially statements of British representatives in foreign countries and those of foreign representatives returning from Britain.	191	251
July 20	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> According to a report from the Spanish Ambassador in London the moment is unfavorable for peace proposals, as British morale is better than ever. The Ambassador thought the conquest of Britain would not be easy.	197	257
July 22	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the view held at the Foreign Ministry in Dublin concerning the British attitude regarding continuation of the war.	201	262

GREAT BRITAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
July 23	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys intelligence from the confidential emissary of the Spanish Minister of Interior regarding two interviews with the Duke of Windsor in Lisbon.	211	276
July 24	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Contains information concerning a letter which the confidential emissary of the Minister of Interior intends to send to the Duke of Windsor.	216	283
July 25	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Further intelligence concerning a conversation of the confidential emissary of the Spanish Minister of Interior with the Duke and Duchess of Windsor.	224	290
July 25	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on problem of securing intelligence regarding Great Britain via Spain.	225	291
July 26	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes a plan worked out with Schellenberg for an attempt to get the Duke and Duchess of Windsor across the Spanish frontier.	235	317
July 30	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Intelligence from Schellenberg in Lisbon regarding the Duke of Windsor.	254	363
July 30	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Further intelligence from a confidential emissary of the Spanish Minister of Interior regarding the Duke of Windsor.	257	366
July 31	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Further intelligence from a confidential emissary of the Spanish Minister of Interior regarding the Duke of Windsor.	264	376
July 31	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal</i> Contains a message to the Portuguese host of the Duke of Windsor for transmittal to the Duke.	265	378
Aug. 2	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports final efforts by his Portuguese host to persuade the Duke of Windsor to remain in Portugal.	276	397
Aug. 2	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a report, apparently by Schellenberg, of the means employed to try to prevent the departure of the Duke and Duchess of Windsor for the Bahamas.	277	398
Aug. 3	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Further intelligence from the confidential emissary of the Spanish Minister of Interior regarding the Duke of Windsor. (See also under "France," "Greece," "Ireland," "Italy," "Naval and Economic Warfare," "Peace Moves," "Portugal," "Spain," "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and "United States.")	285	409

GREATER GERMAN ECONOMIC SPHERE

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 July 3	<i>The State Secretary and Deputy to the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Göring has commissioned the Minister of Economics to coordinate preparations for the organization of the German-European economic sphere. Other offices were requested to cooperate and to desist from independent action in questions involving that sphere.	103	115
July 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan</i> Describes the role of the Foreign Ministry in regard to foreign trade policy and economic negotiations generally.	142	170
July 27	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> The question is raised whether Slovakia should be among those states which are to be tied to Germany by way of a customs and currency union; it would be advisable to touch upon it at the next visit of Slovak Cabinet members.	246	341
July 30	<i>Minister of Economics Funk to Minister Lammers</i> Explains his recent statements about the new economic order after the war and asks whether Hitler approves.	261	369
Aug. 2	<i>The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan to the Reich Commissar for the Netherlands, the Reich Commissar for Norway, and the Military Commander in Belgium</i> Points out that one goal of German economic policy is to secure greater German influence in foreign enterprises. Regulations respecting transfer of capital should be established, altered, or interpreted so as to facilitate German acquisition of such undertakings and to prevent them from being transferred into the possession of foreign nationals. If necessary such regulations should be made to apply retroactively in order to cancel such transactions as have already taken place.	278	401
Aug. 8	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Ribbentrop has given assurances to the Italian Ambassador that the economic reorganization of Europe planned by Germany would take due account of Italian needs and interests.	311	440
Aug. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> A discussion of current economic negotiations involving Switzerland, Slovakia, Italy, Greece, economic reorganization of Europe, et cetera. (See also under "France.")	320	453

GREECE

1940 Aug. 13	<i>The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Metaxas on the Greek reaction to possible Italian intervention; the German Minister's evaluation of Greek policy.	333	471
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GREECE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Greek Minister regarding the state of Greek-Italian relations; Weizsäcker's statement of the German position.	334	472
Aug. 18	<i>The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Greek Government is uncertain of Italian plans, and is trying to placate Germany and Italy.	363	509
Aug. 21	<i>The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Greeks still hope that Germany will restrain Italy. They believe that the Italian actions are deliberate provocations; as a result, popular indignation makes acceptance of Italian demands more difficult.	372	520
Aug. 22	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Greece</i> Following receipt of reports of transfer of Italian troops to Albania, Greece has requested advice from Germany. Ribbentrop has directed that dilatory treatment be given the request.	377	525
Aug. 23	<i>The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Minister</i> Reports Italian concurrence with German views on dispatch of reinforcements to Albania, and the projected offensive in Libya.	383	534
Aug. 24	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Greece</i> Statements by the Greek Minister regarding mobilization. Asks for a report on whether mobilization measures have been ordered.	386	536
Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records informing the Italian Counselor of Embassy of Ribbentrop's views on the Greek situation; Zamboni's reply.	387	537
Aug. 25	<i>The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> There has been no mobilization so far, although Metaxas is not in doubt about the seriousness of the situation.	391	541
Aug. 27	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Reception of the Greek Minister by Ribbentrop at Fuschl on August 26. Ribbentrop's statements on the Greek-Italian situation. (See also under "Italy" and "Naval and Economic Warfare.")	394	544

HUNGARY

1940 June 27	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Hungarian Minister presented a memorandum stating that Hungary would consider it as a discrimination if Rumania made territorial concessions to the Soviet Union, but not to Hungary.	38	38
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HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
June 28	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hungary's Minister President and Foreign Minister pointed to the dangers that could arise if Rumania refused to make concessions to Hungary; they wanted to know whether Germany would support the just demands of Hungary.	43	43
June 28	<i>The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Hungarian Foreign Minister explained in detail Hungary's position on revision of boundaries and the concessions Hungary would make to Germany in exchange for German support.	55	56
June 29	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Csáky suggests that Germany advise Rumania to start negotiating on Hungary's territorial demands.	61	64
June 30	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary</i> Hungary's demands will be discussed at the visit of the Hungarian Ministers to Germany; Germany herself is not politically interested in the Balkans but hopes that after the peaceful settlement between the Soviet Union and Rumania, Hungary will not incur the responsibility for a conflict with Rumania.	63	66
July 1	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Csáky stated that the Army and large sections of the people were in a warlike mood; complained about lack of Rumanian readiness to negotiate with Hungary.	69	75
July 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hungary is to be told that if she wanted to attack Rumania it would be on her own responsibility and she could not expect help from Germany if she ran into difficulties and complications which were likely to arise. However, at the proper time Germany would support Hungarian claims which then could be satisfied without war.	75	85
July 2	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out instructions contained in document No. 75; Csáky outlined the circumstances in which Hungary would go to war.	78	87
July 2	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records warning the Hungarian Minister that if Hungary instigated a Balkan conflict she would forfeit any claim on German support.	81	91
July 2	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> The excitement of the Hungarian public will make war inevitable unless Germany puts greater pressure on Hungary to keep the peace or urges Rumania to make concessions to Hungary voluntarily.	85	96
July 3	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The Hungarian Foreign Minister has named four contingencies which might require immediate armed intervention by Hungary; he asks whether the specific revisions desired by Hungary would be supported by Germany.	94	104

HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
July 4	<i>The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary and the Minister in Hungary</i> Instructions to explain once more the German position to the Hungarians; Hungary cannot expect help from Germany in complications that might follow a warlike action of Hungary; however, Germany and Italy are going to examine the whole problem of revision.	105	117
July 4	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Hungarian Government has grasped the significance of the German warning.	107	118
July 5	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Hungarian Foreign Minister has passed along information indicating Soviet friendliness toward Hungary's revisionist claims.	119	132
July 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation of Hitler, Ciano, Teleki, and Csáky in Munich on July 10; discussion of Hungarian-Rumanian problems; Hitler is going to write a letter to King Carol.	146	179
July 20	<i>The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Summarizes terms of a new German-Hungarian economic agreement.	194	253
July 24	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told the Hungarian Minister who expressed uneasiness about German deliveries of arms to Rumania that these constituted payments for Rumanian oil and were unrelated to political events of the past 2 months.	218	285
Aug. 3	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In a conversation with the Hungarian Minister, Weizsäcker criticized Hungary's approach to negotiations with Rumania as undermining the agreement reached with the Axis leaders at Munich.	284	409
Aug. 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Hungarian Minister complained to Weizsäcker about Rumanian bad faith and an alleged rapprochement between Rumania and the Soviet Union; Weizsäcker expressed doubts, criticized Hungarian intransigence, and finally urged Hungary to start serious negotiations with Rumania.	305	433
Aug. 13	<i>The State Secretary to the Legations in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria</i> Germany refuses to be drawn into discussions of the revisionist claims of Bulgaria and Hungary, but wishes them to seek a direct settlement with Rumania.	336	474
Aug. 24	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Hungarian-Rumanian negotiations have been broken off, and military action on the part of Hungary may be expected the next week unless the Axis Powers intervene.	384	534
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Ciano thought a joint German-Italian démarche with Hungary might be desirable.	390	540

HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Aug. 26	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Hungarian Foreign Minister said the Regent and the Army were pressing for action; he wondered whether, in case of conflict, Germany's neutrality would be strict or benevolent; a letter from Hitler to Horthy could restrain the Regent and the Army.	393	543
Aug. 27	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Foreign Minister</i> Transmits a Hungarian memorandum stating that Rumanian troop concentrations might make Hungarian military action necessary and asking what form German neutrality would assume in such a conflict.	400	553
Aug. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records informing the Hungarian Minister that Ribbentrop had invited Csáky to come to Vienna for a conference on August 29.	401	555
Aug. 28	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Hungarian Minister said that Molotov inquired about Germany's and Italy's attitude toward the Hungarian-Rumanian conflict; he expressed approval of the Hungarian claims, but said nothing about further steps.	406	565
Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation of Ribbentrop, Ciano, Teleki, and Csáky on August 29. Ribbentrop asked whether the Hungarians would accept unconditionally the Award to be rendered by the Axis Powers; the Hungarians asked for time to consider the question. (See also under "Bulgaria," "Italy," "Rumania," and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	410	576

IRELAND

1940			
June 27	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conviction of Held and his sentencing to 5 years' imprisonment.	35	36
July 1	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Irish Government is still suspicious of German intentions. Hempel suggests a statement that Germany still intends to respect Irish neutrality.	79	89
July 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Deals with activities of certain German agents in Ireland. Advises against reprisals in the case of Held.	100	110
July 11	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Eire</i> Instructions to emphasize in all conversations that Germany is primarily interested in preservation of Irish neutrality; as long as Ireland remains neutral Germany will respect her neutrality.	149	184

IRELAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 July 31	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses the views of Irish leaders on political developments in the United States and their hopes respecting future German policy toward Ireland. (See also under "Great Britain" and "Naval and Economic Warfare.")	266	379

ITALY

1940 June 26	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> Mussolini reminds Hitler of his desire to have Italian air and land forces participate in the assault on the British Isles.	26	27
July 1	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Hitler and Alfieri. A general discussion, with particular emphasis on Great Britain.	73	79
July 8	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Hitler and Ciano on July 7. Topics discussed: plans against Britain; relations with France; Gibraltar; Italian complaints against Greece and Yugoslavia; Axis relations with Rumania and Hungary.	129	147
July 13	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> For various technical military reasons it will not be possible to include Italian troops in the attack on the British Isles; an Italian attack on Egypt and Suez would contribute to the victory over Britain, however.	166	209
July 17	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> Mussolini understands Hitler's response to his offer of Italian units for the assault on the British Isles; hopes that Italian attack against Egypt can start simultaneously with the German attack against Britain. <i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to Count Ciano's talks with Ribbentrop and Hitler on July 19 and 20.	185	242 249
July 17	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned from confidential source that Ciano was reassured by his Berlin visit that Germany would not be too generous to France in the final peace; details regarding Italy's territorial aspirations.	193	252
July 27	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> There is evidence that Italian opinion is disturbed by the emphasis in the German press on German leadership in the New Europe; it is suggested the press be directed to stress the principle of the Axis and equality of the partners.	243	331
Aug. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys information from Ciano on developments in Italian-Soviet relations, and statements by Molotov regarding the Mediterranean and Black Sea questions. Ribbentrop's views are requested.	290	416

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 14	<i>The Foreign Intelligence Department of the Wehrmacht to the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Transmits a report from the German Military Attaché at Rome on a conversation with General Roatta regarding Italian preparations for an attack on Yugoslavia. Roatta suggests staff conferences for correlation of plans.	343	481
Aug. 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Ciano is to be informed that while Germany favors an improvement in Italian-Soviet relations, she doubts the usefulness of concrete discussions of the Balkans or Straits questions with the Soviet Union.	348	486
Aug. 17	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Conversation on August 16 between the Foreign Minister and Italian Ambassador Alfieri. Discussion of relations with Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece.	353	495
Aug. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano agrees with Ribbentrop's view that Italian relations with the Soviet Union should be aimed at a general improvement and that concrete engagements should be avoided; no action against Greece or Yugoslavia is planned.	357	501
Aug. 17	<i>German-Italian Commercial Agreement, Signed at Berlin, August 17, 1940</i> Text of sixth Secret Protocol.	361	505
Aug. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Reports statements by Ciano regarding reinforcement of Italian forces in Albania, Italian intentions toward Yugoslavia, and military plans in Cyrenaica.	367	512
Aug. 24	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> The agreed policy to keep the Balkans at peace should be maintained; Italian troop concentrations against Greece and Yugoslavia are preventive only; France is still hoping for a British victory, deserves careful watching and a hard peace; American intervention must be expected, but will not prevent a British defeat; no results of Japanese new course are yet discernible.	388	538
Aug. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Discussion by Hitler, Ribbentrop, Ciano, Mackensen, and Alfieri of the general situation and in particular the problems of southeastern Europe. (See also under "Bulgaria," "Far East," "France," "Greater German Economic Sphere," "Greece," "Hungary," "Middle East," "Rumania," "Spain," "Turkey," "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and "Yugoslavia.")	407	566

LATIN AMERICA

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
June 27	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Brazil</i> Instructions to inform President Vargas that Germany is prepared to make written agreements regarding the future economic relations of Germany and Brazil and would welcome concrete proposals from President Vargas.	41	41
July 3	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out instructions of document No. 41. Vargas agreed to supervise negotiations for the purpose of concluding a postwar trade agreement.	89	100
July 3	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Interprets recent speeches of President Vargas as anticipating the defeat of Britain and the necessity of an orientation toward Germany and Europe.	90	100
July 2	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> To counteract British and United States activities in Latin America, the Missions are to point out the economic possibilities offered by a victorious Germany to those countries of Latin America which maintained a friendly attitude toward Germany during the war.	92	102
July 5	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests instructions on what proposals to make to Brazil regarding the projected trade agreement and offers certain suggestions.	118	131
July 6	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports plans of the United States Government for an economic cartel for export products of countries of the Western Hemisphere. An effort will be made to get the plan accepted at the Pan-American Conference.	127	145
July [10]	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Brazil</i> The text of a statement, to be made to the Brazilian Government, outlining what Germany is willing to do to promote German-Brazilian economic relations.	145	177
July 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Outlines plans to counteract United States efforts to promote a Western Hemisphere economic cartel at the Havana Conference.	178	229
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to the agenda of the Havana Conference, held July 21-30; citation to texts of resolutions adopted and proceedings.		258
Aug. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gives the Brazilian reaction to the German proposals set forth in document No. 145.	299	426
Aug. 8	<i>Draft Circular of the State Secretary</i> Summarizes the decisions taken at the Havana Conference and appraises the results.	316	448

LATIN AMERICA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 23	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Missions in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia</i> Outlines the German attitude toward participating in the future rearmament of South American countries. (See also under "United States.")	381	529

LUXEMBOURG

1940 July 8	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, now living in Lisbon, has expressed the hope soon to be able to return to her country.	138	167
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MIDDLE EAST

1940 June 27	<i>The Minister in Afghanistan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by the Afghan Minister of Economics regarding the terms upon which Afghanistan might take actions supporting German policy in India and the Middle East.	30	29
July 2	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on detailed conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Iran regarding Soviet policy toward Iran.	84	95
July 6	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Iraq Minister of Justice who said the Arabs desired to free themselves from British rule but also hoped Germany would protect the Arabs against Italian imperialism and help them to restore an Arab national government in Damascus. Papen was noncommittal and emphasized Italian interests in this region; a letter from the Grand Mufti to Hitler stressed the common views of the Arabs and of Germany in the struggle against the Jews and the democracies.	125	141
July 9	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Minister President of Iran who expressed uneasiness about the unfriendly attitude of the Soviet Union toward Iran. The German Minister asks whether German mediation of the Iranian-Soviet differences might be considered.	141	169
July 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Notes that Germany should let Italy take the lead in the political organization of the Arab Middle East while maintaining her own economic interests in this region such as oil and air traffic; Germany should avoid being maneuvered by the Arabs into an anti-Italian position.	200	261
July 22	<i>The Grand Mufti to the Ambassador in Turkey</i> The Grand Mufti is sending his private secretary to Berlin and Rome to establish closer relations between the Arabs and the Axis.	209	275

MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by the secretary of the Grand Mufti regarding Italian promises of Arab independence and the possibilities of overturning pro-British elements in the Middle East.	289	415
Aug. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Italian Counselor of Embassy, acting on instructions, has stated that the Iraq Minister President wants a rapprochement of Iraq with Germany.	359	503
Aug. 20	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Germany is interested in the Arab world economically and culturally but not politically since she recognizes Italy's political hegemony in that area; this policy must be concealed from the Arabs, and Germany must not commit herself with respect to the political future of the Arab world.	370	515
Aug. 27	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits memorandum of a conversation with the secretary of the Grand Mufti together with the text of a draft declaration on the independence of the Arab countries which the Arab committee proposed for endorsement by Germany and Italy. (See also under "Italy," "Turkey," and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	403	556

NAVAL AND ECONOMIC WARFARE

1940 Aug. 3	<i>Circular of Ambassador Ritter</i> Instructions to report attitude of governments and shipping interests toward British blockade and navicert system announced as effective August 1. Germany will regard submission to the system as active support of British economic warfare at sea.	283	408
Aug. 6	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> Instruction to notify the Government to which each is accredited, when directed to do so, of the existence of a war zone in the waters around Great Britain and German disavowal of responsibility for damage to persons or ships in those waters.	291	419
[Aug. 6]	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Eire</i> Repeats text of document No. 291 adding that Irish ships will not be attacked in British waters if German instructions as to their operations are followed.	292	420
[Aug. 6]	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in the Soviet Union, Spain, and Japan</i> Repeats text of document No. 291 adding that these Governments are to be urged to have their ships avoid the endangered area since it is no longer technically possible for the German forces to except them from risk.	293	421

NAVAL AND ECONOMIC WARFARE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 [Aug. 6]	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States</i> The United States is to be told that the notification sent to neutral countries is given to the United States Government for information only, since the United States has already prohibited its ships by legislation from transit of the affected area.	294	422
[Aug. 6]	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> The Italian government is to be informed of the communication sent other governments regarding the warning to avoid British waters.	295	423
Aug. 10	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Greece</i> Instructions to call upon the Minister President and demand that trade in war material between Greece and Great Britain be stopped.	324	458
Aug. 16	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> Directions to carry out the instructions contained in document No. 291. Responsibility for this action is to be placed on Britain alone.	350	490
Aug. 17	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Instructions on the line to take following official announcement of the total blockade of Britain.	356	500
Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records a conversation of Clodius with an official of the Greek Foreign Ministry; complaints of Greek conduct. The gravest charge, among several, was that the Greek merchant fleet was still in British service. (See also under "Great Britain," "Greece," "Ireland," and "United States.")	375	522

NORWAY

1940 July 2	<i>Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery</i> Encloses a memorandum for Hitler regarding developments in Norway, particularly with respect to the position of Quisling.	83	93
July 6	<i>Note by Reichsleiter Rosenberg</i> Account of an interview with Quisling in Berlin. Quisling cited instances of disregard of his interests by German authorities in Norway and described Reich Commissar Terboven's efforts to remove him from leadership of the Nasjonal Samling.	124	138
[July 22]	<i>Memorandum by Reichsleiter Rosenberg</i> Lists proposals to be made to Hitler on the handling of Scandinavian affairs, including appointment of a person to coordinate activities relating to Scandinavia, extension of the work of the Nordische Gesellschaft, and in Norway, support of Quisling and the Nasjonal Samling.	207	272

NORWAY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Sept. 4	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Conversation of Hitler with Quisling on August 16. Quisling reported on conditions in Norway and advocated a Norwegian government of the Nasjonal Samling and close cooperation with Germany. Hitler thanked him for his services and assured him of support for himself and his party.	352	491
Aug. 29	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry on the Staff of the Reich Commissar in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports measures to be taken as a result of Hitler's order to prepare the way for the taking over of the leadership of the state by Quisling. (See also under "Denmark," "Greater German Economic Sphere," and "Sweden.")	412	581

PEACE MOVES

1940 June 28	<i>The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a message from the Pope regarding the possibility of a Papal mediation to bring an end to the war.	48	49
July 18	<i>Prince Max Hohenlohe to Senior Counselor Hewel</i> Writes of a meeting with the British Minister to Switzerland, who hinted that an influential group in England might be interested in the possibility of an understanding with Germany if suitable guarantees could be given. The Minister desired information on any concrete German plans.	188	245
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Citation to text of Hitler's speech before the Reichstag on July 19.		249
July 24	<i>Senior Counselor Hewel to Prince Max Hohenlohe</i> Informs Prince Hohenlohe that the present political situation does not permit continuation of contacts with the British.	220	287
July 25	<i>Prince Max Hohenlohe to Senior Counselor Hewel</i> Describes a meeting with the Aga Khan who believes that Hitler ought to concentrate on securing the Mediterranean rather than attacking Britain directly.	228	294
July 26	<i>The State Secretary to the Ambassador to the Holy See</i> Weizsäcker has told the Papal Nuncio that Germany's answer to the Vatican's peace feeler is contained in Hitler's speech of July 19; that Halifax's reply of July 21 confirms that Britain wanted war. (See also under "Great Britain," and "United States.")	236	318

PORTUGAL

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 July 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal</i> Transmits for information the text of a telegram from Madrid concerning a possible Spanish-Portuguese military alliance and the text of a telegram to Madrid with instructions to promote the matter.	176	224
July 30	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by the Spanish Ambassador to Portugal regarding the significance of the supplementary protocol to the Portuguese-Spanish treaty of friendship.	255	364
Aug. 21	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Summarizes the contents of a memorandum dealing with Spanish-Portuguese relations since the outbreak of war. The memorandum has been drafted by Franco for the information of the German Foreign Ministry. (See also under "Spain.")	374	521

RUMANIA

1940 June 26	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Rumanian Minister President opposes any concessions to Soviet demands going beyond a nonaggression pact. Rumania will fight rather than yield Bessarabia. The German Minister believes that Rumania is protracting the negotiations with the Soviet Union in the hope that following an early victory in the west, Germany might still be interested in keeping the Soviet Union out of the Balkans.	19	19
June 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Instructions to advise Rumania, by telephone, to yield to Soviet demands.	28	27
June 27	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Rumanian Foreign Minister on Soviet ultimatum. Fabricius argued against hopeless resistance; the Foreign Minister promised to try to persuade the King to negotiate.	29	28
June 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records questions from Rumanian Minister on German position in Bessarabian crisis and Weizsäcker's replies.	31	30
June 27	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Ambassador was informed that the Soviet Government expected a favorable reply from Rumania in the course of June 28.	32	32
June 27	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Records conversation with King Carol regarding Soviet ultimatum and message from Ribbentrop. A Crown Council would decide on Rumania's final decision.	33	33

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> In conversations with the Rumanian Government, Fabricius is to emphasize that Rumania herself is responsible for her present predicament since she had accepted the British guarantee, had vacillated between the two warring camps and missed any opportunity for a reasonable settlement with the Soviet Union; therefore Rumania had no choice but to satisfy the just demands of the Soviet Union.	34	34
June 27	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Rumanian Minister President has communicated the text of the reply to the Soviet Union; the King's initial reaction to the Soviet ultimatum has been succeeded by a more considered attitude.	36	36
[June 27]	<i>Unsigned Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry</i> The Foreign Minister instructed Fabricius to urge upon the Rumanian Government acceptance of the Soviet demands without reservations, in view of impending Soviet action reported by the Moscow Embassy.	42	42
June 28	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet Union and Rumania agree that the Rumanian note of reply constitutes acceptance of the Soviet conditions; Rumania only requests more time for the evacuation of ceded areas and asks whether Germany could at least save Cernăuți for Rumania.	44	46
June 28	<i>Note by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Fabricius has been informed that the German Ambassador in Moscow would speak with the Soviets concerning a lengthening of the time limits for the evacuation of the ceded areas by the Rumanians.	46	48
June 28	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Rumania, has informed the Soviet Union of her acceptance of Soviet occupation of the ceded territory. The Soviet Union has rejected a request for an extension of the time limits before occupation.	49	50
June 28	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The volksdeutsch groups in Bessarabia and Bucovina have been given instructions for their conduct in connection with the expected Soviet occupation.	50	51
June 28	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Rumania, having learned that Soviet territorial demands in Bucovina are greater than expected, seeks German assistance in preserving intact at least the old territory.	51	52
June 29 ✓	<i>Adolf Hitler to King Carol II of Rumania</i> Hitler rejects any suggestion of German responsibility for Rumania's plight and blames Rumania for her pro-Allied policy in the past; however, Germany still favors a peaceful solution of the present crisis.	56	58

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
June 29	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The new Rumanian Foreign Minister, Argetoianu, said that he was going to conduct a pro-Axis foreign policy; he hoped Germany and Italy would not demand further Rumanian sacrifices, but he was agreeable to a sensible settlement of Hungarian and Bulgarian wishes.	57	59
June 30	<i>Minister Killinger to the Foreign Minister</i> Reports on his visit to Rumania. King Carol sends a personal request to Hitler and Ribbentrop that they use their influence to keep Hungary and Bulgaria quiet.	67	69
July 1	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> King Carol has discussed Rumania's new political orientation and has expressed his intention to send Sidorovici to explain Rumania's policy to Hitler.	68	74
July 2	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> Refers to document No. 68 and suggests that message from the King to Hitler be transmitted through Ribbentrop. Berlin has cautioned Hungary and Bulgaria.	76	86
July 2	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits message to Hitler from King Carol conveying his desire for a close collaboration with Germany, and suggestion that Hitler send a military mission to Rumania.	80	91
July 4	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> Instructs Fabricius to ask King Carol whether he will negotiate with Hungary and Bulgaria regarding their revisionist claims, and to point out that cession of certain territories to these countries seems inevitable. The impression must not be given that Germany would play the part of the official mediator between Rumania and her neighbors.	104	116
July 6	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The King is prepared to negotiate a settlement with Hungary and Italy which will not violate the ethnic principle; Rumania hopes that her future safety will be protected by Germany.	123	137
July 7	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> Sima's request that members of the Iron Guard in Germany be permitted to return to Rumania will not be granted.	128	147
July 8	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Estimates further Soviet intentions in Rumania after occupation of Bessarabia.	130	156
July 13	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> King Carol repeats to the German armed forces Attachés his request for German military missions to Rumania.	161	200

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
July 15	<i>Adolf Hitler to King Carol II of Rumania</i> Replies to document No. 80. Emphasizes that Rumania ought to strive for a definitive settlement with her neighbors. Germany has no political interests in the Balkans and could even do without the Rumanian oil, but nevertheless she would prefer to see Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria settle the territorial problems by themselves rather than go to war against each other.	171	217
July 17	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov stated that the Soviet Union recognized Germany's paramount interests in Rumanian oil.	183	238
July 20	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department</i> King Carol had requested the OKW to send German military missions to Rumania; Hitler has decided that the Foreign Ministry is to deal with this matter through diplomatic negotiations.	196	256
July 23	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Hungarian Minister and the Italian Counselor of Embassy were told confidentially that Hitler would receive the Rumanian and Bulgarian Cabinet Ministers this week.	210	276
July 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records conversation of Ribbentrop with Rumanian Minister President Gigurtu in the presence of Rumanian Foreign Minister Manoilescu; discussion of revision of Rumanian frontiers with Hungary and Bulgaria; Rumanian request for armaments credits.	233	301
July 26	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records conversation between Hitler and Gigurtu, in the presence of Ribbentrop and Manoilescu; Rumanian requests for German military and economic assistance; revision of Rumania's frontiers; the question of a German guarantee of Rumania's frontiers.	234	307
July 29	<i>The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary</i> The German Minister in Bucharest has been instructed to advise Rumania to cede southern Dobruja, including Silistria and Balci, to Bulgaria.	253	362
July 31	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Rumanian reaction to German advice on ceding southern Dobruja to Bulgaria.	262	374
Aug. 8	<i>German-Rumanian Agreement</i> Text of agreement, signed at Bucharest, concerning the export of Rumanian grain to Germany.	315	446
Aug. 10	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Manoilescu has arranged to meet Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov for a preliminary discussion of the boundary question.	323	458
Aug. 16	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Rumanian negotiations with Hungary will start on August 16; with Bulgaria on August 19.	347	486

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Rumanian Minister stated that the Hungarian demands calling for the transfer of 2.4 million Rumanians were unacceptable and that arbitration by Hitler was the only solution.	376	524
Aug. 26	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Rumanian and Hungarian delegates who were to discuss a settlement have explained their points of view to Fabricius; the Rumanians asked whether Germany actually wanted them to hand over to Hungary 2 million Rumanians; Fabricius remained noncommittal.	396	547
Aug. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Rumanian Minister wishes to convey to the Foreign Minister that Rumania would accept either arbitration by the Axis Powers or a conference under the chairmanship of the Axis, provided Rumania could present fully her point of view.	399	552
Aug. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Rumanian Minister was informed that his Foreign Minister had been invited to come to Vienna on August 29.	402	555
Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and Manoilescu in the presence of Ciano in Vienna on August 29. Ribbentrop, supported by Ciano, asks the Rumanians to commit themselves in advance to accept the Award to be made by the Axis Powers. Manoilescu promised a reply by 12 p. m.	408	570
Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Rumanian delegate Valer Pop was received by Ribbentrop on August 29; he said he would advise the King to accept the Award unconditionally.	409	575
Aug. 30	<i>Documents on the Second Vienna Award</i> Text of the Vienna Award and Protocol; exchange of letters between Ribbentrop and the Rumanian Foreign Minister on the German guarantee of the integrity of the Rumanian territory; German-Hungarian and German-Rumanian Protocols concerning the rights of the Volksdeutsche; exchange of letters between Ribbentrop and the Rumanian Foreign Minister concerning a Rumanian-Bulgarian agreement on the Dobruja question. (See also under "Bulgaria," "Hungary," "Italy," "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and "Yugoslavia.")	413	581

SLOVAKIA

1940 June 25	<i>Memorandum by the Minister to Slovakia</i> Reviews German policy toward Slovakia and concludes that the time has now come to make it clear that Slovakia is in the German Lebensraum.	17	16
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SLOVAKIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
July 9	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Refers to reports that Bormann would like to see the German Legation in Slovakia abolished and wishes to have Wächter sent to Bratislava as German Resident-General; since this would weaken the influence of the Foreign Ministry it is suggested that Wächter be appointed Minister to Slovakia with special powers.	143	173
July 22	<i>Memorandum by the Minister to Slovakia</i> Charges that Slovakia has failed to live up to its treaty obligations and its derivative obligations in domestic affairs.	205	268
July 24	<i>The Minister in Slovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports inquiries by the Soviet Minister in Bratislava about German-Slovak relations.	217	284
July 28	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records a conversation between Hitler and Tiso; Hitler gives his views on German-Slovak collaboration.	248	345
July 29	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia</i> Instructions regarding measures to be taken to consolidate German influence in Slovakia. (See also under "Greater German Economic Sphere" and "Hungary.")	263	375

SOUTH AFRICA

1940			
Aug. 24	<i>The Consul at Lourenço Marques to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a suggestion from the Boer General, Maritz, on the means of bringing about an open struggle between the Boers and the British.	385	535

SPAIN

1940			
June 23	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by the Spanish Foreign Minister concerning French Morocco.	3	2
June 25	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Contains the German reply to Spanish memorandum, delivered on June 19, setting forth Spain's territorial desires.	16	15
July 2	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> A report on the internal political situation in Spain, particularly with reference to the position of Serrano Suñer.	87	97
July 3	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports intelligence concerning strengthening of French forces in North Africa; its effect on Spanish policy.	88	99

SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
July 3	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports information from the Spanish Minister of Interior on talks with the Portuguese regarding military collaboration against possible British landing attempts; suggests that rumors about a Spanish-Portuguese alliance be started in the neutral press.	95	105
July 8	<i>The Consul at Tetuan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with the Caliph of Spanish Morocco; alleged statements by the Spanish High Commissioner to the Caliph regarding French Morocco.	135	160
July 29	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> According to a reliable source, Serrano Suñer will soon be appointed Minister President and Foreign Minister; for this reason, his planned trip to Germany ought to be treated as very important.	250	349
Aug. 2	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain</i> Informs Stohrer of pending plans relating to German aim to achieve early entry of Spain into the war.	274	396
Aug. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador to Spain</i> Discusses the problems involved in a Spanish participation in the war.	313	442
Aug. 10	<i>Note of the High Command of the Army</i> A comprehensive report on the strength, capabilities, and attitudes of the Spanish Army.	326	461
Aug. 12	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Spain</i> Ribbentrop wants to know Spain's minimum needs in gasoline and other vital goods in case of a complete British blockade.	329	466
Aug. 15	<i>Francisco Franco to Benito Mussolini</i> States that Spanish Ambassador in Italy will transmit Spain's aspirations and claims; requests Italian solidarity in these aspirations.	346	484
Aug. 16	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits figures from the Spanish Ministry of Trade on Spanish gasoline consumption and requirements for grains, fuel, and other essentials.	355	499
Aug. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys the Spanish Foreign Minister's appraisal of intelligence regarding Britain; discussion of issues related to Spain's entry into the war.	369	514
Aug. 21	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys substance of conversation of Admiral Canaris with General Vigón regarding Spain's requirements for assistance in event of war and Franco's views on Spanish entry into the war.	373	521
Aug. 25	<i>Benito Mussolini to Francisco Franco</i> Assures Franco of full Italian solidarity with regard to the realization of Spanish aspirations.	392	542
Aug. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records information from General Thomas that Hitler had ordered the OKW to examine Spain's economic needs and to decide to what degree they could be satisfied by Germany.	404	561

SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 27	<i>Ambassador Stohrer to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> Submits for consideration a draft protocol to be concluded with Spain in the event of Spanish entry into the war. (See also under "France," "Great Britain," "Italy," and "Portugal.")	405	561

SWEDEN

1940 June 25	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Sweden</i> Transmittal of proposed text of exchange of notes, to be presented to the Swedish Foreign Minister, providing for the transit of German war materials and personnel from Germany through Sweden to Norway and the reverse.	14	13
June 25	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Minister</i> Suggests that with the satisfactory settlement of the transit question the embargo on war materials to Sweden might now be eased.	15	14
June 29	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the position of the Swedish Government on the proposed agreement on the transit of war material and personnel.	60	63
June 30	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a statement by Foreign Minister Günther regarding the proposed agreement on transit of German troops; Günther's attitude with respect to further supplementing the German forces at Narvik.	64	67
July 4	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports further statements by Foreign Minister Günther regarding the proposed agreement on transit of German troops.	110	122
July 8	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that discussions with Foreign Minister Günther on military transit traffic have been satisfactorily concluded and embodied in an exchange of notes between Günther and Schnurre.	131	157
July 8	<i>Minister Schnurre to Swedish Foreign Minister Günther</i> The text of the notes exchanged embodying the transit agreement.	132	158
July 8	<i>Minister Schnurre to Swedish Foreign Minister Günther</i> In a further exchange of notes the transit agreement is defined as permitting the daily transport of 500 German military personnel on leave from Kornsjö to Trelleborg and return.	133	159
Aug. 2	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records discussing with the Swedish Minister German-Swedish relations, the fate of Finland, and the future of Norway. (See also under "Denmark," "Norway," and "Peace Moves.")	279	403

SWITZERLAND

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 July 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Göring advocates rough treatment of Swiss in current economic negotiations, says that the Swiss must not receive any German coal until they return 90 Messerschmidt aircraft delivered by Germany during 1939-1940. Wiehl describes the aircraft question as political and doubts whether it should be included in economic negotiations.	99	110
July 9	<i>The Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission to the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Reviews the economic negotiations with the Swiss in May and June 1940; concludes that it would not be advisable to make the return by the Swiss of German military aircraft a prerequisite to the resumption by Germany of coal deliveries to Switzerland, in view of the considerable Swiss concessions to the Germans.	144	174
July 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry</i> Instructions not to request permission of the Swiss Government to re-establish an Auslandsorganisation staff in Switzerland.	180	234
July 30	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a speech by General Guisan of the Swiss Army which called for especial watchfulness in guarding against threats from outside powers to Swiss independence. Köcher proposes a protest either jointly with Italy or separately.	256	364
Aug. 8	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Swiss Minister remarked that Germany seemed to object to the slow demobilization of the Swiss Army. The State Secretary replied that the tempo of Swiss demobilization was their own affair, but that Guisan's address had impressed him unfavorably and would doubtless have a sequel.	314	445
Aug. 9	<i>The Chairman of the German Economic Delegation to the Chairman of the Swiss Economic Delegation</i> Confirms an agreement which will prevent the export of strategic goods from Switzerland to countries other than Germany and Italy.	318	451
Aug. 13	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The German and Italian Ministers have made démarches with the Swiss Government regarding Guisan's speech.	335	473
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland</i> The Swiss Federal Council denies that Guisan's speech was in any way directed at Germany. (See also under "Greater German Economic Sphere.")	397	550

TURKEY

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 29	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys intelligence on the French Army in Syria; discusses Turkish-Soviet relations; reports conversations with the Bulgarian and Hungarian Ministers in Ankara; requests instructions regarding possibility of talks with the Iraq Minister of Justice.	58	60
July 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Instructs Papen merely to observe Turkish-Soviet relations.	71	77
July 3	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits intelligence on Syria; suggests possibility of Axis discussions with the Soviet Union about a future statute for the Straits.	96	106
	<i>Editors' Note</i> German press announcement, July 4, of the forthcoming publication of a sixth German White Book.		124
July 10	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the effect of the sixth German White Book on Turkey.	148	183
July 16	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comprehensive analysis of the Turkish position in general and of Saracoglu's situation in particular as a result of the publication of the sixth German White Book.	179	230
July 20	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> As a means of drawing Turkey away from Britain, suggests that assurances and concessions be offered by the Axis and, if possible, by the Soviet Union.	198	257
July 22	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassies in Turkey and the Soviet Union</i> Conveys intelligence that the British had made soundings to the Turks about the possibility of a rapprochement of Turkey with the Soviet Union.	202	263
July 23	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the economic agreement between Germany and Turkey is about to be signed.	213	279
July 23	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Political Division VII</i> Records confidential information from the Turkish Counselor of Embassy concerning Cabinet changes which had been considered by the Turkish President and concerning territorial demands reportedly made by the Soviet Union.	214	280
Aug. 1	<i>Ambassador Papen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Summarizes the instructions given to him in a conversation with Hitler and Ribbentrop.	272	393
Aug. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the reaction of the Italian Ambassador to the German-Turkish economic agreement.	308	436

TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 16	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Turkish President in accordance with Hitler's instructions. (See also under "Greece," "Italy," "Middle East," and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	349	488

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

1940 June 23	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits statement by Molotov that a solution of the Bessarabian question can no longer be delayed, and that the Soviet claim extends to Bucovina.	4	3
June 23	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 4 and states that the Soviet Union would wait until June 25 for an official statement of the German Government.	5	4
June 24	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Weizsäcker suggests that Schulenburg be instructed to persuade the Soviets to accept negotiations with Rumania, that Rumania be urged to open negotiations with the Soviet Union immediately, and that Hungary and Bulgaria be advised to hold their peace.	8	7
June 24	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> For Hitler's information gives text of Secret Protocol of August 23, 1939; at the time, Ribbentrop stated orally German disinterestedness in Bessarabia; he recalls that Hitler had authorized him, if necessary, to declare German disinterestedness as far as the Straits.	10	10
June 24	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Sends a Tass report denying that German-Soviet relations have deteriorated.	11	11
June 24	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Believes Stalin is the author of the Tass report, and that the report is preparation for the solution of the Bessarabian problem.	12	12
[June 25]	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to tell Molotov that Germany has no interest in Bessarabia; that Bucovina is a new question in which Germany is interested because of the dense German population; that the economic needs of Germany in the rest of Rumania require peace there; and that Germany is ready to advise Rumania to reach a peaceful settlement.	13	12
June 26	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano, informed of German instructions to Schulenburg with respect to Rumania, says he will recommend a parallel Italian step.	18	18

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
June 26	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 13 and reports that instructions have been carried out; Schulenburg has the impression that the Soviet claim to Bucovina may be dropped.	20	21
June 26	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> In conversation with the Italian Ambassador, Molotov has outlined a possible agreement on the Balkans; he said the Soviet Government would recognize Italian hegemony in the Mediterranean if Italy recognized Soviet hegemony in the Black Sea.	21	22
[June 26]	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov has stated that the Soviet demand will be limited to northern Bucovina; he added that he expects German support for this demand.	25	26
June 27	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Molotov has presented Soviet demands on Rumania and has demanded an answer on June 27.	27	27
July 6	<i>Circular of the Director of the Political Department</i> Instructions to deny rumors of friction between Germany and the Soviet Union.	126	144
July 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to inform Molotov that Germany intends to evacuate the German minority from Lithuania except from the strip to be incorporated into Germany.	139	167
July 11	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the State Secretary</i> Diplomats in Moscow attribute the recent diplomatic activity of the Soviet Union to a conviction that the war will soon end; further moves are expected in the Baltic States, Turkey, and Iran.	156	195
July 13	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov states that Stalin acknowledges the obligation to cede the strip of Lithuanian territory, but hopes Germany will not insist on the cession.	162	201
July 13	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> On instructions from Stalin, Molotov gives Schulenburg a memorandum summarizing a conversation between Stalin and Cripps, in which Stalin rebuffed all efforts to separate the Soviet Union from Germany.	164	207
July 22	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Improvement noticeable in Soviet deliveries of raw materials; trouble may arise from German inability to make compensatory deliveries on time.	206	270
July 26	<i>The Acting Director of the Information and Press Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to refute Turkish claims that the French documents published by Germany were not genuine.	237	319

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
July 26	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Summarizes contents of an intercepted report by Gavrilović, Yugoslav Minister in Moscow, concerning talks with the British, French, and Turkish Ambassadors in Moscow, as well as with Molotov; Gavrilović received the impression that the Soviets did not fear the Germans and were encouraging Yugoslavia to oppose Germany.	238	321
July 29	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov asks about the recent discussions of Germany and Italy with Balkan statesmen; Schulenburg requests information.	249	349
July 29	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet Government would see that German property interests in the Baltic States were safeguarded. Henceforward such questions should be discussed in Moscow.	251	350
July 30	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Refers to document No. 249 and gives information on recent conversations with Balkan statesmen.	258	367
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Excerpt from the Halder Diary of conferences held by Hitler at the Berghof on July 31.		370
Aug. 2	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to inform Molotov that Germany wishes to know what is offered as compensation before considering the Soviet request concerning the strip of Lithuanian territory.	275	396
Aug. 6	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records conversation with Soviet Ambassador; Ribbentrop protests strongly against an article entitled "German Communists Against Dictate at Compiègne" which appeared in a Riga newspaper.	298	425
Aug. 7	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out instructions regarding Lithuanian strip; Molotov promised to consider the question of compensation.	302	429
Aug. 7	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov proposed a mixed commission for settlement of German property questions in Estonia and Latvia, and another commission for property and resettlement questions in Lithuania.	307	436
Aug. 9	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union and the Legation in Lithuania</i> The facilities granted Lithuania in the Memel Free Port Zone will be discontinued; they would lead to politically dangerous Soviet privileges on German territory.	317	450

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 13	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov proposes financial compensation for the strip of Lithuanian territory.	332	470
Aug. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The Soviet Ambassador says that the newspaper article, against which Ribbentrop protested on August 6, appeared as a result of a misunderstanding which will not be repeated.	340	477
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports received from OKW of more Soviet troop concentrations in Bessarabia and Bucovina.	389	539
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Extract from the draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner for August 26 in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff concerning an order by Hitler for strengthening forces stationed in General Government of Poland.		549
Aug. 26	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to try to secure Soviet consent for the withdrawal of a further group of Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche from Latvia and Estonia.	398	551
Aug. 30	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov submits a protest against the denial of the rights of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic in the Memel Free Port Zone.	414	587
Aug. 31	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructions to inform Molotov that, by the Vienna Award, Germany and Italy have effected a peaceful settlement of the territorial claims of Hungary against Rumania; that Bulgarian claims against Rumania are being settled by direct negotiations; that Germany and Italy have guaranteed the territory of Rumania within the new frontiers; and that Germany assumes the Soviet Government will welcome this contribution to peace. (See also under "Bulgaria," "Far East," "Finland," "Hungary," "Italy," "Middle East," "Rumania," "Turkey," "United States," and "Yugoslavia.")	415	588

UNITED STATES

1940 June 27	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Text of Hitler's interview with Von Wiegand was published in the Embassy bulletin, <i>Facts in Review</i> , in an edition of 100,000 copies; it was also printed in the <i>Congressional Record</i> .	39	39
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UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 27	<i>The Consul General at New York to the Foreign Ministry</i> A group of prominent American business and political figures have asked that the Foreign Ministry be informed that they intend to propose to Roosevelt that he 1) send an Ambassador to Berlin, 2) replace the Ambassador in London, and 3) suspend war deliveries to Britain until the new Ambassador in Berlin has had an opportunity for discussions there.	40	40
June 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The nomination of Willkie is unfortunate from the German point of view.	47	48
June 29	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Thomsen characterizes the state of United States-Soviet relations as distinctly cool, and reports comments by the Soviet Ambassador on United States policy toward the Soviet Union.	59	62
July 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the American Chargé d'Affaires in Germany</i> Replies to American note of June 18 and denies that Germany has indicated any intention to acquire territory in the Western Hemisphere; adds that the Monroe Doctrine is inadmissible unless American States refrain from intervention in European affairs.	72	78
July 3	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on the foreign policy plank of the Republican platform, on Willkie's attitude toward the platform, and on the German Embassy's efforts to influence the platform.	91	101
July 4	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses reasons why Roosevelt's prospects for re-election are thought to have declined.	108	119
July 5	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests authority to destroy financial records relating to expenditures for political purposes in the United States, as their seizure would compromise Germany's friends.	112	125
July 5	<i>The High Command of the Navy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests that a telegram be sent to Hertslet in Mexico asking for information about the report that W. R. Davis contributed \$250,000 to the Democratic party.	120	133
July 8	<i>The Legation in Mexico to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hertslet states that Davis in February 1940 gave \$160,000 to the representatives of the Pennsylvania Democratic organization in order to oppose the candidacies of Roosevelt and Senator Guffey.	134	159
July 18	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports arrangements made for distributing a speech by Senator Nye.	186	243

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 July 18	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to document No. 40 and reports on further views and activities of the group of business leaders headed by James Mooney of General Motors.	187	244
July 19	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on efforts of the Embassy to influence the Democratic National Convention.	190	250
July 20	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché gives his appraisal of Roosevelt's intentions and of Lindbergh's position.	195	254
July 21	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> An analysis of Roosevelt's speech of July 19 and of the line to be taken by Germany in reaction to it.	199	259
July 26	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in Cuba to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a memorandum by the Press Adviser of the Embassy in Washington conveying suggestions of the political commentator Fulton Lewis for a message from Hitler to Roosevelt.	230	297
July 29	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> A lengthy analysis of Roosevelt's policy toward Germany since 1933.	252	350
Aug. 5	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes the treatment of German Commercial Counselor Westrick in the press and its implications for other German representatives in the United States.	287	411
Aug. 6	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché discusses speeches by Lindbergh, General Pershing, and Senator Lucas.	288	413
Aug. 6	<i>The Director of the News Service and Press Department to the Embassy in the United States</i> Refers to document No. 230 and asks for an evaluation of Lewis.	296	424
Aug. 7	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Lists books recently published attacking Roosevelt and advocating American neutrality in the production or promotion of which the Embassy has had a part.	300	427
Aug. [7]	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on the importance of Fulton Lewis and on his suggestion of an appeal by Hitler to Roosevelt.	306	435
Aug. 8	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States</i> Asks whether the proposal to transfer destroyers to Britain is being seriously entertained by the United States Government; a German protest is being considered.	312	441

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Aug. 10	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Replies to document No. 312; Pershing is being used as a tool in advocating the transfer of destroyers to Britain; as the law stands, Congressional approval would be required and probably could not be obtained; a German protest, however, might permit opinion to be whipped up in favor of the action.	322	456
Aug. 11	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports signs of improvement in United States-Soviet relations and a stiffening of American policy toward Japan since the latter's announcement of the Greater East Asia program; trade concessions have been made to the Soviet Union in connection with the renewal of the trade treaty.	327	464
Aug. 14	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses intelligence regarding United States actions and plans for defending the Western Hemisphere.	342	479
Aug. 18	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses United States-Canadian defense talks; the British offer of bases for destroyers; the prospects regarding a declaration of war on Germany.	362	507
Aug. 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> A confidential informant states that Ambassador Kennedy threatened to resign over the sending of an American military mission to Britain, since he considers that any prospective American aid would come too late anyway.	364	510
Aug. 23	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Soviet Ambassador on current United States-Soviet relations. (See also under "Far East," "Great Britain," "Italy," "Latin America," and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	379	527

YUGOSLAVIA

1940 June 24	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> At Ribbentrop's direction, von Heeren, German Minister in Belgrade, is instructed to inform the Yugoslav Government and Prince Regent that the German Foreign Ministry had reports that the life of former Minister President Stojadinović was in danger and that plans were on foot to assassinate him; it is suggested that von Heeren get in touch with his Italian colleague who is proceeding along same lines.	7	6
June 28 ✓	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Yugoslav Minister expressed the hope that in view of the Rumanian crisis, Germany would advise Hungary and Bulgaria to keep peace; Weizsäcker replied evasively.	52	53

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
July 5	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Points out that Cvetković-Maček Government came into power entirely owing to internal politics and that a pro-Axis orientation of foreign policy was taken as a matter of course by it as well as by the preceding Government. While not wishing to offend Germany, owing to Yugoslavia's complete economic dependence, Francophile sentiment of important segments of the population required the Government to avoid offending the Western Powers and dictated a neutrality policy.	121	133
July 23	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the arrival of the new Soviet Minister in Belgrade has stimulated pro-Russian and pro-Communist circles as well as Francophiles who are convinced that a Soviet-German conflict sooner or later is inevitable and would ease the situation for the Balkans in general and Yugoslavia in particular.	215	282
July 26	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Yugoslav Foreign Minister expressed his serious concern over Yugoslav-Italian relations.	232	300
Aug. 26	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Prince Regent on Yugoslav relations with Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy. (See also under "Greece," "Hungary," "Italy," and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.")	395	546

No. 1

365/206113

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1191 of June 23

ROME, June 23, 1940—2:55 p. m.

Received June 23—3:05 p. m.

For the Minister personally.

The French Armistice Commission, which Ciano, as he told me this morning, was expecting at about 11 a. m., but which will arrive at 1 p. m. at the earliest according to reports received since then, will be quartered in the private Villa Manzini situated just north of Rome on the Via Cassia. The conferences will be held at Villa Incisa near La Storta, likewise on the Via Cassia about 18 kilometers north of Rome, so that, as the landing field is also outside and north of the city, the Commission will not touch Rome itself.

Ciano did not seem to be certain that the signature would take place today.¹

He expressed himself in terms of the highest satisfaction regarding the official ceremony at Compiègne, which in its matchless dignity and its grandiose display of a spirit of conciliation based on the highest sense of responsibility and its preamble with its great historic implications showed once again that the Führer is not only a very great general but also that he is an unexcelled master in dealing with people. He could not sufficiently admire—and here he repeated what he had

¹In a memorandum of a telephone conversation held on June 24, Senior Counselor Hewel noted:

"After consulting with the Reich Foreign Minister and General Jodl I informed Ambassador von Mackensen in Rome as follows today at 2:00 p. m. by telephone:

"In order to prevent misunderstandings from arising in fixing the time of the truce, the time when Ambassador von Mackensen is informed by the Italian Government that the Italian-French armistice pact has been signed shall be considered as the basis for the truce. Consequently the armistice will enter into force 6 hours after Ambassador von Mackensen has been told of the signature. Ambassador Mackensen is requested to get in touch with Ciano and the negotiating delegations in the question and inform them of the above.

"After fixing the time Ambassador von Mackensen will bring it directly to the knowledge of the Reich Foreign Minister, who in turn will notify the OKW. For safety's sake the time will also be communicated to the OKW directly by radio from Rome.

"The intention is for the German and Italian High Commands to inform the French Government if possible simultaneously of the time when the truce is to begin.'" 365/206126)

The Ambassador in Italy reported in telegram No. 1202 of June 24, 7:55 p. m., that he had been informed by Ciano that the Italian-French armistice had been signed at 7:35 p. m. (365/206130).

already told me in the Special Train on the return from Munich—the greatness of soul and the generosity with which the Führer, who to a greater extent than anyone in the past had all the power in his hands to decide matters without restriction entirely as he wished, dispassionately permitted only very large, historical considerations to be the determining factor in his decisions so as to build on a really long-term basis.

MACKENSEN

No. 2

B15/B002531

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 2051 of June 23

MADRID, June 23, 1940.

Received June 23—9:40 p. m.

The Spanish Foreign Minister ¹ requests advice with regard to the treatment of the Duke and Duchess of Windsor who were to arrive in Madrid today, apparently in order to return to England by way of Lisbon. The Foreign Minister assumes from certain impressions which General Vigón had received in Germany ² that we might perhaps be interested in detaining the Duke of Windsor here and possibly in establishing contact with him.

Please telegraph instructions.

STOHRER

¹ Col. Juan Belgbeder y Atienza.

² The Spanish General, Juan Vigón, had been sent on June 10 as a bearer of a letter from Franco to Hitler and had been received by Hitler and the Foreign Minister on June 16. See vol. ix, documents Nos. 378 and 456.

No. 3

77/58159

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 2052 of June 23

MADRID, June 23, 1940.

Received June 23—10:15 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2037 of June 22.¹

The Foreign Minister told me that the Spanish démarche with regard to French Morocco, etc., had been very well received in Berlin.

¹ This telegram (77/58156), which referred to the memorandum on Spanish territorial claims in Africa presented to Welzsäcker on June 19 (see vol. ix, document No. 488), reads as follows: "Would appreciate being told whether and, possibly, what answer was given the Spanish Ambassador on his démarche about Morocco, etc. From statements in Spanish Air Ministry circles one could infer that the answer was a refusal or at least of a delaying nature." See document No. 16.

Overland communications with Germany, soon to be reopened, were opening up favorable opportunities for bringing war material to Spain for the purposes contemplated. It was the intention, circumstances permitting, to send General Vigón to Berlin again in this matter.

The Minister added that because of the transfer of rather large French air formations to North Africa, the Spanish operation could not be carried out at the present time.

STOHRER

No. 4

103/112240-41

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1205 of June 23

Moscow, June 23, 1940—9:26 p. m.

Received June 23—11:20 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1065 of June 22¹ and my telegram No. 1195 of June 21.²

Molotov made the following statement to me today: The solution of the Bessarabian question brooked no further delay. The Soviet Government was still striving for a peaceful solution, but it was determined to use force, should the Rumanian Government decline a peaceful agreement. The Soviet claim likewise extended to Bucovina, which had a Ukrainian population.

As justification Molotov declared that, although a long time had elapsed since his declaration before the Supreme Soviet, Rumania had done nothing to bring about a solution of the Bessarabian problem.³ Therefore, something would have to be done now.

¹ Not printed (380/210501). This telegram stated that the Legation in Rumania denied reports of Soviet-Rumanian negotiations regarding the cession of Bessarabia or of a Soviet demand that Rumanian delegates come to Moscow to discuss the matter.

² Vol. IX, document No. 520.

³ Molotov's speech of Mar. 29, 1940, before the Supreme Soviet had contained the following passage on Bessarabia:

"Of the southern neighbouring States I have mentioned, Rumania is one with which we have no pact of non-aggression. This is due to the existence of an unsettled dispute, the question of Bessarabia, whose seizure by Rumania the Soviet Union has never recognized although we have never raised the question of recovering Bessarabia by military means. Hence there are no grounds for any deterioration in Soviet-Rumanian relations. True, it is now some time since we have had a minister in Rumania and his duties are being performed by a chargé d'affaires. But this is due to certain specific circumstances of the recent past.

"If we are to deal with this question we must recall the dubious role played by the Rumanian authorities in 1938 in relation to Butenko, who was the Soviet acting minister in Rumania. It is well known that later in some mysterious way he disappeared not only from the legation but from Rumania, and to this day the Soviet Government has been unable to obtain any authentic information about

I stated to Molotov that this decision of the Soviet Government had not been expected by me. I had been of the opinion that the Soviet Government would maintain its claims to Bessarabia—not contested by us—but would not itself take the initiative toward their realization. I feared that difficulties in the foreign relations of Rumania, which was at present supplying us with very large amounts of essential military and civilian raw materials, would lead to a serious encroachment on German interests. I told Molotov that I would report to my Government at once, and I requested him not to take any decisive steps before my Government had taken a stand concerning the intentions of the Soviet Government.

Molotov promised to inform the Soviet Government of my request but emphasized expressly that the matter was extremely urgent. Molotov added that the Soviet Government expected Germany not to hinder but to support the Soviets in their action. The Soviet Government on its part would do everything to safeguard German interests in Rumania.

Accordingly, I request immediate instruction by wire.⁴ I take the liberty of calling attention to the numerous Volksdeutsche residing in Bessarabia and Bucovina for whom provision of some sort will have to be made.

SCHULENBURG

Footnote (8)—Continued

his disappearance, and what is more, we are expected to believe that the Rumanian authorities had nothing to do with this scandalous and criminal affair. Needless to say things like this should not happen in a civilized State or in any well-ordered country for that matter. After this the reason for the delay in appointing a Soviet minister to Rumania will be clear. It is to be assumed, however, that Rumania will understand that such things cannot be tolerated." *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, selected and edited by Jane Degras (London, 1953), vol. III, pp. 447-448.

⁴ See document No. 18.

No. 5

459/224877

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, June 23, 1940—11:57 p. m.

No. 1208 of June 23

Received June 24—2:00 a. m.

For the Reich Minister personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 1205 of June 23.¹

Referring to our conversation of today regarding Bessarabia, Molotov just sent me word that the Soviet Government would wait until and including June 25th for the German Government's stand in the matter.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 4.

No. 6

216/147559-60

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 614 of June 24

Tokyo, June 24, 1940—10:10 a. m.

Received June 25—2:30 a. m.

I. General Muto, the head of the central division of the Ministry of War, informed the Military Attaché that the Japanese Army would welcome Germany's readiness to undertake, if necessary, the role of mediator in the already initiated discussions concerning a settlement between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek, in order to end the conflict in China in a manner acceptable to Japan.¹ The General declared further that for this reason Japan was also very much interested in Indochina. The Military Attaché promised to pass the matter on and in that connection brought up the question of Russia's attitude toward such developments. The General replied that the Japanese Army considered an adjustment with Russia necessary. General Muto's inquiry is, according to Japanese custom, to be considered an official move by the Army.

II. In the course of a discussion to which he invited me, General Koiso, the Colonial Minister, inquired regarding Germany's attitude toward Japanese military action in Indochina and parts of the Netherlands Indies. I called attention to the well-known statement of the Reich Government according to which Germany was not interested in the Netherlands Indies question and added that we would probably also have nothing against Japanese action in Indochina, provided Japan pledged herself to keep America occupied in the Pacific area, possibly by promising to attack the Philippines and Hawaii in case America should enter the war against Germany. The Colonial Minister replied that he would like very much to pursue this idea further. In regard to a possible Japanese nonaggression pact with Russia, the Minister was of the opinion that Russia would in return probably demand of Japan certain territorial concessions in the provinces of northwestern China and Outer Mongolia; this matter might be discussed. The Minister conceded that an agreement with Russia and the realization of the Japanese colonial aspirations in Indochina and the Netherlands Indies would not only gradually make Japan economically independent of America, but also give the expected Konoye government a promising point of departure for an

¹ In telegram No. 585 of July 16 (111/116274) the Embassy in Japan was instructed to treat the proposal in a dilatory fashion and to maintain complete reserve in connection with the question. The Chargé d'Affaires in Shanghai was at the same time instructed to take a similar attitude in case such a proposal were made to him.

adjustment with Chiang Kai-shek. I have the impression that the ambitious Colonial Minister wished by this consultation to qualify for the next cabinet.²

III. Ambassador Shiratori, who is being mentioned more and more frequently as the future Foreign Minister, also advocated a nonaggression pact with Russia in yesterday's *Yomiuri* interview.

IV. The resignation today of Prince Konoye as President of the Privy Council characterizes the continuing domestic development, the goal of which is the formation of a new government and a new coalition party under Konoye. Since the leading personalities of the Konoye group obviously wish to get in touch with me, I request authorization confidentially to discuss with them the ideas of Muto and Koiso in order to determine what forces are behind them and what possibilities they might offer. My impression thus far is that there is now a possibility of forming a Pacific bloc composed of Japan, Chiang Kai-shek China, and Russia, in alignment with Germany; this bloc could keep America occupied in the Pacific area and paralyze her freedom of action in regard to Europe.

OTT

² In telegram No. 530 of June 27 (216/147561) Ott was instructed as follows: "Re II: In your discussions please do not go beyond the declaration of May 22 (telegram No. 412 of May 20) according to which 'Germany is in no way interested in having anything to do with overseas problems in which she considers herself disinterested, as heretofore'; remain noncommittal also in the discussions regarding Japanese colonial aspirations with reference to the Netherlands Indies." Cf. vol. ix, document No. 280.

No. 7

230/152257

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 479

BERLIN, June 24, 1940.

At the direction of the Foreign Minister, I told Herr von Heeren the following by telephone at 1:45 p. m.:

We had reports that the life of Stojadinović was seriously threatened¹ and that there were plans to assassinate him.² Herr von Heeren was hereby instructed to call on the Government, as well as on Prince Regent Paul, and by direction of the Foreign Minister to tell them both the following:

Because of the well-known pro-Axis activities of Stojadinović in recent years, the report, if accurate, would be received very badly as

¹ See vol. ix, document No. 140.

² According to *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for June 25, 1940, this information came from the Italian diplomatic representative and it was Ciano himself who "solicited and obtained German intervention to save the life of Stojadinović."

an indication of an extremely unfriendly attitude and cause extreme astonishment, particularly at the present moment.

Herr von Heeren might, moreover, get in touch with his Italian colleague, who is making a similar démarche.

Herr von Heeren was requested to report here by telephone as soon as possible the carrying out of these instructions, the time of his démarche, and the success it met with.³

WEIZSÄCKER

³ Counselor Siegfried of the State Secretary's secretariat recorded in a supplement to this memorandum that at 7:20 and again at 7:35 he urgently requested by telephone that Heeren, who so far had been unable to see the Foreign Minister, carry out the démarche (230/152258). Later that day Weizsäcker informed the Foreign Minister that Heeren had reported at 9:30 p. m. that he had seen Cincar-Marković who had promised to take all the necessary measures to comply with the German demand (230/152259-60). Finally, on June 25 Heeren reported in telegram No. 506 that he had made similar representations with the Prince Regent. Prince Paul then denied most emphatically that Stojadinović had been in any danger of being assassinated (230/152263-64).

No. 8

2819/485381-84

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister

Telegram en clair¹

URGENT AND PRIORITY

BERLIN, June 24, 1940.

To Baumschule² for the Foreign Minister.

With reference to telegrams Nos. 1205³ and 1208⁴ from Moscow.

I call your attention in addition to the following viewpoints: The important thing in regard to the conversation initiated by Molotov, in my opinion, is to get direct negotiations started between Bucharest and Moscow while not committing ourselves on the question itself. Probably the Russians themselves also prefer the path of peace to the use of force.

Specifically it should be stated:

1) *For Moscow:*⁵

With regard to the matter itself it is already known to the Russians that we agree to their demand for Bessarabia; however, there has been no discussion of Bucovina thus far. It is likewise known to the Soviet Union how important we consider the preservation of peace in the Balkans. ~~In accordance with instructions this has been exactly communicated to Molotov by Count Schulenburg.~~⁶

¹ This copy bears a handwritten notation "To *Wolfsschlucht*" (code name for Hitler's Field Headquarters).

² Code name for the Foreign Minister's office during the campaign in the west.

³ Document No. 4.

⁴ Document No. 5.

⁵ Cf. document No. 13.

⁶ The words scored through were deleted before the telegram was sent.

In the question of procedure ~~we ought to get the Russians to the point where they start negotiating with the Rumanians. With reference to Molotov's remark that now as before the Soviet Union desired a peaceful solution~~ Molotov could be told that we knew that Rumania was in principle prepared for negotiations. We could, if desired, offer that we on our part would induce Rumania to send a plenipotentiary at once. At the same time we would not assume responsibility for the actual settlement either toward the Soviet Union or toward Rumania.

According to telegram No. 1205, Molotov promised Count Schulenburg that the Soviet Union would do everything it could to protect German interests in Rumania. On this point our wishes could be expressed as follows:

- a) In Bessarabia, no crossing of the Prut sector and the Lower Danube, since our petroleum interests would thereby be threatened;
- b) General promise of protection for Reich German rights and interests;
- c) Promise of protection for volksdeutsch interests according to a procedure still to be established; ⁷
- d) In case of an armed conflict, protection of the petroleum region (no air attacks).

2) *For Bucharest:*

Telegraphic instructions to the Legation at Bucharest, with reference to the recent events, particularly to telegrams 956 and 957,⁸ as well as telegraphic instruction 644 of June 1⁹ (instruction RAM No. 3 from Special Train in reply to the statement of the Rumanian Minister President ¹⁰). We see from reports from Bucharest that the Rumanian Government also has received reports of Russian troop movements at the border of Bessarabia and Bucovina. Urgent reports of like purport have also been received here today. We have learned with regret from the statement of the Rumanian Minister President that was transmitted by telegram 957, that, contrary to the advice we had repeatedly given since December of last year, the Rumanian Government was apparently not aware of the gravity of the situation and was at least in part counting on our help against Soviet Russia's wishes. We could only give the Rumanian Government the urgent advice to contact the Soviet Government at once, and do this today, for the purpose of effecting a peaceful settlement of the prob-

⁷ This sentence was amended from an earlier version which read: "Promise of protection for the volksdeutsch group in conformity with the procedure applied to eastern Poland."

⁸ Vol. ix, documents Nos. 515 and 516.

⁹ Vol. ix, document No. 364.

¹⁰ George Tatarescu.

lems. In case of a peaceful settlement between Bucharest and Moscow we thought it was certain that Bulgaria and Hungary would not take advantage of the present moment to assert their familiar claims against Rumania by force.

3) Immediate demand on Hungary¹¹ and Bulgaria¹² that in the event of an immediate peaceful or violent solution of the Bessarabian question they continue to hold their peace. In this connection reference [ought to be made] to previous conversations. With respect to Hungary, also to Hungarian promises made at the meeting in Venice between Csáky and Ciano.¹³ At the same time general declaration of good will toward the national aspirations of Hungary and Bulgaria.

4) In view of the short time limit, a prior, thorough discussion of these questions with Italy no longer seems possible unless through direct telephone conversations from where you are. Otherwise immediate announcement to the Italian Government¹⁴ of our instructions to Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest, and Moscow, with the request that it proceed similarly.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹¹ Cf. document No. 38.

¹² Cf. document No. 37.

¹³ See vol. VIII, document No. 576, footnote 2.

¹⁴ In telegram No. 6 sent by telephone from Baumschule to Rome on June 25 (459/224880-81) the contents of Schulenburg's telegram No. 1206 of June 23 and Ribbentrop's telegram No. 1074 of June 25 were summarized, and Mackensen was instructed to ask Ciano "whether he likewise had been informed by the Russians in the above sense, and if so what position the Italian Government intended to take." See document No. 18.

No. 9

136/74207

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

No. 1

BAUMSCHULE, June 24, 1940.

Is it possible in the first place to detain the Duke and Duchess of Windsor for a couple of weeks in Spain before they are granted an exit visa? It would be necessary at all events to be sure that it did not appear in any way that the suggestion came from Germany. Please telegraph your answer.¹

Germany has no interest in a refusal of an entry permit for Titulescu, who could in any event remain in unoccupied French territory.

RIBBENTROP

¹ In telegram No. 2088 of June 25, sent on June 26 (B15/B002533), Stohrer replied: "The Foreign Minister promised me to do everything possible to detain Windsor here for a time."

No. 10

F19/179-181

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

BAUMSCHULE, June 24, 1940.

Note for the Führer.

The Secret Additional Protocol of August 23, 1939, reads as follows:

On the occasion of the signature of the Non-Aggression Treaty between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the two Parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the delimitation of their respective spheres of interest in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following result:

1. In the event of a territorial and political transformation in the territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) the northern frontier of Lithuania shall represent the frontier of the spheres of interest both of Germany and the USSR. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna territory is recognized by both Parties.

2. In the event of a territorial and political transformation of the territories belonging to the Polish State, the spheres of interest of both Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula, and San.

The question whether the interests of both Parties make the maintenance of an independent Polish State appear desirable and how the frontiers of this State should be drawn can be definitely determined only in the course of further political developments.

In any case both Governments¹ will resolve this question by means of a friendly understanding.

3. With regard to Southeastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares complete political *désintéressement* in these territories.

4. This Protocol will be treated by both Parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of
the German Reich:
VON RIBBENTROP

With full power of the
Government of the USSR:
V. MOLOTOV

As far as I can remember, the following took place at that time:

At the time of the delimitation of the mutual spheres of interest in Eastern Europe, the Soviets stressed their interest in Bessarabia when the Southeast of Europe was mentioned. On this occasion I stated orally our disinterestedness in the Bessarabian question. However, in order not to put down explicitly *in written form* the recognition of the Russian claim to Bessarabia because of the possibility of indiscretions, with which we had to count in view of the then still

¹ The protocol as signed reads "Regierungen," but the copy here, evidently because of a typist's mistake, reads "Erklärungen." See vol. VII, document No. 229.

very vague German-Russian relationship, I chose a formulation of a *general nature* for the Protocol. This was done in such a way that when the Southeastern European problems were discussed I declared very generally that Germany was *politically* disinterested in "these areas," i. e., in the Southeast of Europe. The economic interest of Germany in these Southeastern European territories was duly stressed by me. This was in accordance with the general instructions given by the Führer for Southeastern Europe and also, as I recall it, with a special directive² of the Führer which I received before my departure for Moscow, in which the Führer authorized me to declare German disinterestedness in the territories of Southeastern Europe, even, if necessary, as far as Constantinople and the Straits. However, the latter were not discussed.

R[IBBENTROP]

² Not found.

No. 11

103/112244-45

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

No. 1212 of June 24

Moscow, June 24, 1940—6:50 p. m.

Received June 25—1:00 a. m.

The following information was published by Tass in the Soviet press of June 23, and previously broadcast over the radio on June 22:

"In connection with the entry of Soviet troops in the Baltic countries, rumors recently have increasingly been spread to the effect that 100 to 150 divisions have been concentrated at the Lithuanian-German border, that this concentration of Soviet troops was due to the Soviet Union's dissatisfaction with Germany's successes in the west, and that this revealed a deterioration in Soviet-German relations, and is designed to exert pressure on Germany. Lately, various versions of these rumors are being repeated almost daily in the American, Japanese, English, French, Turkish, and Swedish press.

"Tass is authorized to state that all these rumors, the absurdity of which is obvious anyway, by no means correspond to the truth. In the Baltic countries there are actually neither 100 nor 150 divisions, but altogether no more than 18 to 20 divisions, and these divisions are not concentrated at the Lithuanian-German border but in the various districts of the three Baltic Republics, and their purpose is not to exert 'pressure' on Germany but to provide a guarantee for the execution of the mutual assistance pacts between the USSR and these countries.

"Responsible Soviet circles are of the opinion that the spreading of these absurd rumors aims particularly at clouding Soviet-German relations. These gentlemen, however, pass off their secret wishes as reality. Apparently they are incapable of grasping the obvious fact that the good neighborly relations, resulting from the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact between the USSR and Germany, cannot be

shaken by any rumors or petty poisonous propaganda, because these relations are not based on motives of opportunism but on the fundamental interests of the USSR and Germany."

SCHULENBURG

No. 12

103/112246

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1213 of June 24

Moscow, June 24, 1940—6:49 p. m.

Received June 24—8:45 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1212 of June 24.¹

After the conclusion of our conversation of yesterday concerning Bessarabia (cf. telegram No. 1212 [1205?] of June 23²) Molotov, with obvious complacency, brought up the Tass communiqué of June 22, whereupon I expressed my appreciation.

I infer from the wording of the communiqué that Stalin himself is the author. The refutation of numerous rumors now circulating concerning differences between Germany and the Soviet Union and concerning troop concentrations in connection with Soviet operations in the Baltic region, and the unequivocal clarification of German-Soviet relations ought to be altogether to our advantage at this important juncture. However, the further aim of the communiqué, to emphasize German-Soviet solidarity as a preparation for the solution of the Bessarabian problem, is just as plain.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 11.

² Document No. 4.

No. 13

175/137012-13

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[JUNE 25, 1950—6:00 p. m.]¹

No. 1074 of June 25

[Transmitted by telephone.]

For the Ambassador personally.

Please call on M. Molotov and state the following:

1. Germany is abiding by the Moscow agreements. She takes, therefore, no interest in the Bessarabian question. In this territory live approximately 100,000 Volksdeutsche. Germany is naturally interested in the fate of these Volksdeutsche and expects their future

¹ The information in brackets is taken from another copy (380/210475-76).

to be safeguarded. The Reich Government reserves the right to make certain proposals to the Soviet Government at the appropriate time concerning the question of resettling these Volksdeutsche in the same manner as the Volksdeutsche in Volhynia.

2. The claim of the Soviet Government to Bucovina is something new. Bucovina was formerly an Austrian crown province and is densely populated with Germans. Germany is also particularly interested in the fate of these Volksdeutsche.

3. In the rest of Rumania Germany has very important [*stärkste*] economic interests. These interests include oil fields as well as agricultural land. Germany is, therefore, as we have repeatedly informed the Soviet Government, extremely interested in preventing these areas from becoming a theater of war.

4. Although fully sympathetic toward the idea of settling the Bessarabian problem, the Reich Government is, therefore, of the opinion that the Soviet Union should act in the spirit of the Moscow agreements and do everything in order to reach a peaceful solution of the Bessarabian question with the Rumanian Government. For its part the Reich Government would be prepared, in the spirit of the Moscow agreements, to advise Rumania, if necessary, to reach a peaceful settlement of the Bessarabian question in accordance with Russian views.

Please point out again clearly to M. Molotov our great interest in Rumania's not becoming a theater of war. As matters stand, we are of the opinion that a peaceful settlement in accordance with Russian views is altogether possible, provided the problem is properly handled. We should be grateful to the Soviet Government for a communication concerning its ideas as to further treatment of the matter.²

RIBBENTROP³

² See document No. 20.

³ On June 26 the texts of Schulenburg's telegram No. 1205 (document No. 4) and this telegram were sent as telegram No. 738 to the Legation in Rumania, with the following instruction by Ribbentrop to the Minister there: "I inform you of this exchange of telegrams exclusively for your own personal and strictly confidential information. If you are spoken to on the matter there, please be completely noncommittal and notify [us]." (459/224886-88)

No. 14

205/142449-50

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation
in Sweden*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 734

BERLIN, June 25, 1940.

zu W V 2377.¹

With reference to the conversations of the State Secretary with the Swedish Minister here,² regarding which the Legation has been in-

¹ W V 2377: Not found.

² See vol. IX, document No. 486.

formed by telephone, I would ask that, if possible, tomorrow, June 26, you attend to the following exchange of notes with the Swedish Foreign Minister:

"I have the honor to confirm to you that agreement has been reached on the following between the German Government and the Royal Swedish Government:

"1) The Royal Swedish Government is prepared to permit without restriction the transit of shipments of the German Wehrmacht consisting of goods of all kinds (Wehrmacht property), including war material, from Germany or the areas in Denmark and Norway occupied by Germany through Swedish territory to Norwegian destinations, as well as in the opposite direction.

"2) In so far as goods are concerned for which, according to Swedish regulations, a transit permit is required, the German Government will, in each case, in compliance with the usual formalities, notify the Swedish Government of the shipment in advance in order to ensure prompt transit.

"3) The Royal Swedish Government is prepared to permit the transportation of members of the German Wehrmacht in uniform across Swedish territory between the points mentioned under 1), both as individual travelers and in the form of group transports.

"4) Such individual conferences as may still be necessary to carry out the above arrangements will be started at once between the German Legation in Stockholm, with the possible participation of the Wehrmacht Attachés on the one hand, and the competent Swedish authorities on the other.

"5) The individual questions that may arise in the future in the execution of this agreement will in each case be settled in the same manner with the competent Swedish authorities.

"Complimentary close."

Please make telegraphic report.³ Text of the communications made to the State Secretary by the Swedish Minister after his return from Stockholm will follow in a special telegram.⁴

WIEHL

³ See document No. 60.

⁴ Telegram No. 735 to Stockholm of June 25, (205/142451-52) reproduced the account of Richert's communication of June 19 given in Welzsäcker's memorandum of that date, vol. IX, document No. 486.

No. 15

319/192686-87

The Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Minister

Teletype to Baumschule

BERLIN, June 25, 1940.

e. o. W 3218 g.

1) In connection with the negotiations with Sweden concerning transit of war material to Narvik, at the beginning of May there was imposed an embargo on the export of war material to Sweden. By

direction of the Foreign Minister Swedish requests in connection with negotiations on this matter were to be treated dilatorily.¹

2) Since the transit question has now been settled in accordance with our wishes and the economic discussions with Sweden are to be resumed on June 26, a new decision is required on the war material question also, as it may be expected that it will be brought up for discussion by the Swedish side.

3) There is involved a program of deliveries already contracted amounting to a value of approximately 48 million reichsmarks, which includes principally some 300 pieces of flak of various kinds, as well as ammunition and accessories, 750 airplanes of various types, 90 armored vehicles, some 3000 light machine guns and a large quantity of miscellaneous accessories. A considerable part of the deliveries is already due. It is not necessary for us to make a decision immediately concerning the whole of the projected program. It would be sufficient at first to resume the deliveries of war material in the amounts considered advisable by the military authorities.

4) Entirely apart from the very accommodating attitude which the Swedish Government showed in the last economic negotiations, a resumption of our deliveries of war material to Sweden is especially desirable because the income to be expected as a result of the deliveries of war material is essential in order to finance the German imports of ore and other urgently needed raw materials from Sweden.

To be submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister with the request for a decision. The question is urgent in view of the beginning of economic negotiations on June 26.²

¹ See vol. ix, document No. 202, footnote 1.

² In a memorandum of July 5 van Scherpenberg, an official of the Economic Policy Department, recorded:

"On June 27 Senior Counselor Kordt informed me by telephone that there was now a decision of the Führer to the effect that the export of war material to Sweden in accordance with the proposal contained in the memorandum of the Foreign Ministry could be permitted once more to the extent that the military authorities considered it advisable." (205/142467)

No. 16

790/272514

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, June 25, 1940.

St.S. No. 481

I asked the Spanish Ambassador¹ to see me today and, as instructed, told him the following in reply to his memorandum delivered to me on June 19:²

¹ Antonio Magas y Pers.

² See vol. ix, document No. 488.

"The German Government has taken cognizance of Spain's territorial desires with regard to North Africa. The Reich Government welcomes most warmly the Spanish attitude that after suitable preparation of public opinion, Spain is ready, if need be, to enter the war. As far as Spain's desires for assistance with military equipment in this event are concerned, Germany will at the proper time give them most sympathetic consideration. As soon as the further military situation after conclusion of the French armistice can be ascertained, the Reich Government will again consult the Spanish Government."

The Ambassador took notes on what was said. In reply to a question from him as to our attitude toward the Spanish claims, I simply referred him to the text which I had just communicated to him.^a

WEIZSÄCKER

^a Typewritten marginal note: "Political Department: I recommend that the text of the statement to Magaz be sent to Stohrer." Woermann sent the text to the Embassies in Spain and Italy in telegrams of June 25 (77/68157-58).

No. 17

371/208111-13

Memorandum by the Minister to Slovakia

BERLIN, June 25, 1940.

1. On about June 1, 1939, the Foreign Minister gave me the following instructions for my future activity in Slovakia:

- a. to avoid too much activity;
- b. not to interfere in the Slovak-Hungarian disputes;
- c. to strengthen German influence.

2. When I was sent to Slovakia 8 weeks later, I found on my arrival a country which (apart from the protected zone¹) had been allowed to retain complete independence in the political and economic field—a country with which Germany *was negotiating* as with any other country.

Slovakia was the calling card that we were holding out to the small countries of Southeastern Europe and particularly the Slavic peoples: This is how independently a small country can live that places itself under the protection of the Greater German Reich. It was clear that there was a time limit to this "holding out of the calling card", depending on developments in the political situation in Europe.

3. First, however, in my "activity" in all *negotiations* with the Slovak Government, I had to be discreetly mindful that this calling card remained clean. This I succeeded in accomplishing for the critical period up to April of this year without in any way neglecting the vital

¹ See vol. VI, document No. 40.

demands of Germany (connected with the war) : the protective zone treaty; the war against Poland; the war economy treaty; ² shipments of laborers; ³ the financing through the Slovak National Bank of our huge armaments orders in Slovakia and the transfer of the money of the laborers sent to Germany; ⁴ the placing at our disposal of the entire press and radio for purposes of German propaganda, etc.

If I except Slovak participation in the Polish campaign, which is the exclusive achievement of Tiso and Tuka, I must state that in all these negotiations Minister Durčanský and Karvas, the Governor of the Slovak National Bank (Freemason and Czechoslovak), were the only parties with whom it was possible to negotiate at all.

4. It would not be in keeping with the Slavic mentality if these men had not used their recognition of Germany's essential military demands as an alibi for pursuing in a thousand other matters a policy which must ultimately come in conflict with stark German reality. All these problems for the time being, however, had to be regarded as questions of secondary importance and therefore deferred. Only political exigencies, not sentiment, could receive consideration here. In recording these irregularities, which was all that could be done for the time being, the list of Durčanský's sins, to be sure, grew larger and larger, until I adopted this view with respect to him: If the war were to last many years more, Durčanský must disappear immediately. Since the war will be a short one, however, we can wait before removing him from power until our victory is certain. Until then he can do no irreparable damage.

5. I do not need to go into the Slovak-Hungarian disputes in this connection.

6. To strengthen German influence it was necessarily my first task, in view of Slovak mentality, clearly to establish the special position of the German Legation and the Chief of Mission in the one state under protection. After eliminating certain other secondary connections which still exist between the Reich and this country, I succeeded in doing this. I believe there is no doubt on this score among the Volksdeutsche, the Reich Germans (Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP), the various German Missions, and the German generals of the military missions, or of the protected zone. The same is true of the Slovak Government and the Slovak people, as well as of the chiefs of the

² A German-Slovak treaty on "the exploitation of war economy enterprises in Slovakia for the purposes of German war economy," together with an additional protocol was signed on Jan. 30, 1940 (2871/563922-31).

³ An agreement permitting Germany to engage Slovak labor for work in Germany was signed on Dec. 8, 1939 (9448/E666781-803).

⁴ This was one of a number of economic questions settled in a joint session of the German and Slovak Government Committees held June 9-22, 1940, in Bratislava; a protocol was signed by the two chairmen of the Committees on June 22, 1940 (2906/565965-76).

foreign missions; of these the Italian, Hungarian, and Rumanian Chiefs of Mission call on me fairly regularly to discuss matters and obtain information. The Russian Minister, too, thus far seems inclined to consider the special position of the German Minister.

With regard to an actual strengthening of German influence I refer to point 3, in which connection it is a fact that the general situation and political exigencies have thus far placed certain limits on such a strengthening of German influence.

7. On April 9 and May 10 a new chapter also began in German-Slovak relations. The new political situation permits us to withdraw our calling card, which we have been holding out for so long that it has become known. The time has now come to make it perfectly plain once again, particularly with reference to the countries of southeastern Europe, that Slovakia is in our Lebensraum, that is, that our wishes alone count.

BERNARD

No. 18

175/187014

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, June 26, 1940—12:10 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 26—1:00 a. m.

No. 1213 of June 25

With reference to telegram No. 6 of June 24 from the Special Train.¹

Ciano told me that he had no direct information whatever about Russian intentions. From his first conversation with Molotov some time ago, Rosso had not got the impression that immediate action was imminent.² Ciano listened with great interest to what I told him on the basis of the above-mentioned telegraphic instruction about the Molotov-Schulenburg conversation of June 23 and about the instructions sent to Count Schulenburg. He remarked that he did not see any reason why the Italians should not also suggest to the Russians that they should not shut off the way to a peaceful solution, and offer their services for exerting influence in Bucharest, in case this is wished by us or by the Russians. He will speak to the Duce in this sense tomorrow morning and thinks he can be sure of his agreement. He

¹ See document No. 8, footnote 14.

² Rosso had returned to his post on June 12, 1940, and had been received by Molotov on June 13. Rosso's report of the conversation is printed in Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941* (Florence, 1963), pp. 24-26.

will propose to him that the Russian Ambassador be asked to come to the Chigi and that he be told that Italy unreservedly shares our (group garbled).

Ciano asked finally for a short written résumé about the Molotov-Schulenburg conversation and the instruction sent to the latter which he could use in reporting to the Duce. This I let him have immediately.

A further report may follow.³

MACKENSEN

³ In telegram No. 1216 of June 26 Mackensen reported as follows:

"Ciano has just informed me by telephone that the Duce has expressed agreement with taking the step he had proposed with respect to the Moscow Government. He would now request the Russian Ambassador to come to the Palazzo Chigi at once and instruct him to inform his Government that the Italian Government shared our view as to the handling of the Bessarabian question and concurred with the German action." (459/224889)

No. 19

459/224884-85

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 981 of June 25

BUCHAREST, June 26, 1940—12: 50 a. m.

Received June 26—4: 20 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 957 of June 20.¹

The Minister President asked me today whether a reply to his last offer had not yet been received. I replied in the negative and told him that he must understand that the Reich Foreign Minister was at present at Headquarters and occupied with the important problems of the west. It was our opinion that it was desirable to have as much peace as possible in the southeast and that at present we had no reason to assume that the Russians would start an offensive against Rumania.

The Minister President answered in the negative my question as to whether any conversations had been started with Soviet Russia regarding Bessarabia. Minister Lavrentiev² would probably be received by the King on Thursday or Friday. He assumed that there would be a discussion with him then. If the latter simply demanded Bessarabia, however, the Rumanian Government and the King were determined to fight rather than simply give in. If Russia proposed

¹ See vol. ix, document No. 516.

² Anatoly Josifovich Lavrentiev, Soviet Minister to Bulgaria since November 1939, had been appointed Minister to Rumania on June 14, 1940.

the occupation of military bases, as in the case of the Baltic countries, it was unfortunately known now where this would lead. If she proposed a mutual assistance pact, this would clash with public opinion throughout the entire Rumanian population, particularly in nationalistic circles. There was willingness, on the other hand, to discuss a friendship or nonaggression pact.

To my question whether he believed that Soviet Russia would be satisfied with that, since Molotov in his well-known speech had after all spoken of Russia's claim to Bessarabia,³ which was still unsatisfied, the Minister President replied: Bessarabia has 3 million inhabitants, including 2 million Rumanians, 80,000 Germans, a few thousand Ukrainians, many Jews, and only a few Russians. The surrender of this region would therefore mean the delivery of 2 million of their own people to Soviet Russia, to say nothing of all the other dangers it would entail for the Danube region as a result of the penetration of Russian influence beyond the Dniester. Therefore he was thinking rather of a proposal for an exchange of populations. Stressing the fact that I was not authorized to make any statements in this matter at all, I replied that the Russians would hardly consider this a satisfactory solution, and asked whether he had broached at all the subject of an exchange to the Russians.⁴ He hesitatingly said he had not.

The Minister President is very much worried. I have the impression that the Rumanians are protracting the negotiations with the Russians in the hope of an early Germany victory, and because they believe that our interest in cooperation in the Danube region and peace in the southeast is so great that after ending the present war in the west we might still after all be interested in keeping the Russians out of the Balkans.

FABRICIUS

³ See document No. 4, footnote 3.

⁴ In telegram No. 992 sent on June 26 at 8:40 p. m. (271/176280-81), Fabricius reported a conversation with the Rumanian Foreign Minister. Gigurtu had stated that a Soviet invasion was immediately imminent. Fabricius said: "I asked Gigurtu whether they would at least offer the Russians something more than the Minister President had told me yesterday. The Foreign Minister realizes that the proposals of the Minister President are insufficient. He spoke of Rumania's border of 1856 when Russia did not yet extend as far as the Danube. In 1878 this part [of southern Bessarabia] was taken [from Rumania] which received in exchange the Dobruja. I stated that I could take no position on this. It would be good, however, if a peaceful compromise could be found. The Foreign Minister stated that opposition was senseless in view of the condition of the Army, which is just now being called up, and the lack of airplanes and trained pilots."

No. 20

459/224890-91

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1233 of June 25

Moscow, June 26, 1940—12: 59 a. m.

Received June 26—12: 25 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 1074 of June 25.¹

Instruction carried out at 9 o'clock this evening at Molotov's office.² Molotov expressed his thanks for the understanding attitude of the German Government and its readiness to support the Soviet Government in pressing its claims. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government also desired a peaceful solution, but repeatedly stressed the fact that the matter was extremely urgent and could brook no further delay.

I pointed out to Molotov that Soviet renunciation of Bucovina, which had never belonged even to Tsarist Russia, would substantially facilitate a peaceful solution. Molotov countered by saying that Bucovina was the last remnant still missing from a unified Ukraine, and that for this reason the Soviet Government must attach importance to solving this question simultaneously with the Bessarabian question. Nevertheless, I gained the impression that Molotov did not entirely dismiss the possibility of Soviet renunciation of Bucovina in the course of the negotiations with Rumania.

Molotov stated that our wishes concerning the Volksdeutsche could certainly be met in a manner analogous to the arrangement in Poland.³

Molotov promised to consider most favorably our economic interests in Rumania.

In conclusion, Molotov stated that he would report the German point of view to his Government and would inform me as to its attitude as soon as possible. Molotov added that there had so far been no discussion of the entire matter in Moscow or in Bucharest up to the present. He further mentioned that the Soviet Government wished solely to pursue its own interests and had no intention of encouraging other States (Hungary, Bulgaria) to make demands on Rumania.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 13.

² A more extensive account of this conversation was recorded in a memorandum by Hilger which was transmitted to Berlin as a political report on June 26 (880/210463-71).

³ The copy of this telegram from the files of the Moscow Embassy (380/-210472-74) reads here: "Eastern Poland."

No. 21

459/224892-93

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, June 26, 1940—3:36 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 26—10:35 p. m.

No. 1235 of June 26

With reference to my telegram No. 1195 of June 21.¹

Following the conversation which the Italian Ambassador, Rosso, had with Foreign Commissar Molotov on June 20, the latter summoned Rosso yesterday afternoon. Molotov explained that he had reported the Italian Government's views to his Government, which had approved them. The Soviet Government was of the opinion that Italo-Soviet relations should be reestablished quickly and definitely and should be put on the same basis as those of Germany and the Soviet Government. Molotov stated in this connection that the Soviet Government and Germany were on excellent terms and that the relations between Germany and the Soviet Government were working out very well.

Molotov then declared that in his opinion the war would last until next winter, that there were some political questions, however, which had to be solved without delay, and that he could briefly characterize the Soviet Government's relations with various countries as follows: With Hungary the Soviet Government was maintaining good relations. Certain Hungarian requests were considered reasonable by the Soviet Government.

Bulgaria and the Soviet Union were good neighbors. The Soviet-Bulgarian relations were strong and could be strengthened even more. The Bulgarian demands for Dobruja and for access to the Aegean Sea were considered justified by the Soviet Government, which had recognized them and had no objections to their realization.

The Soviet Union's attitude toward Rumania was known. The Soviet Union would prefer to realize her claims to Bessarabia (Bucovina was not mentioned) without war, but, if that was impossible because of Rumanian intransigence, she was determined to resort to force. Regarding other areas of Rumania, the Soviet Government would communicate with Germany. The Soviet Government regards Turkey with deep suspicion. This was a result of Turkey's unfriendly attitude toward Russia and other countries, by which Molotov obviously

¹ Vol. IX, document No. 520.

meant Germany and Italy. Soviet suspicion of Turkey was intensified by the Turkish attitude in regard to the Black Sea, where Turkey desired to play a dominant role, and the Straits, where Turkey wanted to exercise exclusive jurisdiction. The Soviet Government was hemmed in by a Turkish threat to Batum, against which it would have to protect itself toward the south and southeast, in which connection the German and Italian interests would be considered.

In the Mediterranean, the Soviet Government would recognize Italy's hegemony, provided that Italy would recognize the Soviet Government's hegemony in the Black Sea.

Ambassador Rosso wired Molotov's statements to his Government with the comment that he . . .² them very sensible and recommended that they be acted upon as soon as possible.³

SCHULENBURG

³ Marginal note: "One group missing, apparently 'considered.'"

² An Italian translation of a memorandum handed by Molotov to Rosso and Rosso's telegram No. 307 of June 25 on this meeting are printed in Mario Toscana, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, pp. 41-43.

No. 22

321/193312

The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary

Teletype

No. 111

[Undated.]¹

With reference to report Kult. A 2187.²

Please take steps toward the resettlement of the German national group in Lithuania immediately. The operation is to be carried out by the Cultural Policy Department in closest cooperation with the Gestapo and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, following the same procedure used during the resettlement of the German national group in Latvia and Estonia.³ In so far as negotiations with foreign authorities, particularly with the Lithuanian Government and Lithuanian authorities, are necessary, they must, of course, be conducted by the Foreign Ministry. I have discussed the matter with Reichsführer Himmler.

RIBBENTROP

¹ A marginal note, visible on the original, reads: "Done. June 26."

² Not found.

³ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 153, 154, 156, 158, 190, 199, 207, 239, 252.

No. 23

865/206158-59

The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary

Teletype

No. 112

BAUMSCHULE, June 26, 1940.

1. Please send the following circular letter over my signature to all Reich departments including the Four Year Plan, the OKW, and Reichsführer SS:

"The Foreign Ministry has begun the preparatory work for the peace treaties, in the first place for the peace treaty with France. The departments concerned are requested to inform the Foreign Ministry as soon as possible of wishes and suggestions in their fields of interest which they wish to advance for this preparatory work. Each department concerned is likewise requested to appoint a general representative by name who can be included by the Foreign Ministry in any consultations which may become necessary."¹

2. By way of general guidance for the preparation of the peace treaties I also wish to state the following for your information with reference to what I said today on the telephone:

It is a matter of course that in so far as the state of war is ended by treaties with foreign governments the responsibility rests solely with the Foreign Ministry even as regards the preparation of these treaties within Germany. On the other hand, those countries occupied by us whose future fate will not be determined by international treaties but unilaterally by decrees of the Führer or by German Reich laws should from the very start be considered as part of Greater Germany, so that the determination of their economic and financial structure is an internal German matter for which the Foreign Ministry is not responsible. It has not yet been decided which occupied countries are to be considered for a unilateral German settlement. Therefore it is necessary that for these countries, too, consideration be given to the possibility of an international settlement and that this be prepared—internally—by the Foreign Ministry.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Such a circular letter was sent under No. Pol. XII 1649 g. on June 27.

In a memorandum of July 1 Wiehl noted that he gave the letter to State Secretary Neumann of the Four Year Plan personally. Neumann declared that Göring intended to take a prominent part in the peace negotiations and would assume leadership in the preparation of peace terms in the economic field. It was agreed by Wiehl and Neumann that the decision of the Foreign Minister and Field Marshal Göring on these points would have to be obtained. (365/206666-70)

No. 24

B19/B003627

*The Head of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 114 of June 26

BAUMSCHULE, June 26, 1940.
Received June 26—10:45 p. m.
zu W V 2392.¹

Teletype message for State Secretary von Weizsäcker.

The Foreign Minister requests you to give Ambassador von der Schulenburg the following instruction with respect to the nickel question in the German-Finnish trade negotiations.² The most important point in the German-Finnish trade negotiations was the delivery of nickel ores from the Petsamo mines. The Finns had already promised Germany the major portion of the nickel ore production, but they now say that the Russians too had put forward demands and are asking whether Germany would be content with a lesser quantity of nickel ore. Please say to Molotov that in view of our needs, which the Russians surely appreciate, we attach particular value to the nickel ore, and that we assume, on the strength of our friendly collaboration with Russia, that Russia would raise no objection against allocation of the major portion of the Finnish nickel production to Germany.³

Herewith to State Secretary Weizsäcker for further action.

SCHMIDT
*Minister*¹ W V 2392: Not found.

² See vol. ix, documents Nos. 16 and 293. Following the mission of Schnurre to Helsinki in April, a Finnish economic delegation headed by Fieandt had come to Berlin early in June. A report on the Finnish position as stated to Blücher by Fieandt shortly before he departed for Berlin was sent as Helsinki telegram No. 300 of June 6 (9063/H221053-54). Details on the negotiations in Berlin have not been found. Concerning the agreements reached see documents Nos. 62 and 74.

³ This directive was sent to the Embassy in Moscow in telegram No. 1088 of June 27 (B19/B003628).

No. 25

380/210457-58

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[Moscow, June 26, 1940.]

No. 1236 of June 26

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 1233 of June 25.¹

Molotov summoned me this afternoon and declared that the Soviet Government, on the basis of his conversation with me yesterday, had decided to limit its demands to the northern part of Bucovina and the city of Cernăuți. According to Soviet opinion the boundary line should run from the southernmost point of the Soviet West Ukraine at Mt. Kniatiasa, east along the Suceava and then northeast to Herța on the Prut, whereby the Soviet Union would obtain direct railway connection from Bessarabia via Cernăuți to Lwów. Molotov added that the Soviet Government expected German support of this Soviet demand.

To my statement that a peaceful solution might more easily be reached if the Soviet Government would return the Rumanian National Bank's gold reserve, which had been transferred for safe-keeping to Moscow during World War I, Molotov declared that this was absolutely out of the question, since Rumania had exploited Bessarabia long enough.

Regarding further treatment of the matter Molotov has the following idea: The Soviet Government will submit its demand to the Rumanian Minister here within the next few days and expects the German Reich Government at the same time urgently to advise the Rumanian Government in Bucharest to comply with the Soviet demands, since war would otherwise be unavoidable.² Molotov promised to inform me immediately as soon as he had spoken to the Rumanian Minister.

Regarding the Rumanian Government's attitude toward the new Soviet Minister, Molotov appeared to be annoyed and pointed out that the Minister had not yet been given any opportunity to present his credentials, although the customary time had expired.

SCHULENBURG

N.B. General Köstring has been informed.

¹ Document No. 20.² See document No. 28.

No. 26

F12/198

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

ROME, June 26, 1940/XVIII.

FÜHRER: Now that the problem is to conquer Great Britain, I remind you of what I said to you at Munich about the direct participation of Italy in the assault on the island.² I am ready to contribute ground forces and air forces, and you know how much I desire to do so.

I ask you to answer me in such a way that it will be possible for me to pass to the phase of execution.³

In this expectation I send you the most comradely greetings.

MUSSOLINI

¹ Translated from the Italian text which was delivered to the German Foreign Ministry with a German translation prepared by the Italian Embassy (F12/197).

² Cf. vol. ix, document No. 479.

³ See documents Nos. 73, 129, and 166.

No. 27

459/224898

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, June 27, 1940—1:10 a. m.

No. 1241 of June 26

Received June 27—6:30 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1236 of June 26.¹

Molotov just informed me by telephone that he had summoned the Rumanian Minister² at 10 o'clock this evening, had informed him of the Soviet Government's demand for the cession of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bucovina, and had demanded a reply from the Rumanian Government not later than tomorrow, i. e., on July [June] 27.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 25.

² G. Davidescu.

No. 28

459/224908

The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

JUNE 27, 1940—10:30 a. m.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM THE SPECIAL TRAIN TO MINISTER SCHMIDT

The following instruction is to be transmitted immediately by telephone en clair to Minister Fabricius, Bucharest:

"You are requested to call immediately on the Foreign Minister in Bucharest and inform him as follows:

"The Soviet Government has informed us that it has demanded the cession of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bucovina from the Rumanian Government. In order to avoid war between Rumania and the Soviet Union, we can only advise the Rumanian Government to yield to the Soviet Government's demand. Please report by wire."¹
End of the instruction to Bucharest.

RIBBENTROP

(Telephoned to Counselor of Legation Stelzer² at 11:00 a. m.)

¹ Document No. 33.

² Gerhard Stelzer, Counselor at the Legation in Bucharest.

No. 29

459/224909

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 999 of June 27

BUCHAREST, June 27, 1940—11 a. m.

Received June 27—5:05 p. m.

Molotov sent for the Rumanian Minister to Moscow yesterday evening and made a demand in the form of an ultimatum for the surrender of the whole of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina. He delivered the ultimatum with a 24-hour time limit. It expires at 10 p. m. today. The text of the ultimatum has been announced by telegram but has not yet reached here.

Foreign Minister Gigurtu sent for me just now at 8:30 a. m., informed me of the foregoing and said that he was going at once to report to the King. Judging [he said] from the King's attitude thus far, war was to be expected.

He asked us, and would address the same request to Italy, to hold Hungary and Bulgaria in check in case of war.

I told the Foreign Minister that I would inform Berlin at once. The demand for Bucovina was new to me. As far as discussion was concerned, he had seen in the newsreel in my house what war meant. Was it right to wage a hopeless war on account of Bessarabia? The Foreign Minister seemed to accept this and will try to persuade the King to propose to the Russian Government that delegates be dispatched at once to negotiate on the Bessarabian question.

He would like, if possible, to be informed of our attitude. The Italian Minister has been similarly informed and will get in touch with me at once.

FABRICIUS

No. 30

617/249698-99

The Minister in Afghanistan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

KABUL, June 27, 1940—2:20 p. m.

No. 248 of June 26

Received June 27—3:50 p. m.

For Herr von Weizsäcker.

The Minister of Economics¹ indicated to me yesterday in strict confidence and with a request for the strictest secrecy that for the benefit of active participation in the German interest Afghanistan was ready to mobilize all opportunities arising from sentimental and religious ties, and especially to induce frontier tribes and the Afghan population in India to take action against the English, in order thereby to prevent the shipping of Indian troops to the Mediterranean both now and in the future. According to the Minister's information 30,000 Indians are said to have been shipped in June so far, while the dispatching of approximately 500,000 is in preparation. He estimates India's total capacity at 2 million.

Although the Minister supposedly got in touch with us solely on his own initiative, it may be assumed that at least some elements in the Government know of his step. The Minister is convinced of being able to carry out his intentions if we guarantee the following points:

1. Give assurance that the Russian Soviet Republic will in every way, especially in case of the planned advance, respect Afghanistan's integrity.
2. Support the awarding to Afghanistan of an access to the sea.
3. Deliver planes, tanks, and antiaircraft guns in the quantities needed.

Referring to the intrigues of the Western Powers against each other in the Near East after the World War and the fear of similar difficulties at the end of the present war as the result of Italian and Russian antagonism in the same area, the Minister indicated that the Saadabad Powers² would be inclined to harmonize their policy with Germany's in order thereby to preclude the game of intrigue as much as possible. Turkey's attitude was wavering, however. The Afghan

¹ Abdul Majid Khan, Minister of Economics since December 1938; also president of Afghan National Bank since 1932.

² The Saadabad Pact, signed on July 8, 1937, between Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey provided for noninterference, nonaggression, consultation, and mutual guarantee of common frontiers. For text see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1937* (London, 1950), vol. CXXI, pp. 712-714.

Government would be prepared to undertake to initiate contacts between the Saadabad Powers.

In case the German Government should be favorably disposed toward the Afghan proposals, the Minister requests that a representative, disguised as a businessman, be dispatched in order to settle details without further communication by telegram.

It is of interest in this connection that the Foreign Minister inquired some time ago of me and the Italian Minister individually as to the attitude our Governments would adopt toward Afghanistan after the war. Since the Minister of Economics knew of this step, the assumption is strengthened that at least some elements in the Government have knowledge of his present offer.

The Minister stated several times that his offer was made only to us, since a certain distrust prevailed with reference to Italy—probably because of Amanullah.³

Although it is to be assumed that by the present step Afghanistan is trying to share in the imminent final decision in order to obtain advantages in the new order, the offer nevertheless appears worthy of consideration.

Telegraphic instructions are requested.⁴

PILGER

³ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 60, 369, 449, and 470.

⁴ No reply to this telegram has been found. In telegram No. 277 sent from Kabul on July 18 Pilger reported however that the Afghan Minister of Economics had made further suggestions of the same kind to Oberregierungsbaurat Schnell of the Organisation Todt and that therefore no decisions should be made until Schnell had reported to the Foreign Ministry on his return to Berlin (617/-249901). On Aug. 6, Todt wrote to Weizsäcker saying that he would like to be present when Schnell, who had meanwhile returned, gave his report to the Foreign Ministry (617/249902).

No. 31

459/224904-05

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 489

BERLIN, June 27, 1940.

The Rumanian Minister¹ came to me at 3 p. m. today with the following news: Last night his Government had received from Molotov a note in the nature of an ultimatum.² In this note the demand was made on Rumania that in the course of June 27 she state that she agreed to the evacuation of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina in favor of Russia.

¹ Radu Crutcescu, March 1939–November 1940. 9 c 4 p. 525

² See document No. 27.

The Rumanian Government had replied that it was quite prepared to enter into friendly negotiations, but could not talk under the pressure of an ultimatum. On the contrary, it would respond with mobilization if the ultimatum were upheld.

The Minister then asked me by direction of his Government whether Germany would be prepared to assume the role of mediator in the affair. At the same time his Government inquired whether the German Government would be in a position to indicate whether Hungary and Bulgaria would remain quiet in the event of a Russo-Rumanian war.

Since the instruction to the Rumanian Minister had already left Bucharest at 10 o'clock this morning, it crossed with the instruction that Herr Fabricius received this morning at 11^{*} and carried out between 11 and 12 o'clock in Bucharest.

Under these circumstances, I replied to the Rumanian Minister as follows:

His first question had become out of date as a result of Fabricius' step. The second question, regarding the attitude of Hungary and Bulgaria, was based on an assumption of something that we wished to see avoided, namely, a Russo-Rumanian war.

The Minister nevertheless asked that his communication be transmitted to the Foreign Minister, and in this connection he was particularly concerned to learn whether, in the event of a friendly settlement between Rumania and Russia, Rumanian territory would be considered to be on the bargain counter with respect to Bulgaria's and Hungary's claims.

The Minister was inclined to infer from today's instructions to Fabricius that we were leaving Rumania completely in the lurch. I denied this with respect to the preservation of peace, the maintenance of our well-known economic relations, and the direct relationship between Germany and Rumania. I told him, on the other hand, that I had reason to assume that England, which we know had posed as the guaranteeing power for Rumania, had thrown Rumania to the Russians as an easy prey. The Minister admitted the truth of this latter statement and even said that it was England's aim to touch off the war between Rumania and Russia after all. The Minister requested that if possible a reply be given him to his second question sometime today. I did not promise him one, however.

To the Foreign Minister herewith by teletype or telephone.

WEIZSÄCKER

^{*} Document No. 28.

No. 32

459/224910

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, June 27, 1940—3:07 p. m.

No. 1242 of June 27

Received June 27—9:45 p. m.¹

With reference to my telegram No. 1241 of June 26.²

I was unable to see Molotov himself this morning, but made an inquiry through his *Chef de Cabinet* how the Soviet Government's demand that the Rumanian reply be made today was to be understood. After our conversation of yesterday in regard to cooperation³ in obtaining a peaceful solution, I hoped—considering the short time at our disposal—that for the time being a declaration of willingness to negotiate on the part of the Rumanian Government would be satisfactory to the Soviet Government.

Molotov had me informed that "the Soviet Government expected a favorable reply in the course of June 28." To my question whether in the contrary case the Soviet Government would resort to force the very next day, the *Chef de Cabinet* stated that he was only authorized to give the information referred to earlier.

According to this, the possibility must be considered that the Soviet Government will use force immediately if the Rumanian Government does not accept the Soviet demands in their entirety. In that case, I may point out that—in view of our experiences in eastern Poland—it appears necessary to speed up the safeguarding of the property of Reichsdeutsche in Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, although there seems to be no reason for Volksdeutsche to leave their homes hastily in view of Molotov's reassurance regarding resettlement.⁴

SCHULENBURG

¹ Marginal note: "Transmitted at 10:45 p. m. to the Foreign Minister's Special Train."

² Document No. 27.

³ The Moscow Embassy copy (380/210453-55) reads here: "German co-operation."

⁴ A further telegram from Schulenburg, No. 1244, dispatched June 27, 4:40 p. m., stated: "Molotov just now informed me through his *Chef de Cabinet* that Soviet troops would cross the Rumanian border early tomorrow morning, if the Rumanian Government did not give a favorable reply to the Soviet demands today." (459/224911)

No. 33

271/176234-36

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, June 27, 1940—4:00 p. m.

No. 1002 of June 27

Received June 27—8:30 p. m.

The King summoned me at 10 a. m. He received me in the presence of the Minister President, the Foreign Minister, and the Court Minister.¹ He had a very important statement to make. The Minister President read the Soviet Government's ultimatum, demanding the return of Bessarabia, which had been seized from the Soviet Ukraine at a time when Russia had been militarily weak. The majority of the population of this country was Ukrainian. At the same time, on the basis of a map not yet available here the cession of northern Bucovina was demanded, which linguistically is part of Bessarabian territory and the cession of which would be compensation for the 22 years of unlawful occupation of Bessarabia. A reply was expected in the course of the day (10 p. m.).

The King then stated: At the Berghof and during the conversation with Field Marshal Göring² he had been given to understand clearly that a rapprochement with Germany excluded a rapprochement of Rumania with the Soviet Union. Consequently, Rumania had not clarified her relations with Russia. To be sure, we had been advising Rumania for some time to reach an understanding with Russia. He had, however, assumed that Rumania in practical negotiations with Moscow could discuss concretely the Bessarabian question, which should also be in the interest of Germany, particularly since only recently he had suggested close cooperation in all fields. He appealed to Germany and the Führer. Though he knew very well that our hands were tied, surely there were some ways of assisting Rumania, because, as he had explained at the beginning, we had a certain responsibility for the present situation.

I first stated that we had always pursued a very frank policy toward Rumania. It was erroneous to attempt to burden us with any responsibility on the basis of the conversation at the Berghof, since the general situation had meanwhile changed as a result of Russia's policy against British encirclement, a fact which had not escaped His Majesty either. Russia's claim to Bessarabia was nothing new and we had always advised—recently even in a very concrete form—that

¹ M. Urdareanu.

² On the occasion of King Carol's visit to Germany in November 1938. See vol. v, documents Nos. 254 and 257.

a peaceful understanding (group garbled). The claim to Bucovina was new to me.

I asked the King whether he had already made a decision as to what he would answer the Russians; he replied in the negative and said that it would depend principally on what assistance we could give him. In this connection he emphasized in particular that we should exert a moderating influence upon Hungary and Bulgaria. It might after all be possible to give some help of an indirect nature, such as shipments of arms, ammunition, etc.

At this moment, an urgent telephone message from Berlin was brought to me.³ The King asked me to open the envelope. I then read the text of the message which the Reich Foreign Minister instructed me to convey to the Rumanian Foreign Minister. The King was dismayed. He launched forth into criticism of our policy. How could they ask him to cede one third of his territory without a fight. After all, he had obtained the Führer's word. The policy of the Reich was unreliable. I interrupted the King. As a representative of the Reich, I could not listen to such rash words from His Majesty. I suggested that I retire to the salon until the King had conferred with his advisers. The King agreed to this. When I was called back, he gave me the following statement in a calm and courteous manner: Our reply had been a serious blow to him, as he had counted on Germany, toward whom he wanted to orient his future policy. He immediately had had a meeting of the Crown Council called and would have an answer delivered to me. After me, the Italian Minister was with the King. In this instance, too, it was requested that influence be brought to bear on Hungary and Bulgaria, and the argument was used that Rumania's rapprochement with the Axis Powers prevented her from entering closer relations with Soviet Russia in time.⁴

FABRICIUS

³ See document No. 28.

⁴ Marginal note: "Transmitted to the Foreign Minister's Special Train at 10:05 p. m. Telegram Control Office."

No. 34

459/224912-18

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

No. 2 of June 27 from Baumschule BAUMSCHULE, June 27, 1940.

Received Berlin, June 27—5:25 p. m.

No. 743 from Foreign Ministry Sent June 27—5:15 [sic] p. m.

For information and guidance in conversations I call attention to the following:

Rumania has to attribute the critical development of the Bessarabian problem to her own policy. Last year, the Rumanian Government accepted England's promise of a guarantee¹ and welcomed it very enthusiastically, both in official statements and in the press, though this promise of a guarantee was aimed directly against Germany and the Rumanian Government knew very well that it was in no danger whatsoever from Germany inasmuch as we had always declared that we did not pursue any political objectives in the Balkans. The Rumanian Government has subsequently attempted to follow a see-saw policy by means of which it believed it would be able to satisfy both belligerent parties. Only when Germany's absolute superiority became evident did the Rumanian Government try to establish close relations with Germany in order to enlist our support against Russian claims to Bessarabia. By alternate attempts to find protection against the Russians—first by associating herself with England and then with Germany—the Rumanian Government let things drift and missed the opportunity to reach a peaceful understanding with the Soviet Government.

It is particularly significant that recently the new English Ambassador in Moscow²—as Molotov openly informed the Italian Ambassador—practically encouraged the Soviet Government to take action in the Balkans by declaring to Molotov that hegemony in the Balkans belonged to Russia.³ The Rumanian Government can see from this what is to be expected of English promises of a guarantee. I have no objections against your using these arguments during conversations there.

Moreover, upon sober and realistic reflection, the Rumanian Government must reach the conclusion that the Russian claim to Bessarabia is well founded and that the Soviet Government has never waived that claim. The Rumanian Government, if it considers existing realities, will realize that it is in its own best interests to yield to the Soviet Russian demand.

RIBBENTROP

¹ This refers to the statement by Prime Minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons on Apr. 18, promising to assist Greece and Rumania against aggression.

² Sir Stafford Cripps.

³ See vol. ix, document No. 520.

No. 35

F3/0420

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

DUBLIN, June 27, 1940.

No. 340 of June 26

Received June 27—6:20 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 332 of June 24.¹

Following a closed hearing, Held² was sentenced today to 5 years' imprisonment for aid and support to persons unknown in receiving instructions for collection of information, particularly such as would affect the security of the State, and for possession of a radio transmitter. Held was acquitted of the charge so far as it stated that he himself had been assigned the task of collection of information and had participated in treasonable activity of the I.R.A.³ in the form of receiving \$20,000. This money remains confiscated until the police investigations, which are being continued, are concluded. The case against Mrs. Stuart was postponed to July 1.⁴

HEMPFEL

¹ Not printed (F3/0421).

² On May 24 Hempel had reported that Held, an Irishman, had been arrested for harboring an alleged German agent and the next day he reported that Mrs. Stuart, wife of the Lektor in English at the University of Berlin, had also been arrested in the same connection (telegrams Nos. 289 and 272: 91/100214-15, -17). See vol. VIII, document No. 465, footnote 4, and vol. IX, documents Nos. 437 and 508.

³ The Irish Republican Army.

⁴ Following a 2-day trial Mrs. Stuart was acquitted; Dublin telegram No. 349 of July 3 (91/100271).

No. 36

459/224919-20

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, June 27, 1940—6:30 p. m.

No. 1007 of June 27

With reference to my telegraphic reports Nos. 102¹ and 103.²

The Minister President has just communicated to me the text of the Rumanian note of reply which, because of the urgency, I am transmitting by telephone en clair³ with his consent. It must natu-

¹ The reference is to telegram No. 1002 which is printed as document No. 33.

² The reference is to telegram No. 1003, not printed (459/224917).

³ Not printed (459/224894). In the note the Rumanian Government stated that it was ready to discuss in a friendly way all the proposals made by the Soviet Government. For text of Tass statement on the notes exchanged with the Rumanian Government concerning the transfer of Bessarabia and North Bucovina to the USSR see Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 458-461.

rally not be published by us yet. He asked that we give our warm support to the step taken by the Rumanian Government in Moscow. The King will ask both the Führer and Field Marshal Göring in personal telegrams for their support.⁴

The Minister President then expressed his regret that I had misunderstood the statement of the King on German policy this morning.⁵ The King was very deeply affected by the German reply and had spoken in the first heat of excitement. He [the King] had just left the room and asked him to tell me this once more. Rumania's only hope was Germany and Italy, and nothing would happen to deflect Rumania from this course. At my suggestion, the Minister President had directives sent to all the prefects, in which they were made especially responsible for the good treatment of Volksdeutsche in this time of tension.

The mood in the Crown Council had been very dignified and the attitude of the King had been approved. Total mobilization would take place this very day, but the new Russian Minister⁶ would be informed of it. He will have his first audience with the King tomorrow at the scheduled time, if the Russians do not attack tonight.

In conclusion the Minister President asked me to continue to keep in close contact. I thereupon spoke to him briefly of the efforts made with Molotov by the Reich Government⁷ to arrive at a peaceful solution particularly since the Italian Minister had also done this with regard to the Italian and German step.⁸

FABRICIUS

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See document No. 33.

⁶ See document No. 19, footnote 2.

⁷ See document No. 13.

⁸ In a memorandum of June 27 (459/224921) Woermann recorded a statement by the Italian Counselor of Embassy on the Italian step in Bucharest.

No. 37

585/242596

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, June 27, 1940.

The Bulgarian Minister called on me today and stated that he had been instructed by his Government to make inquiries with us about the development of the Bessarabian crisis and at the same time to ascertain our views as to the further treatment of the Bulgarian wishes.

M. Draganov was even informed about the state of affairs up to the Rumanian Crown Council's meeting,¹ about whose outcome we ourselves had no certain information up to that time.

¹ See document No. 33.

As to further treatment of the Bulgarian wishes, I informed the Minister in accordance with the instruction of the Foreign Minister ² that it was our urgent desire that Bulgaria should not take advantage of the present crisis to achieve her wishes.³ The Minister was very disappointed by this answer. He added—and as he expressly stated, not on instruction of his Government—that the King and the Bulgarian Government would find themselves in an extremely difficult situation if they did not take advantage of the present moment. Given a peaceful solution, public opinion might perhaps be easier to restrain than in case of a military one. What disturbed him especially was the danger that Bulgaria might now receive the Dobruja as a gift from the hands of the Soviet Union rather than from Germany, although he readily conceded that the entire present situation was a result of the German victories. M. Draganov then strongly insisted on obtaining some assurances for the future, perhaps in the sense that Germany recognized the justice of the Bulgarian demands for southern Dobruja and promised to bring about their realization when the time came.

Finally, the Minister promised to telegraph his Government at once of the Reich Foreign Minister's desire that Bulgaria should keep peace at the present.

WOERMANN

² Cf. document No. 45.

³ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "By force."

No. 38

73/52495-96

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, June 27, 1940.

The Hungarian Minister called on me today at 10:30 p. m. and handed me the enclosed memorandum, according to which Hungary intends, to be sure, to pursue her demands on Rumania only in agreement with the Axis Powers; on the other hand, the idea is expressed that in the Hungarian Government's opinion Hungary, too, must be included if Rumania on her own initiative enters into agreements with another state on territorial questions.

I promised immediate transmission of the memorandum to the Foreign Minister. I added that I was authorized to tell him that the Foreign Minister was very anxious for Hungary to continue to keep peace. I had spoken similarly also to the Bulgarian Minister.¹ This communication did not represent a reply to his memorandum but was made independently of it.

WOERMANN

¹ See document No. 37.

[Enclosure]

URGENT
450/B

BERLIN, June 27, 1940—10:15 p. m.

MEMORANDUM

As instructed, I respectfully take the liberty of reporting that according to the Royal Hungarian Government's information Rumania is inclined to make territorial concessions in favor of the Soviets, as the result of diplomatic pressure by the Soviet Union.

The Hungarian Government takes the liberty of pointing out to the German Government that action of this kind would obviously be such marked discrimination against Hungary that the effect on Hungarian public opinion would lead to quite unforeseeable consequences.

So far the Hungarian Government has exerted no pressure of any kind on Rumania, in order to maintain peace in this part of Europe. For the same reason it has not joined any country in any agreement directed against Rumania.

Hungary wishes, or rather intends, to bring about the fulfillment of her justified demands on Rumania exclusively with the help of possible agreements with the Axis Powers or with the consent of the two Great Powers.

If, however, Rumania on her own initiative enters into agreements with another state on territorial questions, Hungary must be included, simultaneously, in the opinion of the Hungarian Government.

No. 39

4515/E182715

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1290 of June 27

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1940—3:00 p. m.

Received June 28—1:20 a. m.

With reference to Multex No. 95 of June 13,¹ and our telegram No. 1174 of June 14.²

The English translation of the Führer interview appeared today in No. 27 of the Embassy bulletin *Facts in Review*, in an edition of 100,000.

¹ Not printed (9920/E694616-45); it contained the text of the interview given by Hitler to Karl von Wiegand, correspondent for the Hearst newspapers, and printed in the *New York Journal-American* on June 14, 1940. See vol. ix, document No. 473, footnote 3. Telegrams on the interview and on supplementary statements made by von Wiegand were sent by the American Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin on June 13 (Department of State, File No. 740.0011 European War 1839/2855).

² Not found.

I was able furthermore through a confidential agent to induce the isolationist Representative Thorkelson ³ to have the Führer interview inserted in the *Congressional Record*, directions (3 groups garbled), of June 22. This assures the Führer interview once more of the widest distribution.

THOMSEN

³ Representative Jacob Thorkelson, Republican of Montana.

No. 40

19/12354

The Consul General at New York to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

NEW YORK, June 27, 1940—4:39 p. m.

No. 203 of June 27

Received June 28—5:35 a. m.

For the State Secretary personally.

Handelsrat Westrick ¹ reports:

"A group of prominent businessmen and politicians, whom I personally regard as reliable in every way, and whose influence I consider to be very great, but who, in the interest of our operation, do not want to be mentioned in any circumstances at this time," suggested that I convey to the Foreign Ministry the following:

The aforesaid group, which has the approval and support of a substantial number of leading personalities, will shortly urge upon President Roosevelt the following recommendations:

1. Immediate sending of an American Ambassador to Berlin.
2. A change of Ambassadors in London.
3. Suspension of armaments shipments to Great Britain until the new Ambassador to Berlin has had an opportunity to discuss matters with the German Government.

It remains of course a question what effect this step will produce in Washington. In any case, however, the communication made to me will likewise be made known by unofficial channels still today to the British Government."

Same to Washington.

BORCHERS

¹ Gerhard Alois Westrick was Commercial Counselor of the German Embassy in Washington.

² See document No. 187.

No. 41

1053/812254-57

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Brazil

Telegram

No. 568

BERLIN, June 27, 1940.
zu W 3237 g.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 624 of June 21.¹

I I request that you make the following general statement to President Vargas as a preliminary reply to his proposal.

The Reich Government is still in favor of an intensive exchange of goods between Germany and Brazil, despite the disappointments which Germany has at times suffered in the past as a result of the attitude of some Brazilian Government agencies, particularly the Banco do Brasil. The Reich Government is especially willing to collaborate in the development of the great natural resources of Brazil, which President Vargas has energetically and prudently set up as his goal. The Reich Government sees therein a broad and lasting field for cooperation to the advantage of both countries. Instead of the former 65 million consumers and producers Greater Germany today has 90 million. Greater Germany will therefore in the future be able to purchase Brazilian products for its enlarged territory and supply industrial products of all kinds to Brazil on a much larger scale than formerly. Moreover, economic conditions and transportation in the European continent will enable Germany in the future to exert a far-reaching influence on the commodity trade of the European continent with overseas areas. A positive economic cooperation would therefore assure Brazil a larger market than any other country could offer.

The Reich Government is prepared even now to enter into general written agreements for such a development of economic relations between Greater Germany and Brazil. In that connection separate agreements on the reciprocal purchase of certain kinds and amounts of goods could also be considered at this time. If the Reich Government is to accept the proposal of President Vargas, however, it must be assured that Brazil, too, has the intention of permanently cooperating in this manner. Certain experiences in the past when individual Brazilian Government agencies, especially the Banco do Brasil, have, contrary to treaty arrangements, arbitrarily broken off economic relations from time to time, serve as a warning for the Reich Government to exercise caution. This reserve on the part of the Reich Government springs from the following simple consideration. After the conclusion of peace Greater Germany will reorient its economic relations toward foreign countries, particularly in the direction of those countries which offer a guarantee that economic relations will be able to develop in a stable and uniform manner, without being influenced by the political bias of individuals.

¹ W 3237 g.: Vol. ix, document No. 518.

The Reich Government is for the present confining itself to this general and positive statement. If President Vargas wishes to continue on this basis the exchange of views which he initiated, the Reich Government will agree to it. In that case it invites President Vargas to put his proposals into concrete form either orally or in writing, and possibly to indicate even now definite types and quantities of goods which the two countries are to purchase from each other.

II. If President Vargas expresses a wish to that effect, you may leave the statement with him informally in writing. If this is done, I should like to have the wording of the informal written text transmitted to me.

III. In the event that President Vargas wishes to continue the exchange of views, you may indicate as you see fit that in such a case the Reich Government would appreciate it if the exchange of views were continued with him personally. You may add as the reason for this that in the present situation the Reich Government has no interest in tedious discussions lasting for months. If the Reich Government were to enter into such discussions, it would have to have a guarantee that they would be concluded quickly and without interruption. If the discussions were to be referred to various ministries and the Banco do Brasil, there would be no such guarantee.

IV. Telegraphic report No. 624 permits various interpretations of one point. Do the words in the first paragraph, "while the war is still going on," refer to firm agreements or to intentions? With respect to the above statement we are for the time being assuming the interpretation that during the war the intention is merely to make firm agreements with reference to goods that are later to be purchased. If Vargas, however, should have had in mind the purchase of certain types and quantities of goods even during the war, we do not intend to refuse that either. In such a case, however, it must be pointed out to President Vargas that special arrangements would have to be made for the financing of German purchases in Brazil during the war, since Germany does not wish to use the foreign exchange which she has available for the conduct of the war for the purchase of goods which cannot be imported to Germany until later.

RIETTER

No. 42

271/176245

Unsigned Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry

[JUNE 27, 1940.]

By order of the Reich Foreign Minister, I informed Minister Fabricius at 12 midnight that, according to a telegram just received

from Count von der Schulenburg,¹ the German Ambassador in Moscow, Molotov had informed him that Soviet troops would cross the Rumanian frontier tomorrow morning, should the Rumanian Government not give an affirmative reply to the Soviet demands this same day.

The Foreign Minister requests Minister Fabricius to see the Rumanian Foreign Minister at once and inform him of the foregoing.

By order of the Reich Government, Minister Fabricius could only give the Rumanian Government the earnest advice to accept the Russian demands without reservation. Any other attitude would be senseless; acceptance of the demands was the only thing that was left.

Should it not be possible for technical reasons for the Rumanian Government to transmit an affirmative answer to Moscow, the Foreign Minister was willing to have such a reply sent to M. Molotov through Count von der Schulenburg, the German Ambassador in Moscow.

¹ See document No. 32, footnote 4.

No. 43

73/52489-92

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 398 of June 27

BUDAPEST, June 28, 1940—2:00 a. m.

Received June 28—5:35 a. m.

The Foreign Minister invited me to the office of the Minister President where the Council of Ministers was just in session, and in the presence of the Minister President pointed out to me that the consequences would be unforeseeable if Rumania discriminated against Hungary by making territorial concessions to a neighbor while refusing even to enter into a discussion of Hungary's authentic¹ demands. The Hungarian Ministers in Berlin² and Rome had already received instructions to speak about this matter.

Csáky explained to me in detail that the Reich Foreign Minister had asked him in Neustettin on April 28³ to maintain peace and quiet in the southeast for the duration of the war, since Germany was greatly interested in this. When he had asked whether the German Government wanted Hungary to go so far as to conclude a treaty

¹ The copy in the files of the Budapest Legation reads: "justified." (9506/-D670026-28)

² See document No. 38.

³ The date was garbled in transmission. The copy in the files of the Budapest Legation reads Sept. 7. Cf. vol. VIII, document No. 30.

of friendship with Rumania, the Foreign Minister had later replied through me that this was not called for at the moment. In January Ciano had spoken to him to the same effect as the Foreign Minister.⁴ He had replied that Hungary would not attack Rumania from the rear even in the event of military complications; she could not, however, remain inactive in the following cases:

1. If Rumania made territorial concessions to another power and discriminated against Hungary;

2. If the Hungarian minority in Rumania was persecuted, that is, if more than the normal number were sent to the front. The Minister President remarked that the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, where Russian agitators were also active,⁵ would be especially endangered in the event of a revolution, owing to the fact that Rumania had distributed (group garbled)⁶ thousand rifles exclusively to the Rumanian population of villages in Transylvania with mixed nationalities;

3. If the fortification measures along the Hungarian frontier were continued in an objectionable manner; the Rumanians had intended to tear down a number of Hungarian villages and to transport their population to the old part of Rumania.

The Foreign Minister added that the Hungarian Government⁷ had never threatened Rumania and had never sought the cooperation of any foreign power against Rumania, trusting that⁸ justified demands would be fulfilled. The Minister President mentioned that he had told Ciano in April that Hungary would first demand all of Transylvania in the negotiations with Rumania, but would be willing to make great concessions in case of reciprocity. The Rumanians, however, had so far not consented to any kind of negotiations with Hungary. In relation [sic] to certain conciliatory statements by Gafencu with reference to Turkey, the new Rumanian Government had adopted an even more intransigent standpoint.

The Foreign Minister emphasized once more that the Hungarian Government could not take responsibility for the consequences if Rumania should cede large territories, some of which had never been Russian before,⁹ to the Soviet Union and refuse, on the other hand, to enter into sincere negotiations with Hungary.

He asked the following questions:

[1.] Did the German Government still wish Hungary to continue her attitude of waiting? I replied that I would refer his question to

⁴ See Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe* (Milan, 1948), pp. 501-504.

⁵ This passage was also garbled in transmission. As received in Berlin it reads: "wo auch russische agitatorisch tätig sei."

⁶ The Budapest copy here reads: "27,000."

⁷ The Budapest copy contains at this point the words "in the last months."

⁸ The Budapest copy here reads: "Hungary's justified demands."

⁹ The Budapest copy contains at this point the word "(Bucovina)."

Berlin as he desired, but that I could even now answer this question in all seriousness in the affirmative.

2. Can Hungary in this case expect that the Axis Powers (Germany) will agree to support Hungary's just demands on Rumania?

When I asked how this was to be interpreted, the Minister President and the Foreign Minister answered that Hungary was prepared to make great sacrifices. On the whole she wished only areas having a Hungarian majority, with due consideration for geographic, economic, and strategic points of view. A corridor to all ¹⁰ large Hungarian national groups settled in eastern Transylvania was not being considered, but rather cession of a strip of territory running northeastward and then eastward along the northern Hungarian-Rumanian frontier. Hungary wished to acquire as few Rumanians as possible. The number of Hungarians living in the area ceded to Rumania was estimated at 1,800,000. In addition almost 300,000 lived in the old part of Rumania. A limited exchange of population was also possible, especially with reference to the Hungarians living in Moldavia and southern Bucovina. The Hungarian Government did not want to impose anything on Rumania that would make her an enemy forever. This would be an unwise policy in view of the Russian threat to both countries.

3. What will be the position of the Axis Powers (Germany) if Hungary should be compelled to intervene with force of arms, for example, in case of a revolution in Transylvania?

The Minister President added that he had urged numerous leaders of the Hungarian minority in Rumania some time ago to use all their influence to keep the Hungarian national groups quiet even in the event of a Russian attack.

In answer to my question both Ministers replied that no additional military measures had been taken in Hungary so far. It was possible, however, that the Chief of the General Staff would request such measures in view of the impending occupation of northern Bucovina by the Russians. The Hungarian Government had so far avoided everything that might create unrest; it had therefore kept the mobilized army corps in garrison and had sent only ¹¹ one army corps to the northeast, but not to the frontier.

Following this conversation the Minister President and the Foreign Minister went with the Minister of War to the Regent's, where the Chief of the General Staff had called a meeting of the National Defense Council. I urged the Foreign Minister once more to keep calm and he definitely promised me he would.

¹⁰ The Budapest copy reads: "the."

¹¹ The word "only" is not on the Budapest copy.

He intended to make the same statements to the Italian Minister later.

Postscript: The Foreign Minister just called me after his return from the Regent's in order to inform me that the Defense Council had merely decided to mobilize the border guard battalions, beginning June 29, and to transfer them to the frontier. When I called his attention to the danger of border incidents he replied that it was exclusively a matter of precautionary measures and the necessary closing of the frontier.

ERDMANNSDORFF

No. 44

459/224987-39

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1009 of June 28

BUCHAREST, June 28, 1940.

Received June 28—8:25 a. m.

In answer to the Russian note of reply that arrived here 2 hours ago, in which it is specifically stated that the Russian Government regarded the Rumanian note replying to the ultimatum and the additional oral statement of Davidescu,¹ the Rumanian Minister, as indicating acceptance of the Russian terms, the Rumanian Government stated that it accepted *unconditionally*. The time limit of 4 days proposed by the Russians for the evacuation was too short in view of the recent floods. The Rumanian Government requests us, if possible, to exert influence on Moscow to the end that the time limit be extended from 2 to 4 days. It also points out that the city of Cernăuți, where numerous Germans live, is to be occupied tomorrow. The Rumanian Government requests us even after the matter has been decided to make the attempt to have Cernăuți left to Rumania; at any rate, to have the time limit for evacuation extended. Moscow expects a definitive answer by noon (12 o'clock) today. Under State Secretary Corozianu, who just informed me of the foregoing at 4:30 a. m. by order of the Minister President, added that this request signified no modification in principle of the unconditional acceptance of the Russian ultimatum, but referred only to hope for help from us, since the Rumanian Government, in accepting the severe Russian terms, is relying on German advice and thereby wanted to prove that it wished to follow the path of close collaboration with us in the future

¹ For the Rumanian note of June 27, Davidescu's oral statement, the Soviet reply and the Rumanian note of June 28, see Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 458-461.

too. Proof of this was the most recent formation of a Cabinet with Argetovianu as Foreign Minister, Gigurtu and Naida Voe (1 group garbled) as Minister without Portfolio, Sidorovice as Minister of Propaganda and Cancicov also in place of Minister of Defense Christu.²

Legation

² Although this sentence had to be repeated after having been garbled in an earlier transmission, these names were still inaccurate. From a memorandum by Heinburg of June 28 (271/176213-15), which deals with the reshuffling of the Rumanian Cabinet, it appears that the first name should read (Constantin) Argetolanu, the third (Alexander) Valda-Voevod, and the fourth Sidorovici.

No. 45

459/224932

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, June 28, 1940.

I asked this morning first the Bulgarian Minister and then the Hungarian Minister to see me, explaining my request by saying that I wanted to convey to them our information on the development of the Soviet-Rumanian conflict.

After I had done this I told the two Ministers as instructed that my statement of yesterday,¹ that in view of the new crisis the Foreign Minister now wished the two states to remain quiet, was based on a misunderstanding on my part, resulting from a talk I had with the State Secretary about our general desire for peace in the Balkans. Actually, the Foreign Minister had said nothing at all on the subject of the Bulgarian wishes in connection with the new situation. I merely wished, I said, to set this matter right and requested the two Ministers to report at once today if they had sent reports on my statements of yesterday.

The *Bulgarian* Minister had just received an instruction from his Government which he conveyed to me. It was to the effect that there had been no collusion regarding Rumania between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. The Bulgarian Government had had no advance notice of Soviet plans. The Bulgarian Government intended, as in the past, to pursue its aspirations only in very close cooperation with us.

The Minister also had new information on Turkish reinforcements at the Thracian border, especially on the appearance of new tanks. He remarked in this connection that the situation continued to be dangerous for Bulgaria, and that consequently his Government was exceedingly interested in learning the German attitude as quickly as possible.

¹ Documents Nos. 37 and 38.

The *Hungarian* Minister merely remarked in connection with the conversation that he would like to learn our stand as early as possible on the memorandum which he delivered yesterday² in accordance with his instructions.

WOERMANN³

² Enclosure to document No. 38.

³ In telegrams Nos. 387 to Sofia and 519 to Budapest, both sent on June 28, Woermann informed the two Legations of his conversations on June 27 and 28 with the Ministers of the two countries (585/242594-95; 73/52493).

No. 46

459/224953

Note by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, June 28, 1940.

Under State Secretary Gaus telephoned from the Special Train and asked me to inform Minister Fabricius by telephone approximately as follows:

We had already heard that the evacuation negotiations were under discussion by a commission, but pursuant to his telegram No. 1009,¹ we had already instructed Ambassador von der Schulenburg to take appropriate steps with the Soviet Government to obtain an extension of the time limits for evacuation.² In the telephone conversation with Minister Fabricius the question of Cernăuți is not in any circumstances to be mentioned, however.

I transmitted the two sentences to Minister Fabricius by telephone at 4:45 p. m. The Minister did not ask any questions but said merely, in reply to a question from me, that everything was going well there so far. The advance had begun; morale in Bucharest was very low.

Submitted herewith to Senior Counselor Kordt for his information.

STEG³

¹ Document No. 44.

² The instruction to Schulenburg has not been found.

³ Attaché Rudolf Steg, assistant to Minister Schmidt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

No. 47

19/12355-56

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 1296 of June 28

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1940—12:27 p. m.

Received June 28—11:00 p. m.

The surprise nomination of the big-business executive Wendell Willkie as Republican presidential candidate projects a distinct

leader-personality on the political stage, and so greatly improves the chances of the Republicans for a victory over Roosevelt and the Democratic New Deal. The opposition within the Republican National Committee against Willkie as a former Democrat and a representative of big business, lacking any political experience, has been swept aside by the majority of the delegates who, supported by a cleverly operating clique, were able on the sixth ballot to achieve the aim of replacing the inactivity and senility of the Republican party by a dynamic era. Willkie is as far as this is concerned the answer to the wishes of all those who feel that the Republican party's chances to win depend on abandoning the old party leaders and bringing in new blood.

From the standpoint of foreign policy, Willkie's nomination is unfortunate for us. He is not an isolationist and while he is reported to have pledged himself to embrace the nonintervention program of his party, (group garbled) his attitude in the past permits no doubt that he belongs to those Republicans who see America's best defense in supporting England by all means "short of war." According to confidential reports Willkie is even a charter member of the W. A. White Committee.¹

Willkie is a World War veteran and a member of the American Legion, which is strongly isolationist. But neither his membership in the American Legion nor his pure German descent have so far had any influence in diverting him from his pro-Allied stand.

Willkie's nomination shifts the ground of the contest for the presidential election between him and the candidate of the Democratic party (presumably Roosevelt) to purely domestic political issues. In matters of foreign policy, the present difference between Willkie and Roosevelt is at most one of methods and not of belief.

THOMSEN

¹ The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, organized by William Allen White in May, 1940.

No. 48

534/252479-80

The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 87 of June 28

ROME, June 28, 1940—3:30 p. m.

Received June 28—6:05 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The Cardinal Secretary of State sent for me today and handed me the following message of the Pope, given below in translation, with

the request to relay it as promptly as possible to the Führer and Chancellor.

"Deeply concerned by the prospect of countless victims and irreparable devastations which the now impending resurgence of war operations will cause, the Holy Father, on his own initiative and with the sole intent of doing his utmost for the salvation of mankind and civilization, in the conviction that a just and honorable peace is the desire of the peoples and that the prolongation of the war could easily lead to further fighting and crises, should like to address himself to the Governments of Germany, England, and Italy with the request to try the path of mutual conciliation, in order to arrive at the termination of the conflict. Before initiating this step, however, His Holiness desires that Your Excellency confidentially sound out your Government as to the reception it would accord to such a request of the Pope."

A similar step was taken with the Italian Ambassador. An analogous communication will be transmitted to the British Government through the Apostolic Delegate in London, as the English Minister to the Holy See is not in contact with his Government.

The Cardinal Secretary of State reiterated orally that the Pope's intention to mediate was due to his own initiative. I do not think it impossible that the Pope was encouraged in this largely by the declarations of the Führer in the interview granted to Karl von Wiegand,¹ especially by the statements in item 6, regarding relations with England.

I should be grateful to receive your instructions regarding a reply to the inquiry.²

BERGEN

¹ See vol. ix, document No. 473, footnote 3.

² See document No. 236.

No. 49

271/176205

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1251 of June 28

Moscow, June 28, 1940—5:38 p. m.

Received June 28—9:40 p. m.

At 11 o'clock today the Rumanian Minister here delivered to Molotov the note of reply of the Rumanian Government whereby the Soviet demands for the occupation of the cities of Cernăuți, Chisinau, and Cetatea Albă were accepted. The Soviet Government has not granted the urgent request of the Rumanian Government for an extension of the time limits, so that the Soviet troops will begin to march in today

at 2 p. m., Moscow time. Determination of the time and details of the occupation of the other territories is being delegated to a mixed commission, and Odessa is being proposed by the Soviet Government as its seat. Generals Koslov and Boldin (probably commander of the military district of Odessa) are being appointed Soviet delegates to this commission. If, for technical reasons, it should become necessary to change the time limits for the occupation by a few hours, the Soviet delegates will be empowered to grant the necessary delay. The text of the exchange of notes and a commentary were broadcast by Soviet radio in a special announcement at 2 p. m. today.¹

SCHULENBURG

¹ The text of this broadcast on the Soviet-Rumanian exchange of notes was given in Schulenburg's telegram No. 1252 of the same day (271/176192-94). It is identical with the document published in English translation in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 458-461.

No. 50

1632/389957

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1013 of June 28

BUCHAREST, June 28, 1940—[6:30 p. m.] ¹

[Received June 29—8:30 a. m.]

Pol. IV 2109.

Yesterday I sent the following instructions to the leaders of the German national groups in Bessarabia and Bucovina, at the same time informing the Consulates at Galati and Cernăuți: "Those Volks-deutsche who have been prominent in anti-Bolshevist activities and have reason to fear that their names are on the G. P. U. list are advised to depart for Transylvania at once. Otherwise all Volks-deutsche shall remain on their farms, identify themselves to the Russian military forces as Germans and make contact with the Russian commanders, who will give them protection until they are resettled. They shall defend themselves against any roving bands of marauders. In such case only shall the inhabitants of isolated farms go to the nearest compact German settlement. Parish registers are to be buried at once." At my request, moreover, the Minister President has instructed the prefects to ensure at once unconditionally that Volks-deutsche will be protected against possible acts of violence by Rumanians. In the same sense, Marabu [sic], who is known to Heyden-

¹ The times of dispatch and arrival of this telegram were found on another copy (175/137019).

Rynsch, issued the order through the General Staff and the Rumanian Security Police that . . . high-ranking officials be assigned to the two *Volksdeutsch* Gauleiters with power to comply promptly . . . with requests for protective measures.² I take it for granted that you will ensure—with the Russian High Command effective protection for all *Volksdeutsche* without exception.³

FABRICIUS ⁴

² This passage was badly garbled in transmission.

³ Marginal note: "Agreed. R[ibbentrop]."

⁴ In accordance with a German policy, first carried out in Estonia and Latvia, of repatriating the *Volksdeutsche* from areas which had fallen under Soviet control (see vol. VIII, documents Nos. 153 and 252, footnote 2), negotiations on the resettlement of approximately 13,000 *Volksdeutsche* were begun soon after the Russian occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina. In contrast, however, to the documentation from Foreign Ministry files which is available with respect to the resettlement of the remaining *Volksdeutsche* from the Baltic States after the latter had been annexed by the Soviet Union in July 1940 (see documents Nos. 22 and 102) the corresponding files of the Economic Policy Department on the Russo-German negotiations on this subject have not been found. See, however, *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (Berlin, 1943), vol. VIII, pt. 2, pp. 624-639, for the text of the agreement signed on Sept. 5 with some notes on the negotiations by the German editors. Negotiations for the repatriation of a smaller number of *Volksdeutsche* from southern Bessarabia and northern Dobruja, territories that were still under Rumanian sovereignty, were conducted in Bucharest in the course of October 1940 and led to a similar German-Rumanian agreement on Oct. 22. For the text see *ibid.*, pp. 640-657.

No. 51

271/176199

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, June 28, 1940—7:00 p. m.

No. 1014 of June 28

Received June 29—7:15 a. m.

The Minister President tells me: The Rumanian Government has just received information today about the extent of the cession demanded in "north Bucovina." It had previously assumed that the part of Bucovina north of the Prut was involved, whereas it now turns out that more than half of Bucovina is being demanded, and, in addition to that, a part of the old Rumanian territory in northern Moldavia. The Rumanian Government has therefore proposed to Moscow via Davidescu, 1) that only the district of Cernăuți come immediately under military occupation, 2) that a mixed commission meet in order to negotiate in a friendly way about a definitive settlement concerning additional territory, 3) that old Rumanian territory remain in Rumania.

Only if Soviet Russia shows compliance is there possibility in the long run to achieve friendly neighborliness. The people's indignation is very great; also the King has designated the Russian demand as unbearable, while a larger part of the Rumanian people are for war and will not forgive the Government the unconditional cession of the entire area. The Minister President asks me to inform my Government of this, and to request it to influence Moscow so that at least the old territory [*Altbesitz*] will be left as it was.

The telephone message of the Rumanian Minister in Moscow of 1:00 p. m. was given to the Minister President at 1:15 p. m.

FABRICIUS

No. 52

230/152270

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 497

BERLIN, June 28, 1940.

The Yugoslav Minister came to see me today in order to tell me the following by order of his Foreign Minister:

M. Cincar-Marković was naturally rather uneasy over what was going on between Rumania and Russia. He was therefore counseling peace in Hungary and Bulgaria. He hoped that Berlin was doing the same in Budapest and Sofia. He assumed that we, too, had advised Bucharest to yield.

I was rather short in my statements to M. Andrić and only told him that we had no indications that Budapest or Sofia wanted to start a conflagration.

At the insistence of M. Andrić that we were surely working in favor of peace in the Balkans, I replied that it was our traditional policy, which we had regularly pursued in the war so far, to work in favor of peace wherever possible.

When M. Andrić also mentioned the Balkan Pact¹ in the course of the conversation without, however, showing it much respect, I told him that politically this Pact was a living corpse. It could only be invoked by someone seeking a legal justification for his desire for war.

I closed the conversation with a few statements on British incendiaryism in the Balkans.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ By the Balkan Pact, signed at Athens Feb. 9, 1934, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia mutually guaranteed the security of their Balkan frontiers. For text see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1934*, vol. CXXXVII, p. 496.

No. 53

585/242598-99

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SOFIA, June 29, 1940—12:10 a. m.

SECRET

Received June 29—5:35 a. m.

No. 250 of June 28

With reference to my telegram No. 248 of June 28.¹

As was to be expected, the King outlined to me in a very friendly conversation lasting an hour and a half the difficult situation that would arise in a few days, as soon as the public, at present still stunned by the Russian advance in Bessarabia, came to its senses and in addition the influence of foreign propaganda took effect. A vehement agitation would then be launched against him and the Government for the "betrayal" of Bulgarian Dobruja; British money would in this connection make use of the Bulgarian Trotskyite Communists, just as it had done in the strike movement which recently had been suppressed only by the energetic application of the civilian mobilization act.

The King finally formulated two main questions:

1) Would it not be possible for Germany to prevail upon Rumania to redress the wrong done in the Peace of Bucharest of 1913, thereby winning over a neighbor with whom she had had nothing but good relations up to that time? (After a settlement of the revisionist demands of Bulgaria, and probably also of Hungary, there might be a guarantee of the Rumanian frontier by Germany, Italy, and Russia, which would check the latter's further advance in the Balkans.) The King referred in this connection to the dangerous, ambiguous policy of Yugoslavia, which was doubtless trying, for its own protection, to bring Russia back to the Balkans. What was otherwise possible? The promise of a subsequent arbitral award, for instance? In any event, the situation would be intolerable if Bulgaria did not receive at least a promissory note. If not, there would be the danger of a violent revolution, followed by very close association with Moscow in the future.

2) There was a recurrent report that Germany, Russia, and Italy had divided the Balkans into spheres of interest. If this were true, he would be grateful for confirmation of this fact, as well as for information as to the settlement proposed in the Straits question, so that he could plan a long-range policy.

The King's view of Bulgaria's situation is shared by myself and Count Magistrati.² Since the oppressive uncertainty about Bulgaria's future contains many elements of danger for our position in the

¹ Not printed (585/242597).

² Italian Minister in Bulgaria.

Balkans, and since Bulgaria is our sincere friend, who, by resisting all tempting offers, has thwarted every attempt to establish a Balkan bloc, I should be grateful if a study were made as to what, if anything, we could do for her. Please telegraph instructions indicating what I should reply to the King.*

RICHTHOFEN

* At 11:30 a. m. of June 29 (271/176184) Richthofen telephoned Berlin that the Italian Minister in Sofia had that morning received an instruction saying Italy "was sympathetic toward Bulgaria's just claims and requested her only to keep calm." Richthofen repeated his request that he be given instructions. For these instructions see document No. 70.

No. 54

865/206172-73

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission¹ to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

No. 10 of June 29

HWIX,² JUNE 29, 1940—4:26 p. m.

Received June 29—5:15 p. m.

Today there was a conference in Wiesbaden between General Roatta, Deputy Chief of the Italian General Staff, and the German Armistice Commission with regard to reaching an agreement on the implementation of the Armistice Agreement. General Roatta stated that he concurred fully with all the proposals of General von Stülpnagel. He made almost no suggestions of his own. Essentially the following was agreed upon:

1. Italy may demand surrender of weapons and war material from the area east of the Rhone and bounded on the north by the Geneva-Lyon highway (excluding Lyon), and will carry out all military control measures in this sector.

¹ The German Armistice Commission was established in accordance with the provisions of article 22 of the Armistice and was under the control of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. It held its sessions at Wiesbaden. It was headed by General von Stülpnagel, and the representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Commission was Senior Counselor Hencke. Also in accordance with the provision of article 22 of the Armistice, there was constituted a French delegation with the German Armistice Commission which was charged with representing French interests and receiving the directions of the German Armistice Commission. The French delegation was headed by General Huntziger. The French Government has published a collection of documents of this delegation under the title *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice* (Paris, 1947), vols. I-III.

For a table of organization of the German Armistice Commission as of June 29, 1940, and a table of organization of the French delegation as of Aug. 23, 1940, see *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 453 and 454, respectively.

² Telegraphic symbol used on messages sent from Wiesbaden by the representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Armistice Commission.

2. Surveillance of the French armament industry to ensure observation of the prohibition on the manufacture of war material will be carried out jointly by Germany and Italy in the entire unoccupied French area. A special agreement is in prospect on this subject.

3. It will be left to Italy to determine the strength of the French forces in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Syria.

4. Germany will make the necessary regulations with regard to the French colonial areas in Indochina, the West Indies and French Equatorial Africa.

5. With regard to the French naval forces, Germany will assume control of all Atlantic ports and Italy of all Mediterranean ports. General Roatta stated that an Italian Armistice Commission is convening at Turin. A telegraphic report on its personnel will follow.

An exchange of military liaison staffs in Wiesbaden and Turin is intended.

Of political interest is General Roatta's intention to bring French forces in Syria, gradually over a considerable period of time, back up to the strength of a division, so as to give the French the possibility of defending themselves if necessary against an attack on the part of English troops from Palestine.

HENCKE

No. 55

73/52505-06

The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair via Air Courier

URGENT

No. 401

BUDAPEST, June 28, 1940.

Received June 29—6:10 p. m.

The Foreign Minister asked me to call on him this evening and said that he thought it important to tell me the following prior to my return to Berlin:

I. He knew that Germany was interested in the maintenance of peace in southeastern Europe mainly for economic reasons. He therefore wanted to tell me that after Hungary had obtained the desired revision of her boundary with Rumania, she would see to it that Germany's economic interests would not only not be injured but promoted. Hungary would make efforts to increase considerably over their present level the deliveries in which Germany was interested, even if this necessitated curtailment within Hungary itself. Hungary was moreover ready to grant Germany free traffic through Hungary (the so-called toll traffic) since she knew that Germany was particularly interested in settling the traffic problem in the southeast; Germany could then run her own trains through Hungary, without

supervision and with her own personnel, to any destination in the southeast over any of the lines agreed upon.

II. Following this communication Count Csáky explained to me in detail the Hungarian stand in the revision question vis-à-vis Rumania. He repeated in essence the explanations which he made yesterday to Herr von Erdmannsdorff (telegraphic report No. 398¹). He urgently requested that I also explain in detail the Hungarian standpoint in conversations with the leading German personages upon my return to Berlin. I had the impression that this request was more important to him than the economic statements given in paragraph I. From Csáky's statements, on which I shall report orally in greater detail,² the following points, which go further than the statements to Herr von Erdmannsdorff, should be given special emphasis:

Count Csáky underscored that when the desired revision of her border with Rumania had been carried out, Hungary would be completely satiated. Not only the Government but also the Hungarian national consciousness had definitely come to accept the existence of Slovakia as an independent state. With reference to Yugoslavia, too, Hungary waived any territorial claims, except for a very small border revision of a few square kilometers at the only spot where Yugoslav territory crossed the Drava river to the north. Only Hungarians and Germans lived in this small area. The correction was so slight that it would hardly be visible on the map and could be agreed in an amicable manner. When I asked twice whether his statement about Hungary's being definitely satiated, and especially about Slovakia, was the official position of the Hungarian Government, Count Csáky confirmed this explicitly and also replied in the affirmative to my further question whether I should report his statements in this sense in Berlin.

Another point to be emphasized in Csáky's statements is his concern about a further Russian advance. He would for this reason be very much interested in reaching a peaceful and permanent settlement with Rumania. For this reason he had opposed the more far-reaching demands of the Hungarian military for the return of all of Transylvania. He wanted to create even now the premises for a later joint defense of the Carpathian line by Hungary and Rumania.

CLODIUS
ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ Document No. 43.

² A memorandum by Clodius dated June 29 gives a more detailed account of Csáky's statements (73/52498-501).

No. 56

175/137030-32

Adolf Hitler to King Carol II of Rumania

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 29, 1940.

I gather from the report of my Minister¹ that Your Majesty feels there is some connection between the events now being visited upon Rumania and the visit of Your Majesty to the Berghof.² This is also confirmed to me by the telegram that Your Majesty had the kindness to address to me.³

Your visit to the Berghof took place on November 24, 1938. The decisive reason for this conference was primarily Your Majesty's anxiety concerning the menacing turn that developments had taken in the residual state of Czechoslovakia. At this conversation Your Majesty expressed the wish that the Carpatho-Ukraine should in no circumstances revert to Hungary, but you stressed the necessity for you to have a direct corridor to Germany. Your Majesty even expressed the wish that the German Reich might undertake the construction of a Reich Autobahn for this purpose across the territory of Slovakia through the Carpatho-Ukraine to Rumania. At the time I advanced both economic and political arguments against it. Nevertheless only a little later on—namely, in the spring of 1939—England asserted with increasing emphasis that Germany wished to break into Rumania. These insinuations, which were in contradiction to the essence of the conversation as it had taken place and which grew worse as a result of British assertions about an alleged ultimatum by the German Reich to Rumania,⁴ were not, unfortunately, corrected or refuted by the Rumanian Government in the way that was to be expected. On the contrary, when England used these reasons in offering Rumania a mutual assistance pact against Germany, Rumania not only did not reject it, but accepted it.⁵ The claim of British propaganda regarding an alleged threat to Rumania from Germany was thereby confirmed, at least indirectly.

It was precisely this continued imputation as to German designs in areas that lie entirely outside our natural interests that finally led in the summer of 1939 to the discussions in Moscow and to the final settlement of German-Russian relations resulting therefrom. The sig-

¹ See document No. 33.

² See vol. v, document No. 254.

³ Not found. See document No. 36.

⁴ Cf. vol. vi, document No. 42; cf. also *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, third series (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951), vol. iv, document No. 395.

⁵ Cf. vol. vi, document No. 195.

nificance of this clarification, however, lay in establishing that there are regions in which Germany is interested politically, regions in which Germany is interested only economically, and regions in which Germany is not interested at all.

As far as Rumania is concerned, Germany has never had political interests in this country and therefore also refused to exert any influence in this respect. But in spite of this, as Your Majesty well knows, Rumania was for decades a steadfast and active ally of the opponents of the German Reich. I need here only bring to mind the unvarying attitude of the Rumanian delegation at Geneva. It was not until very recently that Rumania attempted to free herself from those ties which had thus far at any rate always kept her on the anti-German side. The documentary material available to the Reich Government gives instructive information about this.

As far as the conflict in question is concerned, my Government has been trying from the beginning to express the view toward each party that it ought to be possible to avoid warlike developments; for I believe that in the existing circumstances, the most profitable goal Rumania can pursue is the preservation of peace. I should be glad to be helpful to Your Majesty in this, so far as it lies within the power of Germany.*

ADOLF HITLER

* According to a notation on the document, this message was telephoned to Fabricius at 8 p. m. It was handed to the Court Minister at 9 p. m. as Fabricius reported in telegram No. 1040 sent in the late evening of June 29 (175/137033).

No. 57

175/137024-25

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 1034 of June 29

BUCHAREST, June 29, 1940—7:40 p. m.

Received June 30—5:50 a. m.

Argetoianu wished to speak to me immediately upon taking over his post as Foreign Minister. He said Gigurtu had remained in the Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio. The King had summoned him, Argetoianu, because as an old politician he was known in the country, while Gigurtu had as yet hardly made an impression in the field of foreign affairs. In the hour of trial he, as well as Vaida Voevod, had not wished to forsake the King even if it was very hard for him now to have to sanction the only decision that was possible, namely, to accept the Russian ultimatum. But it was necessary now

to make a clean sweep of the erroneous policy of the past. He had taken over his office on the definite condition that the King would openly adopt a policy of cooperation with the Axis, particularly with Germany. But Berlin and Rome would also have to join in this policy. Rumania had made the great sacrifice with respect to Russia and had sacrificed provinces without putting up a fight. He did not wish to debate whether it had been right from the standpoint of German political and economic interests in the Danubian region to permit Russia to cross the Dniester. The important thing now was to break with the past. He requested the Reich Government, however, not to expect further sacrifices from Rumania and to hold Bulgaria and Hungary in check.

I replied that the Foreign Minister should remember the reply the Reich Foreign Minister had made to Tatarescu's first proposal;¹ in the reply, to be sure, the intention of a rapprochement was received with interest, but attention was nevertheless drawn to the need for satisfying certain revisionist aspirations of Rumania's neighbors. The Foreign Minister replied that the biggest neighbor had been satisfied, and that to a greater extent than it could have expected. Bulgaria's revisionist problem was not so difficult; Hungary's aspirations, on the other hand, were unrealizable if the sincere desire of Rumania for rapprochement was not thereby to be made unpopular at the outset. In conclusion the Foreign Minister defined his program as follows:

Open and conspicuous collaboration, with Rumania declaring herself as Germany's friend unambiguously; a sensible settlement of the Bulgarian and Hungarian questions.

FABRICIUS

¹ See vol. ix, documents Nos. 345 and 364.

No. 58

265/172341-42

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 488 of June 29

ANKARA, June 29, 1940—7: 45 p. m.

Received June 30—12: 45 p. m.

1. I have learned from an excellent source that the Syrian Army as well as the French naval unit submitted to the Bordeaux Government because the troops and the ship's crew declared that they did

not want to continue the war. This was communicated to Massigli by Weygand.

2. One would suppose that under the impression of the progressive collapse of the Allied front, and particularly as a result of Russian intervention in Bessarabia, Turkey would subject her policy to a thorough revision, especially in order to bring about an improvement (evidently one group missing here) ¹ Russia. From a long conversation which I just had with the Russian Ambassador ² I gather that the opposite is the case. The Turkish Government is convinced at the present time that Russia, together with Bulgaria, is preparing a campaign against the Straits. Terentiev said that if this situation continues any longer it might have serious consequences for Turkey. I also gather from what he said that Russia might be amenable to establishing friendly relations, but only on condition that Turkey turn her back on England entirely.

For guidance of my conversation it would now be essential to know the views of the Reich Government and of Italy on the future of the Straits. From here it looks as if in any case it would be better for Italy's future Mediterranean position to have Turkey instead of Russia at the Straits. If this is so, then I could try, by exerting appropriate influence here, to improve Turkish-Russian relations decisively by means of Turkish concessions before it is too late.³

Such an improvement would not affect bad Russo-English relations.

3. The Hungarian and Bulgarian Ministers hinted at the concern of their Governments that if they should now remain quiet they might jeopardize their claims. I told both of them that the Führer and the Foreign Minister would not forget old friends.

4. The Hungarian Minister relayed to me a request for a confidential talk from the Iraq Minister of Justice, who is a member of a delegation at Ankara.⁴ He claims that, with the concurrence of the Cabinet, he is speaking for the Iraq people's wish to break away from England, and that he wishes to convey to me his views for the settlement of the Arab question.

My suggestion that he talk about it with the Italian Ambassador was declined. Perhaps I might receive some useful information. Please send instructions.⁵

PAPEN

¹ Actually the Ankara draft of this telegram indicates no omission (4511/E182675-76).

² Alexei Terentiev had occupied his post since 1938.

³ See document No. 71.

⁴ See document No. 125.

⁵ Not found.

No. 59

19/12870-71

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1309 of June 29

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1940—9:21 p. m.

Received June 30—10:10 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 703 of June 27 (with Pol. V 6652).¹

The official relations between the United States and Soviet Russia are distinctly cool. No improvement is to be expected at this time, although interventionist newspapers and correspondents are seeking to condition American public opinion to the idea that the United States and Russia, being both threatened by Germany, are logical allies. For these people it would be a natural thing to make an American national hero out of Stalin, if he were to attack Germany from behind.

The Soviet Government is doing nothing here to improve relations. On the contrary, it is dissatisfied with the success of Oumansky's protests (cf. telegram No. 1239¹) and demands complete, instead of limited, freeing of machinery shipments.² With the American Government Oumansky maintains only the most essential contact, although he was at one time a welcome guest even at the White House. Steinhardt has not yet returned to Moscow from his vacation. Oumansky told me that he has received countless letters from private American citizens urging Russia to strike at Germany before it is too late; the attitude of the American Government vis-à-vis Russia, on the other hand, he characterized in his fluent German as *lässig und feige* (flabby and cowardly). The American Government's line of policy toward Russia is obscure because it is as undefined as the rest of Roosevelt's uncertain foreign policy. Some forces active in the State Department are for an appeasement of Russia (as also of Japan), so as to help England and relieve the Pacific front. Other forces, on the other hand, active in the opposite direction, consider any rapprochement with Russia (or Japan) as being below America's dignity.

Whether England's defeat, which is here believed to be imminent, will be assessed by the American Government as constituting a threat

¹ Not found.

² Over the course of the preceding several months the Soviet Ambassador had entered a series of protests against the application of American restrictions on exports of certain strategic items, such as machine tools, to the Soviet Union.

that can be averted only by giving up the position in the Pacific and assuming an active interest in the Atlantic front cannot yet be predicted at this time.

THOMSEN

No. 60

205/142455-56

The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, June 29, 1940—9:45 p. m.

No. 1086 of June 29

Received June 30—2:30 a. m.

The Swedish Foreign Ministry today communicated the following position of the Swedish Government on the contemplated exchange of notes, regarding the text of which, moreover, agreement was obtained:

1. The Swedish Government was prepared to permit the transit of war material in full compliance with our wishes. The further arrangements necessary for effecting the transport of personnel should, however, be established and signed simultaneously with the exchange of notes. It had been explained by the German side to Minister Richert at the time¹ in response to his inquiry, that there was no question of actual troop transports. Consequently the Swedish Government was proposing the following supplementary statement:

"In connection with point 4 of the exchange of notes, it is agreed that transports of personnel shall until further notice proceed as follows:

"a) approximately 150 men per week from Narvik to Germany in both directions in special cars and trains made available for the purpose; b) two trains weekly in both directions from Kornsjö to Germany.

"c) There shall in general be no other transit to and from Germany or Denmark. If special reasons exist, however, the transit of individuals may also take place. Special regulations will be transmitted for these individuals.["]

¹ Possibly a reference to discussion in the course of the interview between Ribbentrop and Richert on June 15; see vol. ix, document No. 466.

Richert, in his report to Günther on this interview, quoted Ribbentrop as saying that after the cessation of hostilities in Norway "it was expected that there would be no objection to travel through Sweden by persons belonging to the German armed forces in Norway, especially those on leave concerning whom it was desired to make special arrangements." For text of report see *Handlingar rörande Sveriges politik under andra världskriget: Transiteringsfrågan Juni-December 1940* (Stockholm, 1947), pp. 9-11.

2. Without prejudice to the exchange of notes, which has not yet taken place, and which had not originally been intended, furlough trips might proceed within the scope of the above-mentioned supplementary agreements. The first transport of troops on leave amounting to 150 men will leave Riksgränsen probably this evening with destroyer crews.²

BELOW

² i. e., members of the crews of German destroyers which had been sunk at Narvik.

No. 61

175/137087

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, June 29, 1940—10:48 p. m.

No. 407 of June 29

Received June 30—3:45 a. m.

The Foreign Minister, with whom I had luncheon following my conversation with his deputy, told me that the Army Corps to be mobilized next was the one in Szeged. He asserted, on the strength of a recent Rumanian press campaign, that it was not entirely impossible that King Carol, gambler that he is, might try to recoup his popularity shaken by the cession of territory, by launching a sudden attack against Hungarian territory for the purpose of advancing the border to the Tisza. The Hungarian Minister at Bucharest, incidentally, had been instructed to ask the Rumanian Government for an explanation as to why, having accepted the Russian terms, it had ordered general mobilization. To me also, Csáky stated that he had great trouble resisting the pressure exerted by leading Hungarians, including Imrédy,¹ for an early solution of the Transylvanian question by force of arms.

The Foreign Minister added that he would be grateful if the Reich Government would give the Rumanian Government to understand, just as the Yugoslav Government had done, that we should be glad if it would establish contact with the Hungarian Government with regard to the Hungarian claims. He had addressed a similar request to the Italian Government.

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ Hungarian Minister President, May 1938–February 1939.

No. 62

B19/B003631-32

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, June 29, 1940.

The Finnish Minister called on me today and first expressed his satisfaction over the conclusion of the German-Finnish trade treaty,¹ which nearly doubles the volume of trade between the two countries. The Minister was particularly pleased that conclusion of a treaty was achieved even though it had been impossible to settle the nickel question owing to the difficulties raised by the Soviet Union.

The Minister then gave an account of the recent Soviet-Finnish conversations concerning the Soviet-Finnish trade treaty in connection with the nickel question and the question of the Åland Islands. He confirmed the reports received here that the Soviet Union at the last moment waived linking the latter two issues to the trade treaty, but that these issues between Finland and the Soviet Union would have to be resolved.

On the question of the Petsamo nickel the Minister gave an account that coincides with the material available here, but which I shall nevertheless relate here as he presented it.² Shortly before the conclusion of the trade treaty, he said, the Soviet Union proposed to the Finnish Government three possibilities for a solution of the nickel question, namely,

a concession for the Kolosjoki nickel mines, which belong to the Canadian firm, The Mond Nickel Company, Ltd., or
 a concession for a joint Finnish-Soviet company, or
 some third arrangement, involving in any case the expropriation of the mines belonging to the Canadian company.

Molotov had said in this connection that The Mond Nickel Co., Ltd., was in no position to cause difficulties if Finland wished to revoke the concession. The Soviet Union's interest in the nickel mine area and the nickel itself exists for all time to come, and involved also "getting the English out of Petsamo." My inquiry as to whether the Soviet Union's interest in the "mine area" implied also a territorial demand, was answered by the Minister in the negative.

The question of the Åland Islands³ was brought up at a later stage of the trade negotiations than the question of Petsamo. Molotov

¹ Cf. vol. ix, document No. 367; the film of the text of the German-Finnish trade agreements cited at footnote 5 to document No. 367 was defective and the papers were filmed again as 9208/H249624-76. See also document No. 74, *post*.

² Documents from the Finnish side concerning Finnish-Soviet negotiations on the question of the nickel concession have been published in *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940-June 1941* (New York, 1941), an English translation of the Finnish Foreign Ministry's Blue and White Book.

³ The question of fortification of the Åland Islands was regulated by the Convention Relating to the Non-Fortification and Neutralization of the Åland Islands,

(Footnote continued on next page.)

declared that the Soviet Union still took the position that the Islands should not be fortified, but that if Finland wanted their fortification, this must be worked out jointly with the Soviet Union, that is, by means of a treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union. If the Åland Islands are not to be fortified, the Soviet Union would demand supervisory rights over them, to which end also a treaty would be concluded. The Finnish side then recalled that Stalin and Molotov last autumn had agreed to fortification of the Åland Islands by Finland, provided that she did it alone.⁴ To which Molotov replied that the Soviet Union had changed her views after the Soviet-Finnish war. She had not wanted to broach the subject at the peace conference,⁵ however, so as not to raise any difficulties while the conference was in progress.⁶

M. Kivimäki is aware that we have taken up direct contact with the Soviet Union on the nickel question.⁷ He suggested that a solution might also be provided by a Soviet-German-Finnish concession.

WOERMANN

Footnote (3)—Continued

signed at Geneva, Oct. 20, 1921, to which the Soviet Union was not a signatory; for text, see *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. ix, p. 211. For previous references in this series to the question of the Åland Islands see vol. v, ch. iv; vol. vi, documents Nos. 145, 187, 229, 528, 612, 626, 776; vol. viii, documents Nos. 106, 147, and 206; and vol. ix, document No. 19.

⁴For the Soviet position, see the Soviet memorandum of Oct. 14, 1939, to Finnish Minister Paasikivi in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. iii, pp. 382-384; also Molotov's speech of Oct. 31, 1939, in V. Molotov, *Soviet Peace Policy* (London, 1941), pp. 27-46.

⁵The reference is to the negotiations leading up to the treaty of peace signed at Moscow on Mar. 12, 1940, terminating the war between the Soviet Union and Finland. See vol. viii, documents Nos. 651, 661, 664, and 672, and vol. ix, document No. 19.

⁶On July 2, upon instruction of the Foreign Minister, Welzsäcker informed the Finnish Minister of the German position on the Åland Islands question as follows: "Viewed as a practical matter, it seems to the German Government that it would be the natural and logical thing for the Åland Islands to remain unfortified. However, we are taking no interest in the matter and in any case would not insist on inferring any special control rights or the like from the earlier Åland Convention." (B19/B008726)

⁷See document No. 24.

No. 63

271/176146

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, June 30, 1940.

No. 1 of June 30 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, June 30—4: 30 p. m.

No. 523 of June 30 from the Foreign Ministry

As you know, Count Teleki and Count Csáky some time ago ex-

pressed the desire to visit Berlin.¹ There will probably be an opportunity at the end of this week or the beginning of next week to comply with this wish, since the Führer will then probably come to Berlin from the front for a few days. The Foreign Ministry has already gotten in touch with the Hungarian Minister in Berlin to arrange the details of the visit. Please also come to Berlin for the visit. As for the Hungarian attitude toward Rumania, we have taken note of the statements of their Minister President and Foreign Minister which you reported recently. The Hungarian position, moreover, has also been set forth in a memorandum delivered to the Foreign Ministry by the Hungarian Minister.² As we have always emphasized, we have no political interest in these Balkan questions. Now that an amicable understanding has meanwhile been reached between the Soviet Union and the Rumanian Government about Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, we do not assume that Hungary, for its part, now intends to run the risk of a conflict with Rumania for the sake of her revisionist desires. There will no doubt be an opportunity during the contemplated visit to Berlin to talk about this subject, too, in connection with the discussion of the present international situation.³

Please be guided accordingly in your further conversations there.

RIBBENTROP

¹ On Apr. 19, the Hungarian Minister had informed Weizsäcker that Teleki and Csáky would like to visit Berlin in the second half of May (73/52317). On June 30, the Hungarian Minister conveyed to Woermann Csáky's urgent request that he be received by the Foreign Minister within the next few days. This was to be an incognito visit which would not affect his and Teleki's visit to Germany contemplated for a later date. (73/52514)

² Enclosure to document No. 38.

³ See document No. 146.

No. 64

30/22128-29

The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, June 30, 1940—9: 10 p. m.

No. 1090 of June 30

Received July 1—12: 25 a. m.

With reference to my telegram of June 29.¹

Foreign Minister Günther added the following confidentially during a private meeting with Dankwort² regarding the transit through Sweden of members of the German Wehrmacht in uniform: With the proposed supplementary statement (telegraphic report No. 1086 of the 29th¹) the Swedish Government hoped it had for the time being complied to all intents and purposes with the present German . . .³ If in addition it should be necessary to supplement the Narvik forces he

¹ Document No. 60.

² Karl Werner Dankwort, Counselor in the German Legation in Stockholm.

³ Typewritten marginal note: "Evidently the word 'wishes' is missing here."

would find appropriate ways and means of doing this, too. Such transit of members of the Wehrmacht from the south to the north of Norway should then if possible not be routed through the whole length of Sweden, but from Storlien on the so-called Swedish inland railway to Riksgränsen. Günther expressed the expectation that it would be a case here of smaller (evidently group missing) that could be carried out ostensibly as trips of soldiers on leave which had been agreed upon, whereas war material would go separately according to arrangement. The Foreign Minister would like to have exact figures for such a single transport from southern Norway via Storlien to the Narvik area.

BELOW

No. 65

490/232262

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*¹

St.S. No. 502

BERLIN, June 30, 1940.

By direction of the Foreign Minister I am charged with making the following statement at the conference of the directors of departments on Monday, July 1:

Germany is not considering peace. She is concerned exclusively with preparation for the destruction of England.

I request that you take note of this directive today and that you communicate it orally in your department to the extent necessary.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The addressees were the Auslandsorganisation, the State Secretary for Special Duties (Keppler), the Political Department, the Legal Department, the Cultural Policy Department, the Economic Policy Department, the News Service and Press Department, the Department for German Internal Affairs, and the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

No. 66

B15/B002536

The Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry

Teletype

AM BACH, June 30, 1940.

With reference to telegram No. 2140 of June 29 from Madrid,¹ on protection of the residence of the Duke of Windsor.²

The Foreign Minister requests first that Abetz be instructed to undertake unofficially and confidentially an unobtrusive observation of the residence of the Duke.

¹ Not found.

² The reference is to the Paris residence of the Duke.

Secondly, Ambassador von Stohrer is to be instructed to have the Duke informed confidentially through a Spanish intermediary that the Foreign Minister is looking out for its protection. However, no written statement whatever is to be made.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 67

F17/097-105

Minister Killinger to the Foreign Minister

BERLIN, June 30, 1940.

Enclosed is a report on my trip to Rumania from June 23 to June 28 concerning

- a) the Russo-Rumanian conflict
- b) conversations with
 - 1) General Moruzov (Chief of the Security Police)
 - 2) Minister Urdareanu (Court Minister)
 - 3) King Carol of Rumania.

Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister for his information, with the request that he decide whether the report should be submitted to the Führer.¹

V. KILLINGER

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, June 30, 1940.

REPORT ON RUMANIA, WITH REFERENCE TO THE RUSSIAN CRISIS CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL MORUZOV, MINISTER URDAREANU, AND KING CAROL

By a telegram of June 21, General Moruzov asked me to come to Rumania for a consultation on important matters. In connection with the measures against British sabotage attempts I had become very well acquainted with General Moruzov, Chief of the Rumanian Security Police. After the Foreign Minister had given his consent, I left for Rumania.

Upon my arrival I found that high political tension prevailed generally, caused by the continual border violations by the Russians at the Bessarabian and Ukrainian frontier. There had been several flights over the border, and on the Russian side as many as 200 tanks had paraded back and forth along the border.

After a short consultation with Minister Fabricius I went to General Moruzov. We had a conversation that lasted about 4 hours.

¹ The Foreign Minister's decision is not known.

Although I realized that he surely wished to speak to me only about the Russian question, I listened quietly to his statements about the newly founded National party.* He asked me for my advice on various matters, for instance, handling of the Jewish problem, labor peace, organization plans, party guard, etc. I told him that I could comment only briefly on all these questions since, if they were to be discussed thoroughly, it would take me days. I proposed that he invite four experts from Germany for an extended period, who could serve the party leaders in an advisory capacity, one to be a representative for propaganda, one for organizational questions, an SA leader, and a representative of the Labor Front. Moruzov cordially welcomed the proposal. The persons concerned would naturally be guests of the country.

During this conversation a report arrived to the effect that five Russian fliers had flown across the border as far as Cernăuți, that is, about 50 kilometers. We then spoke about the Russian problem.

Naturally the same arguments are always advanced in discussions of the Russo-Rumanian problem. Thus: Rumania remained neutral, her neutrality worked in Germany's favor; we furnished as much oil as possible, etc. Can't you call the Russians off? They were not worried about Bulgaria and Hungary. What should they do if the Russians attacked. I could only reply that we could make no demands of any kind on the Russians, who in this war had protected us from the rear; we could only express wishes to them. Direct help against Russia would be folly. We still had an important opponent and had no desire to fling away our protection for the rear for the sake of Rumania. In reply to his question whether they ought to fight, I told him that I considered it better if they entered into negotiations and complied with the demands the Russians might make. Because of the southeastern economic area (oil, grains, minerals, etc.) we Germans had no interest in an extension of the war to the Balkans.

He asked if I would not speak sometime to Minister Urdareanu, who, as the representative of King Carol, would be very much interested in my views. For they took the stand that they had to fight. I said that I was willing to have this talk.

The conversation with Urdareanu was along the same lines as that with General Moruzov. Only, in speaking to Urdareanu, I emphasized even more strongly the senselessness and, above all, the hopelessness of a battle.

He left the room a moment and asked me a short time later whether I would give the King an opportunity to speak with me.

* The National party had been created by a decree issued on June 21. Supreme leadership in the party was vested in King Carol. Included in the new organization were the Iron Guard and the Peasants' party, which had not been connected with the former all-party "National Renaissance Front."

I naturally stated that I was willing. The audience was scheduled for Thursday, June 27, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

Meanwhile Minister Fabricius informed me of the telegram that had arrived during the night,³ to the effect that the Russians had intended to attack the next morning, but the Führer had expressed the wish that he would prefer the matter to be settled peacefully.

The next day I learned of the ultimatum of the Russians to Rumania. Fabricius further informed me of the Foreign Minister's instructions to advise the Rumanian Government to comply with the demands.⁴ He likewise said that the King had flared up but that he had said in an appropriate way that he would not put up with such language.⁵

The day passed with sessions of the Crown Council and all kinds of conferences with the General Staff.

In the afternoon I was received by the King. I thought that because of what had occurred I would see a nervous and perhaps depressed man and was amazed at the firm and unequivocal attitude that he took and maintained. We spoke about the ultimatum and its consequences, and what was to be done. Naturally Moruzov and Urdareanu had informed him of the conversation they had had with me.

The King spoke as follows:

I asked you to speak with me in order that you might convey a request to Herr von Ribbentrop and the Führer.

The Russians have given the Rumanians an ultimatum that is equivalent to a rape. I cannot accept it. The Rumanian people, too, have their honor, which is also my honor. The fight will naturally be a hard one but I cannot act differently, since I am also an officer and a Hohenzollern. I desire only one thing: that Hungary and Bulgaria do not attack me from the rear and that I may release the reserves that are committed there. Then I can offer the Russians resistance. Please ask the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister to use their influence to keep Hungary and Bulgaria quiet.

I know that I am being reproached for having entered into a defensive alliance with England. The alliance is entirely one-sided, and I am not committed to anything. But remember we are a small country with products that are needed in warfare. This was the only way it was possible for me actually to keep Rumania out of the war and to preserve a strict neutrality which has worked out in Germany's favor. Had I refused the protection of England, Rumania would probably have been pulverized. I have kept my agreement with Germany during the war. If the oil did not flow as Germany expected during the

³ Cf. document No. 13, footnote 3.

⁴ Document No. 28.

⁵ See document No. 33.

winter months, it was not my fault. The reason was force majeure, the freezing over of the Danube, the floods, so that the supports of the pipelines filling the tankers were under water; and the organization of transportation was your affair, not ours. You have been working closely with us in preventing British sabotage.⁶ You will have to admit that I have done everything I could in this respect. I had all the war material that the British wished to transport on the *Dermonte* for the destruction of the Danubian route confiscated (cannons, machine guns, large quantities of explosives, magnetic mines). I also supported the Canaris organization and its expansion. I hushed up the matter of the illegal weapons that were found and that belonged to you (30 submachine guns).⁷ You cannot reproach me with having acted disloyally. And now I am attacked by the Russians in a manner similar to the methods of highway robbers. I shall defend myself.

I realize fully that Germany can give me no support against Russia. But one thing she can do, and one act of friendship is worth another—for the oil has continued to flow without interruption precisely during your western offensive—namely, call off Hungary and Bulgaria.

On the Salzberg I solemnly promised the Führer⁸ and Field Marshal Göring to fight Bolshevism with all the means at my command. This I have done. If by reason of the war that was forced on you the situation has changed basically, politically, not ideologically, I have nevertheless preserved my stand with respect to Bolshevism.

Remember that a tremendous amount of Communist propaganda has begun in the Balkans. In Bulgaria nothing is being done to combat it; the alliance with Russia is sought from sentiments of Pan-Slavism. In Yugoslavia they have all gone overboard and are throwing themselves into the arms of Russia for fear of Italy. Moreover, the Pan-Slavist movement, the Mafia, is nothing more than a springboard for the Comintern. The danger of the Bolshevization of the Balkans is tremendous. Perhaps you, who are occupied with these matters, are precisely so informed. Is Germany interested in the Balkans going Communist? If this happens, that area will be economically lost to Germany, or at least reduced to such a state of chaos that it will be of no real help in the war.

And do you realize that Russia and the others who are pursuing a pro-Russian policy in the Balkans are, in the last analysis, working for your enemy, England? You surely know of the celebration held by the British engineers at the Astra Romana, where they got drunk and exclaimed: "Now is the time!" They celebrated even before we, you and I, knew anything about the Russian ultimatum. (This is a fact.)

In reply to my question as to what action he had taken with respect to the Russians, he informed me that he had sent them word that he

⁶ See vol. ix, document No. 116.

⁷ See vol. ix, document No. 316.

⁸ See vol. v, document No. 254.

was prepared to negotiate.⁹ He also intended to make concessions if they were kept within reasonable bounds.

My reply was:

You view the matter from the standpoint of the soldier and the Rumanian nationalist. As such your attitude is comprehensible. I myself have been a soldier and still am, and I therefore understand that attitude very well. But as a politician I can by no means approve the attitude. In this case the question is not one of good or bad, honorable or dishonorable, brave or cowardly, but merely of strong or weak. I do not doubt the bravery of your soldiers, but the best soldier is inferior if he lacks modern military equipment. The Russian colossus will crush you to death. You will therefore lose not only Bessarabia and Bucovina but surely even more. The oil will probably be destroyed in the process. Thus a source of Rumanian wealth will be lost. We, too, would suffer if the Rumanian economic area were paralyzed. I advise you, therefore, to give in for reasons of political common sense.

After deliberating for some time, he said:

No, I cannot. Please go to Germany at once, try to speak to Herr von Ribbentrop as soon as possible, and through him to the Führer, and tell him of my request. I consider myself bound by the trade agreements. I shall continue to supply oil. See to it that Hungary and Bulgaria do not attack me from the rear and that I continue to receive munitions from you.

Without making promises of any kind I stated that I was prepared to go but told him that I no longer had any air connections; they had been suspended by reason of the total mobilization.

He ordered his own parlor car with the necessary staff to be made ready at once and all the tracks cleared. An hour later I was already en route with my escort on this special train. Hungary permitted me to continue on the same train to Budapest. After a brief conversation with Erdmannsdorff, I took the plane to Vienna.

There I met an acquaintance, the agent of the Security Service in Sofia, who was on his way there. He informed me that Russia had already issued a second ultimatum and that it had been accepted by Rumania in the night.¹⁰

My mission was thereby ended.

I flew on to Berlin and reported by telephone to the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary.

Since the King of Rumania asked me to communicate his request to the Führer, I request the Foreign Minister to decide whether this report should also go to the Führer.

⁹ See document No. 36.

¹⁰ See document No. 44.

The State Secretary asked me for my opinion with regard to Bulgaria and Hungary. I told him that I considered it proper to call off Bulgaria and Hungary as long as we are still busy with England.

The matter can be decided when we make a final settlement of the Balkan question after the victory.

V. KILLINGER

No. 68

175/137042-43

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1056 of June 30

BUCHAREST, July 1, 1940—1:20 a. m.

Received July 1—8:45 a. m.

I. The King sent for me. He wanted to confirm once more in person the statements made to me by the Foreign Minister and the Court Minister:¹

1. Abrogation of the Anglo-French guarantee.

2. The political agreement with Germany. Asked for my opinion on it, I replied that the King must realize that such an agreement must contain nothing that would be aimed at Russia. It was our position, to be sure, that Bolshevism must not be allowed to penetrate into southeastern Europe and the Balkans, but as was known to him from the Führer's statements, we had so far pursued only economic objectives in that region, and not political ones. The King's proposal would nevertheless receive sympathetic consideration in Berlin. The King has in mind a policy of alliance like that of King Carol I with the Triple Alliance; lacking such protection Rumania is incapable of any action and is subject to Soviet Russian influence. He sees his country's only salvation in a very close alignment with Germany; he said the former policy favoring the Western Powers was now being discarded for good, and a new policy initiated. He wished to inform me also in strict confidence that the Government would undergo a drastic change in the next few days and receive a complexion friendly to Germany. The present Government would first carry out the territorial cession and then step down.

He is going to send Sidorovici to the Führer to explain Rumania's new attitude toward the Reich. Sidorovici would not conduct any negotiations, but would outline the King's thoughts about the change in his policy (cf. my telegram No. 1046 of June 30²).

II. The abrogation of the Anglo-French guarantee is in my opinion more than a mere gesture; it signifies a defeat for England and will strike at the old Francophiles, who applauded this guarantee after Gafencu's speech in Parliament. For the political agreement it would

¹ In telegrams Nos. 1036 and 1038 sent during the night of June 29 Fabricius had reported these two officials as saying that Rumania would immediately renounce the Anglo-French guarantee and conduct a definitely pro-German policy (175/137026; 271/176152).

² Not printed (175/137038).

be possible to find a suitable formulation that would not offend Russia, once the Hungarian and Bulgarian demands are attended to (the demands of the former, to be sure, if they are to be realized at all, would have to be scaled down considerably, also in the interest of the Volksdeutsche). I am in favor of Sidorovici's trip.

III. In the course of the conversation with the King we touched on the question whether and to what extent England had instigated Russia's sudden advance in the Balkans. Contrary to the point of view which I advanced, the King held that this is evident from several indications: England is feeling German pressure and wishes to relieve it; England encouraged resistance because she would like to see the oil fields destroyed on account of Germany; England just now obtained signature of the trade agreement in Moscow.

These considerations arouse the King's concern that Russia will push on further in order to carry the war into the Balkans. He is extremely concerned about communism, which is raising its head everywhere. There is a danger that Soviet Russia might use the suppression of Communist activities as a pretext for further advances. The King believes therefore that it would be desirable to have Germany take an unequivocal position *very soon*.

Please wire instructions.³

FABRICIUS

³ See document No. 76.

No. 69

73/52510-13

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, July 1, 1940—2:05 a. m.

No. 408 of June 30

Received July 1—5:30 a. m.

The Foreign Minister told me that Archduke Albrecht,¹ who has been called to active service as battalion commander at Pécs, had advised him that his foreign policy should take into account the mood of the Army, which was eager to fight for Transylvania and would hardly tolerate without a commotion another demobilization without prior political victories. Csáky also pointed out that very many influential Hungarian personages, including the Minister of War and himself, came from Transylvania, and that, moreover, the view prevailed here that for psychological reasons it was preferable with respect to both Rumania and their own people, to retake Transylvania by fighting. He said the Government was in a difficult position since it had to

¹ Archduke Albrecht of Hapsburg, member of a collateral line of the former ruling house.

account to Parliament for its restraint to date and was afraid that if it explained this restraint on the grounds of adverse advice by the Axis Powers, public opinion would react in an unfriendly way which might work to Hungary's detriment at the peace conference.

Csáky is fully aware of the difficult tactical terrain in Transylvania. The numerical strength of the available Rumanian and Hungarian troops was fairly even, but Hungarian fighting morale was much better; yet stiff Rumanian resistance had to be expected in the event of a conflict. He had no great hope of obtaining relief through a simultaneous attack by Bulgaria, because the Bulgarians had thus far received no answer to their inquiry as to whether the Turks would remain passive in this case and because the Bulgarian Government, moreover, for reasons of domestic policy wished to avoid the establishment of a common frontier with the Soviet Union.

Csáky added that the Rumanian Foreign Minister had answered the Hungarian inquiry ² as to reasons for the general mobilization by saying that it was not directed against Rumania's neighbors. In fact, general mobilization had already been in effect and had now merely been legalized.

Rumania wished to live in peace and accord with Hungary. The common enemy was the Soviet Union.

In reply to these general phrases which, despite repeated Yugoslav representations in Bucharest, revealed no readiness to negotiate, he, Csáky, had sent word that the Hungarian Government regretted that it could not be satisfied with this information, particularly since Rumania had in the past few days moved four divisions to the Hungarian border via Transylvania. Csáky further stated that the political director in the Foreign Commissariat had expressed to the Hungarian Minister in Moscow spontaneously and as his personal opinion [his Government's] disinterest in Transylvania and the trans-Carpathian territory. It was striking how the Soviet Minister here was encouraging Hungary to take armed action against Transylvania. The Soviet Minister had expressed himself to me in a similar vein.

Csáky said further that the Hungarian Government had now decided to mobilize the Debrecen Army Corps also. Of the Szeged Army Corps, mentioned yesterday,² only the units facing Rumania were mobilized, while Yugoslav sensibilities were being spared and consequently no units would be mobilized along the Yugoslav border. Should the report be confirmed that the Rumanian Government planned to resettle some 1½ million Rumanians from Bessarabia in Transylvania, the Hungarian Government could in no circumstances accept that.

² See document No. 61.

I conducted my conversation in accordance with telegraphic instruction 523 from the Reich Foreign Minister.⁸

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ Document No. 63.

No. 70

585/242606

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

No. 1 of July 1 from Special Train JULY 1, 1940.

Received Berlin, July 1—8:05 p. m.

No. 393 of July 1 from Foreign Ministry Sent July 1—9:00 p. m.

Please guide your conversations with King Boris and the Bulgarian Government on the Bulgarian-Rumanian question in the following manner:

Germany herself is not politically interested in these Balkan questions. We are merely interested for economic reasons that peace and tranquillity are not disturbed in the Balkans. We therefore welcome it that an amicable settlement has now come about between Rumania and the Soviet Union on Bessarabia and northern Bucovina.

We have full understanding for the Bulgarian revisionist wishes with respect to Rumania. We believe, however, that the hour for achieving these wishes has not yet come and are convinced that a settlement of the Dobruja question satisfactory to Bulgaria could be attained after the restoration of peace in Europe. At such time we would also be prepared to exert our influence in behalf of such a settlement.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ In telegram No. 254 of July 2 Richthofen reported that these instructions had been carried out and that Foreign Minister Popov had promised that "Bulgaria would avoid anything that might disturb German policy." (585/242608)

No. 71

265/172343

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey

Telegram

No. 3 of July 1 from Special Train JULY 1, 1940—8:17 p. m.

Received Berlin, July 1—8:20 p. m.

No. 317 of July 1 from Foreign Ministry Sent July 1—9:00 p. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 488.¹

Until further notice please do not attempt to exert influence on Turkish-Russian relations with a view to improving them. Rather

¹ Document No. 58.

I should like you to restrict yourself to continuing a careful observation of developments in Turkish-Russian relations.

RIBBENTROP

No. 72

19/12878

The Foreign Minister to the American Chargé d'Affaires in Germany

BERLIN, July 1, 1940.

SIR: In your letter No. 1176 of June 10 [18],¹ you stated on behalf of your Government that it would not recognize any transfer of a geographical region in the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power, and would not consent to any attempt at such a transfer. I have the honor to reply to you the following:²

The Reich Government fails to see for what reason the Government of the United States has addressed this communication to the Reich Government. In contrast to other countries, particularly in contrast to England and France, Germany has no territorial possessions on the American Continent and has given no occasion for the assumption that she has any intention of acquiring such possessions. The communication addressed to the Reich Government is therefore redundant, as regards Germany.

Apart from this, it should be pointed out in this connection that the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine implied in the communication of the United States Government would come to this, that the right to possess territories in the Western Hemisphere is conceded to some European countries, and denied to others. Such an interpretation is obviously untenable. Leaving this aside, however, the Reich Government wishes on this occasion to point out once more that noninterference of European nations in the affairs of the American Continent, demanded by the Monroe Doctrine, is as a principle justifiable only on the condition that the American nations on their part refrain from interfering in the affairs of the European Continent.

Accept, Sir, etc.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Vol. IX, document No. 474.

² In a memorandum of June 25 (4497/E105441), in response to a request from Ribbentrop for a draft reply to the American note, Woermann had written: "It is proposed to answer the note by a mere acknowledgment, for which a draft is enclosed (4497/E105443). From the Italian Embassy I have learned that a similar procedure has been followed in Rome. A certain recognition of the American position could, to be sure, be seen in such an acknowledgment. After the various statements made by us (the last one being the Führer interview with Karl von Wiegand), there are no objections to this. In the light of this Führer interview, another express confirmation that Germany has no territorial claims on the American Continent and the adjacent islands seems superfluous."

No. 73

F9/0356-0364

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, July 1, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND AMBASSADOR ALFIERI OF ITALY, AT THE FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND COLONEL GENERAL KEITEL, JULY 1, 1940¹

Ambassador Alfieri first expressed his thanks for the sympathy on the occasion of Balbo's death which the Führer had shown in a telegram² that revealed a noble humanity and great understanding. On the following Sunday there would be a religious and military ceremony in honor of Balbo in the Hedwig Church, to which representatives of the German Wehrmacht would also be invited. Balbo's death was an extremely serious loss to Italy, for he had been one of the best representatives of Fascism and was among those who had been especially close to the Duce.

Alfieri then mentioned the extremely fascinating scenes in the latest German newsreel of Compiègne showing the Führer rubbing his hands with glee.

The Führer replied that he never doubted that the moment would come when France would be conquered; but still, war was also a matter of luck, although luck generally favored the able. Often the course of events depended on trifles and therefore such war operations had to be planned in the minutest detail.

At present Germany was again in the midst of preparations for new and great tasks.

Ambassador Alfieri here interposed the remark that in Italy, too, sentiment was strong and resolute in the face of coming events, and asked in this connection whether the Führer had already replied to the latest letter of the Duce.³

The Führer said that he had not, for as yet he had been too busy with military deliberations and plans for the immediate future. The present situation was described by the Führer as follows:

1) With regard to the politico-psychological element, which must always be accorded very great weight, it was always a good tactic to make the enemy responsible, in the eyes of public opinion in Germany

¹ Marginal note: "[For] F[ührer]."

² Not printed (F12/196). On June 29 an Italian communiqué had announced that Marshal Italo Balbo, Governor-General of Libya, had been killed in air action over Tobruk.

³ Document No. 26.

and abroad, for the future course of events. This strengthened one's own morale and weakened that of the enemy. An operation such as the one Germany was planning would be very bloody. All-out air war would also severely affect the civilian population. Therefore one must convince public opinion that everything had first been done to avoid this horror. Such a procedure strengthened one's own resolution and weakened the resistance of the enemy, in whose ranks the question would immediately arise: Why all this?

Ambassador Alfieri replied that he could not say anything about world opinion but knew that in Europe England was already being blamed for the war. The Reich Foreign Minister undoubtedly had still more detailed information about it. He himself knew merely from his discussions in the Diplomatic Corps at Berlin that England was generally held responsible.

The Führer went on to say that in his speech of October 6⁴ he had likewise been guided by the thought of making the opposing side responsible for all subsequent developments. He had thereby won the war, as it were, before it had really started. Now again he intended for psychological reasons to buttress morale, so to speak, for the action about to be taken.

2) As for the military aspects of Germany's future plans, they were being prepared with the greatest care. Some units which fought in the west were already home again to repair their mechanical weapons, motors, and the like. The same was true of the Luftwaffe, which, moreover, would be fully as strong again in 10-14 days as it was on May 10.

The Germans were continuing to build bases on the coasts of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, constructing positions for attack and organizing a flexible supply system for munitions, fuel, and aircraft requirements. These activities had begun immediately after the conclusion of the armistice with France, and if the Ambassador could today take a trip through the occupied French territory, he would see gigantic columns rolling westward with the material for undertaking the impending tasks. Among others, bases were also provided for German E-boats on the coast opposite England. All this had the desirable secondary psychological effect of helping to bridge over the present dead period.

There were also diplomatic preparations to make. These involved among other things clarifying the question of the conditions under which Spain would be prepared to participate more actively in the present conflict.

As a matter of principle, the fact that it had been possible to make France break away from her alliance with England should be con-

⁴ See vol. VIII, Editors' Note, p. 227.

sidered a great success. Italy, too, gained thereby, since industry in northern Italy could no longer be attacked by French planes. Italy could henceforth concentrate more on air attacks and air defense in other areas.

The Führer then spoke about the Allied Supreme War Council records found by German troops, from which the documents of interest to Italy would be made available to the Italian Ambassador.⁵ The things revealed by these documents, which contained all the minutes of the meetings of the Supreme War Council, were probably the most sensational that had come up in the course of the war so far. Some of the Balkan countries, too, appeared in a very interesting light. Of Rumania it could only be said that she had already been overtaken by the punishment she deserved. The Führer emphasized most strongly that one had to be very careful with Yugoslavia. The documents had revealed some extremely interesting things about her, too. The records showed that the Greek Minister of War had already agreed to the landing of the Allies in Salonika. Now all these men would naturally give a great deal not to have had these documents found. A very interesting appraisal of England's own position had been found in the material, which contained 2,000 to 3,000 documents. It also contained the files of Gamelin on the preparation for the war. It disclosed, moreover, that operations in Norway had already been planned twice before April 8 and the only reason they could not be carried out was that they had not been prepared in time.

Ambassador Alfieri replied that in his opinion it was interesting psychologically that England apparently was beginning to take stock of her actual position. He knew the Vatican milieu very well and did not believe that the peace move of the Pope,⁶ which the Duce had already flatly rejected, originated only on the initiative of the Pope. Alfieri mentioned in this connection a conversation with the American Chargé d'Affaires, Heath, in which he had told Heath of his absolute certainty that England would be utterly defeated. He had said this, moreover, to all the other foreign diplomats in Berlin too, since it was in keeping with his conception of an Italian Ambassador's duty and with his personal conviction as well. He had told the American Chargé d'Affaires that England would be utterly destroyed and that he wondered why Great Britain was not herself taking some initiative now, since such an initiative would be extremely difficult if not altogether impossible once the offensive against England had begun. Only 3 days later the American Chargé d'Affaires had told him that he had on his own responsibility informed his Government of the conversation with Alfieri and now wondered whether the United States Government should take some initiative. Alfieri had

⁵ Certain records of the Supreme War Council were printed in the sixth German White Book. See Editors' Note, p. 124.

⁶ See document No. 48.

stated immediately that he could not express any opinion whatever on that, since in the first conversation he had merely given a purely personal opinion of his own and he had not received any instructions whatever in this matter. Ambassador Alfieri added that he thought the Americans had immediately transmitted his conversation with the American Chargé d'Affaires to England and that the American inquiry had therefore probably not been made without British influence. He had informed the Duce about the facts in the case, and if he received instructions from the Duce and from the Führer he could of course soften his attitude somewhat toward the American Chargé d'Affaires.

The Führer replied that he could not conceive of anyone in England still seriously believing in victory. If the fight were to continue, it would extend over wide areas and would certainly not be easy. If the English still entertained any thought of winning, they did so only because they counted on support from third countries, presumably mainly from the United States, but perhaps also with a secret hope as to Russia. But how could military thinkers among the English still believe in victory when they saw before them the front extending from Narvik to the Gironde and perhaps still further!

In connection with Russia the Führer remarked that the documents revealed the intention of the Allies to bomb Baku and Batum and that an agreement had already been reached with members of the Turkish Government regarding the necessary flights over Turkish territory.⁷

In reply to a remark by Alfieri that the Spaniards could unfortunately not occupy French Morocco because they were not yet sufficiently armed, the Führer said that he did not consider that disadvantageous, since otherwise the English would, if possible, have landed in Morocco, which they certainly would not do as long as the territory remained French. In the further course of the fight against England, Gibraltar and the Suez Canal would have to be attacked. With reference to the latter the Germans would make certain proposals to the Duce. Germany had long-range bombers that made it possible to reach the Suez Canal from the island of Rhodes; Alfieri called this an arrow into the heart of the British world empire.

Ambassador Alfieri then also mentioned that in connection with the Russian occupation of Bessarabia Italy had given no assurances to Bulgaria and Hungary but only fine words, as Count Ciano expressed it.

The Führer replied that Hungary would probably remain quiet, and that this was also the best course, since one could not be sure that

⁷ See document No. 156.

the Hungarians would not be defeated by the Rumanians or that they would not some day even find themselves facing the Russians. In such a case Hungary would naturally turn to Berlin and Rome for help. In reply to inquiries one could therefore only tell them to take what they wanted, but that they would do so on their own responsibility, and take the consequences themselves.⁸

Ambassador Alfieri thereupon handed over a report by Magistrati on the attitude of Bulgaria.⁹

In conclusion the Führer stated that whatever happened, destiny would bring Italy and Germany ever closer together—a development which he had foreseen as far back as 20 years ago. Whatever might come, the two countries would emerge from this war as gainers.

After about an hour the conversation was concluded in a cordial atmosphere.

SCHMIDT
Minister

⁸ See document No. 75.

⁹ Not found.

No. 74

5382/E361687-88 ;
5382/E361720

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, July 1, 1940.
W V 2458.

The German-Finnish trade agreements concluded on June 29, 1940,¹ after negotiations lasting 3 weeks, were conducted on our side from the standpoint of attaining a maximum expansion of the trade relations with the Baltic States on the basis of the new situation. The negotiations were successful in substantially enlarging the volume of the deliveries provided for on both sides, as a result of which the money amounts envisioned for the next 6 months are in some instances considerably higher than the amounts for the entire preceding year.

1. As to the most important items on the list of Finnish exports the following may be noted:

The quotas for lumber and lumber products show considerable increases, e. g.,

sawn lumber	to 33 million RM
timber and lumber for construction	to 8.4 million RM
plywood	to 6 million RM
cellulose	to 24 million RM.

¹ See document No. 62 and footnote 1.

Delivery of metals has been assured by a series of contracts between German and Finnish firms. Our wishes for an increase in copper deliveries to us, however, could not be realized because Finland, owing to the stoppage of overseas imports, will require for her own needs a larger portion than hitherto of her domestic production, even though that production has been increased. The negotiations about delivery of nickel ore from the Petsamo area have not yet been brought to a conclusion and are being continued separately.² With regard to farm products, such as butter, eggs, and cheese, a certain decrease in deliveries to us was unavoidable on account of the deterioration of the Finnish supply situation.

It is to be expected that the Finnish exports to Germany will exceed the German deliveries. In order to prevent any stoppage in our imports that might possibly develop for that reason, the following measures have been agreed upon:

First, the Finnish Government has undertaken to guarantee the punctual payment to the Finnish exporters even in the event of an adverse balance of the account, by means of an interim financing arrangement up to 300 million finnmaks, or 15 million RM. Also, the money amount of Finnish commodity deliveries has been divided into two schedules, A and B, with schedule B comprising the deliveries of commodities that are of secondary importance to us, which will be effected only in the event of a favorable development of the clearing.

2. On the *German export side*, among other things, the Finnish requests for delivery of 750,000 tons of coal and 125,000 tons of coke were complied with in full. We increased the iron quota, too, from the current 1,000 tons per month, to 4,400 tons per month. The Finnish Government has undertaken to issue import licenses for German goods, including nonessential goods, during the second half of 1940 at a rate of not less than 75 percent of the German imports in the second half of 1938.

3. In response to a German request, the clearing arrangement of October 2, 1934, has been replaced by a new, technically up-to-date clearing agreement providing for the keeping of dual accounts, in reichsmarks and finnmaks. We agreed to permit until further notice the payment of sea freight charges and transit transportation costs through the clearing. Further, the arrangement whereby one-half of the regular 20 percent foreign exchange margin was to be paid in actual foreign currencies, in effect since 1935, was modified by us on a temporary basis in view of Finland's difficult foreign exchange position, so as to permit the entire 20 percent to be paid into the special account.

4. Agreements were entered into regarding the inclusion of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in the German-Finnish clearing system and the consequent modifications of the customs tariff; these agreements however will become effective only with the abolition of the customs border between the old Reich and the Protectorate.

² See document No. 221.

5. The question of trade with the enemy was discussed in detail with the leader of the Finnish delegation. There was full agreement that Finnish foreign trade with our enemies either via Petsamo or via Russia is out of the question for the future. We did not insist that this declaration by the leader of the Finnish delegation be committed to writing. Nevertheless, in a document dealing essentially with other questions (Finnish position on the foreign exchange balance)³ he mentioned this view as self-evident.

6. The question of permits was settled by us in a generous manner: Permits will be required only for voyages to the western Baltic (western Sweden, Denmark, and Norway). They will not be required for other traffic in the Baltic Sea or for Finnish shipping via Petsamo.

SCHNURRE

³ Not found.

No. 75

73/52521-23

The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

BACH, July 1, 1940.

Received Berlin, July 2—12:30 a. m.

Instructions for Minister von Erdmannsdorff to be transmitted at once by telephone to Budapest by State Secretary von Weizsäcker.

Minister von Erdmannsdorff is requested to call on the Hungarian Foreign Minister this very evening and to make the following statement to him orally:

Contrary to our communication of yesterday¹ to the effect that "Germany was not assuming that Hungary for the sake of its revisionist desires now intended to run the risk of a conflict with Rumania," the Reich Government has just received news of incidents of a serious kind on the Hungarian-Rumanian border.² It is likewise reported that the Hungarian Government has not declared itself satisfied with the reply of the Rumanian Government to the effect that the Rumanian mobilization was simply a precautionary measure, not directed against Hungary. Reports are reaching Berlin, moreover, to the effect that Hungarian troops are being mobilized on a considerable scale, while the Hungarian Government had informed Minister von Erdmannsdorff merely of the mobilization of isolated units. In order to avoid any misunderstandings, the Foreign Minister would like to define the German standpoint for the Hungarian Government, as follows:

In principle, the Reich Government is politically disinterested in Balkan problems. It desires that in the interest of all, the Balkans

¹ Document No. 63.

² The Legation in Bucharest the same day reported that Hungarian soldiers had attacked Rumanian border guards the previous night (271/176132-33). The same information was conveyed to Weizsäcker by the Yugoslav Minister together with an urgent request from the Yugoslav Foreign Minister that Germany restrain the Hungarians (271/176129).

not become a theater of war, and it has therefore welcomed the peaceful accord between Russia and Rumania. Germany has sympathy for Hungary's just revisionist demands. But Hungary must not expect Germany to resort to arms for the sake of these Hungarian demands. The Foreign Minister is unable to see what aims Hungary is pursuing with her mobilization measures, for even the Hungarian Government probably realizes that an attack by Rumania on Hungary is entirely out of the question. Should the Hungarian Government therefore attempt, contrary to expectations, to carry through its revision by force, it will do so entirely on its own responsibility. The Reich Government believes it necessary, however, to call the attention of the Hungarian Government to the fact that the beginning of such a war can, indeed, be visualized, but not its further developments, and all the consequences that might arise for Hungary from such a war, given the present situation in the Balkans. The Reich Government is aware of the fact that the appraisal of this problem is primarily Hungary's affair, but it would not like to neglect making it absolutely clear that it is not inclined to render Hungary military assistance of any kind in any difficulties or complications that might arise for Hungary from such action. The Foreign Minister would also like to add that, in his opinion, at a more suitable time a revision can be effected without resort to armed force, and that the Reich Government would then support such revisionist demands.³

³ Marginal notes:

"Dictated by telephone to Minister von Erdmannsdorff. Terminated at 2:00 a. m."

"Dictated by telephone to Ambassador von Mackensen. Terminated 2:15 a. m."

"State Secretary has talked with Minister von Erdmannsdorff as well as with Moscow. H. July 2."

"Démarche carried out at 2:00 a. m."

No. 76

175/137050

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 3 of July 1 from Baumschule

BAUMSCHULE, July 2, 1940.

Received Berlin, July 2—2:10 a. m.

No. 771 of July 2 from Foreign Ministry

Sent July 2—2:20 a. m.

For the Minister personally.

The Führer is at present on a journey to the front. Establishment of a telephone connection is to our regret not possible. It is suggested that the King transmit to you the statement which he wishes to make to the Führer.¹

You are requested then to transmit the statement to me in order that I may relay it to the Führer at the front. As for the rest I request you to let it be known in your conversations there that the latest news

¹ See document No. 68.

about serious border incidents at the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier has given occasion for Berlin to advise Budapest to hold back.² Corresponding advice has also been given to Bulgaria.³

RIBBENTROP

² See document No. 75.

³ See document No. 70.

No. 77

B19/B003635

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, July 2, 1940—3:28 a. m.

No. 1277 of July 1

Received July 2—7:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 1088 of June 27¹ and 1113 of June 29.²

Molotov explained that the subject of the negotiations between the Soviet Government and Finland³ was less the question of the nickel ore than that of the Anglo-Canadian concession in Petsamo. In the opinion of the Soviet Government there was no longer any room for the English in Petsamo, where the Soviet Government had secured special rights. The Soviet Government therefore demanded that Finland grant the nickel concession in Petsamo to a mixed Soviet-Finnish company.

As regards the delivery of nickel ore, the Soviet Government has already decided to supply Germany with no less than one-half the Petsamo nickel ore output. Our request that the German share be increased to 75 percent would receive sympathetic study.

SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 24, footnote 3.

² Not found.

³ See document No. 62.

No. 78

73/52530-31

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUDAPEST, July 2, 1940—7:16 a. m.

No. 417 of July 2

Received July 2—9:45 a. m.

I called at the home of the Hungarian Foreign Minister at 2 o'clock in the morning and carried out the telephonic instructions of the Foreign Minister.¹

¹ Document No. 75.

When Csáky attempted to interpret German political disinterest in the Balkans as meaning only a geographic concept of the Balkans—in the present case, Old Rumania, that is, beyond the Carpathians and Bulgaria, I denied that such was the case.

Csáky repeatedly stressed the fact that the Hungarian Government realized fully that if it proceeded against Rumania it could not expect any assistance at all from Germany.

The purpose of the Hungarian military measures was primarily to make Rumania willing to negotiate. He realized the danger that the guns might go off by themselves. The Hungarian Government had not reached a final decision to attack because of Transylvania, which was a vital question for Hungary, but reckoned with the possibility of war-like developments which were urged by the entire nation. This might happen if:

- 1) A revolt broke out in Transylvania and Hungarians were slaughtered.

- 2) Public order broke down in Transylvania. He was convinced that even the German Minister in Bucharest entertained fears on this score.

- 3) The Russians in Bessarabia crossed the Prut, so that they [the Hungarians] might intercept them at the Carpathians. Also, Russian intervention had to be expected in the case of Jewish persecutions of especial significance.

- 4) The Rumanian Government decided to settle the Bessarabian Rumanians in Transylvania.

Csáky observed that he was aware of the danger that many Hungarians would be slaughtered in Transylvania if the Hungarian troops entered the country. There was a list of hostages there which included also the names of his relatives and those of the Minister President. He had learned from the Führer, however, when the Czech question was solved, that a nation sometimes had to make a heroic decision since it would otherwise have no right to further existence. Despite friendly words, Yugoslavia's attitude in the event of a conflict had not been fully clarified. He believed, however, that she would be restrained by the Russians. The Hungarian people were in the grip of a psychosis with regard to Transylvania that might find revolutionary expression if it was repressed too much. If the Rumanian Government declared its willingness to negotiate, the tension would be greatly eased.

Csáky again categorically denied Rumanian reports regarding serious border incidents. If Hungary wished to attack Rumania, she would not begin with skirmishes.

As for military measures, the Foreign Minister remarked that the Army Corps of Budapest, Debrecen, and Szeged were for the present

remaining in their garrisons. The military timetable, with curtailments of civilian traffic, had thus far only been submitted on the stretch Budapest-Miskolc-Csap, and Budapest-Szolnok-Debrecen-Csap. For the present only the effective strength of the troops would be maintained. It would take 12 days yet before they were ready for action.

The Foreign Minister intends to submit to the Cabinet for consideration the closing sentence of my instructions referring to the later peaceful implementation of Hungary's revisionist desires and to inform me of its attitude.²

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ Later that day, Erdmannsdorff reported that the Italian Minister had told him that he had been instructed by Ciano to make a similar démarche (73/52537). This was the result of Mackensen's conversation with Ciano on the morning of July 2, after the former had been informed by Weizsäcker of Ribbentrop's instructions to the Legation in Budapest. (See document No. 75, footnote 3.) Mackensen reported on his talk with Ciano in telegram No. 1264 of July 2 (73/52532-33). Ciano expressed full agreement with the German viewpoint and said that he had already given a warning to Hungary's Minister and Military Attaché in Rome. Ciano also remarked that he suspected Csáky's ambition was behind Hungary's actions.

No. 79

91/100263-64

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

SECRET

No. 347 of July 1

DUBLIN, July 1, 1940.

Received July 2—12:40 p.m.

For the State Secretary.

Although I have done everything within the limitations imposed upon me to reassure the Irish Government regarding our attitude and to minimize the suspicion of an impending German attack, this latter still remains undiminished as a result of the Held case and now apparently especially because of the charges against the Stuart family and the group around them.¹ At the same time the British are again exerting increasingly powerful pressure on De Valera to bring about the end of Irish neutrality through a dangerous playing on the question of Northern Ireland, in which the American Minister here is apparently assisting. De Valera declares, as I have reported,² that he does not intend to give in. In my view, and in the opinion of my

¹ See document No. 35.

² Telegram No. 345 of June 30, not printed (91/100265-70).

Italian colleague, Berardis, who probably has reported to this effect, it is nevertheless necessary in view of British pressure to take immediately a somewhat more decisive step than my statement made in accordance with telegraphic instruction No. 190 of June 15,³ in order to save the situation, so as to restore the confidence of De Valera, which has been shattered as a result of the Held and Stuart cases, and thereby to strengthen his power of resistance to British threats and to facilitate a possible future rapprochement with the Axis Powers. De Valera has made statements of this latter tenor to my Italian colleague (see telegraphic report No. 333 of June 24⁴) in connection with expressions of deep anxiety concerning an attack. He apparently was attempting in this way particularly to elicit a reassuring statement from the Axis Powers to the effect that there was no intention to make an attack, after I had put off a similar suggestion expressed to me by Walshe by referring to the consideration that a statement on such matters, where strategic dispositions were concerned, could hardly be expected.⁵

With reference to telegraphic report No. 345 which will be sent at the same time.⁶ I would note that I have had since the beginning of the war, and now to an even greater degree, the impression that the Irish Government is extremely concerned to do everything possible to maintain strict neutrality in spite of the recognized difficulties and that particularly Walshe and Boland are exercising a strong influence on De Valera in this direction. If it is to have any effect, the suggested statement or declaration must now make clear, so far as possible, that we, in accordance with our intention, which we continue to hold, of respecting Irish neutrality as announced in our statement made at the beginning of the war, are also engaging in no activity looking to the formation of a fifth column in preparation for future use of Ireland as a military base against England. Ambiguity, which might give support to new suspicion, should be avoided. Such a statement should be given to De Valera worded in a strictly guarded form in order to avoid possible misuse. In view of the rapid course of developments please let me have early instructions in which also the matters relating to Northern Ireland discussed in telegraphic report No. 345 of June 30 should be taken into account.

HEMPEL

³ Vol. IX, document No. 437.

⁴ Not printed (91/100256).

⁵ Hempel had reported this conversation with Walshe in telegram No. 320 of June 17 (91/100244-46).

⁶ See footnote 2.

No. 80

175/137054

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1073 of July 2

BUCHAREST, July 2, 1940.

Received July 2—5:25 p. m.

For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 771 of July 1.¹

The King, to whom I communicated the contents of telegram No. 771 through the Court Minister, sent for me and told me the following for transmittal to the Führer and Reich Chancellor:

1. We have dropped the guarantees given to us by England and France.

2. We seek and desire close collaboration with Germany in all fields, guaranteed by political treaties and beneficial to both countries.

3. We possess reliable information indicating that the Russians intend to go beyond the fixed line of demarcation for the purpose of approaching or seizing the oil fields; this is also evident from their military operations.

4. The evacuation of Bessarabia unfortunately gave occasion for deplorable incidents, in which the Russian troops insulted and disarmed our forces and hampered their evacuation. Exceptional steadiness and sang-froid is required to avoid a clash.

5. I take recourse to the assistance of the Führer and request him to help and protect us in these trying times.

6. We have done everything demanded of us in order to safeguard the peace of our country.

7. In order to strengthen this collaboration still more, I request the Führer to dispatch a military mission to Bucharest.

End of communication.

FABRICIUS

¹ Document No. 76.

No. 81

73/52528-29

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 510

BERLIN, July 2, 1940.

On instructions from the Foreign Minister, I summoned today the Hungarian Minister to draw his attention once more to the démarche which Herr von Erdmannsdorff had made with Count Csáky at 2 a. m.

this morning¹ and the reply given by Count Csáky.² I read to him verbatim and emphatically the instruction to Herr Erdmannsdorff and informed him almost verbatim of Count Csáky's reply, as reported by Erdmannsdorff.

I added in the name of the Foreign Minister that he still could not quite understand Count Csáky's reply. It had been clear what Erdmannsdorff had to say. Count Csáky's reply, however, was not reassuring but rather had to be considered as a confirmation of our fears. Did the Hungarians really comprehend the seriousness of Erdmannsdorff's *démarche*? Count Csáky was saying "he realized that the guns might go off by themselves. Hungary had not yet reached a final decision to attack, but reckoned with the possibility of war-like developments which were urged by the entire nation." I added: If the Hungarian Government should act in this manner it would do so alone and on its own responsibility. The Foreign Minister had noted especially alternative No. 3 for the outbreak of the war, namely, the case of the Russians crossing the Prut. Did the Hungarians intend to start a war with Russia, a Great Power closely associated with us, and to march on Moscow? The Foreign Minister had in mind precisely such a case when he had Erdmannsdorff state that the beginning of such a war could be envisaged, but not its further developments and all its consequences. After all, the Hungarians would risk everything in that event.

Sztójay thought that point No. 3 was to be interpreted to the effect that it would be a very tragic development, to be sure, if Hungary were compelled to engage in a race with Russia to the ridges of the Carpathians in the uncertain hope that she would be able to let the bugle give the command, "Army halt!", when these ridges had been reached. Moreover, one could not be quite sure, Sztójay said, whether one day the Russian Government might not claim the Carpatho-Ukraine. Possession of the boundary formed by the ridge of the Carpathians, however, was for Hungary an eminently vital question in view of the Bolshevik wave.

In this connection, I too endorsed the view that Hungary ought not to feel too secure with regard to the Carpatho-Ukraine, although the Russians did not treat this as a topic of actuality at present. Reverting thus to my warning against playing with Russian fire, I emphasized in the name of the Foreign Minister that should Hungary instigate a Balkan conflict, it would exclude any subsequent appeal from Budapest to Berlin for support and assistance.

To the Foreign Minister by teletype.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 75.

² Document No. 78.

No. 82

365/206671

The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

BERLIN, July 2, 1940.

V. P. 10996/5 g

Pol. XII 1790 g.

I have taken note of your letter of June 27, 1940—Pol. XII 1649 g.¹ Meanwhile my letter of June 20, 1940—V. P. 10238/5 g.²—in which I reserved to myself the unified direction of economic matters for the peace negotiations has probably reached you. This reservation stands. I assume, therefore, that the organization proposed in your letter applies to the coordination of the peace terms in all fields, but not their formulation individually. The economic portion will, in any case, be definitely decided by me. In accordance with my circular letter, I shall therefore undertake the coordination of the economic questions, which are then to be incorporated in the comprehensive document to be compiled by you.

I have sent a copy to the other recipients of your letter.

GÖRING

¹ See document No. 23, footnote 1.

² Not found. A letter from Wiehl to Gaus of June 25 would seem to indicate that Göring's letter of June 20 had not been addressed to the Foreign Ministry. Wiehl wrote: "In this connection, it is interesting that the Field Marshal, as I have confidentially heard, on last Thursday [June 20] or Friday dispatched a circular letter to the departments dealing with domestic affairs (Economics Ministry, Food Ministry, Finance Ministry, etc.) summoning them to send to him proposals for economic conditions of peace. The Foreign Ministry did not receive such a summons. It must therefore have gone directly to the Foreign Minister. Furthermore, Reich Minister Funk is said to have seen the Führer in the middle of last week and to have received from him instructions to prepare economic conditions of peace. We have so far not participated in all these preparations. In case you have learned anything there about such decisions by the Führer or are informed about the opinion of the Foreign Minister concerning our participation, I would be grateful for a communication." (4379/E082996-97)

No. 83

4468/E087566-69

Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery

1814/Ri/Dt.

JULY 2, 1940.

DEAR PARTY COMRADE DR. LAMMERS: Enclosed I am transmitting to you another note about developments in Norway, with the request that you submit it to the Führer.¹ I am also enclosing a consolidated

¹ Rosenberg had prepared other memoranda on the Norwegian situation for presentation to Hitler under dates of May 20 and June 20. See vol. ix, document No. 283 and footnote 9.

report on the situation by Schickedanz,² based on numerous reports we have received from Norway.

I regard the manner of the whole proceeding as so objectionable that I request you to submit the matter to the Führer as promptly as possible, particularly as Reichskommissar Terboven intends to make a report to the Führer very soon.

Heil Hitler !

ROSENBERG

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, July 2, 1940.

NOTE

Subject: Developments in Norway.

A number of new reports and material concerning developments in Norway have arrived that make it morally imperative to me to submit these messages to the Führer once more. To me they confirm the opinion, which from the beginning appeared well grounded, that certain persons who hitherto were concerned only with German domestic administration, are acting abroad in a manner indicating ignorance of conditions and perhaps for that very reason feel impelled to take highly complicated decisions.

From the material enclosed I gather in the first place that, contrary to the wish expressed to me by the Führer, which presumably was communicated to Reichskommissar Terboven as a directive, the efforts of the German administration are constantly directed not indeed at supporting the Nasjonal Samling under Vidkun Quisling, but at disabling it by forcing on it former renegades as associates. More and more outspoken demands are advanced that the founder, that is Quisling himself, detach himself from his own movement; in fact it is being suggested to him that he had better devote himself to other things, possibly in Germany, since he was no longer acceptable. In the view of the German administration the so-called unacceptability seems to result from the fact that he has advocated a Pan-Germanic community and cautioned Germany against English maneuvers in a manner that a later appraisal might well describe as a warning that saved Germany herself. In addition, the conduct of the German administration in Norway, i. e., the Reichskommissariat, is characterized by the fact that the Reichskommissar threatens to make his financial assistance to the Nasjonal Samling dependent on compliance by Quisling with his demands.

The principle of setting aside a vigorous although small pro-German minority by pushing forward individuals who are political nonentities

² Additional enclosures indicated as accompanying this letter have not been identified.

and who have stood either on the opposite side or aside from all fronts, appears practically as the most impossible method that could have been employed in the German interest in Norway. The fact that they want to force Otto Strasser³ types on a gentleman like Vidkun Quisling is a demand of almost insulting character which can be made to him only if one is unaware of Quisling's honorable motives, or with the intent of deliberate defamation.

About the motives of this whole line of conduct I should like to refrain from judgment. I believe, however, that it is sufficient to evaluate the facts themselves.

³ Former National Socialist who broke with Hitler in 1930.

No. 84

65/45604

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

TEHRAN, July 2, 1940—7:00 p. m.

No. 309 of July 2

Received July 3—2:50 a. m.

According to a number of recent detailed conversations with Ambassador Filimonov here, the Russian Embassy defines the policy of the Soviet Union toward Iran as follows:

1. The Soviet Union does not intend to put an end to Iran's political independence.
2. The Soviet Union will insist on the elimination of any British influence in Iran.
3. The Soviet Union will demand of the Iranian Government a commitment that in future it will concede no position of political influence to any third power.
4. The Soviet Union will content itself with free zones in Persian Gulf ports, and secure transit rights on Iranian railroads.

The Ambassador made no mention of any possible military measures to secure predominant influence in Iran to which Russia obviously aspires.

For the rest, Filimonov has an entirely negative opinion of the Shah,¹ doubts the sincerity of the "very late" change of course in Iran's foreign policy, and stresses in particular the miserable social conditions of the great mass of the Iranian people, who would not submit to these conditions forever.

ETTEL

¹ Riza Shah Pahlevi, 1925-1941.

No. 85

73/52538

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, July 2, 1940—10:40 p. m.

No. 422 of July 2

Received July 3—1:25 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 419 of July 2.¹

In view of the demonstrations in the Chamber of Deputies, the general temper, and reports from the Consulate at Szeged, it is to be expected that the guns here will go off against Rumania if matters are allowed to drift; the driving force in this is said to come recently more from the politicians than from the General Staff, whose military preparations are, indeed, largely directed against the dreaded Russian attack, while the Foreign Minister (see my telegram No. 417 ²) brought up so many possible reasons for the invasion of Transylvania that this could happen at practically any time.

Should this be prevented in our interest, then, in my opinion, the desire of the Axis Powers for the preservation of peace would have to be communicated to the Hungarian Government even more clearly than before, or the Rumanian Government would have to be strongly urged to make voluntary concessions because of the circumstance that the Hungarian Government, in view of the tense expectations of the public, is hardly in a position to demobilize unless it can show successes or at least can make positive promises that can be turned to account publicly.

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ Not printed (73/52537). This telegram reported Erdmannsdorff's conversation with the Italian Minister. See document No. 78, footnote 2.

² Document No. 78.

No. 86

B15/B002538

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2182 of July 2

MADRID, July 2, 1940.

Received July 3—12:04 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2088 of June 25.¹

The Foreign Minister informed me that the Duke of Windsor is traveling to Portugal today or tomorrow to confer there with the Duke

¹ See document No. 9, footnote 1.

of Kent who is in Portugal in connection with the jubilee celebrations. Windsor told the Foreign Minister that he would return to England only if his wife were recognized as a member of the royal family and if he were appointed to a military or civilian position of influence. The fulfillment of these conditions was practically out of the question. He intended, therefore, to return to Spain where the Spanish Government had offered him the Palace of the Caliph at Ronda as a residence for an indefinite period. Windsor has expressed himself to the Foreign Minister and other acquaintances in strong terms against Churchill and against this war. The Foreign Minister supposes that Windsor also is going to Portugal in order to replenish his supply of money.

STOHRER

No. 87

2281/481465-66

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

TOP SECRET
No. 1496 g.

MADRID, July 2, 1940.
Pol. III 1839 g.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Internal political situation in Spain.

With reference to our report No. 1491 g. of June 2.¹

By telegram No. 2099 of June 26 of this year,¹ I reported that Serrano Suñer, the Spanish Minister of the Interior, wished to go to Germany for a short time—possibly incognito—and to orient himself there. In view of a safe opportunity that arose unexpectedly today, I should like also to add the following in written form:

1) As I have stated by wire, Serrano Suñer is today undoubtedly the most influential and also the most important Spanish politician. He is, however, just as surely the man with the most enemies in Spain, especially among the military and those circles of the Falange that do not wish to see the Unity party of the country debased to an irresolute political tool of the State leadership. As was reported at the time, General Muñoz Grande, the chief of the Falange and Minister without Portfolio, a few months ago fell victim to the decisive influence of Serrano Suñer with Franco.² Accordingly to apparently reliable reports, Air Minister Yagüe, who is generally called the "Falange Gen-

¹ Not found.

² In telegram No. 816 of Mar. 16, 1940, Stohrer had reported that Gen. Muñoz Grande had been relieved of his posts (492/232784). He had given further details on the situation in reports Nos. 1321 g. of Mar. 13 (492/232782-83) and 1330 g. of Mar. 20 (492/232785-86).

eral" here, was a few days ago removed for the same reason, that is, strong opposition to the Minister of the Interior. The well-known General Queipo de Llano also entered into strong opposition to Serrano Suñer. In this connection, to be sure, Generalissimo Franco's strong action, prompted by Serrano Suñer, could not be considered unjustified in view of the General's insubordinate conduct.

Serrano Suñer's attitude toward us has always been friendly. That his friendship for Germany, however, has come about more by way of the Axis, that is, by way of Italy, which he knew from his youth and esteemed very highly, I have stressed at various times in my reports of the last few years. Serrano Suñer's ties with Italy have also been strengthened by reason of the fact that on his trip to Rome in the spring of last year he was feted to an extraordinary degree. He has since that time also been on especially good personal terms with Count Ciano, who on his trip to Spain in July of last year mentioned Serrano Suñer to me as being the reliable man of the Axis.³ In his inmost heart, however, Serrano Suñer, who is a strict, not to say intolerant Catholic, may still have certain reservations with regard to the Third Reich. That he nevertheless believes in and hopes for a German victory I have stressed at various times. His hatred of England is our absolute guarantee of this.

I do not think that Franco will be made to drop his brother-in-law. It is possible, however, that in view of the internal political tension that has obviously been increasing again recently, an attempt will be made to remove by force the influential but unpopular Minister of the Interior. There is, at any rate, no lack of threats to this effect. Nevertheless our attitude toward Serrano Suñer will, in my opinion, have to continue to depend upon the attitude of Franco toward his brother-in-law. I am therefore of the opinion already expressed in my telegram that we should accommodate Serrano Suñer's desire to be allowed to visit Germany—if conditions permit.

2) The defeat of France and the definite expectation aroused far and wide in Spain of an early final victory for Germany cause all sorts of internal political groups to look to Germany and try to assure themselves of German help at the right time in attaining their egoistic aims. Thus representatives of the most divergent internal political groups in Spain very recently approached me, or other members of the Embassy, as well as the Landesgruppenleiter. I mention in this connection only the monarchists who see Spain's salvation in summoning the Infante Juan (the third son of former King Alphonso XIII); also Falangists of the original movement and military men who see a guarantee of Spain's future only in a military

³ Cf. Stohrer's report of his conversation with Ciano, July 12, 1939, in San Sebastián, vol. VI, document No. 663.

dictatorship. I met all such attempts at rapprochement by declining them in a friendly way, referring to the Führer's order not to interfere in Spain's internal affairs. The other members of the Embassy and the party exercise the same caution in similar cases.

All this shows the muddled state of the present political situation. In addition to this is the fact—especially perceptible to the Embassy—of the differences between the individual ministers, particularly between the Foreign Minister and the Minister of the Interior. A number of operations which in themselves fall within the functions of one or the other of these ministries, must be submitted to both since failure to consider one of the ministers would lead not only to refusal to support the démarche of the Embassy but even to direct action against it. Even socially this condition requires separating the opposing camps and a careful doling out of consideration and cultivation of the individual cliques, parties, and political groups. At various times I have reported that the Army is still the element of greatest solidarity among them, and even today is on the whole loyal to the Minister of the Interior and Generalissimo's brother-in-law, despite dissatisfaction with his actions. Besides cultivating relations with the Foreign Minister and Minister of the Interior, I therefore devote special attention to preserving friendly relations with important military circles.

V. STOHRER

No. 88

77/58163

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2187 of July 2

MADRID, July 3, 1940.

Received July 3—3:45 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2089 of June 25.¹

The Spaniards have again postponed action in Spanish Morocco since, according to consistent reports from French North Africa, not only has no disarmament taken place there, but rather a strengthening, particularly in regard to the Air Force. The Spanish Government therefore on June 29, through its Ambassador to the Quirinal, called the attention of the Italian Government to this fact, and stated that the French Air Force had at present more than a thousand planes in North Africa and that new troops had constantly been landed in Casa-

¹ This telegram reads as follows: "I hear in strict confidence that the Spanish Government has decided to enter French Morocco as soon as the French Air Force in North Africa is disarmed. According to one familiar with the situation a Spanish action would even then not be without danger." (77/58162)

blanca. In the opinion of the Spanish Government, the size of the Air Force, the number of tanks and other troops far exceeds the requirements for preserving order. The Spanish Government accordingly requests the Italian Government to press for disarmament, since otherwise the French military forces in North Africa could be used by England against Spain and Italy.

STOHRER

No. 89

235/157135

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

RIO DE JANEIRO, July 3, 1940—1:02 a. m.

No. 655 of July 2

Received July 3—9:25 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 568 of June 28 [27].¹

In the course of a long interview with the Federal President today, I made the representations included in the above-mentioned telegraphic instruction. The Federal President was visibly pleased at our reception of his proposal and declared that cooperation with Germany, which had always given him good service, was very pleasant for him. He also agreed that the supervision of the negotiations should continue to be a matter between him personally and myself. The Banco do Brasil would thus be hindered from throwing sand in the gears (literally). He could not exclude the Minister of Finance,² but he would see that the negotiations were carried on only with me or my representative. Nothing was said of the Foreign Minister. The agreement would be thought of as a skeleton agreement in which the contracting parties promise each other to buy from each other after the end of the war certain goods to an amount to be defined in the agreement.

The Federal President also stated that he was much interested in reaching the most speedy conclusion possible.

PRÜFER

¹ Document No. 41.² Arthur de Souza Costa.

No. 90

235/157134

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 653 of July 2

RIO DE JANEIRO, July 3, 1940—1:09 a. m.

Received July 3—1:25 p. m.

Federal President Getulio Vargas in speeches on June 11 and 28 before naval circles defined the over-all policy of Brazil. The first

speech, which already gave a clear indication of aloofness from North American policy and occasioned sharp criticism in North America, but was also subjected to attempts at reinterpretation encouraged by Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha, was confirmed in all points by the recent speech.

The political position of the Federal President consists in strict adherence to the neutrality of Brazil; maintenance of the Pan-American policy while reserving freedom of action in domestic, foreign, and economic policies; aloofness from the competition of political ideologies; adherence to the Monroe Doctrine, but only insofar as the defense of the Continent against external attacks requires it and without intervention in the quarrels of other continents; rejection of international Jewish emigrants, high finance, and other circles of warmongers; acknowledgment that the sound ideas of young vigorous nations would be taken over for the development of Brazil.

The speeches mean, despite protestations of friendship, a rejection of North American policy by the Federal President in anticipation of England's defeat and the resulting weakening of Roosevelt, and orientation of Brazilian policy toward trade with Germany and Europe.

Repeated to Buenos Aires, Santiago, Montevideo, Lima.

PRÜFER

No. 91

19/12377-78

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1940—3:43 p. m.

No. 1345 of July 3

Received July 4—3:50 a. m.

With reference to your [*my*] telegram No. 1296 of June 28,¹ and my telegram No. 1230 of June 19.²

The Republican party convention which concluded on June 30, and culminated in the nomination of Wendell Willkie as Republican presidential candidate, permits the drawing of the following tentative conclusions on the American foreign policy:

The struggle for the formulation of a foreign policy plank at the Republican party convention was conducted with almost as much heat as was the contest fought for the nomination of the presidential candidate. With the increasing probability of Willkie's nomination, the isolationist group intensified its efforts to obtain adoption of an isolationist foreign policy program calling for peace. The isolationists are afraid that Willkie is ready and determined to extend to the Eng-

¹ Document No. 47.

² Vol. IX, document No. 493.

lish every possible aid short of active military assistance, against which he has already come out himself. By making skillful use of all tactical openings, the isolationist wing of the Republicans succeeded, however, in anchoring the foreign policy of the Republican party on principles, to the observance of which the presidential candidate Willkie had formally pledged himself during the convention, the two most important of which read as follows: ³

1. The Republican party is firmly opposed to involving this nation in a foreign war.

2. The Republican party stands for Americanism, preparedness, and peace.

To what extent it will be possible during the election campaign now starting to keep Willkie in line on foreign policy issues naturally depends not only on the size and character of the group of Democratic opportunists, but more particularly on the development and duration of the war. Willkie has announced that he will lay down his political program in a policy speech at his birthplace, Elwood, in the State of Indiana. It can be assumed that he will first await the outcome of the Democratic party convention, which will be held in the middle of this month in Chicago, so that we shall have no new clues to his attitude on foreign policy until that time.

This success of the isolationist Republicans in the field of foreign policy was made possible in part by the promotion campaign authorized by telegraphic instruction No. 666, of June 17.⁴ This fact is reflected, for instance, by the circumstance that the above-quoted principles of the Republican platform on foreign policy were taken almost verbatim from the conspicuous full-page advertisements in the American press (e. g., the *New York Times*, June 25, p. 19), which were published upon our instigation.

THOMSEN

³ The two following sentences are in English in the original.

⁴ Not found.

No. 92

8614/E604161-62

Circular of the Foreign Minister ¹

Telegram

Multex No. 142

BERLIN, July 2, 1940.

Sent July 3—4: 20 p. m.

su W VIII b 2263 ² V.

The complete collapse of British hopes for support on the European Continent makes it probable that England and the U. S. A. as well will

¹ Addressed to "all Missions in Ibero-America."

² W VIII b 2263: Vol. IX, document No. 470.

intensify their anti-German activity in Central and South America. Accordingly our defense must also be strengthened. Effective arguments for that purpose may be found in the economic significance of Germany as a supplier and a purchaser. The great advantages which trade with Germany offered for the Latin American countries even before the war could be very considerably increased with the powerful economic expansion of the Reich which is to be expected after the end of the war. By the size of her population and her capacity to purchase Germany can offer to these countries a larger market than any other country, and with her increased productive capacity she can supply all needs.

I request that you impress these possibilities upon the Government there in the appropriate manner and in that connection mention our intention of taking into account the present attitude of the above-named countries in the regulation of our economic relations after the war. I also request that you make full use of all other channels for presenting these arguments to the circles that are influential politically and economically. Please acknowledge receipt.

RIBBENTROP

No. 93

121/119671-72

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram ¹

HWIX 154, WIESBADEN, July 3, 1940—7:15 p. m.

No. 23 of July 3

Received July 3—8:15 p. m.

General Huntziger, the chairman of the French delegation, informed General von Stülpnagel today as follows: This morning substantial English naval forces, including large battleships, appeared before the port of Oran and gave the French Admiral an ultimatum to sink within 6 hours French battleships lying in the harbor, including the largest battleships, *Strasbourg* and *Dunkerque*. Should the French not comply with this demand, English warships would undertake to do the sinking. The French Admiral replied that he rejected the ultimatum and in the event of British attacks, would fight the English. The French Government has issued the following orders:

1) The attacks of the British fleet are to be answered with battle. For this purpose French naval forces in the western Mediterranean

¹ This telegram is similar in part to the text of a note of July 3 from General Huntziger to the German Armistice Commission. The French note is printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. 1, pp. 38-39.

are putting out for Oran in order, if necessary, to assist French naval forces there.

2) French air forces in North Africa will, if the occasion arises, be used in the fight against the English. The following orders have, moreover, been issued: The French warships in English harbors (not very numerous) are, if necessary by the use of force, to put out for France at once. The terms of the German Armistice Commission for the identification of the ships are to be strictly observed in the process.

The French naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean at Alexandria have received the order to fight their way through to Bizerte.

General Huntziger told General von Stülpnagel upon transmission of this information that the French Government now realized that by giving its orders, it was exceeding the scope of the Armistice Agreement. It hoped, however, that the German Government would understand that it was fighting for its life.

The Führer, to whom the statement of General Huntziger was reported, approved the attitude of the French Government and authorized General von Stülpnagel to inform General Huntziger that he would observe with interest a possible battle of the French fleet, and the attitude of the French naval forces would have an influence on their future fate.²

HENCKE

¹ Substantially the same information was reported to the Foreign Ministry by Hencke by telephone at 6 p. m. on July 3 (365/206192-93). See document No. 111.

No. 94

73/52542-43

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

[BERLIN,] July 3, 1940—12:00 midnight.¹

Minister von Erdmannsdorff has telephoned a formal reply by Foreign Minister Count Csáky, which Count Csáky read to him in translation for conveying to the Reich Foreign Minister.

"Count Csáky expresses his thanks on behalf of the Hungarian Government for the detailed and friendly explanations contained in the communication of the Reich Foreign Minister.² It never was nor would it ever be Hungary's intention to jeopardize the large capital that the good will and support of the German Reich mean to her. In this connection Count Csáky wishes to call the attention of the Reich Foreign Minister to the sincere questions and proposals which he had recently transmitted to him through the Hungarian Minister in

¹ Marginal note: "Received by the night duty office at 12 midnight. Steg, July 3."

² Document No. 75.

Berlin,³ and later through the German Minister in Budapest.⁴ The substance of these statements was that Hungary would like to settle her issues with Rumania in agreement with the Axis Powers. Count Csáky considers it his duty to name four contingencies which might require immediate intervention by the Hungarian Government:

- "1. Massacre of the minorities;
- "2. A revolution in Transylvania;
- "3. In case the Russians should cross the present line of demarcation and approach the Carpathian Mountains in Rumania;
- "4. Forcible Rumanization of Transylvania by refugees from Bessarabia and the Bucovina.

"The Hungarian Government is especially grateful for the Foreign Minister's communication, according to which he 'would also like to add that, in his opinion, at a more suitable time a revision can be effected without resort to armed force, and that the Reich Government would then support such revisionist demands.'

"In order to preclude misunderstandings and uphold the interpretation desired, the Hungarian Government—as it has already done on several previous occasions—states once again that its desires for revision are aimed, in the first place, at the so-called Szekler country, which could easily be linked with the other Hungarian regions of Rumania through the triangle formed by Marosvasarhely, Banffy-hunyad-Nagybanya and the Carpathians, by an exchange of populations, if necessary. The Hungarian Government would be grateful if the Reich Government would let it know whether this request for revision, repeatedly presented by Hungary, is implied in the definition of revisionist claims which the Reich Government would support at the opportune time."⁵

³ Enclosure to document No. 38.

⁴ Document No. 43.

⁵ Marginal note: "Political Department! Would it be possible to submit a map showing the localities in relation to one another? W[eizsäcker] July 3."

No. 95

186/74214-15

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

MADRID, July 3, 1940.

No. 2208 of July 3

Received July 3—12 midnight.

With reference to my telegram No. 2184 of July 2.¹

The Spanish Minister of the Interior informed me in strict confidence of a detailed conversation that he had a few days ago with the Portuguese Ambassador here. The Minister of the Interior expressed his fears to the Ambassador that French North Africa and particularly Morocco, which was by no means disarmed, might still make

¹ Not found.

common cause with the English and that English operations could then extend from Morocco to the Canary Islands and Portugal herself. The Minister recommended to the Ambassador that Portugal align herself more closely with Spain. The Portuguese Ambassador went at once to Lisbon, where he had an exhaustive conversation with Salazar, the head of the Government, who is a personal friend of his. The Ambassador reported on this yesterday to the Spanish Minister of the Interior, saying that Salazar was firmly determined to repel most sharply any encroachment on the part of England. Salazar fully realized that the reorganization of Europe, with the more or less complete exclusion of England, was imminent. Salazar had expressed confidence that in case of danger Spain would help. The Spanish Minister of the Interior stated with reference to these remarks that even closer political collaboration between Spain and Portugal, possibly even a military alliance, seemed to him desirable, since after it was concluded England would no longer dare to undertake anything at all against Portugal.

Since it cannot be foreseen whether such an alliance will materialize, the Spanish Minister of the Interior considers it advantageous to arouse in England strong anxiety regarding the conclusion of such a treaty. It would be rewarding, therefore, if in the press of some neutral country, Switzerland or Hungary, for example, the positive statement were made in a report datelined Lisbon that a few days ago, apparently under the impression of the flank protection now afforded by the German troops on the Spanish border, a secret military agreement had been concluded between Portugal and Spain providing for immediate intervention of Spain in Portugal if the English took the liberty of encroaching there. If there is no objection there, please see that this is taken up by the German press and, through the Press Agency [DNB], given wide circulation abroad. Please send telegraphic instructions.²

STOHRER

² Cf. document No. 176.

No. 96

265/172847-48

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 497 of July 3

ANKARA, July 3, 1940—7:35 p. m.

Received July 4—3:50 a. m.

1. Massigli has left for Syria. His attitude toward the Pétain Government is still doubtful. Since the London declaration yester-

day,¹ Turkish circles are expecting the occupation of Syria by English troops in the near future. Massigli has stated that the demobilization of the Syrian Army is not feasible owing to the impossibility of removing the men.

2. With reference to my telegram No. 488² and your No. 317:³ The Turkish Government adheres to the opinion that alliance (one group missing) could still become valuable to Turkey. Neutral diplomats from the Baltic countries are circulating the idea here that the Russians, frightened by our quick success in France, might be inclined to come to an understanding with England. At the same time the British Ambassador has said they are placing great hopes in the mission undertaken by Sir Stafford Cripps.⁴ At any rate, he said, they hope in England that they can persuade the Russians not to keep the economic agreements with Germany, so as to exert pressure on the Axis Powers on the food front. If the attack which the Reich is expected to make on England should not be successful, the food front would play a decisive role in the coming winter.

These arguments make it possible for the Saracoglu group to remain in power. Informant ascertained yesterday from the State President that there is no thought of a change of government for the time being. I agree with the Italian Ambassador in the opinion that if Russia has no prospects of reaching agreements about the Straits with a Turkish government acceptable to her, modifying the Montreux Convention in accordance with Russian wishes, Russia will certainly obtain a pledge in this regard before the European war is over. If you do not desire a direct Turkish-Russian settlement, consideration should be given to whether it might be expedient for the Axis Powers to confer directly with Russia about a future statute for the Straits.

PAPEN

¹ This apparently refers to an official British Government statement issued on July 1 to the effect that Britain would not allow Syria or the Lebanon to be occupied by any hostile power.

² Document No. 58.

³ Document No. 71.

⁴ See document No. 164.

No. 97

406/214641-42

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 226 of July 3

TALLINN, July 3, 1940—10:50 p. m.

Received July 4—3:50 a. m.

State President Paets has resumed contact with me through a reliable intermediary. He informed me that despite the extreme leftist orientation of some of the ministers, sovietization and unification with the

Soviet Union need not be expected of the present Government. But it could not be foreseen whether the Russians might not impose a transformation in a radical sense. He himself would hold his position as long as possible in order to prevent (one word missing, probably "transformation") of the country into a soviet system and unification with the Soviet Union, but he was reckoning with the possibility of being removed from office by the Russians although he was continually receiving messages of sympathy from the widest circles of the Estonian population. The State President repeated his hope that Germany on account of her economic interests in the country would oppose Estonia's Bolshevization. He also informed me through this intermediary that the Estonian armed forces were told by the Russians to provide housing for 2,000 aircraft within 2 months, to modernize the coastal fortifications near Tallinn, and to bring the Army up to combat strength. I merely accepted the information. Deputy Prime Minister Kruus has emphasized again in an address that foreign policy was oriented exclusively toward the Soviet Union, and linked this statement with a decided rebuff to the Western Powers. Estonia's occupation by the Red Army was justified because the Soviet Union could not wait until the enemy appeared on the eastern border [*Ostgrenze*] (one group garbled) and occupied strategically important areas. The Red Army would protect Estonia against attacks. The Foreign Minister, in a speech to workers, which dealt primarily with domestic political issues, described the Government as a broadly-based coalition which would fight big capital if it should oppose the planned social reform, and would take no orders from capitalism. Soviet Commissar Zhdanov is back since yesterday. The subject of the talks is not known as yet. There will be no official farewell for the recalled Soviet Minister Nikitin, from which it may be inferred that he has fallen in disgrace as a result of events.

FROHWEIN

No. 98

4416/E083852-53

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, July 3, 1940.

No. [1134]

W V 2462 II.

With reference to your telegram No. 1277 of July 1.¹

I. For the present for information only:

1. Molotov's reply in the Petsamo question is unsatisfactory even though it would appear at first glance that the Soviet Government

¹ Document No. 77. The texts of Moscow telegram No. 1277 of July 1 and of the telegram printed here were transmitted to the Legation in Helsinki for information in a telegram of July 4 (5381/E361666-68).

is accommodating our wishes. Our requests to Finland to ship to us at least 75 percent of the Petsamo nickel output² were envisaged only as a stopgap solution, because we would have demanded transfer to us of the entire Canadian concession at the peace negotiations at the latest. The Finnish Government had always been on notice that the present German request was limited to *delivery* of at least 75 percent of the nickel production only so long as the Canadian concession was in effect. The German demand for a corresponding participation in the concession in the event of a change in the status of the Canadian concession had been directly announced by the Finnish Government and was recognized in principle by that Government.³

2. Acceptance of the Russian proposal would entail an unfavorable development in the future. Rate, volume, and technological level of production at the nickel mines would become wholly dependent on the good or bad will of the Soviet Government. Moreover, on the terms of this proposal we would have to discuss delivery of the nickel ore with the Soviet Government and not the Finnish Government. This would mean dependence on the Soviet Government in the nickel question, and the fulfillment of Soviet compensation demands which, as we know from experience, are much harder to meet than Finnish demands. A German concession or participation in a concession would, according to the Russian proposal, be ruled out for all time to come. The Soviet Government is pretending now that it is complying with a German request. The fact however is that we have been in accord with the Finnish Government for a long time, and that the Soviet Government has now deprived us of our success through its intervention with Finland.

3. We cannot let it appear that we are satisfied with this arrangement. Instructions for any further *démarche* must be reserved until the matter has been presented to the Foreign Minister.⁴

II. We do not understand here to what Molotov was referring with his remark that the Soviet Government has secured special rights in the Petsamo area. At the Finnish-Russian peace conference, the Soviet Government plainly stated to the Finnish Government that it was disinterested.⁵ Please make a supplementary telegraphic report on how Molotov's remark should be interpreted.⁶

RITTER

² Details on these requests have not been found. See document No. 24.

³ See document No. 122.

⁴ A draft telegram of July 3 from Weizsäcker to the Foreign Minister, discussing the terms of a *démarche* in Moscow, is in the files (4416/E083854-55). In this draft it was proposed that the German Ambassador in Moscow be instructed to tell Molotov that "if the Soviet Government, in spite of its *désintéressement* in the nickel ore, attaches importance to participating in the concession we would agree to a German-Soviet or a German-Soviet-Finnish concession-company, and would welcome this as a realization of the cooperation in opening up the resources of the earth which Germany and the Soviet Union have been striving for." The reaction of Ribbentrop to this proposed *démarche* has not been found. See document No. 150, footnote 1.

⁵ Cf. vol. ix, document No. 19.

⁶ See document No. 182.

No. 99

4050/E065202

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, July 3, 1940.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWITZERLAND

Ministerialdirigent Bergemann informed me today by request of State Secretary Landfried¹ as follows:

In a discussion yesterday with Field Marshal Göring at Karinhall there was generally great dissatisfaction with the attitude Switzerland has recently taken toward us. Field Marshal Göring had demanded that Switzerland be handled very roughly during the economic negotiations² now under way in Bern, but when he was informed of the instructions given the negotiating delegation he became convinced that this line of policy had already been taken into account. He said in the course of the discussion, however, that Switzerland must no longer be supplied with German coal at all unless she returned the 90 Messerschmidt airplanes which we had delivered to her in the time from the fall of 1939 to the spring of 1940.

I replied that the man who was conducting the negotiations, Hemmen, was coming here tomorrow and I would then discuss the negotiating situation with him. The return of the Messerschmidt planes, however, seemed to me to be predominantly a political demand with respect to which it seemed doubtful to me whether it should be advanced within the framework of the economic negotiations. I would obtain an opinion on the matter in our Ministry.³

WIEHL

¹ Bergemann and Landfried were officials of the Economics Ministry.

² See vol. IX, document No. 377 and footnote 2.

³ See document No. 144.

No. 100

F17/071-072

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, July 3, 1940.

Held is an Irish citizen and an active member of the I. R. A. In April of this year he came from Ireland to Germany and presented the Artus plan originated by the I. R. A. and known to the Foreign Minister from the memorandum by Veessenmayer.¹ This plan foresaw the landing of German troops in Northern Ireland. The Abwehr came to no decision with Held as to this plan. Held then returned to Ireland.

¹ Not found.

Soon thereafter the German confidential agent, Brandy, a German officer, made a parachute landing in Ireland. He had signal equipment, a rather large sum of dollars, secret code, etc., with him.² The Abwehr gave Brandy the addresses of Held and Mrs. Stuart as confidential agents with whom he could find shelter if necessary. Brandy then stayed for a short period at the home of Held and hid the above-mentioned material there along with Held's parachute, several insignia of the German Luftwaffe, German decorations from World War I and other military effects as well as plans of Irish ports and defense layouts. Since then he has disappeared.

Details as to how it happened that the material was discovered in the house of Held are not known by us. It may be that this occurred during one of the searches which are systematically carried out in the houses of the members of the I. R. A.; it is also possible that this was a case of treachery. Whether and to what degree Held made incriminating statements after his arrest is also not known.

According to the reports of Minister Hempel, the material found in Held's house, whose German origin was evident, has created a great sensation in the Irish Government and caused fears that this was a sign of German plans for a landing in the Irish Free State. A special report³ follows on telegrams Nos. 345⁴ and 347⁵ from Dublin, the most recent which refer to the matter.

Reprisals for the arrest of Held are out of the question, because he is an Irish citizen, and furthermore German interest in his case should not be shown.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

² See vol. IX, document No. 310.

³ Not found.

⁴ Not printed (91/100265-70).

⁵ Document No. 79.

No. 101

1512/372109-11

Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs

BERLIN, July 3, 1940.
D III 200.

THE JEWISH QUESTION IN THE PEACE TREATY

The imminent victory gives Germany the possibility, and in my opinion also the duty, of solving the Jewish question in Europe. The

desirable solution is: All Jews out of Europe. The task of the Foreign Ministry in this is:

a. to anchor this demand in the peace treaty and to put through the same demand by means of separate negotiations with the European countries not affected by the peace treaty;

b. to assure in the peace treaty the necessary territory for settling the Jews and to determine the principles for the cooperation of the enemy countries in this problem;

c. to determine the position of the new Jewish overseas settlement area under international law;

d. as preparatory work:

1. clarification of the wishes and plans of the interested party, Government, and scientific offices inside Germany and to harmonize these plans with the wishes of the Foreign Minister; for this the following is also necessary:

2. preparation of a survey of the objective data available at various places (number of Jews in the different countries); making use of their assets through an international bank,

3. taking up of negotiations with our ally Italy on these questions.

With regard to beginning the preparatory work, Referat D III has already approached the Foreign Minister with suggestions via the Department for German Internal Affairs, and has been instructed by him to institute this preparatory work at once. There have already been discussions with the office of the Reichsführer SS in the Ministry of the Interior and with a number of party offices. These offices approve the following plan of Referat D III:

Referat D III suggests as a solution to the Jewish question: In the peace treaty France must make the island of Madagascar available for the solution of the Jewish question, and must resettle the approximately 25,000 French people living there and compensate them. The island will be transferred to Germany as a mandate. The strategically important Diégo Suarez Bay, as well as the harbor of Antsirane, will be German naval bases (if the Navy should so desire perhaps these naval bases could also be expanded to include the harbors—open roadsteads—of Tamatave, Andevorante, Mananjary, etc.). In addition to these naval bases, suitable portions of the country will be detached from the Jewish territory for construction of air bases. The portion of the island not needed for military purposes will be placed under the administration of a German police governor, who will be under the control of the Reichsführer SS. In this territory the Jews will otherwise have self-administration: their own mayors, police, postal and railroad administrations, etc. The Jews will be jointly liable for the value of the island. Their former European assets will be transferred for liquidation to a European bank to be set up for the purpose. In so far as these assets are insufficient to pay for the land which they get and for the necessary purchase of commodities in Europe needed

for developing the island, bank credits will be made available to the Jews by the same bank.

Since Madagascar will be only a mandate, the Jews who live there will not acquire German citizenship. On the other hand, all Jews deported to Madagascar will from the time of deportation be denied the citizenship of the various European countries by these countries. Instead they will be citizens of the mandate of Madagascar.

This arrangement will prevent the possible establishment of a Vatican State of their own in Palestine by the Jews, thus preventing them from using for their own purposes the symbolic value which Jerusalem has for the Christian and Mohammedan portions of the world. Moreover, the Jews will remain in German hands as a pledge for the future good conduct of the members of their race in America.

We can utilize for propaganda purposes the generosity which Germany shows the Jews by granting them self-government in the fields of culture, economics, administration, and justice, and can stress that our German sense of responsibility to the world does not permit us to give a race that has not had national independence for thousands of years an independent state immediately; for this they must still prove themselves to history.¹

RADEMACHER

¹ On Aug. 16 Rademacher forwarded to Minister Luther a more extended elaboration of the Madagascar Plan, which had been worked out in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, and noted that the Plan had also been taken up with the Foreign Minister by SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich (1512/372053-54, 372056-71).

A further memorandum of Rademacher to Luther of Aug. 30 indicated that the Madagascar Plan had been discussed with other German government departments (1512/372050-52). See also document No. 345.

No. 102

4546/E146183-84

The Reichsführer SS to the Foreign Minister

SPECIAL TRAIN, July 3, 1940.

Rk. 10339 B.

MEMORANDUM

I understand that some 3 to 4 thousand Germans in the Baltic area who did not opt for Germany during the original resettlement operation,¹ have now expressed the desire and communicated the urgent request that they be allowed to come to Germany. All they want, they stress, is to save their bare lives, because Russia is taking the most drastic measures in the Baltic area, either liquidating people outright or deporting them to Siberia.

¹ See vol. VIII, document No. 252.

The problem has two aspects in my opinion. One is humanitarian: These are people who rejected Germany's hand in November-December and by a wrong sense of pride regarded themselves as Estonians and Latvians rather than Germans; but yet they are people of German blood.

The other side is political: We told the Russians in November-December, if I remember correctly, that after giving each individual this chance to decide, we would no longer recognize any one in Estonia and Latvia as a German, and that with that any minority problem ceased to exist for us in that area (except of course with respect to the Germans).

This raises the question now whether we should reopen the subject with the Russians. Another consideration is that this would set a bad example for all future options by Volksdeutsche. We told both the Baltic Germans and the south Tirolese that after the closing of the options we would recognize no one of those remaining behind as a German. If we yield now we serve notice that nobody needs to opt for Germany at the first call because the mighty German Reich would in any case come to their aid if they should fare badly later on.

For this reason I would like to warn against admitting these Germans. I am convinced, moreover, that these are not the best of Germans but that it is a question of a part of the Baltic area that is already very much estranged from Germany. These 4 to 5 thousand persons, who are surely a pretentious and hypercritical lot, certainly would be no desirable addition.

The only suggestion that I could make in this connection, and which might be politically acceptable also to the Russians, would be to admit mothers with their children.²

HIMMLER

² At a meeting on Aug. 15 attended by representatives of the various government departments with an interest in the resettlement question, SS-Obersturmbannführer Fährndrich stated the following:

"In a meeting with the Reichsführer SS on Aug. 14, it was decided that, in addition to the resettlement of Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche from Lithuania, a 'later resettlement' of Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche from Estonia and Latvia would also be carried out. In connection with this 'later resettlement' from Estonia and Latvia a distinction was made between a) such physical and juridical persons who remained in Estonia and Latvia with the approval of German official organs and who now in connection with the 'later resettlement' would be treated just like the first resettlement with respect to transfer of their property, assistance in getting a new start, and in the indemnification granted to them; b) all other Volksdeutsche, who now want to participate in the 'later resettlement'; these would be treated as *refugees* and brought within the old borders of Germany; resettlement privileges would not be recognized in their cases, since they had already had opportunity upon the occasion of the first resettlement from Estonia and Latvia to make use of this privilege.

"There was agreement that in the negotiations with the Soviet Government both groups would be treated as resettlers in order to insure as far as possible the transfer of their property." (memorandum of Aug. 21: 9824/E660970-74)

These general principles were spelled out in a directive sent by telegrams Nos. 353 to Riga and 334 to Tallinn on Aug. 22 (9824/E660986-88).

No. 103

6956/E518695-96

*The State Secretary and Deputy to the Commissioner for the
Four Year Plan to the Foreign Ministry*¹

V. P. 11088/1

BERLIN, July 3, 1940.
Rk. 10364 B.

In a decree, a copy of which is enclosed, the Field Marshal has commissioned the Minister of Economics to coordinate preparations for the organization of the German-European economic sphere. In so doing Reich Minister Funk will avail himself of the cooperation of all state and party offices concerned.

The Field Marshal requests all offices to adapt themselves to this plan of action and to desist from handling independently those pertinent questions that belong in the context of the problem as a whole so that duplication of work will be avoided.²

KÖRNER

[Enclosure]

HEADQUARTERS, June 22, 1940.

The organization of our economy after the conclusion of the military conflict must be prepared without delay. I therefore commission Minister of Economics and Reichsbank President Walter Funk to undertake these preparations at once and to draw up a plan to that effect in cooperation with all state and party offices concerned.

The preparations are to extend to the following fields:

1. coordination of the areas incorporated into the Reich and of the occupied areas within the Greater German economy,
2. economic settlement with the enemy states,
3. reorganization of the continental economy directed by Germany and its relations to the world economy.

I reserve the right to make decisions and issue directives in executing these plans.³

GÖRING

¹ This letter was also sent to the Deputy of the Führer, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, the High Command of the Wehrmacht, and to the Ministers of Agriculture, Labor, Transport and Interior.

² See document No. 142.

³ Funk called a meeting of various departments concerned on July 22 to discuss preparations for postwar economic reorganization; from brief handwritten notes by Lammers, it appears that on that occasion Funk made "fundamental statements" but that the discussions "did not assume major proportions" (6956/E518701-02). On July 25, Ribbentrop informed Funk that he had given Clodius the assignment to deal "with the questions regarding the organization of a Greater European economic sphere under German leadership." (1780/406586)

No. 104

175/137062-63

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

MOST URGENT

S S S 14 AM BACH, July 4, 1940—2:12 a. m.

No. 5 of July 3

Received July 4—2:35 a. m.

For the Minister personally.

The Führer has received the message sent him by the King of Rumania.¹ In view of his desire to see peace and quiet preserved in the Balkans, the Führer would like for his part to learn the views of the King of Rumania as to how and in what form he visualizes the final pacification of the region after the Rumanian-Russian revision question has been settled.

For your personal information and use in talking to the King of Rumania, it should be said in the first instance that we have urgently advised Hungary to keep the peace. I now request that you have a confidential, personal conversation with the King in which you try to ascertain his ideas about the development of the future relationship to his two neighbors, Hungary and Bulgaria, and whether he would be willing, if necessary, to enter into negotiations with these countries regarding territorial revisions. You may point out that in Germany's view Rumania is not now and will not in the future ever be capable of a military effort that would retain within her state territory such strong national groups in spite of their natural desire to be reincorporated in their homelands. You may safely point out in an appropriate manner that actually Rumania owes her expansion at the expense of Bulgaria and Hungary only to a tragic disaster, namely, the defeat of Germany and her allies, and that she would never have been able to annex these territories by her own power. It would naturally be even more difficult for Rumania to keep these territories after her neighbors had regained their strength. It should be clear to the King of Rumania for all these reasons that he cannot evade cession of certain territories which happen to be populated by Hungarians or Bulgarians, not Rumanians, if he is really desirous of creating for his people an existence secure for all the future. Recognition of this fact by the King of Rumania and his Government is the primary condition for a real pacification in the Balkans.

Please conduct the conversation with the King of Rumania in a form that would preclude any conclusion on his part that Germany wishes to assume the role of an official mediator; what we want at

¹ Document No. 80.

this time is merely to be informed about the ideas of the King of Rumania and the Rumanian Government regarding these matters. Please report by telephone.²

RIBBENTROP

² Fabricius reported carrying out the instruction in a telephone message of the same day (175/137068). This was followed by a telegram elaborating what had been said: "The King was calm during the conversation; he must still think over carefully the question put to him, since it had great importance in domestic politics. The Bulgarian question was easier to solve; the Hungarian was more difficult, since Hungarians were not settled compactly to the frontier. Just the same he kept an open mind to our arguments.

"Finally the King remarked that he did not have the answer to his question whether the Führer was prepared in fact to accept his proposal for close cooperation with Germany." (telegram No. 1093 of July 4: 175/137067)

No. 105

73/52546

*The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary and the Minister in Hungary*¹

JULY 4, 1940.

Instructions for State Secretary v. Weizsäcker and Minister von Erdmannsdorff.

Please inform orally the Hungarian Foreign Minister and the Hungarian Minister in Berlin² of the standpoint of the Reich Government on the Hungarian-Rumanian question as follows:

1) The Government of the Reich desires to preserve peace in the Balkans. The attitude of the Hungarian Government is not clear. The Government of the Reich would therefore not like to neglect pointing out to the Hungarian Government once more, in all seriousness, the complications and, in certain circumstances, even disastrous consequences that might arise for Hungary from the use of armed force against Rumania.

2) If the Hungarian Government says it knows that Germany will render no military assistance in such a war against Rumania, then the German attitude has not yet been made entirely clear. The Reich Government wanted to bring out clearly—and does so now—that not only would it not lend Hungary any military assistance but that she would leave Hungary to her own devices in facing any consequences that might result from any violent actions taken by Hungary.

3) The Government of the Reich will now take occasion, in agreement with the Italian Government, to examine the problem of revisions in the Balkans in detail and from every angle and reserves the right to inform the Hungarian Government of the result of this

¹ This message was transmitted to Berlin by telephone through the Foreign Minister's personal staff and was sent to the Legation in Budapest at 8:15 p. m. of the same day.

² A memorandum by Weizsäcker indicates that he saw Hungarian Minister Sztójay in the afternoon of July 4 and read to him verbatim Ribbentrop's instruction (73/52544-45).

examination. It goes without saying that this presupposes that the Hungarian Government will follow the advice of the German Government and undertake not a violent, but only a peaceful solution of its territorial revisionist desires with regard to Rumania.

RIBBENTROP

No. 106

865/206201

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

No. 27

HWIX 175, JULY 4, 1940—4:00 p. m.

Received July 4—4:30 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1 of June 26.¹

With regard to the question of mobilizing industry in occupied French territory for the purposes of German armament on the basis of article 3 of the Armistice Agreement, the Chief of the OKW decided, after reporting to the Führer, that industry should be only indirectly mobilized for the conduct of the war; therefore not directly for the production of war material, but solely for the production of articles that are urgently needed in Germany.

According to the decision of the Chief of the OKW regarding the interpretation of the term "war material" within the meaning of article 6, raw materials and economic goods in the unoccupied territory cannot, therefore, on the basis of article 6, be seized for the war economy. Raw materials and economic goods in unoccupied territory which are important for the German war economy can, therefore, be utilized only through the channels of free exchange. Written report will follow.²

HENCKE

¹ Not printed (865/206160). In it Hencke had reported that the question of the use of French industry for German armament had been discussed at the first session of the German Armistice Commission.

² Such a report has not been found.

No. 107

78/52550-51

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, July 4, 1940—4:45 p. m.

No. 429 of July 4

Received July 4—8:45 p. m.

I gather from statements made to me by the Deputy Foreign Minister that the Hungarian Government has now finally understood the

gravity of our warning against provoking a Balkan conflict. Vörnle emphasized in speaking to me that the Hungarian Government would do nothing without the consent of the Axis Powers. The situation remains tense because of (group garbled) ¹ mobilization. The acute danger of a crisis seems to me to have been averted, however.

In Vörnle's opinion, Hungarian revisionist demands are concerned with the territory north of a line leading along the Maros, which empties into the Tisza at Szeged, to Alba Iulia, and then via Sighişoara to the Szekler country. This is north and northeast of Braşov and comprises the former Hungarian counties of

- 1) Haromsz (Rumanian Trei Scaune, capital, Sfântul-Gheorghe),
- 2) Csik (capital in Rumanian, Miercurea Ciuc),
- 3) Udvarhely (capital in Rumanian, Odorhei),
- 4) Maros-Torda (capital in Rumanian, Târgu-Mureş).

Northeastern border is the ridge of the Carpathians. I hear from an informant that the Yugoslav Minister here has proposed to his Government to offer the advice in Bucharest

1. to start demobilizing, if the Hungarians agree to demobilize simultaneously;

2. as quickly as possible to take up [negotiations ²] with Hungary and Bulgaria and to offer to cede the southern Dobruja as well as a strip of territory 50 to 80 km. wide, along the Hungarian border, possibly running along the former administrative border between the Principality of Transylvania and the Kingdom of Hungary, with resettlement of the Szeklers. In this way the cities of Sighet, Satu-Mare, Oradea, and possibly Arad would fall to Hungary; it seems certain, in this connection, that the Hungarians in any case are going to demand Cluj, which had a predominantly Hungarian population until 1919.

The Rumanian Minister here is supposed to have made similar proposals to his Government.

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ The copy of this telegram in the files of the Budapest Mission (9506/E670024-25) reads: "continuing".

² The text here reads "Vollzugsrat", but the Budapest copy has "Verhandlungen".

No. 108

19/12379-81

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram

No. 1358 of July 4

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1940—3:46 p. m.

Received July 5—5:30 a. m.

Roosevelt's prospects of being elected a third time have declined owing to:

1. the unexpectedly swift defeat of France and the President's underestimation of Germany's power;
2. the nomination of a Republican candidate of equal caliber;
3. the election campaign maneuvers of John L. Lewis, chief of the CIO, and Senator Wheeler.

Regarding 1. The great majority of the American people turned away from the isolationists and embraced Roosevelt's foreign policy when he proved to be right in his predictions about the outbreak of the war. All measures of the Government for assistance to the Allies were endorsed despite their petty, unneutral character, in certain anticipation of the Allied victory postulated by Roosevelt. The war was expected to last several years, at the end of which America's material and moral aid would bring about a decision. The lightning bolt that felled France after 6 weeks has leapt over to Roosevelt. Confidence in his leadership and farsightedness in foreign-policy matters has been shattered with considerable groups. There is scarcely any doubt left that England will be defeated. The absurdity of Roosevelt's intervention policy has thus been demonstrated for a long time to come. His miscalculation of the time element renders his candidacy valueless. If the war should end before the November elections, it would also mean the end of Roosevelt.

Regarding 2. If Roosevelt should be nominated at the Democratic party convention in Chicago he would, contrary to all expectations, find himself confronted with the necessity of fighting a candidate who is his equal in popularity, demagoguery, and rhetorical ability; a further factor is that for physical stamina alone Willkie has the advantage of the rapidly aging Roosevelt.

The Democratic party is entering this situation unprepared and disunited; besides, it has no other candidate who is Roosevelt's equal in vote-getting power. The New Deal wing, for self-preservation, has every interest in upholding Roosevelt's third candidacy and is therefore working hard, but unsuccessfully so far, to smear the Republican counter-candidate as a creature of fascist big business, who could not stand up against the true people's friend Roosevelt. The conservative wing, in default of another candidate, will in deference to party discipline go along willy-nilly with Roosevelt's candidacy, even despite its misgivings about the break in tradition and its pronounced isolationist tendencies, while some may desert to the opposition.

Intervention-minded Republicans, such as Lippmann, the *New York Times*, W. A. White, etc., have suggested that Roosevelt yield the field to their candidate Willkie, on the grounds that Willkie is eminently suited to assume Roosevelt's foreign policy heritage.

Regarding 3. At this juncture John L. Lewis enters the arena with the approximately 8 to 10 million votes controlled by him. He is

determined to make ruthless use of his influence, and will do so in favor of strict isolationism. Lewis is pursuing that policy not indeed because of any pro-German sentiments, but because he fears that America's involvement in a war would mean the establishment of an American dictatorship and the placing of his organization under emergency laws. He is negotiating with the Republicans at present and will support them in the campaign if Willkie publicly declares himself for keeping America out of all European conflicts. Lewis can throw his strength at will to the Republicans or the Democrats, but this much is certain, that he surely will not use it for Roosevelt. He may even, as he has already threatened to do, organize a third party of disgruntled Democrats, the Peace party, and in the person of the closely-allied Senator Wheeler put up a suitable presidential candidate, who would certainly have no chance of being elected, but would be able to ruin the chances of any candidate disliked by Lewis.

In this situation, Roosevelt has wrapped himself again in silence, but, as I previously reported, many signs, actions, and statements indicate that Roosevelt is not yet willing to withdraw from the political arena. Since Germany's victories have thwarted him in his role of "peacemaker", he would now instead like to go down in history as the leader of the American people in the war against Germany, for he is firmly convinced that the great conflict between Germany and America is bound to occur and he will, if re-elected, do his share to bring on that conflict.

That the psychosis holding America in its grip today will make way for a saner approach to German-American relations if Roosevelt is defeated in the elections can be regarded as certain in the light of all past experience.

THOMSEN

No. 109

B19/B008639

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 398 of July 4

HELSINKI, July 4, 1940—6:00 p. m.

Received July 5—12:40 a. m.

The Finnish Foreign Minister told me confidentially that sentiment friendly to Germany was developing in the population "in avalanche proportions [*lawinenartig*]" and that efforts were under way to form a government oriented exclusively toward Berlin. Public opinion was influenced strongly by the idea that Finland with the aid of German arms could in a few months recover the territories lost to Russia. This idea was supported by discussions which Finnish pri-

vate citizens had in Germany with Germans not in positions of responsibility and by private correspondence coming from Germany.

At the request of the Foreign Minister I gave it as my personal opinion in the matter that Germany would respect her agreements with Russia, so that this idea which had been mentioned constituted an illusion which was extremely dangerous, both for Finnish-Russian and for German-Russian relations. As regards German-Finnish relations these must be improved slowly and by stages and not violently and forcefully. In view of Russian suspicion I would regard as objectionable the formation of a government of a tendency one-sidedly friendly toward Germany, and I could not conceive that such a government would find 100 percent favor in Germany. I preferred a government which cooperated with us secretly [*unter der Hand*], but which outwardly displayed an attitude of reserve.

The Foreign Minister agreed with me and said he would adopt an attitude along that line with regard to plans for reconstituting the government. Please let me have a telegraphic reply as to whether my statements are approved.¹

BLÜCHER

¹ In telegram No. 310 of July 6 Woermann replied as follows: "Agree with the line taken in your conversation. Nevertheless, please avoid as much as possible statements such as that in the third to the last sentence in your telegraphic report, since there is the danger later on of erroneous interpretation." (6434/H059863)

No. 110

205/142462-63

The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, July 4, 1940—10: 55 p. m.

No. 1109 of July 4

Received July 5—3: 30 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1086 of June 29.¹

Foreign Minister Günther asked me to call on him in order to discuss the matter of the transit of members of the German Wehrmacht, and said the following in order to justify upholding the Swedish standpoint, which is that only two trains should leave Kornsjö for Germany per week and vice versa (figure 1 b of the cited telegraphic report):

Günther started by saying that on the basis of Minister Richert's report on the conference with the Reich Foreign Minister² he had had the impression that trips by soldiers on leave would remain restricted to smaller proportions, somewhat like the projected trains from

¹ Document No. 60.

² See vol. IX, documents Nos. 466 and 528.

Narvik—all the more since confirmation had been given by Germany that whole troop transports were out of the question. Upon the request of Germany he had then with great difficulty put through in the Cabinet the concession by Sweden of two trains a week. With the best will to cooperate he could not go beyond this. He believed he could assume that Germany, too, as evidenced in the exchange of letters between the Führer and the King,³ did not have the intention of placing Sweden in a situation which would necessarily mean to the outside world a clearly recognizable surrender of her neutrality. Daily German military trains on Swedish soil as a regular institution would, however, be incompatible with his efforts to maintain at least the outward appearance of neutrality; on the other hand, if only two trains were sent a week, if possible at irregular intervals, the thesis of occasional trips could be maintained.

Günther mentioned that the German trains had already been the subject of British démarches⁴ and that also the thought of possible British bomb attacks on them, with all the attendant consequences, ought to be taken into account. Furthermore, he pointed to the fact that important parts of the Swedish merchant marine were exposed to British seizure.

An attempt to put through the execution of the more extensive German request would, Günther continued, certainly bring at least himself and therewith his entire previous work into serious difficulties, but in addition would also involve the Swedish Ministry in difficulties with the Riksdag. Günther asked that we consider whether it would be worth while even from the German standpoint to abandon the line of cooperation animated by good will, which was after all already showing good results, in favor of putting through particular points with the indicated consequences. In conclusion Günther asked that his statements be reported to the Reich Government, and expressed the hope that his reasons would be understood. He now wanted to await the German reply and would greatly welcome an early agreement in accordance with the Swedish proposal for a supplementary statement, since the Swedish Government wished to publish in the near future a soothing statement on the resumption of the transit of goods and of German soldiers on leave since the end of the Norwegian campaign.

Please wire instructions.⁵

BELOW

³ Vol. ix, documents Nos. 142 and 161.

⁴ Such British démarches had been made through an aide-mémoire of the British Legation in Stockholm on Apr. 26, 1940 (*Handlingar rörande Sveriges politik under andra världskriget: Transitöringsfrågor och därmed sammanhängande spörsmål April-Juni 1940* (Stockholm, 1947), pp. 126-127), and in an interview between Lord Halifax and the Swedish Minister in London on June 26, 1940 (*Transitöringsfrågan Juni-December 1940*, pp. 21-22).

⁵ Such instructions have not been found. The subsequent negotiations were carried on in Stockholm by Minister Schnurre as Special Envoy.

No. 111

365/206197

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M

BERLIN, July 4, 1940.

zu Pol. I M 9477 g.¹

Subject: Communication of the German Armistice Commission to the French delegation regarding suspension of article 8 of the Armistice Agreement.

The text of the communication reads:

"In reply to the communication handed to me regarding the incidents in the western Mediterranean,² I have the honor to inform you that the Führer of the German Reich and Supreme Commander of the German Wehrmacht has expressed his understanding for the decisions taken by the French Government. He has further stated that the assurances given for the French fleet in article 8 of the Armistice Agreement gain in importance with respect to a fleet that is prepared to resist unjustified and dishonoring seizure by other powers.

"The German Armistice Commission reports on this matter that it is prepared to postpone the execution of those provisions of the Armistice Agreement that are incompatible with the reported French measures, until the situation is clarified.

"The Italian Armistice Commission has been informed of the German view."

KRAMARZ

¹ Pol. I M 9477 g.: Not found.

² See document No. 93 and footnote 1 thereto.

[EDITORS' NOTE. On July 4, 1940, German newspapers published a DNB report announcing the forthcoming publication by the German Foreign Ministry of a sixth German White Book consisting of French diplomatic and military documents which had been captured by German troops in France. The DNB report stated that "in view of the tremendous significance of these documents a beginning has been made even at present, prior to publication of the White Book, to bring them to the notice of the public in serialized form." The first major group of documents was, in fact, published in the German press on July 4 and 5. These documents as well as others published subsequently in the course of July 1940 were referred to as the sixth German White Book, even though they formed only a part of the documentation contained in the bound volume of White Book No. 6 which was published by the Foreign Ministry in 1941

under the title, *Die Geheimakten des französischen Generalstabes*. The numbering of documents as they appeared consecutively in the German press is different from the order in which they were published in the White Book. Of the documents published first in the German press, German propaganda gave greatest attention to those referring to alleged plans for Allied moves in the Middle East, and against Russian oil fields in the Caucasus; particularly emphasized were the efforts supposedly made by René Massigli, France's Ambassador in Ankara, to get the consent and support of the Turkish Government for such plans.]

No. 112

19/12882-88

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram

TOP SECRET
No. 1362

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1940—11:44 a. m.
Received July 5 [6?]—1:10 a. m.

As you have gathered from my reports, it is necessary for us in our information activities [*Aufklärung*] in America to employ a great variety of methods, for which it will probably be possible to render normal accounting after the war is over and Germany's own courier service is restored.

In order to step up to maximum efficiency especially our purely foreign-political information campaign in America, which seeks to prevent the country from entering the war and to exert direct political influence, we had to use such special methods as are dealt with, for example, in my secret telegraphic report No. 1230 of June 19 to the State Secretary ¹ and in the secret telegraphic instruction No. 666 of June 17 (Presse 268 g).²

The payments required for these purposes are obtained from various press and propaganda funds and made to the recipients through trusted go-betweens, but in the circumstances it is obvious that no receipts can be expected. In all such cases I have therefore made out to the disbursing officer a receipt, or else a voucher statement.

Such receipts or memoranda would fall into the hands of the American Secret Service if the Embassy were suddenly to be seized by American authorities, and despite all camouflage, by the fact of their existence alone, they would mean political ruin and have other grave consequences for our political friends who are probably known to our enemies, and cause serious political damage to us.

¹ Vol. ix, document No. 493.

² Not found. See document No. 91.

I therefore request that the Embassy be authorized to destroy these receipts and statements, and henceforth dispense with making them, as also with keeping accounts of such payments.^a

This telegraphic report has been destroyed.

THOMSEN

^a The reply to this request has not been found, but see document No. 190, last sentence.

No. 113

821/193822

The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

KAUNAS, July 5, 1940—12:40 a. m.

No. 127 of July 4

Received July 5—5:10 a. m.

I have learned in strict confidence from a good source that Molotov told Lithuanian Foreign Minister Krėvé-Mickevičius, who returned to Kaunas yesterday evening, that Lithuania's incorporation in the Soviet Union is a settled decision. All attempts of Krėvé-Mickevičius to modify this decision failed. Lithuania's incorporation is to be the first to be completed and will be followed by that of Latvia and Estonia. To Krėvé-Mickevičius' question why Lithuania had to be the first, Molotov is reported to have replied that this was done on account of Germany.

The procedure apparently planned is to convoke a Seimas which is to agree that (apparently one group missing) is declared. Dekanosov, who also was in Moscow these last days, has returned with several officials in order to arrange the details of the proceedings.

ZECHLIN

No. 114

490/282266

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, July 5, 1940—5:30 p. m.

No. 1306 of July 5

Received July 5—11:00 p. m.

The Swedish Minister here told me confidentially that on the occasion of a recent visit he had found the British Ambassador here in an extremely depressed state of mind. Cripps had said that England was

daily expecting a sudden attack on the British Isles. The democracies were so hopelessly inferior to the totalitarian states that an attack on the Island would very likely be successful. The British Government would then be forced to emigrate to Canada—there to end up by force of circumstances as a junior partner of the United States.

To the Swedish Minister's inquiry as to why in such circumstances Great Britain did not make peace Cripps answered that England could not do that because Germany would doubtless demand the surrender of the entire British fleet and for such a concession no British Government could assume responsibility before the people.

SCHULENBURG

No. 115

365/206205

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

No. 32 of July 5

HWIX, JULY 5, 1940—6:30 p. m.

Received July 5—7:10 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 29 of July 4.¹

The decision of the Führer mentioned in the previous report was, in agreement with the OKW, next communicated to the French in the following form:

1.) Provisions of the Armistice Agreement with respect to demobilization and disarmament of French air forces, including antiaircraft guns in the unoccupied area, as well as with respect to the prohibition against planes taking off (article 12) were suspended in so far as the air force and air defense are necessary to repel English attacks in the Mediterranean.

2.) What units are necessary for defense would be decided by the Armistice Commission, which was likewise determining the special regulations to be observed for commitment.

3.) A prerequisite for all measures affecting the Mediterranean was that the French Government give advance notice of them to the Italian High Command, which had particularly to decide with respect to measures in North Africa and Syria. The Italian Armistice Commission was informed of the German views.

4.) The employment of French air forces in the Atlantic was excluded.

HENCKE

¹ Not printed (365/206202). It reported the intention to communicate Hitler's decision as given in the document printed.

No. 116

1004/307899-408

*Circular of the Office of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan*¹

SECRET

BERLIN, July 5, 1940.

V. P. 11192/5 g

Subject: Execution of the Armistice Treaty.

I. In accordance with a wish expressed at the meeting on July 4, 1940,² I am once more summarizing my statements regarding the legal situation briefly as follows:

a) The Armistice Treaty does not give Germany rights in the economic field in the unoccupied part of France. Such rights also cannot be construed by way of broad interpretation.

b) This does not preclude that it be demanded for the unoccupied territory also, among other things, on the basis of article 10, that the French Government revoke the Black Lists, as well as suspend measures against German assets.

The return of rolling stock and vehicles from unoccupied to occupied territory is regulated specially in article 13, paragraph 2.

Under the title of "traction facilities" the delivery of horses from unoccupied territory may also to a certain extent be demanded on the basis of article 5 within the framework of the military negotiations.

c) With regard to the occupied portions of France, Germany can claim rights in the economic field arising from articles 3, 17, and 21.

Article 3 gives Germany "all rights of the occupying power." From these "rights of the occupying power" Germany can derive the powers to take all measures, in the economic field as well, in the occupied parts of France that she considers proper, according to her judgment of the exigencies created through continuation of the war with England. The rights conferred by article 3 thus exceed the rights of the occupying power within the meaning of The Hague Rules of Land Warfare.

Article 17 gives Germany the right to safeguard economic assets and supplies in the occupied territory and obligates the French Government in its decrees to obtain the consent of Germany. At the desire of the French, Germany has promised, in deciding on petitions of the French Government for approval in disposing of assets and supplies in occupied territory, to consider also the vital needs of the population of the unoccupied territory.

Article 21 establishes no independent claim, but simply the responsibility of the French Government for the performance of the obligations assumed in other articles.

II. The center of gravity of economic measures in France, accordingly, lies with the Military Commander, who has to exercise the rights

¹ Sent to the Ministries of Economics, Food, Finance, Transport, and Labor, the offices of the Commissioner for Motor Transport, the Chief Forester, and the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank.

² No record of this meeting has been found.

of the occupying power established by article 3. The Military Commander is Colonel General v. Brauchitsch; his permanent deputy, General Streccius. Jonathan Schmidt, the Württemberg Minister of Economics, is appointed Chief of the Military Administration. As head of the Economics Division the Field Marshal has appointed Ministerialdirigent Michel, to whom are to be assigned officials from the economic departments.

III. Negotiations concerning the economic questions of the Armistice Agreement shall in future no longer be conducted by the German Armistice Commission, which is under the direction of Infantry General von Stülpnagel, but by a special economic delegation. In agreement with the Foreign Office, the Field Marshal has appointed Minister Hemmen to head this delegation.⁸ Besides discussing the implementation of the economic agreements of the Armistice Agreement, the economic delegation will also conduct free negotiations with the French Government on economic matters. Its aim in so doing must be so far as possible to place the economic potential of the unoccupied territory in the service of the German war economy.

IV. The definition of the term "economic assets" in article 17, proposed by Ministerialdirektor Moritz in the meeting of July 4, 1940, is attached. You are requested, in accordance with the agreement, to study the suggestion and submit your wishes in regard to supplementing or amending it by noon of July 6, 1940. Please at the same time send the proposals directly to the other departments concerned.

V. By the same time, I ask for your kind submission of the demands that should be made on the French Government, on the basis of article 17, for safeguarding of supplies and economic assets in occupied territory. When making these proposals, I ask that you consider in each case whether it is expedient to require legal and administrative measures of the French Government through the instrumentality of the Armistice negotiations, or whether autonomous administrative measures of the Military Commander on the basis of article 3, would better achieve our ends. In that connection I ask you to consider that a well ordered French Administration does not now exist in the occupied parts of France.

By order:
DR. GRAMSCH

[Enclosure]

Economic assets is the comprehensive concept for everything that is important to the economic life of the individual or the community. An exhaustive enumeration of these assets is naturally not possible.

⁸ See document No. 117.

In order to make clear to the French Government the substance of the provisions and to facilitate their administration, there is given below a list of examples of economic assets from the most important economic spheres:

Food and feed of all kinds, as well as the raw materials and installations for their production, raw materials, semimanufactured and finished goods of all kinds, as well as installations and equipment for their extraction, including mineral and forest resources, foreign currency, legal tender, etc.

No. 117

1004/807390/1-90/2

The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of the French Delegation to the German Armistice Commission

ch. ib No. 7/40

JULY 5, 1940.

A "Special Commission on Economic Questions" has been created for settling and implementing the economic questions arising from the Armistice Agreement which cannot be settled by the Military Administration. Minister Hemmen has been appointed chairman of this Commission. The Commission for the present will be located at Wiesbaden.

The Commission will be composed of the following representatives:

- a. from the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
- b. from the Foreign Ministry
- c. from the Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration
- d. from the High Command of the Wehrmacht
- e. from the High Command of the Army (Chief of the Military Administration in France).

The French Government is requested to detail corresponding persons to the Special Commission on Economic Questions who would be authorized also to negotiate, if necessary, on questions that do not arise directly out of the implementation of the Armistice Agreement, but will be taken care of by way of special agreement.

It might be desirable to group these persons under a chairman.

The present arrangement will be retained for economic questions which are restricted to the occupied area.

These will be settled directly with the representatives of the French governmental authorities with the Chief of the Military Administration in France, located in Paris.

It is suggested on this occasion that the persons detailed to the Chief of the Military Administration in France for the occupied area be placed under unified direction. The request is therefore made that the French Government appoint a plenipotentiary with the Chief of

the Military Administration in France and send him to Paris. In the future all special French deputies in the occupied area would be subordinate to the plenipotentiary. Moreover, the plenipotentiary would represent the French Government with the Chief of the Military Administration in France, so that in this way urgent matters can be settled without delay in direct cooperation with the Chief of the Military Administration.

It is also requested that a deputy for money and banking be appointed at once, and that we be informed when he will arrive at the line of demarcation in Bourges. He will then be taken at once to the Chief of the Military Administration in Paris.

VON STÜLPNAGEL
General of Infantry

No. 118

1058/812243

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

RIO DE JANEIRO, July 5, 1940—10:22 p. m.

No. 669 of July 5

Received July 6—8:45 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 655 of July 2.¹

Since the Brazilian Government possibly will not make any concrete proposals regarding the agreement to be concluded, aside from the purchase of Brazilian products of a definite kind and quantity, please let me have instructions as to what we should propose in that case.

The following framework seems to the Embassy appropriate: a trade agreement for additional reciprocal purchases to the extent of 50 to 100 million clearing marks [*Verrechnungsmark*]. No commitments as to time, but a promise on both sides of earliest delivery. Purchase of Brazilian products, therefore, in general, at our option, but with the promise of extensive consideration for Brazilian wishes. German promise to purchase coffee in the amount of 25 percent of the total amount, possibly more, if Brazil permits re-exportation to countries on the continent of Europe.

With reference to the supplementary nature of the agreement, we should try to see that German counterdeliveries consist entirely, if possible, of orders for the Brazilian Government. It is questionable, however, whether this can be done in view of the strained situation of the budget of the Federal Government.

¹ Document No. 89.

The principal difficulty in the way of such an agreement and likewise in fixing the upper limits on its quantities lies in the need for probably rather long-term interim financing here, which is rendered much more difficult because of Brazil's narrow capital and credit basis.

PRÜFER

No. 119

73/52556

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 445 of July 5

BUDAPEST, July 5, 1940—11:55 p. m.

Received July 6—6:30 a. m.

The Foreign Minister told me it was remarkable that Molotov who, in general, at best received Ambassadors, had now received the Hungarian Minister twice within 3 days; the last time on his own initiative. At the first conversation, he had rejected the proposal of the Hungarian Minister to resettle 5 Hungarian villages with a total of 12,000 inhabitants, situated in northern Bucovina, but had now stated that he had reconsidered the matter and that the Soviet Union would probably meet Hungary's wishes. He had added that he was anxious, rumors to the contrary notwithstanding, again to state that the Soviet Union had no demands to make on Hungary, with which country it desired to live in all friendship. He considered Hungary's demands on Rumania quite as just as the Russian demand for Bessarabia. The Soviet Union was not contemplating making further territorial demands on Rumania.

Csáky believes that this sudden unexpectedly friendly attitude of the Soviet Government,¹ which was evident also on the Russian radio and in the Tass reports, was perhaps attributable to the fact that the Soviet Government now wanted to assert its claims against Iran and from there later on, possibly against Turkey, and therefore did not wish at the present time to advance any more claims in southeastern Europe. The British Minister here had inquired with great interest about Hungarian-Russian relations, in view of the Russian radio reports.

The Foreign Minister observed further that Hungarian steamers which, like the German steamers, had been prevented by the Russians at Reni (near the confluence of the Prut and Danube) from proceeding, had received instructions to be guided by the attitude of the German steamship companies.

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ Similarly, the Hungarian Minister told Weizsäcker on July 8, that Soviet-Hungarian relations were correct and "even better than correct." (73/52559)

No. 120

1754/404428

The High Command of the Navy to the Foreign Ministry

B. Nr. A IV 1610 geh.

BERLIN, July 5, 1940.

Pol. I M 9534 g.

Attention: Counselor v. d. Heyden-Rynsch.

It is requested that the following telegram be transmitted in code to the Legation in Mexico.¹

"For Hertslet.² The following official information has become known here: W. R. Davis, who has dealt with various oil matters for the Mexican Government,³ paid \$250,000 to the National and Pennsylvania State Democratic organizations. In response to an inquiry, Under Secretary of State Welles stated that he could make no comment on the subject.⁴ An explanation is requested.⁵ Dr. Fetzer."

By order:

[signature illegible]

¹ A note in the file indicates that this was sent as telegram No. 330 to Mexico (9922/E694651).

² Hertslet was a representative of OKW on special mission. See vol. ix, document No. 13.

³ Cf. vol. viii, document No. 242 and footnote 10.

⁴ In a press conference on May 4, the following question was addressed to Welles: "Mr. Secretary, on the Mexican thing again, a story was published by a usually responsible journalist a few weeks ago that W. R. Davis, who has made a number of oil arrangements for the Mexican Government, in 1936, I believe, or 1938, gave a gift of \$250,000 to the Democratic party, divided between the National Committee and an organization in Pennsylvania. Do you know anything about that?" To this Welles replied that he regarded that "as a matter entirely political" and was "not in a position to comment on it, either to verify it or to deny it." (Department of State, *Division of Current Information*, vol. xii, No. 74: Memorandum of the Press Conference, Saturday, May 4, 1940)

⁵ See document No. 134.

No. 121

504/234965-68

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Pol. 2 Nr. 1

BELGRADE, July 5, 1940.

Received July 9.

Pol. IV 2282.

Subject: The Foreign policy of Yugoslavia during the European conflict.

The government which has thus far determined Yugoslavia's attitude on foreign policy during the European conflict only came into power shortly before the outbreak of the conflict and its composition had been determined almost exclusively by political developments within the country. Even the appointment of Cvetković, the present

Minister President, to take over the government, had been made in January¹ of last year purely for reasons of domestic policy and had then in August of last year led to the agreement with the Croats and the entry into the Cabinet of the Croatia leader, Maček. The foreign policy of Yugoslavia, in the pro-Axis orientation which it had received under the leadership of the Prince Regent when Stojadinović was Minister President was always treated by the Cvetković Government, just as later by the Cvetković-Maček Government, as a matter of course and being beyond dispute. And this was also underscored outwardly by the appointment of Cincar-Marković, the former Yugoslav Minister to Berlin, as Foreign Minister. In these circumstances it was certain from the beginning that Yugoslavia would make every effort to avoid involvement in the European conflict, for, in view of the geographic position of Yugoslavia, there could no longer be any question of Yugoslavia's alignment with the Western Powers since the Anschluss and the collapse of Czechoslovakia, if only for absolutely cogent reasons of political power. Moreover, the economic ties with Germany, which had become closer and closer in recent years, had promoted the general realization that a break with Germany would have catastrophic effects on the Yugoslav economy. Just as little, to be sure, could a participation of Yugoslavia in the European conflict on the side of Germany be expected, for, aside from the fact that there were no Yugoslav interests that urgently demanded this, the pronounced Francophile sentiment which is still widespread in large classes of the population would, indeed, have proved an insurmountable obstacle to such a step on the part of the Yugoslav Government. This automatically resulted in the decision to adopt an attitude of at least formal neutrality, and the question could only be whether, under this surface neutrality, obedient to sentiment, Yugoslavia would follow public sentiment and be closer to the Western Powers or follow her economic interests and become closer attached to Germany.

The picture which the Yugoslav attitude presented from the outbreak of the conflict until today, through a certain lack of clarity, always revealed this ambivalent tendency. The Yugoslav Government was undoubtedly determined from the beginning so to fashion its neutrality in detail as to avoid, under all circumstances, a conflict with its powerful German neighbor. On the other hand, however, it also believed, for reasons of domestic policy, and because it did not always appraise the prospects of victory as favorable to Germany, that it had to avoid giving any serious displeasure to the Western Powers. In the field of war economy, this attitude found expression

¹ Actually, the Cvetković Cabinet was formed after the government headed by Stojadinović resigned on Feb. 4, 1939.

in the tendency to satisfy our wishes only within the limits that seemed necessary to keep us from exerting political pressure. At the same time, however, such narrow limits were set that, inasmuch as it was possible at all, it could not give the Western Powers any cause for serious complaint. An example of this is, among many other things, the attitude of the Yugoslav Government with regard to our wishes for deliveries of copper. It was realized that these wishes had to be met, but everything was done to keep the quantities as small as possible, and the attempt was made to calm the French owners of the copper mines by finding ways and means, since the outbreak of the conflict, of shipping about the same amount of copper to France as to Germany. Although, therefore, our war economy has thus far, by and large, without too great difficulties obtained from Yugoslavia everything that we could normally expect, the cooperation that we experienced in this matter has nevertheless not been such as to have placed us under any particular debt of gratitude.²

More dilatory even than in the economic field was the attitude of the Cvetković-Maček Government in the political field, in so far as the guidance of the press and public opinion were concerned. Partly because of liberalistic inhibitions at home, partly because of an old disposition to yield to the political wishes of the Western Powers, they contented themselves with keeping the press in general free from expressing too much hatred for Germany, but otherwise permitted the Francophile tendency of the intellectual element that was dominant in the press to be expressed rather openly. The same laxness was shown by the Cvetković-Maček Government also in the handling of enemy propaganda. Here, too, it was thought that the neutrality obligations could be satisfied by formal prohibitions, but they failed to take any energetic action, and tolerated the sabotaging of official policy by passive resistance on the part of subordinate officials. It was only when public opinion was whipped up by press and enemy propaganda in the excitement of the days of the German military operations this spring to a point where it threatened to cause a serious political embarrassment to the government, that it was decided to resort to energetic measures, and since then, helped by the clarification that has taken place in the world political situation, matters have actually calmed down to a considerable extent.

The same weakness of the Cvetković-Maček Government, which has heretofore made it seem incapable of pursuing a clear-cut political line, is again apparent today, when Yugoslav interests, in the unanimous opinion of all political groups which are to be taken seriously, would require an unconditional and candid adjustment of Yugoslav policy to the situation created by the German victory in the west.

² See vol. ix, document No. 442.

Differences of domestic policy, personal enmities and loyalties, have until now prevented a determined adjustment of Yugoslav policy to the new situation, and it is indeed hardly to be assumed that the present government will go beyond half-way measures and formalities.

It is likely that the conflicting feelings which may have animated the Prince Regent during the great political events of recent days, have not been conducive to a greater clarity in Yugoslav policy either.

HEEREN

No. 122

B19/B003641-42

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, July 6, 1940—6:00 p. m.

No. 401 of July 6

Received July 6—9:40 p. m.

The Finnish Foreign Minister maintains on the strength of the reports of Ramsay¹ and Fieandt, in contrast to the contents of your telegram No. 388,² that the demands made by the German side at the talks in Berlin were not for participation in the *concession*, but for a share of the *output*.³ The Russians on the contrary demanded a concession.

The Foreign Minister envisages a development in the immediate future whereby the Petsamo nickel enterprise would resume operation at a very early date and turn over its output for a period of from 3 to 5 years to a distributing company, yet to be established, which would in turn make deliveries to Germany and Russia. The 3 percent ore as mined would be converted in Petsamo to 50 percent matte which would then be the product shipped out. If the German Government, however, should currently be interested in the 3 percent ore, such wishes could be met. The distributing company could be purely Finnish, or it could be a Finnish-German-Russian organization.

Meanwhile the Finnish Government has received a communication from the English Legation here, expressing agreement with any plan for the reorganization of the nickel company, provided that the entire output goes to Russia. The Foreign Minister does not appear to have allowed the note to influence his decision, but is anxious to supply the nickel needs of the German Government.

I request your telegraphic instruction regarding the first paragraph, as to whether the standpoint expressed in telegram No. 388, insisting

¹ H. Ramsay was one of the Finnish representatives conducting economic negotiations.

² The reference here to Berlin telegram No. 388 is incorrect. The reference is to the telegram of July 4 to Helsinki cited in footnote 1 to document No. 98.

³ See also documents Nos. 136 and 259.

on recognition by the Finnish Government of Germany's participation in the concession, should be pressed or softened in subsequent talks.

Also please indicate your position on the project developed by the Foreign Minister.⁴

BLÜCHER

⁴ See document No. 136.

No. 123

175/137077-78

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, July 6, 1940.

No. 1118 of July 6

Received July 6—9:45 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The King has communicated to me through Foreign Minister Manoilescu¹ the following reply for transmission to the Führer and Reich Chancellor:

"His Majesty the King has accepted the communication of the Führer² with his special thanks.

"In complete accord with his Government—which will handle this question from now on—His Majesty declares his willingness (group garbled) to have negotiations initiated between the Rumanian Government on the one hand, and the Governments of Hungary and Bulgaria on the other. This declaration is based on the hope and confidence that the Führer will extend his moral support to Rumania with a view to preventing the opposite parties to the negotiations from carrying their demands beyond the bounds of national justice and political reason. His Majesty stresses expressly that only such possibilities and solutions may be counted on as will in no way (group garbled) violate the ethical [*ethnic*?] principle. In order to be able to maintain this principle it is regarded as desirable to contemplate extensive reciprocal resettlement of populations, which would be carried through in a planned and systematic manner within a determined period of time. His Majesty views this action and the hoped-for final settlement of all our differences with the aforementioned neighboring states merely as a means to the end of achieving complete security for Rumania through permanent protection extended by the Reich, and a close and extensive collaboration with Germany.

"His Majesty hopes that this sincere declaration, which implies a colossal sacrifice for Rumanian national sentiment, will be regarded as proof of his spirit of cooperation and his personal appreciation of the Führer."

¹ Mihail Manoilescu had succeeded to the post of Foreign Minister in the new Cabinet headed by Ion Gigurtu, which came into office on July 4.

² Document No. 104.

The Foreign Minister added to this personally that he had taken the conduct of Rumania's foreign policy from now on into his own hands, with the approval of the King, and that he was therefore making a special plea for German support. He would first negotiate with Hungary, because these negotiations would be more difficult than those with Bulgaria. He would request Belgrade to undertake a certain preliminary mediation, but would keep us currently informed.

The Foreign Minister also requests that Minister Romalo be granted his first audience at an early date.

FABRICIUS

No. 124

4469/E087696-705

Note by Reichsleiter Rosenberg

BERLIN, July 6, 1940.

CONVERSATION WITH M. QUISLING OF OSLO

Upon German invitation Quisling is on a few days' visit in Berlin. Referring to what had previously been stated about the negotiations in Oslo, and the attitude of the Reich Commissar, he mentioned some details and then briefly described the course of recent events.

Quisling said that on May 17 Professor Worm-Müller spoke over the radio on the occasion of the Norwegian national holiday. He was an old and declared opponent of Germany. Quisling himself was not permitted to speak until June 24.

A leader of a left-wing democratic party (Radicals)¹ named Clausen, a member of the pro-British circle, had on the day of the German landing in Norway advised the Gauleiter of the Nasjonal Samling in Trondheim to shoot himself. But he, as most political opponents of Germany, by and by reappeared and took up his work. Now this Clausen was again in charge of negotiations about wage contracts, was the state labor mediator, and designated as the coming Minister of Finance.

M. Jonas Lie was selected to be Minister of Police and now was being forced on him as leader of the Nasjonal Samling, that is, of his own party. Lie was previously a nationalist in general and also pro-German in general. But it had come out that Lie had not only fought as an officer under the Nygaardsvold Government, but he had also interrogated arrested members of the Nasjonal Samling in a very ugly manner. In the Nasjonal Samling Lie had really no authority.

¹ The Norwegian Venstre or Liberal party.

Besides various other persons Eck, the former Gauschatzmeister in Frankfurt-Main, had also been assigned to Quisling to organize the party. He was said to have stated that Reich Commissar Terboven's treatment of Quisling and the Nasjonal Samling was impossible. He offered his resignation and went back to Germany.

In the beginning, after Quisling's first forced resignation,² he was supposed to take over the demobilization. Yet when he was to start, it turned out that the whole organization had already been completed by others and that the intention was to shelve him as a department chief who had to do only with the payment of wages.

Next the so-called *Faedrelandets group* (an offshoot of the Conservatives) was pushed into the foreground. As their exponent, appeared the journalist Viktor Mogens who was scheduled to become Minister of Propaganda and already was frequently called on to speak on the radio. Mogens was probably married to a Jewess from southern Russia. Head of that group had been the Jew Lemkuhl who escaped to America. The editor of the *Tidens Tegn* was the Jew Halle. Such were the people who, at this of all times, were selected to help in the formation of a Norwegian Government. Quisling had learned of the plans for the government for the first time from members of his own party who replied to the invitation of the German Mission to participate in the new government that they had to decline until they had spoken about it with Quisling (the name of the person concerned is Axel Stang).

Quisling and the Nasjonal Samling had been promised, among other things, that they could build up the labor service with the help of German advisers. Now a certain William Fürst was appointed manager of the labor service. This man had been expelled from the Nasjonal Samling for bad conduct. Here again, when everything was completed, Quisling was forced to come aboard as the last man.

Next Quisling reports on his interviews with the Reich Commissariat. On June 25 a conference was held at Terboven's office in which an SS-Gruppenführer from East Prussia and Herren Delbrügge, Stahlecker, and Müller participated. Terboven propounded the idea that he thought it a good thing for Quisling to go away for a time. He might perhaps obtain an assignment from the German Government to carry out a scientific project and to take up residence in Germany. Quisling replied that it was clear that Germany's enemies wanted him to go away, in order to go to work. Terboven: Quisling ought not to occupy the center of the stage in this manner. Quisling: We are hated because we worked for Germany. In the past I was a man of good reputation, but since I became aware of the fatal trend of Nor-

² See vol. ix, documents Nos. 118 and 187.

wegian policies and advocated cooperation with Germany, all the plutocratic and pro-British personages are lined up against me. Terboven thereupon stated in a peremptory fashion that unless Quisling went along with his proposal a new party would be established in Norway. He was in a position to organize a large movement in 2 months. Quisling thereupon said: "With money and power you are certainly able to do a great deal, but you will not gain hearts by that." Terboven: "You have also received a great deal of money; what we had in Germany was only pocket money compared to that." Quisling said that he did not feel it possible to make an answer to that. In any case Terboven put the alternatives to him either to accept his request or to decline it.

The consequence of an outright rejection would have been that the Nasjonal Samling, which had fought for Germany, being confronted with a political movement established by the Reich Commissar, would have become merely a splinter party. It was intended to maneuver Quisling's Nasjonal Samling into the position of an opposition party, in order to treat it then accordingly! Quisling went on to say that his person was, of course, of no importance, but he could not assume that it was the will of the Führer that he be presented with such an ultimatum. Terboven replied to this: "The Führer has always accepted my suggestions."

Quisling thereupon said: "In my opinion that is not Germanic fidelity." Quisling referred to the agreement made with Minister Bräuer.³ At that time, after Quisling's resignation, Dr. Bräuer had presented him certain proposals from a document: Support of Quisling and the Nasjonal Samling, free propaganda, no prohibition of uniforms. Terboven made no reply to this reference.

Later a conversation between Quisling, Stahlecker, and Müller took place. The German officials took pains to give a more temperate aspect to the matter and advised him to accept an invitation from the Government of the Reich. Further conversations aimed at his retirement, for the time being, from the leadership of the Nasjonal Samling. He was expected to leave the appointment of his successor "with full confidence in the hands of the Reich Commissar," which he declined to do. Quisling stated that he had some time ago reported orally to the Führer; the Führer had assured him of support, and he could not make a decision yet. Terboven thereupon again spoke to him in a menacing tone, whereupon Quisling answered: "After all, you must not destroy a brotherly movement. You might only make enemies out of friends who have suffered for you. You may achieve that, but that cannot be the intent of your actions."

³ See vol. ix, document No. 113.

On Saturday June 29 another conference took place at Terboven's office. He told Quisling that the substitute leader should be M. Lie, who would become Minister of Police in any circumstances.

Thus Quisling was faced with a question of power politics. The Reich Commissar embodied the whole power of the German Reich. He had demanded his resignation and had threatened him with the establishment of a new party and the suspension of all support, including financial, for the Nasjonal Samling. Faced with this situation, Quisling stated that he was anxious about the reaction within the Nasjonal Samling to the appointment of M. Lie. M. Lie's authority within the Nasjonal Samling was slight. In the interest of the movement he had built up he was proposing that at least Lie should not be appointed before the change of government had been effected. Only then could he achieve something with the help of his prestige as the Minister of Police. Quisling expressed his conviction that there was a real risk that such measures might blast the whole Nasjonal Samling to pieces.

Shortly thereafter I received a note from M. Hagelin from Oslo, which I enclose.⁴

To me, Quisling's attitude is that of an upright Germanic man devoted to the Führer, who ought *never* be treated in this manner.⁵

ROSENBERG

⁴ Not found.

⁵ In the files is an undated draft letter from Quisling to Hitler similar in content and tone to this memorandum (4469/E087721-36). Another copy of the same letter with the date July 8 has been filmed on APA Reel No. 290, from a file in the custody of the German Military Documents Section, Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office, United States Army, No. 250-d-18-42/1. The question of who composed this letter and whether it was actually sent was gone into at the Quisling trial, but no conclusive answer was given. See *Straffesak mot Vidkun Abraham Lauritz Jonssøn Quisling* (Oslo, 1946), pp. 66-69. A Norwegian translation of the letter printed in the proceedings of the trial bears the date of July 10.

No. 125

2361/488066-71

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

THERAPIA, July 6, 1940.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Conversation with the Iraq Minister of Justice.

Following up my telegram of today,¹ I wish to report on my talk with Minister of Justice Naji Shawkat, member of the Iraq delega-

¹ Not printed (2361/488072).

tion,³ which took place yesterday. The conversation was arranged through the good offices of the Royal Hungarian Minister⁴ at the request of the Iraq Minister of Justice at my residence in Therapia. Consul General Seiler acted as interpreter, on my request.

The Minister explained that he represented in the present Iraq Cabinet the opinion of the Iraq people and its aspirations to achieve freedom and independence from England. Regrettably, it had been impossible to date to drop Nuri as-Said, the head of the Cabinet,⁵ who is known to be an Anglophile, for fear of English reprisals. In the further course of the conversation, which was conducted on my part in a purely noncommittal manner, the Minister of Justice sought to explain why relations were broken off and measures were taken against Germany last September.⁶ The fact that the Cabinet refused to sever relations with Italy, as demanded by the English Ambassador, despite the support he received from Nuri as-Said, should be considered as a positive achievement of the nationalistic trend of the present Cabinet. To my remark that the future development of the political situation in the Near East was a matter of interest primarily to Italy and that, therefore, I could be regarded only as an intermediary for proposals and wishes addressed to Italy via the Reich Government, the Minister of Justice replied that this was indeed the purpose of his visit. As the Arab national movement had fought Anglo-French imperialism, so it would have to oppose Italian imperialism. It was therefore to the interest of the Axis Powers for Germany to use her influence with Italy, in order to support a solution that would be compatible with the interests of the Arab movement.

I told the Minister of Justice that all peoples fighting for their freedom naturally had to make a contribution themselves. We had a right to expect that now, when we were about to enter the final phase of the contest with England, the people's government of Iraq would also do everything militarily possible to support the fight. The Minister of Justice expressed himself very cautiously on this point, but intimated that we would undoubtedly receive the support of the Iraq Army against England when the time came. In this connection I would suggest making use of Herr Steffen, Schlüterstrasse 45, Berlin, who, as representative of Rheinmetall, I am informed, has excellent connections with the Chief of the Iraq General Staff.

As a first step, the Iraq Minister of Justice recommended the re-establishment of the Arab national government in Damascus.⁷ This

³ See document No. 58.

⁴ Zoltán de Máriássy.

⁵ Cf. document No. 359, footnote 1.

⁶ The German Mission in Iraq had been requested to leave by Sept. 6, 1939 (telegram No. 444 of Sept. 7 from Rome: 83/61490).

⁷ Participation of Arab nationalists in the government had been brought to an end as a result of measures taken by the French in the period March-July 1939.

measure is very strongly endorsed by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, whose letter to me is enclosed. The Arab national government will resume its struggle also in Palestine, and this should be of particular value to us at a moment when the most diverse interests were clashing in Syria. It is assumed that England will shortly attempt to occupy Syria and disarm the French forces. The Arab uprising could successfully intervene in such a moment of weakness. The prerequisite, however, was that we relieve their anxiety over a possible Italian imperialism.

I promised the Iraq Minister of Justice that I would confidentially inform my Government and request that the matter be dealt with in greatest secrecy. In the event that there are any communications to be conveyed to the Minister of Justice, a channel is open via my Hungarian colleague and the Iraq Minister here, who likewise belongs to the nationalist group.

PAPEN

[Enclosure ']

BAGDAD, June 21, 1940.

Supreme Arab Committee
for Palestine

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to present to Your Excellency my friend Naji Bey Shawkat, Minister of Justice of the Kingdom of Iraq, who is leaving for Ankara today. I assure Your Excellency that Naji Bey is the person in whom you can place complete confidence in discussing the general questions concerning the Arab countries. It is a great occasion for me to be able to enter into relations with your Government through the good offices of Your Excellency, for ever since the beginning of the present war, the difficult circumstances in which I found myself in Syria, with regard to the French, and in Iraq, to the British, made such relations impossible. I therefore take the opportunity provided by the departure of my friend Naji Bey, to write to Your Excellency asking you to convey to His Excellency the Great Chief and Leader^a my sincerest felicitations on the occasion of the great political and military triumphs which he has just achieved through his foresight and great genius. I beg Your Excellency to convey to him my regards and compliments, together with my best wishes for the undertaking entered upon to create a new order. I must also express to him my thanks for the interest and attention which he has never ceased in the past 4 years to give to the Arab question in general, and Palestine in particular. The Arab nation

¹ The original of this enclosure is in French, its letterhead in Arabic.

^a In English in the original.

everywhere feels the greatest joy and deepest gratification on the occasion of these great successes.

Palestine, which has for the past 4 years been fighting the democracies and international Jewry, is ready at any time to assume an active role and redouble her efforts both at home and in the other Arab countries. The Arab people, slandered, maltreated, and deceived by our common enemies, confidently expect that the result of your final victory will be their independence and complete liberation, as well as the creation of their unity, when they will be linked to your country by a treaty of friendship and collaboration.

I beg Your Excellency, to discuss with my friend Naji Bey in detail the Arab question and the future of Palestine and of Syria, as well as the program which your Government may deem advisable to lay the foundations for bringing about the collaboration between our two peoples.

I beg Your Excellency to believe the most brotherly sentiments of the Arab people toward your great and valiant people, and present to you, Excellency, my best greetings.

The Grand Mufti of Palestine
MEHEMET AMIN EL HUSSEINY

No. 126

884/210974

*Circular of the Director of the Political Department*¹

Telegram

Multex 152

BERLIN, July 6, 1940.
Sent July 7—6:20 a. m.
e. o. Pol. V 6976.

With reference to Multex 72 of May 29.²

The action of the Soviet Union against the Baltic countries and Rumania has resulted in numerous rumors that there is friction between Germany and the Soviet Union. Please deny emphatically such rumors, which are partly products of pure imagination and partly malicious inventions. Now, as before, the Non-Aggression and Friendship Pacts are the mutual basis for German-Soviet relations.

Acknowledge receipt.

WOERMANN

¹ Sent to the Missions in the United States, Japan, Spain, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Italy, Turkey, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

² See vol. ix, document No. 347, footnote 2. This reference was omitted from the telegrams sent to the three Baltic States.

No. 127

8614/E604166-68

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1374 of July 5

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1940.

Received July 7—9:25 a. m.

W VIII b 2495.

In contrast to speculations in the local press and business circles (cf. DNB reports of the last few days) that the American Government has practically abandoned the plan for an economic cartel for export products of countries of the Western Hemisphere,¹ it is stated today officially that President Roosevelt will use his entire influence to persuade the nations of the Western Hemisphere to accept his plan. The President has supposedly not let himself be discouraged by the lack of enthusiasm with which his plan was received in the Ibero-American countries and his own country, and will work hard to get his plan accepted at the Pan-American Conference on July 20. The President still takes the position that something must immediately be done in order to forestall economic penetration of the Western Hemisphere by Germany; he continues in his resolve to seize the initiative in this "economic war against Germany".

To what extent this new, strong gesture should be taken seriously cannot yet be evaluated. All the indications are that the President, spurred on by the Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture, and the Treasury, is determined to prevent the restoration of a strong position of Germany in Ibero-America's foreign trade; at the same time he is aware that the time for action presses and that his objective can be attained in practice only if the surplus products of the Ibero-American countries are taken in return for cash payment. The difficulties in the way of a realization of the plan, however, are becoming clearer and clearer even to the President; in domestic politics the growing concern of the politically influential farmers is particularly regrettable [sic]; they are anxious about a market for their own tremendous surpluses, and some time ago they attacked the President when relatively small quantities of canned meat from Argentina were delivered to the American Navy. But financial circles, too, particularly the New York banks, expressed themselves as openly skeptical. The State Department (except for Berle), which sees itself in the position of having to throw Hull's foreign trade policy overboard, does not seem to be especially enthusiastic about the plan. From offi-

¹ See vol. ix, document No. 534 and footnote 2.

cial and private sources in American countries, which are predominantly negative or reserved toward the economic cartel, one hears that the pessimism as to the workability of the plan has greatly increased in the last few days.

Although the situation accordingly seems to offer little prospect of success, nevertheless the President has already shown on numerous past occasions that he does not let himself be turned away easily from pursuit of his plans by a negative public opinion and practical difficulties, and therefore it is also entirely possible that today's statement from official circles not only serves the purpose of saving face, but is actually an expression of the President's determination to have his way at the Havana Conference in this matter, too.

Arguments of local financial circles against the practical workability of the cartel plan, which can also be utilized in discussions with the governments of Ibero-American countries, are based on the following:

1. The existing system of trade agreements, which would lose their material importance through the cartel and would have to be renounced in large part.

2. The considerable difficulties that would thereby develop for all the Ibero-American countries for the export of such products as are not included in the cartel.

3. The necessity that the cartel, the funds for which would be provided by the United States, would be strictly supervised by American authorities (thus total domination of the cartel by the United States of America).

4. The necessity of fixing the production quota for all the Ibero-American countries and all the products affected, since with unrestricted production the cartel could be confronted by the impossibility of buying up the increased quantities produced (thus abandonment of the economic freedom of the separate Ibero-American countries).

5. The conviction that the cartel can exist only for a few years, if at all, but that by that time the trade relations of the separate cartel countries to countries of other continents, which in the meantime would have to find other sources of supply, would be damaged to such an extent that Ibero-America would be confronted by an economic catastrophe.

6. Destruction of the free market because of the necessity of price-fixing as a result of the rise in prices to be expected in the Ibero-American countries as well as the storage and transportation costs.

7. The necessity of inducing the Ibero-American countries to liquidate their tremendous dollar assets from sales to the cartel by obtaining finished products from the United States, which could be obtained from European countries at much lower prices.

8. The impossibility of delivering all the finished products needed by the Ibero-American countries from the United States, considering the comprehensive American armament program.

Mexico as well as all the South and Central American Missions except for Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and El Salvador are being sent coded copies as soon as possible.

THOMSEN

No. 128

175/137083

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Rumania

Telegram

No. 797

BERLIN, July 7, 1940.
zu Pol. IV 1468 g. IV.¹

For your strictly confidential information.

By direction of the Reich Foreign Minister the desire expressed there by Sima to the effect that the members of the Iron Guard in Germany should return to Rumania will not be granted for the present. Further directives may follow.²

WOERMANN

¹ Pol. IV 1468 g. IV: Not found.

² On Aug. 3, Ribbentrop instructed Fabricius once more not to discuss this matter with Sima since a return of Iron Guardists residing in Germany was "not opportune at the moment" (telegram No. 928: 172/135326).

No. 129

F9/0340-0355

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, July 8, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND COUNT CIANO IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, AMBASSADORS VON MACKENSEN AND ALFIERI, AND STATE MINISTER MEISSNER, JULY 7, 1940

After a few cordial words of greeting to Count Ciano the Führer spoke of the reason for his presence in Berlin. In the first place he had come to the capital of the Reich in order that by his entry he might arrange a demonstration which would clearly show the world the attitude of the German people. For, contrary to the English radio reports, this people was not crushed or broken, but, as had been shown again yesterday, was absolutely at its peak. In the second place, his presence in Berlin was for the purpose of considering the steps that should now be taken and reviewing the situation together with the military experts.

In certain circumstances he (the Führer) would stage another demonstration so that, in case the war should continue—which he thought was the only real possibility that came into question—he might achieve a psychological effect among his own people and a disruptive propaganda effect among the English people. In the very recent past, the practical effect of propaganda measures had become clearly evident, for German propaganda had undoubtedly achieved important results in France, and therefore perhaps now too it would be possible by a skillful appeal to the English people to isolate the English Government still further in England. For sentiment in England was such that the Government was already being forced to take measures against pacifists and people opposing the war. After all, a war consists not of a single action, but of innumerable different elements and operations and it is important to create and exploit imponderables, none of which perhaps is by itself decisive, but which in their total effect might considerably facilitate the attainment of the desired end result.

Thus, for example, it had been very fortunate that the Duce and he (the Führer) had not insisted on the surrender of the French fleet. One would never get the French fleet that way. But now, by this intelligent handling of the fleet question, England and France had been made mutual enemies. This eased the situation considerably, in particular for Italy, and improved the situation in the western Mediterranean as well as the position of the Axis Powers with respect to Franco.

The Führer expressed his satisfaction over the fact that the Italian armistice terms had been so formulated as to contribute to the present favorable situation as to France. The fact that even though there was a French sham government in London, there was on French territory a French government under Pétain, to which the French colonies had also adhered, was doubtless a great advantage for Italy and Germany. The situation of the industrial area in northern Italy was thereby considerably improved. The English could not in the long run go on bombing northern Italy from aircraft carriers, and although air attacks at night did not cause any considerable material damage, they did alarm the people and, as Germany knew from her own experience, had an unfavorable effect on war production, so that the cessation of such attacks was a great relief.

The Führer then informed Count Ciano that Germany would presently, through the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, demand of the French that they make available for the German Luftwaffe two airfields with French ground personnel, one east and one west of Spanish Morocco.¹ If the fighting between France and England

¹ See documents Nos. 151, 158, and 169.

should continue, Germany would station wings there and intervene in this fighting. No such action would be taken, however, if the Anglo-French engagements should subside again.

Germany was, moreover, about to undertake a regrouping of her armed forces, complete the deployment of her Luftwaffe against England, and carry out the reorganization of her armored and motorized units. The scope of the operations to be conducted against England was being clarified with the military experts, for it was obvious that when the blow against Great Britain was struck, the operations would have to extend over wide areas.

From Germany's point of view there were three theaters of war: 1) the area around England which was comprised by the front from Trondheim-Stavanger to the Gironde Estuary; 2) the Mediterranean; and 3) the combat area of the submarines, whose task it was to cut off supplies reaching England from the south and the west. Planning for the theaters of war in East Africa and the Mediterranean was Italy's concern. The Führer intended first of all to bring about a unified concept as to the continuation of operations and would then inform the Duce of it. If necessary, another personal exchange of views at the Brenner Pass might follow.

As for the more immediate problems, the implementation of the armistice, whose terms had been coordinated between Germany and Italy, was quite clear. These terms had to be exploited in such a way that Germany and Italy would achieve the desired aims in their spheres of interest. For Germany the watchword for this exploitation could above all be: continuation of operations against England. Basically Italy and Germany should realize, however, that France was now playing the part of an unfortunate and innocent victim of British wiles. Actually, however, that was not the truth of the matter. If France were now in a position to do so, she would immediately attack Germany and Italy and destroy these countries. The conflict between England and France gave no reason for underestimating or failing to understand the danger emanating from France. Just as there was an eternal England with a definite political orientation, there was also an eternal France with an equally definite anti-Axis attitude. The Führer asked Count Ciano to explain to the Duce that although the German press now apparently took the side of France, this did not signify the least deflection in the line to be followed with France. France was to be treated absolutely as an enemy, and the instruction which the Führer had issued to the German press to give that country milder treatment was purely tactical.

Count Ciano replied that Italy was of precisely the same opinion regarding France. That country was engaging in really classical-style theatrics and maintaining that she had fallen into a trap laid by

England. It would be dangerous to allow France somehow to slip over to the German-Italian side. The French would then at the opportune moment point out that after all they, too, had fought on the side of Italy and Germany against England and would try thereby to obtain more favorable peace terms. The Duce was somewhat disturbed about this possibility and took the view that although France was a defeated enemy, she was still an enemy of the Axis Powers and should be treated as such. The advantages of a separation of France from England had been fully recognized by Italy and for that reason she had stipulated moderate armistice terms. If peace were concluded with France, however, the political costs of the war should be imposed on that country a hundred percent. As for the actual costs of the war, the Duce took the view that these financial matters were not so very important, and while France should be forced to pay war reparations they should not be exorbitant.

Count Ciano then brought up the question of a separate peace with France. Such a peace would give still greater emphasis to the separation between France and England.

The Führer expressed misgivings on that score. If a peace treaty were concluded now with the French Government, the colonial problem would also have to be settled in that treaty, which would mean, for example, the return of the Cameroons to Germany. It was altogether possible that the English would then occupy these territories. They might also march into Morocco. As long as Gibraltar was in English hands the Italian fleet could not sail out into the Atlantic Ocean, and the German fleet was too small to carry out effective operations at such great distances. Today one must expect anything from the English, and therefore an occupation of the territory west and east of Spanish Morocco was quite possible.

If the war against England should continue, moreover, Germany would in all circumstances have to keep control of the west coast of France. This too was an obstacle to the conclusion of a separate peace with France. For France would naturally demand the return of her west coast. Furthermore, the occupation of the strip along the west coast of France guaranteed the connection with Spain. If the war with England should continue, maintenance of good relations and contacts with Spain was necessary at the very least, also in view of possible American operations. It was possible that at some opportune moment England and perhaps America, too, would try to gain a foothold in Portugal. For such a contingency the intervention of Spain would be of the greatest importance. Since, however, the Spaniards had to depend on foreign countries for their supply of fuels, coal, arms, and munitions, Germany had secured for herself an important

railroad and highway running through France to Spain and had extended her occupation to a 20-km. strip east of this railroad.

An attack on Gibraltar, to which a great deal of study had already been given in Germany, could be made only with the help of Spain. If England were to be driven out of Gibraltar, that could be accomplished only by an attack from the land side by the Spaniards themselves, who would be aided by provision of certain special weapons. Gibraltar could not be conquered from the sea and the air. If the war should last for a long time, the Italian fleet would also have to be free to leave the Mediterranean without hindrance, to say nothing of Gibraltar's economic importance for supplies from overseas.

Count Ciano concurred with the Führer's statements about the psychological action for achieving a disruptive propaganda effect on the enemy. The probability was that the war would go on. Italy's and Germany's chances were bright. The Duce was of the opinion that the final blow against Great Britain should be struck now in order to lay that country low. He was planning certain military operations in the Mediterranean and in Africa and also desired to participate with Italian land and air forces in the direct blow that Germany would strike against England. For this purpose Italy had already prepared 10 divisions and up to 30 wings of aircraft. The Duce requested urgently that the Italian troops be honored with permission to fight beside the German Wehrmacht in this operation against England.

The Führer replied that the problem of the next military operation by Germany would be given further study and he would communicate the result to the Duce.

Regarding the actions planned by the Italians, Count Ciano stated as follows: Preparations were being made for a march on Cairo with the objective of bringing Egypt and especially the Suez Canal under Italian control. The death of Balbo had caused some delay, to be sure, but Graziani, the specialist in desert fighting, as Balbo's successor would continue the preparations energetically. The attack on Egypt was a difficult operation requiring much courage. Advancing 600 km. through the desert presented great difficulties merely for the water supply of an expeditionary force of 80,000-100,000 men. The water supply was to be secured by the distillation of sea water and by air transport.

Another element of uncertainty was the probability of a naval engagement between the Italian and English fleets. On July 8 twelve transports had been sent off from Italy for Italian North Africa. In order to protect them the entire Italian fleet would for 4 days be in the Mediterranean outside its ports. In view of the well-organized

English air reconnaissance from Malta, a clash of the fleets was probable. Churchill had said in his latest speech that the Italian fleet would still have an opportunity to match its strength with the English.³ Now it would probably be the Italians who offered the English this opportunity.

The Führer here interposed the remark that Churchill had also said that the English Army was burning to make contact with the opposing German Army. Well, the English had had enough of this contact with the German Army, and if they had not run away, it would still be continuing.

Count Ciano remarked in reply that instead of saying that the English Army was burning, one ought to say that it had been burned. Reverting to the attack on Egypt, he said that it would take place between July 20 and 30. It was naturally difficult to make any definite predictions about the course of future events. The English, who had strong units stationed in Egypt and could draw on additional troops from Palestine, would undoubtedly put up strong resistance. Italy had to act boldly. In order to reestablish her communications with Abyssinia and protect her flow of supplies there, Italy had to press on to the Suez Canal.

The Führer remarked at this point that if Italy was interested in sowing mines in the Suez Canal while it remained in English hands, Germany could make long-range bombers available for that purpose; but they would have to make intermediate landings at Italian bases in Libia or on the island of Rhodes, and from there they would carry out their operations against the Suez Canal. Of course these mines would have to be removed again when Italy had captured the Suez Canal. Germany would also provide the necessary material for that purpose.

Count Ciano then took up the subject of the attitude of certain Mediterranean countries in the present conflict. Italy was very dissatisfied with Greece, for Greece was supporting the English fleet so that it found Greek ports almost like the home country. Moreover, Greece was betraying to the English Italian submarines which surfaced in her waters; for this reason, and also because of the inherently unfavorable operational conditions for submarines in the Mediterranean owing to the clearness of the water, Italy had already suffered considerable losses. In a short time she had lost four large submarines. Ciano had twice taken very strong steps with the Greeks. The first time he did so through his *Chef de Cabinet*, since he himself was still in a theater of operations. The second time he had himself spoken to the Greek Minister and told him that if anything like

³ The speech, given in the House of Commons on July 4, 1940, is printed in *The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill*, compiled by Charles Eade (London, 1951), vol. I, pp. 222-228.

that should happen again, the matter would be settled, not by the Italian Foreign Minister, but directly by an Italian admiral.³ The Greeks had naturally denied everything, but their attitude was, nevertheless, extremely questionable. Italy also saw a danger in the statement in Churchill's latest speech to the effect that England would take the necessary measures to assure herself of absolute supremacy in the Mediterranean. It was not impossible that this implied the occupation of certain Greek islands, such as Corfu and others, by the English. If Corfu were occupied and made into a base for English naval planes, the industrial area of northern Italy would again be endangered by the English four-engine flying boats. Therefore Italy considered it advisable to proceed herself with the occupation of the Greek islands in the Ionian Sea, especially, however, of Corfu and the adjacent islands, for Greece was impatiently waiting for the moment when she would be violated by England.

The Führer referred in this connection to the extremely interesting documents which Germany had found on all these questions and which would be sent to the Duce.⁴

Count Ciano then spoke about Yugoslavia. Italy was now in possession of proofs of the insincerity of the policy of that country. In any case Prince Regent Paul was a slave of England. The Yugoslav people were uncertain in their attitude, but in any case were not pro-German or pro-Italian. Recently Yugoslavia was displaying pro-Russian sentiments. She did this, however, less for the sake of Russia than from an anti-Axis attitude. To be sure, Italy too had hitherto taken the position that the Balkans should be left in peace as much as possible. Now, however, the Duce believed that in about a month the Yugoslav question would have to be liquidated. It was a unique opportunity for Italy, for after the armistice with France she had only one land frontier to defend. Italy was, after all, very much interested in the Adriatic Sea, whereas Rumania and the Black Sea belonged to the German sphere of interest. Italy considered the time ripe for reducing the size of the Yugoslav state—a typical Versailles creation of anti-Italian orientation.

The Führer replied that the decisive question in this connection was whether it was a matter of indifference to the Duce and Italy which country had possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. If Italy should attack Yugoslavia, Hungary would immediately fall upon Rumania, since Hungary would then no longer have anything to fear from her Yugoslav neighbor. In the event of an attack on Rumania by Hungary the Russians would also no doubt bestir themselves again, cross the Danube, and seek to establish a connection

³ See *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for July 3, 1940.

⁴ See document No. 73 and Editors' Note, p. 124.

with Bulgaria. The royal house of Bulgaria was not very secure; moreover, that country had a strong Communist and Pan-Slav movement. Consequently the Russians would undoubtedly push on to their old historic Byzantium, the Dardanelles, and Constantinople. Now it was a question of Italy's stand on the matter. Germany for her part had hitherto used her influence to pacify Hungary and had told her that beyond a certain point Germany could not assume any obligations or guarantees toward Hungary.⁵ This had been done in order to avoid the outbreak of a larger conflict. The questions broached by Count Ciano would in reality be no problems once England had been broken or peace with England had been established. So long as the conflict with England had not been won, however, the conflict in the Balkans could give rise to difficult problems. It might even happen that England and Russia, under the influence of these events, would discover a community of interests.

Count Ciano interjected the remark here that the Russian attitude in general was unclear and seemed to cause the Duce all sorts of worries.

The Führer then stated further that Germany was interested in Rumania chiefly on account of the petroleum imports. It was true that since France had been disposed of the situation in this respect was no longer so difficult and the consumption of petroleum had fallen. Nevertheless, Germany would suffer injury if the war should sweep over Rumania, and the oil wells should consequently either change hands or be destroyed. Germany was still importing 140,000 tons of petroleum a month from Rumania, and presumably Italy, too, was similarly interested.

Count Ciano replied that Italy was supplying her petroleum needs almost exclusively from Rumania and took cognizance of the Führer's misgivings by remarking that he would transmit them immediately to the Duce. By his further statements he indicated that he fully agreed with the arguments of the Führer and that he was sure the Duce, too, would adopt this attitude. Personally he believed that the Yugoslav affair could be "postponed" until the war with England had been settled. The important thing now was to note that Yugoslavia was not a country friendly toward the Axis, that in the new Europe to arise after the war she could not assert any right to maintain her present form and her attitude, and that the Yugoslav problem had to be settled when the Führer, in whose hands the whole matter after all lay, deemed that the time for it had come.

The Führer pointed to the clear delimitation of spheres of interest between the Reich and Italy. The Mediterranean and the Adriatic

⁵ See document No. 75.

had from olden times belonged to the historic sphere of interest of the Italian peninsula, and Germany fully recognized this. Regarding the seesaw policy of Yugoslavia, Germany had documents which would be made available to the Duce. As a member of the "ancestral royal house" of Britain and by all his inclinations, Prince Regent Paul belonged to Western Europe, and his attitude was also shown by the documents. The Yugoslav problem must be solved along Italian lines when the time came. The Führer again called attention to the Hungarian aspirations and raised the question whether Hungary, too, might not hope to attack Rumania jointly with Russia, for the Hungarians probably would not dare to do so alone.

The Reich Foreign Minister emphasized in this connection the recently strengthened ties between Moscow and Budapest.

In conclusion the Führer added with reference to the problem of Yugoslavia that if war should break out spontaneously in the Balkans, the Duce could of course intervene at once, and such intervention would then be fully in Germany's interest.

As the final point the Hungarian question was again discussed.

Count Ciano reported that the Hungarians came to the Palazzo Chigi several times a day and with their apparent predilection for maps had laid before him the most varied cartographic documents.

The Reich Foreign Minister recalled in this connection the somewhat peculiar attitude of Hungary in the settlement of the Slovakian question. Then, too, Minister President Darányi—who by the way had been, as the Führer himself emphasized, a perfect friend of England and France—had submitted maps.⁶ But later, when the Award was to be made in Vienna, the Hungarians had other wishes again, and Darányi had acted so ungratefully in Vienna toward Italy—at that time after all the great champion of the Hungarian wishes—that he had to be reprimanded by the Reich Foreign Minister when he declared that the Munich Agreement was perhaps very good but the 3-month waiting period stipulated for the Hungarian interests was much too long.⁷

Finally, the question was also raised whether it would be desirable to have Ciano meet Teleki and Csáky in Berlin. When Count Ciano said that it would, it was decided to invite the Hungarian delegates to Berlin for Thursday so that a conference among the three might then be held.⁸

After 1½ hours the conversation ended.

SCHMIDT

⁶ See vol. iv, document No. 62.

⁷ Cf. vol. iv, document No. 99, especially pp. 123–124.

⁸ See document No. 146.

No. 130

104/112283-84

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, July 8, 1940—4: 14 p. m.

No. 1319 of July 8

Received July 8—5: 35 p. m.

For the State Secretary.

For OKH Attaché Group.

With reference to your telegram No. 1159 of July 6.¹

There are no indications that the Soviet Union had any intention of moving into the oil area when it occupied Bessarabia. In judging whether a move into the Dobruja is contemplated, the following considerations must be taken into account:

(1) The Soviet Government clearly indicates as its aim a closer relationship with Bulgaria, while the latter exercises an uneasy reserve.

(2) Many Soviet circles have not forgotten that at one time all three estuaries of the Danube were in Russian possession.

(3) The appearance of a number of higher Russian officers in Bessarabia.

(4) A remark of the leader of the Soviet Military Attaché Section to the Bulgarian Military Attaché, after the latter's congratulation in connection with Bessarabia, to the effect that it would be possible to meet once again on the Danube. To this the Bulgarian emphasized the fact that the aspirations of his country are confined to the southern part of the Dobruja and that Bulgaria would undertake nothing without the consent of Germany.

Please consider item (4) strictly confidential.²

Köstring No. 187.

SCHULENBURG

¹ This telegram, sent to Köstring on behalf of the OKH Attaché Group, reads as follows: "The Military Attaché in Rome reports that according to latest information the Italian General Staff assumes that the Russians plan to move not into the oil region but into the Dobruja, to connect with Bulgaria. Please state your views". (380/210425)

² On July 10 Schulenburg sent the following supplementary telegram: "On two separate occasions Molotov volunteered to the Hungarian Minister here that the Soviet Government regards as final the present boundaries between the Soviet Union and Rumania". (telegram No. 1326: 271/176062)

No. 131

205/142468-69

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1129 of July 8

STOCKHOLM, July 8, 1940—8:20 p. m.

Received July 9—3:00 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 1125 of July 7.¹

1. Conversations with Foreign Minister Günther, which went off in the most friendly manner, were successfully concluded today. The exchange of notes was signed today in the form of an exchange of letters² between Foreign Minister Günther and me in the last version which you have there. At the same time a second exchange of letters³ took place, the text of which was approved by the representative here of the competent German military authorities; it is being reported in a separate telegram.⁴

2. Sweden is afraid that because of the heavy train traffic between Kornsjö and Trelleborg of German transports of men on leave beginning on July 16, there will be British bombing attacks on these trains. Foreign Minister Günther spoke to me about rumors which emanated from the British Legation here. The Swedish Government will strengthen the anti-aircraft defenses along this line very considerably and intends, in the interest of the effective defense of this area, to do away with the arrangement of prior warning shots which has existed heretofore. An official communication on this subject will be given the Air Attaché here by the Swedish Government. Foreign Minister Günther asked me however, to report this even now. Please inform the OKW and Division I C of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff at the Air Ministry.

3. Technical discussions relating to rates, schedules, identification papers, food stations, etc., will be started this afternoon by the specialists present here, with the participation of the Military Attaché.

SCHNURRE
WIED

¹ Not found.

² Document No. 132.

³ Document No. 133.

⁴ Not printed (205/142470).

No. 132

4449/E086708-09

*Minister Schnurre to Swedish Foreign Minister Günther*¹

STOCKHOLM, July 8, 1940.

MR. MINISTER: I have the honor to confirm to you that agreement has been reached between the German Government and the Royal Swedish Government on the following:

1. The Royal Swedish Government is prepared to permit the transit of shipments of the German Wehrmacht consisting of goods of all kinds (Wehrmacht goods) including war material from Germany or the areas in Denmark and Norway occupied by Germany through Swedish territory to Norwegian destinations as well as in the opposite direction to the extent possible in view of the available transport facilities. The shipment may be escorted by transport details.

2. In so far as goods are concerned for which according to Swedish regulations a transit permit is required the German Government will in each case, in compliance with the usual formalities, notify the Swedish Government of the shipment in advance in order to ensure prompt transit.

3. The Royal Swedish Government is prepared to permit the transportation of members of the German Wehrmacht, especially those on leave, in uniform (without weapons not belonging to the personal equipment of the soldier and with the stipulation that rifles and pistols will be transported in special cars), across Swedish territory between the points mentioned under 1, both as individual travelers and in the form of group transports, in the case of the latter after prior notification for the purpose of agreement on suitable measures for carrying out the transit.

4. Such individual conferences as may still be necessary to carry out the above arrangements will be started at once between the German Legation in Stockholm, with the possible participation of the Wehrmacht Attachés, on the one hand, and the competent Swedish authorities on the other.

5. The individual questions that may arise in the future in the execution of this agreement will in each case be settled in the same manner with the competent Swedish authorities.

Accept, etc.

SCHNURRE

¹ Foreign Minister Günther's note to Schnurre consisted of a similar text in Swedish (4449/E086710-12).

No. 133

4449/E086713-14

*Minister Schnurre to Swedish Foreign Minister Günther*¹

STOCKHOLM, July 8, 1940.

MR. MINISTER: The transports of men on leave mentioned in figure 3 of the notes exchanged between us today² refers to men on leave who obtain home leave from their units stationed in Norway and return to their units at the end of their leave. One train is provided daily for the transportation of each 500 men on leave from Kornsjö to Trelleborg and vice versa. If, for technical reasons, there should be difficulties on the Swedish side on weekends in dispatching trains on Saturday and Sunday also, it shall be made clear in the individual technical discussions whether the weekly quota of men on leave can be transported in six trains. The same applies to the leave traffic from Narvik to the Reich and back, with the provision that one train in either direction is needed weekly.

Orders will be given by the German military authorities to the effect that rifles and pistols issued to the men on leave be left with their units.

Other transports of members of the Wehrmacht between Germany or Denmark and Norway through Swedish territory are not intended at present. Should there be a question of such transports in future, the two Governments will come to an agreement on them in advance.³

Accept, etc.

SCHNURRE

¹ Foreign Minister Günther's note to Schnurre consisted of a similar text in Swedish (4449/E086715-16).

² Document No. 132.

³ By a further exchange of notes which took place on Sept. 14 between Günther and Wied, it was agreed that transit would be provided to the extent of one train daily between Kornsjö and Trelleborg for each 1000 men on leave and two trains weekly between Narvik and Trelleborg for each 500 men on leave. The texts of these notes have not been found in the German Foreign Ministry archives but they are printed in *Transiteringsfrågan Juni-December 1940*, pp. 116-117.

No. 134

1754/404435

The Legation in Mexico to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MEXICO, July 8, 1940—8:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received July 9—8:10 a. m.

No. 408 of July 8

Pol. I M 9723 g.

For Fetzner, OKM.

With reference to your telegram No. 330 of July 5 (Pol. I M 9534 g).¹ Your information is correct. In February 1940, D[avis] acting

¹ Document No. 120.

through Walter A. Jones paid about 160,000 dollars to the representative of the Pennsylvania Democratic organization for the purpose of

1. promoting the candidature of (group garbled) in opposition to the anti-German Senator Guffey;

2. buying the approximately 40 Pennsylvania delegates to vote against Roosevelt at the party convention in Chicago, to be held on July 17.

Welles' reserve is to be explained on the grounds that D[avis] now is representing a power that must be reckoned with even by the Government. H[ertslet].

RUEDT

No. 135

77/58164

The Consul at Tetuan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

TETUAN, July 8, 1940—9:00 p. m.

No. 12 of July 8

Received July 9—10:30 a. m.

With reference to report No. 683 of [June] 12.¹

According to what the Caliph² told me yesterday, the High Commissioner has offered him the Sultanate and autonomy for all Morocco under Spanish sovereignty and has suggested that Caliphate troops occupy the French Zone. The High Commissioner declared that Germany had given Spain a free hand in Morocco. Even so, the Caliph rejected the offer as too uncertain.

I regard the Caliph's account as credible. The High Commissioner's statement about Germany's *désintéressement* in Morocco is also confirmed by the other side. I recommend that the Spanish Government be warned against machinations in Morocco and disposing of the French Zone, so that we shall not be faced with *faits accomplis*. Same text to Madrid.³

RICHTER

¹ Not found.

² In the Spanish Protectorate Zone of Morocco the powers of the Sultan of Morocco were delegated to a Caliph, whose administration was controlled by the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuan. Since 1925 the Caliphate was held by Muley-el-Hassan ben El Mehdi ben Ismail.

³ On July 17 Welzsäcker wired the Embassy in Madrid and the Consulate at Tetuan as follows: "It is not the intention here to approach the Spanish Government in any way on the basis of the Caliph's statements. Please also continue to maintain complete reserve on the question of Morocco." (77/58165)

No. 136

4416/E083859

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Legation in Finland*

Telegram

No. [312] ¹BERLIN, July 8, 1940.¹
zu W V 2550.²

With reference to your telegram No. 401 of July 6.³

1. The course of the negotiations here could not have left the Finnish delegation in doubt that we are interested primarily in a concession and have regarded the agreement about delivery of nickel ore only as an interim solution, since the Finnish Government believed that there was no possibility at present of bringing the Canadians to surrender the concession.⁴

2. As a result of events which have occurred in the meantime the situation is basically changed. The English-Canadian attempt to dispose of the concession to third parties to our disadvantage can by no means be accepted by us without opposition. Any collaboration on the part of the Finnish Government in such a transaction, the aim of which is directed against Germany as clearly appears from the démarche of the English Minister there,⁵ is bound to create the impression here that the Finnish Government, contrary to the assurances given us, is supporting English intrigues directed against us.

Please warn the Finnish Government urgently in this sense against arriving at any accomplished facts without having come to an agreement with us on the matter in advance.

WIEHL

¹ A subsequent reference to this telegram in a memorandum by van Scherpenberg of Oct. 29, 1940 (4545/E146179-80) indicates that it was not sent until July 10. From the van Scherpenberg memorandum, as well as from Helsinki telegram No. 416, printed as document No. 150, the telegram number could be identified.

² W V 2550: Not found.

³ Document No. 122.

⁴ See also document No. 259.

⁵ See document No. 122.

No. 137

66/46484-48

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, July 9, 1940.

RAM 18.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SATO,¹ IN THE PRESENCE OF AMBASSADOR KURUSU AND CONSUL GENERAL STAHLER, ON JULY 8, 1940

After a word of thanks for the hospitality extended by the German Government and congratulations on Germany's victory over France, Ambassador Sato said that exactly as Germany would now establish a new order in Europe, Japan for her part had been striving for 3 years to establish a new order in the Far East and the South Sea. Through this parallelism a very close cooperation between Germany and Japan seemed to be absolutely indicated. For 3 years Japan had been drawing the attention of the British, French, and American Governments to itself and thereby had to a certain extent also facilitated Germany's task of establishing a new order in Europe. In this manner the Governments of the two countries could support each other.

As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Japan was compelled in the existing circumstances to seek good-neighbor relations with Russia, just as Germany, too, was compelled to maintain good relations with Russia. In this respect as well, Japan and Germany could cooperate.

As regards America, Ambassador Sato said that since the beginning of the Chinese War Japan had held the attention of that country and had forced the American fleet to remain in the Pacific Ocean. Japan was of the opinion that America could not afford to go outside her zone, which included North and South America, and intervene in European or Far Eastern affairs. A continuation of this principle was likewise in the common interest of the two countries. Ambassador Sato concluded his remarks with renewed emphasis on the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation also had to extend to economic matters.

With reference to China Ambassador Sato added that at the present moment Japan was making great efforts to end the Chinese war, which had now lasted 3 years, in order to obtain freedom of action. In this connection he also pointed out that in Japan public opinion with

¹ Sato had been in Italy to conduct economic negotiations between Italy and Japan. He arrived in Berlin on June 23 on his way back to Japan to talk with members of the German Government. See vol. ix, document No. 503.

reference to Indochina and the Netherlands Indies had become very excitable.

The Reich Foreign Minister noted with gratification the desire of Japan to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He was of the opinion that German-Japanese cooperation represented nothing new in itself. He himself had been one of those who some years before had already promoted this cooperation with Kurusu's predecessor, General Oshima—a cooperation which had already borne fruit for both parties. Germany had obtained evident benefits therefrom in her struggle for equality of rights, while the existence of a strong Germany had doubtless brought considerable advantages to Japan during the entire period of her struggle for China up to the present day. Without the presence of a Germany that had again grown powerful Japan could not have penetrated so deeply as she actually had into the British and other spheres of interest in Eastern Asia. This showed the natural interest of both powers in cooperation.

Plans for a very close collaboration between Germany, Japan, and Italy had already been considered previously. They had failed because Japan was disinterested in European affairs, as was again evident from the most recent speeches of Japanese statesmen.

As a result of the German victory over France there would be a thorough revision of all foreign-policy factors. He personally believed that in the future, too, friendly cooperation with Japan would be possible within the framework of the new order now being established in Europe. What particular form this collaboration was to take he could not say at the moment, since he was informed about the German plans but not about the political aims of Japan. He therefore asked Sato for further clarification of the basic political policy which Japan intended to follow. He would be especially interested in hearing from the Japanese how they conceived of collaboration with Germany—whether it was to be only in the economic field or was to take some other form.

Ambassador Sato replied that it was understandable that for outsiders Japanese policy had been hard to understand. For 9 years—that is, since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflict—Japan had been striving to orient her policy in a definite direction, but had repeatedly been forced to moderate this reorientation somewhat. For Japan the new order in the Far East meant above all the formation of a new China with which she could maintain friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan should assure peace in the Far East. In order to attain this goal, Japan had been fighting stubbornly for several years against the so-called Washington regime, which found its expression in the treaties of 1921, especially in the Nine-Power Treaty. This Washington regime gave supremacy in

the Far East not to China and Japan but to the Anglo-Saxons. However, Japan had no intention of eliminating foreigners from the Far East. On the contrary! She fully intended also to give the proper place in China to economic cooperation with Germany.

In her relations with America, however, Japan had to be very careful.

When the Foreign Minister asked what actually was the deeper reason for the difficulties between Japan and America, Sato replied that this reason was to be found in Japan's struggle against the system of the Nine-Power Treaty. But Japan was not fighting against the principles of this treaty. Politically she was quite prepared to respect the independence of China. Economically she was likewise in agreement with the so-called principle of the open door. She wished to reverse the roles, however, and be the host herself, while the other nations could only be guests in eastern Asia.

When the Foreign Minister repeated his question about the deeper reasons for Japan's difficulties with America, Sato replied that the sources of friction with America were to be found less in the economic than in the humanitarian² field. American sympathies were with China. America considered herself the protector of this country, so to speak, and wished to continue her police power in the Pacific Ocean with the help of her supremacy at sea. Under these circumstances Japan was striving to bring the war with China to an early end. Sato stated that, perhaps somewhat in contrast to the Japanese military, he personally did not believe that Japan could advance as far as Chungking. It was therefore necessary to seek a solution of the Chinese problem by means other than military. For this reason Japan had supported the government of Wang Ching-wei and was prepared to conclude a very generous agreement with it. Japan had no desire whatever to interfere in Chinese affairs or force anything upon the Chinese but was prepared to negotiate with Wang Ching-wei on a footing of equality. If the Chinese were sensible, it would doubtless be possible to reach some solution whereby China would not lose face. In this case America, too, would perhaps gradually modify her position and adopt a more friendly attitude toward Japan. America's economic interests in China were not great, but this very fact did not by any means make the situation less difficult. In view of the considerable economic interest of England in this area it was much easier to reach an agreement with her than with the Americans, who considered matters from a totally different point of view.

When the Foreign Minister expressed the conjecture that perhaps America was alarmed by the growing power of Japan and her in-

² "Humanitarian" was substituted in longhand for "ideological," which was deleted.

creasingly strong Navy and that the differences with that country were based on the fact that America, which hitherto had dominated the Pacific Ocean alone, now found herself forced to share this domination with Japan, Sato replied in the affirmative and added that particularly Japan's efforts to achieve naval parity with America and the secrecy maintained regarding her new naval construction had caused very strong ill feeling in America. For this reason Japan had to be very careful with regard to America, especially since Stimson had entered the Administration, in order not to provoke this country to sharp measures against Japan. To be sure, America had already denounced the trade agreement, but no export embargo against Japan had yet been pronounced. The Japanese, however, were very dependent on America for their supplies of petroleum and iron.

The Foreign Minister replied that he had always taken the position that when a strong policy was followed, the economy, too, fared well. When a weaker policy was followed, the economy always fared worse. Germany had her own experiences in this field. During the time that she was politically weak and the governments of that period maintained that for economic reasons she had to be compliant, Germany had in the end received no economic advantages in return for her concessions. Now Germany was strong, and consequently her trade as well was flourishing. She obtained everything she needed from other countries, in addition to all economic facilities such as credit and the like.

Only a few months ago Germany had been regarded as an encircled country. But now England was so completely encircled as no other country in world history had ever been. Germany was no longer interested in gold, which had flowed to America in such large amounts. In its thousand-year existence the German Reich would never again build anything on the basis of gold. In Germany gold had been dethroned, and the other countries would have to follow this example. Now, when England was in such danger, her gold stocks had also been sent to the United States, so that approximately 85-90 percent of the total world supply of gold was held there. The result would be that at the end of the war the United States would be choked with gold and goods and would be happy to sell to other countries, such as Japan for example, everything that those countries needed, on the most favorable terms.

Economically Germany was to all intents and purposes absolutely independent. She was herself making many of the things which were formerly imported, or had found substitutes for them. After the war the European economic area would be completely independent. This did not mean that Germany no longer desired world trade. On the contrary! However, this new world trade had to be based on the in-

dependence of the economic areas participating therein and on an exchange of surpluses. The old world trade had been based on the possibility that England might at any time blockade other countries and cut them off from their supplies of raw materials. Under the new world order Japan would have the deciding voice in the Far East, Russia in Asia, and Germany and Italy in Europe; and in Africa, too, Germany and Italy would exercise exclusive supremacy, perhaps in conjunction with a few other interested parties.

The Foreign Minister then brought up the attitude of the South American countries. The South American States, which Roosevelt was trying to bind to North America economically, seemed to realize that after the war the United States would not be able to absorb South American raw products, and were therefore already turning to Europe in order to assure a market for their goods after the war. Whoever wished to carry on trade with Europe, however, would in the future have to turn to Germany.

Sato replied that since he was not an economist he could not express any opinion on economic questions. But if trade was no longer to be on a gold basis, it would probably not be possible to return to a free exchange of goods with elimination of foreign-exchange regulations and other trade restrictions.

With regard to the United States, Japan was perhaps not so much influenced by economic pressure as by the American fleet, and therefore she had to be careful. Moreover, if the United States should become involved in a conflict with Japan, it could no longer remain neutral in the European conflict either.

The Foreign Minister admitted that the Japanese situation was difficult and that Japan had to adjust her policy to conditions as they were. With regard to the gold question he stated, moreover, that Germany would not henceforth be without gold but would never again make the German economy dependent on gold, that is, on international speculation.

With regard to Russia the Foreign Minister called attention to the efforts that he had been making for years to influence Ambassador Oshima in the direction of a settlement between Japan and Russia. Germany had reached a lasting settlement with Russia, and the interests of the two countries had been very clearly delimited with respect to each other. He welcomed the efforts that Japan for her part also had been making during the last few months to come to a settlement with Russia.

In conclusion Sato asked another question, which he himself termed somewhat indiscreet. What was Germany's conception of the future structure of Europe?

The Foreign Minister replied that the German Government was at present concerned only with one question, namely, how it could

continue the war and bring it to a victorious conclusion. For that reason he could not say much yet about the political future. The only certainty was that Germany's remaining enemy, England, would be defeated.²

SCHMIDT

Minister

² The telegram sent by Kurusu and Sato on July 10, reporting on this same conversation, is in the mimeographed collection of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, exhibit No. 1020. Cf. also exhibits Nos. 1021, 525, and 526.

No. 138

328/195440

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 650 of July 8

LISBON, July 8, 1940—10:08 p. m.

Received July 9—5:25 a. m.

The Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, who for some time has been living in retirement with her husband and child in a suburb here, told acquaintances that she hoped soon to be able to return to her country. Efforts were already being made through Spain toward this end. In the World War her sister, the then Grand Duchess, had remained in the country, and it cost her her throne. This time the Grand Duchess left the country, which had been another mistake.¹

HUENE

¹ On Aug. 6 the Papal Nuncio had mentioned to Weizsäcker the question of the return of the Grand Duchess to her country. Weizsäcker had replied that this was impossible since she had fled and placed herself morally on the side of Germany's opponents (Weizsäcker memorandum, St.S. 632 of Aug. 6: 328/195443).

No. 139

1379/857742-43

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, July 9, 1940—1:05 a. m.

No. 1164 of July 8

Received July 9—9:00 a. m.

For the Ambassador.

Please inform Molotov orally of the following:

In accordance with evacuation plans announced by the Führer in his Reichstag speech of October 6, 1939,¹ the Reich Government in-

¹ See vol. VIII, Editors' Note, p. 227.

tends, now that resettlement of the German national group in Latvia and Estonia has been completed, to carry out resettlement in the Reich of the Germans from Lithuania. The Reich Government will accordingly submit to the Lithuanian Government a proposal based on the principle of reciprocity and voluntary cooperation. A great many persons of Lithuanian nationality live in the Memel territory and the Suwalki district. The German minority in Lithuania numbers about 40,000.

Naturally the resettlement will not affect the strip of territory which, under the Moscow agreements of September 1939,² is to be incorporated into Germany to rectify the German-Lithuanian boundary.³ As was stated in the exchange of letters between you and M. Molotov,⁴ we reserve the right to determine the time for the incorporation of this territory. We assume, however, that the military measures carried out by the Soviet Government in Lithuania do not include this district.⁵

RIBBENTROP

² See vol. VIII, document No. 159.

³ This sentence, garbled in the original message, was corrected in a later telegram of July 9 (1379/357744).

⁴ Vol. VIII, document No. 218.

⁵ On July 12 Schulenburg wired the following reply: "Instruction carried out today with Molotov. Molotov replied that he would study the situation and take up the question again soon" (telegram No. 1348: 104/112307). See document No. 162.

No. 140

121/119698-99

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, July 9, 1940.

No. 2295 of July 9

Received July 9—10:48 p. m.

The Foreign Minister just informed me that the French Foreign Minister, in agreement with Marshal Pétain, made a statement of the following content to the Spanish Ambassador in Vichy:¹

"France understands her situation as the loser and does not have the intention of withdrawing from it, even though circumstances permit France to appear as the 'associate' of the victors. France does not fail to recognize that she must pay for her defeat; she merely wishes Germany and Italy to understand her loyal attitude and to consider whether it is possible to modify the severe terms of the armistice with regard to the internal life of France and to render the subjection of this country less harsh. The French Government requests the Spanish Government to transmit these ideas and suggestions to the German and Italian Governments. In order to attain the desired

¹ José Félix de Lequerica y Erquiza.

results the French Government would consider direct contact between France and the German Government to be very useful. The French Foreign Minister therefore requests the Spanish Ambassador to transmit his wish to his Government, e. g., to meet Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in Germany or somewhere else. The trip and meeting would be accomplished without any publicity. The French Government requests the Spanish Government to bring this suggestion to the attention of the Berlin-Rome Axis. The French Foreign Minister stresses that France fully recognizes her defeat. She merely asks the victors, who are, as is logical, keeping large parts of France occupied for the purposes of the war against England, to relax the terms of the occupation in so far as possible."

End of the statement of the French Foreign Minister.*

STOHRER

* In a memorandum of July 8 Stohrer recorded that the Spanish Foreign Minister in conveying to him the statement of the French Foreign Minister said "that there was undoubtedly to be inferred from it an attempt to come over to our side and to improve the situation that has arisen for France through the defeat. He saw in it particularly a certain rapprochement with Italy, which country was mentioned particularly in the French démarche. The extremely mild Italian peace terms led him to the conclusion that Italy was not averse to a rapprochement with France, perhaps as a possible future counterpoise to Germany (Latin bloc!). Spain would not agree to such an Italian policy. The Minister closed with the recommendation to us to watch these developments most carefully." (454/223636)

No. 141

65/45616-17

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 329 of July 9

TEHRAN, July 9, 1940—10:00 p. m.

Received July 10—1:15 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 326 of July 8.¹

In the conversation today the Minister President² complained about the inscrutable and unfriendly attitude of the Soviet Union. He asked me the question whether the reason for this attitude was known to me. I replied to him that from several conversations with Soviet Ambassador Filimonov I had received the impression that in the opinion of the Soviet Union, British influence in Iran was very great, if not decisive.³

The Minister President answered me that the best contrary evidence was the fact that the British Minister⁴ was complaining almost daily about the alleged anti-English attitude of Iran. In answer to a precise question of mine, the Minister President assured me that the Soviet Union so far had not made demands of any kind. The Iranian

¹ Not found.

² Ali Mansur.

³ See document No. 84.

⁴ Horace James Seymour.

Government, therefore, had no (one group missing, probably "clue") for the unfriendly behavior of the Soviets; it was afraid that Moscow was seeking a pretext for carrying out some plans in Iran possibly by force.

The Minister President further told me that the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow had received instructions to inquire of M. Molotov what complaints or grievances the Soviet Union had with respect to Iran so that clarity might be obtained at last. This clarification could not be obtained in a conversation with Ambassador Filimonov which took place yesterday as Filimonov stated that he had not received instructions or information of any kind from Moscow.

The Minister President finally emphasized that the most valuable possession of a people and state was its independence and that Iran was prepared to fight for it.

It was clearly noticeable from the statements and the behavior of the Minister President that the Iranian Government is greatly worried by the behavior of the Soviets. There is the added fact that everywhere it is assumed that the unfriendly remarks of the Iranian speaker on the German radio⁵ were made on instructions from the German Government, so that Iran is faced with a common German-Russian front.

Perhaps there is the possibility of learning through the Embassy in Moscow what the reasons are for the behavior of the Soviet Union toward Iran. Could German mediation of Iranian-Soviet Russian differences possibly be considered? I request telegraphic instruction.⁶

ETTEL

⁵ Attacks on the Iranian Government and the Shah, made by an Iranian émigré speaker on the German radio, were discussed in a conversation of Ettel with the Minister President on July 9 and reported in telegram No. 328 of the same day (65/45615).

⁶ The requested instruction was sent in telegram No. 299 of July 15 over Welz-säcker's signature (65/45618). It reads as follows: "German mediation in any Iranian-Soviet Russian differences is out of the question. You are requested to observe reserve in this matter."

No. 142

365/206682-86

The Foreign Minister to the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan

SECRET

now at MUNICH, July 9, 1940.

Pol. XII 1790 g.

The statements in your letter of July 2, 1940—V. P. 10996/5 g¹—and in your letter of June 22, 1940, to the Reich Minister of Economics which was sent to the Foreign Ministry with State Secretary Körner's

¹ Document No. 82.

letter of July 3, 1940—V. P. 11088/1²—lead me to make the following remarks for the sake of clarifying the authority of the various departments concerned:

I am proceeding on the assumption that the direction of the internal German economy, and in particular the planning of a greater German economic area is as a matter of course the affair of the Four Year Plan and of the offices responsible for economic matters. In this the Foreign Ministry is affected and interested in so far as this activity also has to do with foreign countries, inasmuch as from it there might arise repercussions affecting foreign policy in general; and particularly in so far as the implementation of such planning depends upon negotiations with foreign countries, including such countries which, while retaining their own sovereignty, belong to the greater German economic area.

The direction of economic negotiations with foreign countries and responsibility for their preparation within Germany *have always been*, in accordance with the principle *that foreign trade policy is an inseparable part of foreign policy, exclusively the task of the Foreign Ministry*. The offices responsible for economic matters provide the factual data from the area of the *German* economy for the negotiations, whereas the Foreign Service obtains the necessary material regarding the economic conditions of the *foreign* countries concerned. The closest cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the offices responsible for economic matters is assured by the Economic Policy Committee (HPA) of the Reich Government, an institution of long standing, to which the Four Year Plan and all of the economic offices, as well as the High Command of the Wehrmacht, belong.

Through the Economic Policy Committee of the Reich Government, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Ministry, the preparatory studies for the economic negotiations with foreign countries are instituted and collected, the guiding principles for the conduct of the negotiations are set up and the decisions are made which become necessary in the course of the negotiations. The Foreign Ministry sees to it that the decisions of the Economic Policy Committee are carried out and appoints the negotiating delegations and the government committees. The most appropriate person in each case is appointed leader of the negotiations, and it has been the practice in this regard in the past to employ also officials from the internal departments. But of course men in charge of negotiations who are not officials of the Foreign Service are as such also subordinate to the Foreign Ministry. The delegations receive their instructions from the Foreign Ministry and they must make their reports exclusively to the Foreign Ministry.

² Document No. 103.

This organization, which alone guarantees the necessary unified direction and effectiveness in economic negotiations with foreign countries, has always worked well, as I can say after the successes of our trade policy of late, e. g., in regard to Russia and the southeastern European and South American countries. No difficulties of any sort have arisen. As Deputy for the Four Year Plan you have exerted any influence you desired on how things have been done, and it has never happened in any question whatsoever that the point of view of the Four Year Plan has not been taken into account.

The above-mentioned organization was not arbitrarily conceived, but emerged from the exigencies of the situation. Only if the Foreign Ministry also has direction of the preparations for economic negotiations with foreign countries can it conduct the negotiations themselves satisfactorily and make immediate use of all possibilities which arise in the course of them. This is the only way in which in the interest of the economic negotiations themselves the possibilities of foreign policy to exert influence and pressure can be employed at the proper time and in the proper way—in the negotiations with Rumania of late, for example, this always played a decisive role. And conversely, this is the only way to guarantee that the capacity of the future greater German economic sphere can be made to serve our general foreign policy aims. In this connection I would call to mind as an example only the importance of the economic negotiations in preparing the way for the understanding with Russia, as well as for influencing Turkey's attitude with regard to her guarantee treaty with England and France, and the attitude of the South American countries toward the Pan-American ambitions of the U. S. A. The Führer also regards the economic negotiations with foreign countries from this point of view. This is again evident from his recent decision that the preparation and execution of negotiations on arms deliveries to foreign countries are exclusively the affair of the Foreign Ministry, not of the military authorities.³

You and I have long been in complete agreement regarding these principles for the departmental treatment of economic questions relating to foreign countries. I refer in this regard to my letter of April 7, 1938,⁴ and to the conference that followed.

These principles must also be decisive for the economic side of the armistice and peace negotiations and their preparation. To change this at all or to proceed according to other points of view than those conforming exactly to the responsibilities of the various departments, which have proved themselves in the past, could have only detrimental results.

³ In a letter of May 5 to Keitel, Ribbentrop stated that Hitler had recently decided that "the conduct of negotiations concerning deliveries of arms to foreign states was the business of the Foreign Ministry." (5116/E295594-96)

⁴ Not found.

If for special reasons you consider it necessary for the Four Year Plan to make a special compilation of the proposals of the separate economic departments in preparation of the economic side of the armistice and peace terms, this is an internal measure which you are taking as the one responsible for the conduct and planning of the Greater German economy. It is absolutely necessary, however, that these proposals then be dealt with in full detail in the Economic Policy Committee of the Reich Government as data to be used in preparation of the negotiations themselves. For the above-mentioned reasons this is the only way in which the Foreign Ministry can acquire the knowledge of everything involved which is indispensable for the conduct of the negotiations, so as to obtain a maximum of economic benefits for Germany while fully observing the requirements in the field of foreign policy in every case.

I should like to emphasize expressly that I am fully aware of the size and importance of the economic tasks that lie before us and that I am in no way contemplating any restriction in the activity and responsibility of the Four Year Plan and the internal economic offices, nor do I wish to intervene in their practical preparatory work any more than is absolutely necessary for the preservation of the interests to be upheld by the Foreign Ministry. In particular the planning and organizing of the German-European economic area will be primarily the affair of the Minister of Economics in accordance with the instructions you gave him on June 22, 1940. However, in so far as the inclusion of foreign countries in this economic area is concerned, including countries which are sovereign but which belong to the greater German economic sphere, or when it is a question of the economic settlement with the enemy countries, I must insist that such matters be handled by the Foreign Ministry in the manner described above.

I have sent copies to the other recipients of your letter.

VON RIBBENTROP

No. 143

2276/479871-72

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, July 9, 1940.

e. o. Pol. IV 1926 g.

1) The Slovak Minister called on me today before going to Slovakia for two days and asked whether it would not be possible to arrange an early reception for President Tiso in order to settle the internal political crisis in Slovakia.¹ I pointed out to the Minister that, according

¹ This crisis resulted from the resignation of Sano Mach as Chief of the Hlinka Guard. See vol. IX, documents Nos. 309 and 407.

to a telegram received today from Bratislava,² Minister President Tuka had expressed a desire to be received. M. Černák replied to this that a visit by Tuka would probably cause less difficulties in the matter of protocol than one by the State President, but he did not want to argue on his own initiative for either solution.

2) According to reports received here, which are probably correct, Reichsleiter Bormann is now occupied with the question of the Slovak crisis. He is said to have worked out a plan whereby the Legation in Bratislava would be abolished and a German representative, whose title is still to be decided upon (it might perhaps be Resident General), would be sent there with a staff; Governor Wächter is being considered in this connection.

3) If Governor Wächter is sent to Bratislava on a permanent assignment in this or some other capacity, the position of Minister Bernard would in fact be weakened to such an extent that he should then be assigned to some other post.

4) The abolition of the Legation and the appointment of a permanent "Resident General" would presumably mean that the influence of the Foreign Ministry in handling the Slovak question will at least be reduced. Also from the point of view of Slovakia such an arrangement would be a very obvious step toward further diminution of national independence. It should be considered whether it would not then be a better solution if Governor Wächter went with the appropriate full powers to Bratislava as Minister.

5) Minister Bernard was summoned to Berlin for a report shortly after the outbreak of the crisis (about May 20) and since then has not been back at his post.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

² Not found.

No. 144

4050/E065184;
4050/E065191-93

*The Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions
With the German Armistice Commission to the Director of the
Economic Policy Department*

WIESBADEN, July 9, 1940.

In response to teletype message No. 10 of July 8¹ I am sending by express courier in the enclosure the requested memorandum on the

¹ Wiehl had asked Hemmen to send a short memorandum indicating how Switzerland had been handled in the negotiations heretofore and what concessions had been obtained without linking the question of coal deliveries with that of airplanes (9881/E693324). See document No. 99.

course of the German-Swiss negotiations in the months of May and June 1940 up to the time when I handed over the conduct of the negotiations to my representative Ministerialrat Seyboth.²

HEMMEN

[Enclosure]

WIESBADEN, July 9, 1940.

MEMORANDUM

With respect to the demand of the Field Marshal that the airplanes we delivered to Switzerland be returned before resumption of coal deliveries to Switzerland, I submit the following survey of the course of the negotiations thus far:

In the first phase of the negotiations in Berlin at the end of May,³ and thus before the beginning of the offensive in the west, we made the following demands in advance *as a prerequisite for an extension of the clearing agreement*:

1. Transfer of all assets in special accounts in cash foreign exchange to Berlin,
2. Free choice of purchases drawn on the clearing balance,
3. Treatment on a footing of real equality with enemy states as regards deliveries of war material, i. e., that the Bundesrat resolution of February 14, 1940, be rescinded,
4. Transfer to us of current Dutch, Belgian, and Norwegian orders of war materials, or the raw materials and production facilities earmarked for that purpose.

At that time the coal was still being delivered, and the above demands were expressly made in advance in order to avoid the threatening coal embargo.⁴

Nevertheless, Switzerland accepted only demand No. 1 immediately. In the other questions Switzerland acted so hesitantly for 3 weeks that in the meantime the coal embargo went into effect.

However, upon resumption of the negotiations in Bern on June 15, 1940, and thus after the defeat of France, they agreed also to demands 3 and 4, and by decree they immediately carried out an absolute export embargo for war materials and the transfer of 28 million francs to the Reichsbank, and this *even for the time being without the coal embargo being lifted in return*.

On the contrary, in these negotiations I took the stand that under the changed circumstances I could only support a lifting of the coal embargo if

² Of the Economics Ministry.

³ Marginal note in Wiehl's handwriting: "April."

⁴ See vol. ix, document No. 377.

1. the entire former deliveries of aluminum to England from Switzerland (i. e., 12,000 tons of raw aluminum plus 5,500 tons of aluminum alloys) are absolutely delivered to Germany in the future;

2. watch mechanisms, watch jewels, and industrial diamonds are opened to export in the future without restriction;

3. the unimpeded export of raw materials needed for the active finishing (conversion) process is opened at once;

4. considerable additional orders for machine tools and war material can be placed at once on a short-term basis and the necessary nonferrous metals for this are contributed from Swiss stocks;

5. these orders and in addition considerable deliveries of food-stuffs are carried out through the coal-iron account and the agricultural account *on the basis of a credit* in the amount of a total of 120 million Swiss francs.

Before my departure from Bern the Swiss, on condition that the coal embargo be lifted and the necessary coal deliveries be resumed, had agreed

to demand No. 1, so that in the future we will receive all of the aluminum formerly delivered to England on condition that we assure the delivery to Switzerland of the necessary aluminum oxide from Italy, Germany, and France,

to demands Nos. 2 and 3 without reservation,

to demand No. 4, the additional ordering of machine tools and war material was agreed to up to the limits of the actual capacity of the Swiss factories and relevant order lists were requested of us by way of participation of the War Technology Division of the Swiss Military Department. All war material manufactured for England and France is offered us; an absolute export embargo on machine tools and war material to enemy countries is assured.

Re demand No. 5, the Swiss promised to make available a credit for payment of the additional orders under 4 and for agriculture in the amount of the coal deliveries actually made (at present prices about 80 to 90 million francs). This means, therefore, that for every ton of coal delivered we receive in the first place deliveries of the same value in return and, in addition, the equivalent once again as a credit for payment of the additional orders of war material.

I consider it entirely possible to increase still further the amount of the credit as measured against the coal deliveries actually made, possibly even twofold; but I believe that we should not make demands going beyond that, and thus in particular should not make the return of the airplanes a prerequisite to the resumption of the coal deliveries.⁵

HEMMEN

⁵ Marginal note in Wiehl's handwriting: "A copy was given to Ministerialdirektor Gramsch with the request for clarification of what wishes the Field Marshal has regarding coal deliveries to Switzerland."

No. 145

1053/312246-48

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Embassy in Brazil*

Telegram

MOST URGENT
[No. 595] ¹BERLIN, July [10] 1940.¹
zu W 3374.²
3375 g.³

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 655 ⁴ and 669.⁵

In order to secure, even before the Havana Conference, favorable results as far as possible from the conferences which have been successfully initiated with the Federal President, I request that you continue the discussion immediately and—without assuming any commitments for the time being—make the following statement:

Germany is prepared in principle to import 300 million reichsmarks' worth of Brazilian products a year after the end of the war, instead of the previous total imports of Brazilian products to the value of 170 million reichsmarks annually, provided that both Brazil and Germany are able to create the necessary economic conditions with respect to delivery, payment and shipment. The figure of 300 million reichsmarks is arrived at by taking into account that in 1938 Germany's exports to Brazil amounted in value to about 170 million reichsmarks, that through the Krupp transaction ⁶ and the motorization transaction ⁷ additional German deliveries to the value of 100 million and 20 million reichsmarks, respectively, are in preparation, and that furthermore Germany can promise delivery of railway rolling stock to the value of about 50 million reichsmarks in a normal delivery period. Moreover, it should be pointed out that, at the request of the Federal President, Germany has already declared, in telegraphic instruction No. 549,⁸ that she is prepared to deliver the steel mill ⁹ valued at 70

¹ The date and telegram number have been supplied from Rio de Janeiro telegram No. 774 of Aug. 6, 1940 (1053/312226).

² W 3374: Not found.

³ W 3375 g.: Not found.

⁴ Document No. 89.

⁵ Document No. 118.

⁶ Krupp had been awarded in 1938 a contract for the supply of artillery to the Brazilian Army under the Brazilian rearmament program. The Brazilian request for bids was reported in detail in Rio de Janeiro report A 2/9 geh. of Dec. 28, 1937 (326/194547-51) and the signature of the contract by Krupp on Mar. 28, and by the Brazilian Government on Mar. 28, 1938, in Rio de Janeiro report A 2/9 geh. of Mar. 30, 1938 (326/194696-698).

⁷ According to a letter from the firm Friedrich Krupp A. G. to the Reichsgruppe Industrie of Aug. 4, 1939 (346/200692) a contract for the motorization of the artillery arm of the Brazilian Army had been signed by representatives of Krupp and the Brazilian Government on July 28, 1939.

⁸ Of June 20, 1940, not printed (8719/E609578).

⁹ See vol. ix, document No. 470. In a letter W VIII b 3371 of Oct. 7, 1940 (8616/E604213) Pamperrien informed the Ministry of Economics of the final award of the steel mill contract to the United States.

million reichsmarks. This formulation, with the figure of 300 million, seems more effective than the method proposed in telegraphic report No. 669.

Within this framework coffee and cotton are to be included in the amount of 30 percent each, in connection with which I should like to point out that with a trade volume of 170 million reichsmarks we have previously imported only 20 percent coffee and 35 percent cotton. It is self-evident that we must have the possibility of shipping some of this coffee on to other European countries. The remaining 40 percent of the total sum will be divided among goods of our choice.

In principle it will have to be left to the Brazilians, by means of orders in Germany and prefinancing, to enable us to make these purchases. Nevertheless, if it appears advisable, in case the Brazilians should bring up this matter in order to question the value of our proposal, the following may be pointed out.

Since coffee is controlled by the Government, prefinancing of 90 million reichsmarks for the contemplated coffee imports would hardly offer any difficulties. Prefinancing of cotton purchases by private parties there is already being prepared by us to some extent (cf. telegraphic instruction No. 558 ¹⁰). For the remainder of the imports there is the possibility of prefinancing from the fact that 100 million reichsmarks will accrue from the Krupp transaction and 20 million reichsmarks from the motorization transaction, for which transactions the dates of payment could without great difficulty be advanced to the dates of payment for our commodity purchases. Perhaps it will also be possible in the same manner to prefinance internally in Brazil the rolling stock and the steel mill. For your information only: In connection with the above proposal we assume that the Federal President is at the moment anxious to have an impressive proposal from us before the Havana Conference in order to support the attitude he intends to take, and for that reason we have gone as far as we possibly can. If in your opinion the intended political effect can definitely be achieved with a lower offer in accordance with telegraphic report 669, you are also authorized to make such an offer.¹¹

WIEHL

¹⁰ Of June 25, not printed (8614/E8604163).

¹¹ See document No. 299.

No. 146

66/46426-33

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministers Secretariat

BERLIN, July 11, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER, ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COUNT CIANO, HUNGARIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT COUNT TELEKI, AND HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COUNT CSÁKY, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, AT THE FÜHRER-BAU IN MUNICH, ON JULY 10, 1940

To begin with, Count Teleki made a lengthy political, historical, and ethnographic exposition and using the familiar Hungarian arguments justified Hungary's revisionist demand for Transylvania, to which the Hungarian people attached more importance than to any other territory lost in 1919. The mobilization of several Hungarian divisions, Teleki stated, was more in the nature of a precautionary measure which Hungary had taken in order to be prepared for any eventuality, such as, for example, the outbreak of a revolution in Rumania, an imminent danger that the Hungarian minority in Transylvania would be massacred by the Rumanians, or an act of desperation by Carol in the form of a Rumanian attack on Hungary with the object of advancing the Rumanian frontier up to the Tisza.

Count Teleki furthermore called attention to the great restraint which the Hungarian Government had imposed on itself vis-à-vis Rumania, because it knew that the Axis Powers attached importance to peace in the Balkans. Public opinion in Hungary was, however, greatly aroused and in the cases previously mentioned would certainly demand active intervention by the Government. In this connection Teleki stated that the mobilization measures were in part due to the desire of the Hungarian Government to give its impatient public a demonstration of action and thereby pacify public opinion. The military measures had been especially necessary to counterbalance the admonitions to maintain peace, which Hungary had continuously given to the Hungarians living in Transylvania.

When Count Teleki mentioned in this connection that Hungary was prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of the desire of the Axis Powers to maintain peace in the Danube Basin and the Balkans, the Führer replied that the Axis Powers were demanding no sacrifices of any kind from Hungary. If Hungary believed that she could take action in Rumania by her own strength, and was prepared to take responsibility herself for all the consequences that might arise from such an action, there was no obstacle to military intervention against Rumania. Although they had so far fought with extraordinary suc-

cess in the present war, the Axis Powers still had their chief enemy, England, to conquer in a life and death struggle, and refused to take responsibility for any consequences of failure of the Hungarian action against Rumania or for complications which might arise out of this action, and to scatter their armed forces, which were urgently needed in the present struggle. The Führer asked Teleki the direct question whether Hungary was absolutely certain she could conquer Rumania if no other Power intervened in the conflict.

Count Teleki and Count Csáky visibly hesitated before answering and then replied that they did believe they could fight successfully against Rumania, if the action took place at a favorable moment. Count Csáky referred to the opinion of the Hungarian military authorities, who were of the opinion that under certain conditions they could defeat the Rumanians. One favorable moment at which Rumania might have been successfully attacked had, to be sure, already passed by. This was the moment shortly before the Russians marched into Bessarabia, when the Rumanian Army was largely concentrated on the Russo-Rumanian frontier. The spirit animating the Hungarian troops was excellent and would undoubtedly contribute greatly toward victory.

The Führer replied that an action such as Hungary contemplated against Rumania had to be weighed very soberly. By a number of examples he showed how even the bravest army had to suffer disaster if it was inadequately equipped, and he came to the conclusion that in making an estimate of the chances for success of a military operation the numerical strength and material equipment of the enemy had to be carefully and soberly included in the calculation. If he applied this method—which he had followed in all of his operations so far—to the case of Rumania and Hungary, he came to the conclusion that neither with respect to matériel nor with respect to troop strength did Hungary have such superiority over Rumania that she could count on certain victory. Regarding Rumania's armament Germany was very well informed, since she had examined the contracts that Rumania had concluded with the Skoda Works and to some extent had taken them over in order to obtain petroleum from Rumania in exchange for deliveries of war material. In these circumstances only a very great general could tip the scales in favor of Hungary. Prior to a war, however, nothing could be stated with certainty regarding the ability of army commanders. Only during the progress of the war did their qualities appear. Therefore Hungary had to realize that although a military operation against Rumania could easily be started, it was very difficult to foresee its end and its possible effects. If other countries, too, intervened in the conflict, the situation in the entire Balkans might be involved, and from the resulting confusion the conflict might extend to the ideological plane, especially in view of the

fact that social conditions in some of the countries concerned left very much to be desired. The consequences for Hungary of such an ideological struggle were quite incalculable, however. Therefore the greatest caution was required. Germany herself was interested in Rumania only on account of the petroleum, and although the situation with respect to consumption had eased after the conclusion of the French campaign, Germany could not be indifferent to what happened to the Rumanian oil wells.

Moreover, the ethnographic situation in Transylvania was far from clear, as he (the Führer), being a former Austrian, knew. In addition to the Hungarians there were also Rumanians and Germans in Transylvania. The latter were in no wise interested in a change of regime, but had always given him to understand that they wanted to remain aloof from the political game and desired only to be able to continue working in tranquillity and peace and preserve the prosperity that they had by their ability been able to achieve in the course of time, as well as their cultural freedom. On the other hand, the Führer assured the Hungarian gentlemen that Germany was quite sympathetic to their demands. It would perhaps be best if the Hungarians tried to achieve their objective by separate stages and through negotiation.

When Count Csáky then asked what would happen if the Rumanians should refuse to enter into such negotiations, the Reich Foreign Minister interposed that the Rumanian Foreign Minister had told the German Minister there that Rumania was prepared to negotiate, and wished to negotiate first with Hungary and only thereafter with Bulgaria, since the Hungarian questions would be more difficult to solve.¹

The Führer stated in this connection that King Carol was suddenly making the greatest efforts to bring about close political cooperation with Germany. The Führer had remained very cool toward these attempts at a rapprochement. King Carol had even written him a letter² which had not yet been answered. He would take the opportunity to inform the King of Rumania that a prerequisite for the establishment of the German-Rumanian collaboration he desired would be settling the revisionist demands with his neighbors. The Führer stated that he would develop these ideas more in detail in his reply to Carol and was firmly convinced that King Carol would then negotiate.³ Moreover, he would have the letter sent to Rome by telegram in order that the Duce might express his opinion on it,

¹ See document No. 123.

² Document No. 80.

³ Telegram No. 586 of July 16 informed Csáky that Hitler's letter to King Carol had actually been sent (73/52576). For the text of the letter see document No. 171.

for he (the Führer) intended to inform King Carol that this letter likewise represented the view of the Italian Chief of State.

When the Führer invited Count Ciano to express his opinion, too, on these questions, the latter replied that it was very easy for him to state his position inasmuch as he could endorse the statements of the Führer completely. Italy was engaged in a very difficult war against England and was already fighting on several fronts: in the Mediterranean, in Egypt, in Africa, and in Somaliland. For that reason she could not, any more than Germany, scatter her forces in an additional theater of war and therefore had a very strong interest in maintaining peace in the Balkans, especially since in the event that a war broke out she would also have to fight on several fronts in the Balkans—on the very difficult Albanian sector, among others. And what the Führer had said with reference to provisioning applied to an even greater extent to Italy. With reference to her petroleum supply, which was of primary importance for a country engaged in naval warfare, as Italy was, the Italians were entirely dependent on Rumania, since the routes through Gibraltar and the Suez Canal were closed. Furthermore, Italy did not have the domestic resources which Germany had at her disposal as a result of her development of the synthetic production of substitutes. Italy was therefore entirely in favor of maintaining peace and order in the Danube Basin and the Balkans, insofar as this was at all possible. However, Italy regarded the Hungarian demands with friendly understanding. Count Ciano therefore saw no other way to settle these problems than that proposed by the Führer, namely to strive to satisfy the revisionist desires of Hungary by stages and through negotiation. As for the question whether Italy would be prepared to participate in these negotiations, this point would first have to be discussed with her German ally. Exactly as in the case of Germany, King Carol had also tried to draw closer to Italy. In reply to all his efforts in this direction, some of them insistent, he had always been told by the Italians, as Hungary well knew, that the road from Bucharest to Rome led via Budapest.

Count Teleki and Count Csáky were obviously gratified at the Führer's proposal to call attention once more, in a letter to King Carol, to the necessity of revisions and to make closer collaboration between Rumania and Germany conditional upon a settlement of these questions, and they expressed their thanks for this "new proof of Germany's sincere friendship for Hungary."

Following a short exchange of views on Germany's successes in the war so far and the reasons for them, the conference concluded after a duration of 2 hours.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 147

174/136349/1

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 538

BERLIN, July 10, 1940.

Today the Japanese Ambassador mentioned to me the Reich Foreign Minister's conversation with former Japanese Minister Sato.¹ Since I do not know what this conversation was about, I am perhaps repeating in the following what you already know.

Kurusu said that the Japanese Government was steadily traveling along the road of gradual agreement with Russia. It was proceeding from little things to greater ones. Kurusu said that he would keep us informed in the matter. To begin with there was still a long-range settlement to be concluded in regard to the constantly recurring and troublesome question of the fisheries off Kamchatka and Sakhalin. Next would come the settlement of the Amur boundary questions. Kurusu did not indicate whether there are any other more far-reaching efforts at agreement behind this; he did, however, claim that his colleague, Togo, was at the present time working in a favorable atmosphere in Moscow.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 137.

No. 148

3471/E017951

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*¹

Telegram

No. 527 of July 10

[ANKARA, July 10, 1940—10:45 p. m.]²

[Received July 11—4:30 a. m.]

After the occupation of Bessarabia and the loss of Rumania in consequence of the latter's falling in with the Axis line, the Saracoglu clique has been very active in its efforts to persuade the President to prepare the way for intimate Russian-English-Turkish relations. For this purpose the [Turkish] Ambassador in Moscow³ was instructed to give the most friendly assurances in Moscow and at the same time to keep in closest contact with Sir Stafford Cripps. The Russians were to be told of the danger of German-Italian hegemony in Europe and

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer.]"

² The words enclosed in brackets are from another copy (265/172353-54).

³ Aly Haydan Aktay.

of the necessity of a strong Turkey as an ally, while simultaneously the English in Ankara have promised further deliveries of matériel via Iraq. The German publications * affected this plan like a bomb-shell.

A Cabinet Minister who has been an opponent of Saracoglu's policy for a long time told me that consideration is being given to placing Raouf * at the head of a reorganized cabinet. Since they expect Russian demands in any case, they will perhaps wait with the reorganization so as to utilize it as compensation.

With reference to your telegram No. 330 * regarding Massigli, I would think it more effective if he were thrown out by the Turkish Government instead of being withdrawn by the French Government.† I was told that the former eventuality is quite imminent. Numan assured me that the Turkish Government, especially in view of my protests, had repeatedly told the Allies last spring in unmistakable terms that it would not tolerate any action which violated Turkish neutrality. It [the Turkish Government] could prove this by publication of a White Book. The Saracoglu clique was obviously talking differently at the same time.

PAPEN

* See Editors' Note, p. 124.

† Presumably Huseyin Rauf Orbay, Turkish Minister President in 1922 and 1923, later in opposition to Atatürk; elected to the National Assembly in 1939.

* Not printed (3741/E017948). This telegram of July 9 requested an immediate report on whether the personal responsibility of Massigli could be proven for statements in the newspaper *Istanbul* that the documents published by the German Government were forgeries and that "Germans lie when they breathe". A marginal notation by Rintelen states that Ribbentrop wanted this information in order to back up a demand for Massigli's recall through the channel of the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.

† Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "No".

No. 149

91/100289

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Eire

Telegram

IMMEDIATE

No. 3 from Fuschl

No. 214 from the Foreign Ministry

FUSCHL, July 11, 1940.

Received Berlin, July 11—12: 55 p. m.

Sent July 11—3: 20 p. m.

In all conversations there please put most emphatically in the foreground that in connection with Ireland we have exclusively the single interest that her neutrality be maintained. As long as Ireland conducts herself in a neutral fashion it can be counted on with absolute certainty that Germany will respect her neutrality unconditionally. Accordingly it is an utterly unreasonable suspicion that we might have the intention to prepare to use Ireland as a military base against Eng-

land through a so-called "fifth column," which besides does not exist.

If the British Government in dealing with the Irish Government makes use of the idea of a union of Northern Ireland with Southern Ireland, it is evident that this is only a sham, which is only engaged in for the purpose of maneuvering Ireland out of her neutrality and drawing her into the war. The question of how Germany would act in case of establishment of the unity of Ireland is therefore wrongly posed and purposeless.

RIBBENTROP

No. 150

B19/B003644

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, July 11, 1940—6:33 p. m.

No. 416 of July 11

Received July 11—10:20 p. m.

1. The Foreign Minister told me in a very gratified tone that there has been a sudden shift in the situation relative to the nickel question. Molotov's representative Sobolev informed the Finnish Minister in Moscow that the Soviet Government would limit its purchases of nickel ore in Finland during 1940 to 40 percent of the output on condition that the remainder is sold to Germany. The Soviet Government was at the present interested in nickel ore and also in a concession and the elimination of the English. Sobolev added that Russia would correspondingly supply diesel oil and that, moreover, construction of a nickel smelting plant had been completed in Russia.

2. The Finnish Minister in Berlin has been instructed to inform the German Government that the Finnish Government is ready to deliver 60 percent of the nickel ore output to Germany and would start operations to this end at the earliest possible date. The Finnish Government is planning to organize a Finnish corporation to take over distribution during 1940. The more complex matters, such as granting of the concession, would then be settled in the course of the year.¹

¹ Weissäcker quoted this telegram to this point in telegram No. 1200 of July 13, 1940, to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, and added:

"Please convey to the Soviet Government the following:

"We are prepared to accept the foregoing as an interim solution although it falls far behind what we agreed upon with the Finnish Government before the Soviets put forward their demands. We shall continue negotiations with the Finnish Government on this basis and create the essential technical conditions for a quick start of production. We concur in the view that revision of the concession conditions should be pursued independently of this, and reserve the right to make further proposals designed to safeguard German interests in such a revision.

"For the information of your Mission only:

"We have ordered a technical study of the practicability of dividing the concession into two separate territorial sections, since a joint German-Soviet concession might be a source of unpleasant difficulties." (B19/B003649-50)

3. The Foreign Minister, to whom I spoke in conformity with telegram No. 312,² expressed his deep satisfaction that Germany was interested in a concession. In his opinion, that is, his private opinion, it would be the best solution if Germany were to take over the concession. He had heard that Germany would demand (group garbled) of the concession from England in the peace treaty. He would welcome that because a positive legal basis would be provided in that case.

4. The I. G. Farben representatives are leaving for Petsamo today.³

BLÜCHER

² Document No. 136.

³ I. G. Farben Industrie was to receive the share assigned to Germany of the Petsamo nickel production. A contract on this subject was concluded at Helsinki on July 23 between I. G. Farben and the Petsamo Nickel Company. (4416/-E063865)

No. 151

121/119710-11

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 547

BERLIN, July 11, 1940.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires just called on me (9:00 p. m.) in order to tell me the following:

Through the liaison officers between the two Armistice Commissions in Wiesbaden and Turin the Italian Government had learned that tomorrow, Friday, July 12, a base in the zone of Oran and one in the zone of Casablanca are to be demanded of the French in the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.

The Duce was of the opinion that such a demand was likely to compromise the intransigent line of Italian policy toward France. For that would be a kind of passive solidarity of France with the Axis.

If the German Government should nevertheless adhere to the above demand, the Italian Government would ask the French for bases at or in the neighborhood of Oran, in order to obtain greater freedom of movement in the western part of the Mediterranean Sea.

The Chargé d'Affaires suggested that the matter be postponed for a day in Wiesbaden so that it could be discussed at leisure.

I told Signor Zamboni that I would see what could be done, but considering the short time available I did not want to promise absolutely that the matter could still be postponed.¹

For the time being I refrained from asking Herr Hencke in Wiesbaden to postpone the matter for a day, for I suspect that the demand stems from a direct instruction of the Führer.

The motive for the Italian proposal seems to me to be rather transparent. If the Armistice Commission is not to transmit this demand

¹ In the original extra space is indicated at this point.

to the French as yet, it will be necessary to clarify whether the instruction came from the Führer. I shall try to obtain this clarification here in Berlin; perhaps it would also be practical, however, to do the same thing simultaneously at the Obersalzberg.

Herewith transmitted to the Foreign Minister by teletype.*

WEIZSÄCKER

* See document No. 158.

No. 152

B15/B002549-51

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Special Train, FUSCHL, July 11, 1940.

No. 2 of July 11 from Fuschl

Received Berlin, July 11—11:55 p. m.

No. 1023 of July 12

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent July 12—2:20 a. m.

For the officer in charge. Special confidential handling. Top secret.

Your telegram No. 2298¹ regarding the Duke of Windsor has just been received. We have received likewise a telegram from the Minister in Lisbon with the following content:

"Lisbon No. 661 of July 11. Strictly confidential. As Spaniards from among those around the Duke of Windsor have informed us confidentially on visits to the Legation the designation of the Duke as Governor of the Bahama Islands is intended to keep him far away from England, since his return would bring with it very strong encouragement to English friends of peace, so that his arrest at the instance of his opponents would certainly have to be expected. The Duke intends to postpone his departure for the Bahama Islands as long as possible, at least until the beginning of August, in hope of a turn of events favorable to him. He is convinced that if he had remained on the throne war would have been avoided, and he characterizes himself as a firm supporter of a peaceful arrangement with Germany. The Duke definitely believes that continued severe bombings would make England ready for peace. Huene." End of telegram from Lisbon.

We are especially interested in having the Duke return to Spain at all events. In our view it is of decisive importance for the success of such a plan, that our interest should in no way become known. There-

¹ In telegram No. 2298 of July 9, Stohrer had reported: "The Spanish Foreign Minister told me today that the Duke of Windsor had asked that a confidential agent be sent to Lisbon to whom he might give a communication for the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister will immediately fulfill this request.

"The Foreign Minister also told me, as the Minister of Interior had done a few days ago, that right up until the end of his stay here Windsor was still holding to the decision reported in my telegram No. 2182 of July 2 [document No. 86], and had reiterated his intention to return to Spain." (B15/002545)

fore it seems best for Spaniards to undertake the affair. While according to the telegram from Lisbon, the Duke will postpone his departure for the Bahamas until August, we are nevertheless convinced that he is surrounded by English agents, who will try to get him away from Lisbon as soon as possible, if necessary by force. In our opinion haste is accordingly required. We cannot tell exactly in what way the Spanish may have the opportunity, especially in connection with the existing liaison between the Spanish Foreign Minister and the Duke of Windsor, of getting the Duke without further ado back into Spanish territory. From here it would seem best if close Spanish friends of the Duke would privately invite him, and of course his wife, for a short one or two week visit to Spain on pretexts which would appear plausible both to him, to the Portuguese, and to the English agents. That would mean, therefore, that the Duke and Duchess, as well as the English and the Portuguese, must believe that Windsor in any event is going to come back there. If it does not take place in that way there is the danger, according to our information about the company of the Duke, that the real reason for the return of the Duke to Spain will become known in England and that England then would prevent it at all costs. For your personal information I would add: After their return to Spain the Duke and his wife must be persuaded or compelled to remain on Spanish territory. For the event of the latter alternative we must reach an agreement with the Spanish Government to the effect that by reason of the obligations of neutrality the Duke will be interned, since the Duke as an English officer and a member of the English expeditionary force must be treated as a military fugitive who has crossed the frontier. I would like to have your view of the attitude of the Spanish Government and its background. At any rate, at a suitable occasion in Spain the Duke must be informed that Germany wants peace with the English people, that the Churchill clique stands in the way of it, and that it would be a good thing if the Duke would hold himself in readiness for further developments. Germany is determined to force England to peace by every means of power and upon this happening would be prepared to accommodate any desire expressed by the Duke, especially with a view to the assumption of the English throne by the Duke and Duchess. If the Duke should have other plans, but be prepared to cooperate in the establishment of good relations between Germany and England, we would likewise be prepared to assure him and his wife of a subsistence which would permit him, either as a private citizen or in some other position, to lead a life suitable for a king. You will, at the proper time, receive more detailed instructions in the matter. The following will also serve to orient you personally:

(1) The Duke, according to information from Lisbon, is living at the home of a Portuguese banker, who is reported to be friendly to Germany.³

(2) A report has reached us today from a Swiss informant⁴ who has for many years had close connections with the English Secret Service to the effect that it is the plan of the English Secret Service, by sending the Duke to the Bahamas, to get him into English power in order to do away with him at the first opportunity. There is no objection to your informing the Spanish of this entirely confidentially.

I would ask you, following receipt of this telegram, to express your views very thoroughly as to what possibilities you perceive of getting the Duke and Duchess back to Spain as soon as possible. I advise especially that you observe caution in connection with the Spanish, except for those individuals of whose absolute discretion you are sure as a result of experience. Even in these cases, however, I request that you say only what is necessary.

Please deal with this telegram personally and confidentially.⁴

RIBBENTROP

³ Ricardo do Espírito Santo Silva. See document No. 276.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See document No. 159.

No. 153

104/112298-300

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1185

BERLIN, July 11, 1940.

W 3428 g. Ang. II.

I. The Legations at Riga, Tallinn, and Kaunas have received the following telegraphic instruction:¹

As a result of political events of recent weeks in the Baltic States the early union of the Baltic countries with the Soviet Union may be expected after the elections of July 14.² The events in western White Russia and western Ukraine, where the National Assemblies decided simultaneously to join the Soviet Union and to expropriate all private property, arouse the fear that our important commercial interests in the Baltic States might soon be gravely imperiled in case of similar developments there.

Upon receipt of a further instruction which will be issued after

¹ These instructions were sent as telegrams Nos. 234 to Tallinn, 276 to Riga, and 187 to Kaunas (104/112301-02).

² Elections had been set in the three Baltic States for the same day.

approval by the Foreign Minister,³ I request that you explain immediately to the present or possibly newly-formed Government there, with a reference to the extent of our commercial interests, that we definitely expect our economic interests in the Baltic States to be fully safeguarded, regardless of how their political and economic structures develop. We must have assurance that the sale and transfer of German resettlers' property in Estonia and Latvia can be carried out without interference; that the remaining property of Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche will remain untouched; that we can maintain our trade with the Baltic countries at least in the volume fixed by the most recent commercial agreements; that our commercial representatives and forwarders can continue to carry on their activities without interference, and that our shipping interests will be safeguarded. With these conditions we for our part are willing to continue to trade with the Baltic countries.

I request a telegraphic report as soon as possible concerning the reception of the above statement by the Government there.⁴

For your information only: The Embassy in Moscow will be informed of the above instruction with orders (likewise in accordance with a further instruction which will be issued after approval by the Foreign Minister) to inform the Soviet Government of the extent of our commercial interests in the Baltic States and to express the expectation that these commercial interests will be safeguarded regardless of future political developments. End of the telegraphic instruction.

II. Below you will find instructions regarding your attitude in connection with the contemplated representations which you are to make to the Soviet Government as soon as possible and at the highest possible level, but only upon further instructions to be issued after approval by the Foreign Minister.⁵ First, the Soviet Government is to be informed of the telegraphic instructions to Riga, Tallinn, and Kaunas and in connection therewith the following is to be stated: We are not interfering in the political developments which have taken place in the Baltic States since September 1939 or which are further in the making. However, it would be contrary to the agreements of September 1939 if our very considerable commercial interests in the Baltic countries were imperiled by these developments. We expect, therefore, that the Soviet Government will likewise give full consider-

³ In the files is a draft teletype message to Ribbentrop requesting further instructions (2173/471348-350). The instructions appear to have been sent on July 13, but only the draft has been found (2173/471371).

⁴ See documents Nos. 157 and 172. Telegram No. 244 of July 15 (9376/E664304) from the Minister in Tallinn reported that he had made the statement as instructed to the Estonian Foreign Minister; the Foreign Minister had replied that he personally took a positive attitude toward it, but would have to get a Cabinet decision before giving the official position of his Government.

⁵ See footnote 3.

ation to our economic interests regardless of how further political developments in the Baltic countries shape up.

III. Regarding the extent of our interests, the following data may be given—with the reservation that the figures quoted are based on estimates:

The value of resettlers' assets in Estonia and Latvia which have not yet been transferred is estimated at a minimum of 50 million reichsmarks, approximately half of which is in cash deposits in the Bank of Latvia.

Furthermore, in the three Baltic countries we have extended commercial credits in the amount of 30–35 million reichsmarks, and the amount of industrial credits and shares may be estimated at 50–60 million reichsmarks. The value of the other property of Reichs-deutsche and Volksdeutsche is estimated at 20–30 million reichsmarks. Including resettlers' assets, our capital interests in the Baltic countries therefore amount to at least 160–180 million reichsmarks.

We are, however, also greatly interested in maintaining our trade with the Baltic countries, from which, under normal conditions, we could during the current year purchase goods in the amount of approximately 180–200 million reichsmarks, among them such particularly important raw materials as shale oil, phosphorite, flax, lumber, and also grain, hogs, butter, eggs, seeds. Similarly, we must emphasize the safeguarding of our shipping interests and the unimpeded activities of commercial representatives and shipping agents in the Baltic countries.

IV. Transfer of the above-mentioned resettlers' assets is contemplated principally by way of the normal export of goods, but we would welcome it if instead of this process, which requires a number of years, a quicker solution could be found. The payment of rather large cash amounts for the needs of Russian occupation troops might be considered, as well as the taking over by Soviet authorities of assets, real estate, etc., which are still available, against a lump-sum compensation, which would be settled through the clearing system by deliveries from the Soviet Union to us. If the Soviet Government shows interest in such a transaction, we are prepared to enter into detailed discussions by experts.*

WEIZSÄCKER

*Schulenburg reported on July 17: "Instruction regarding protection of our economic interests in the Baltic States carried out today with Molotov. Molotov promised thorough and friendly consideration and speedy decision." (telegram No. 1404: 104/112325)

No. 154

321/193328-29

The State Secretary to the Legation in Lithuania

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, July 11, 1940.

No. 185

e. o. Kult B. sper 68-05 (g) 8.7.

For the Minister personally.

For your personal information. Secret.

With reference to your telegram No. 135 of July 8.¹

The Ambassador in Moscow has been instructed to inform Molotov orally, as follows:

[Here follow the instructions contained in telegram No. 1164 of July 8 from the Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, document No. 139.]

The Lithuanian Government will be notified of our proposed resettlement project only after Moscow's reaction has become known.²

Please convey to the executive of the national group, upon instruction from the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, the following directive: No panic sales of German property; no departures without orders; refrain as far as possible from taking sides on domestic political issues; wait calmly for directives from Berlin.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ This telegram reported increasing anxiety among members of the German national group in Lithuania and suggested that this might be relieved by an announcement that their resettlement was envisaged (321/193327).

² See document No. 162.

No. 155

2768/536305-07

The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

COPENHAGEN, July 11, 1940.

Pol. 3-230

Pol. VI 1965.

Subject: Conversation with the new Danish Foreign Minister.¹

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 774 of July 9² and 778 of July 11.³

The new Danish Foreign Minister, Eric Scavenius, visited me yesterday in order to make his first official contact with me. It was evi-

¹ A new Danish Ministry, in which Stauning remained as Minister President and Eric Scavenius became Minister of Foreign Affairs, had been formed on July 8.

² Not printed (2135/467879).

³ Not printed (247/164136).

dent from the conversation that two questions particularly were troubling him:

1.) The future political and economic relationship between Germany and Denmark, and Germany's plans in this respect; 2.) our attitude toward the new Danish Government.

M. Scavenius introduced the conversation by saying that the decision to enter the Government had been a very hard one for him to make. He had only decided to do so because the King had personally appealed to his sense of national duty and honor as a Dane and because the near future would in all probability confront Denmark with serious decisions. If Denmark wanted to influence the shaping of her destiny, she could do so only in the closest contact with Germany. He had wished to support this policy. It had therefore been his first official act to orient Danish policy unmistakably toward Germany and to express this in a statement approved by the entire Government. The Danish Minister in Berlin would be instructed to deliver the text of the statement (see enclosure) in the Foreign Ministry,⁴ thus informing the Reich Government officially that the Danish Government was prepared to collaborate actively with Germany and to take her rightful place in the new order in Europe under the leadership of Germany. Referring to the statements of Reichsleiter Rosenberg on the common Nordic destiny, M. Scavenius asked whether contact had already been made with Sweden, and how we thought it could be carried out in practice.

M. Scavenius assured me in reply to my question that the final passage of his statement, which relates to the preservation of the independence and individuality of Denmark, makes no reservation but was only supposed to show the Danish people that the policy of the new government was by no means a self-imposed task. It was his wish that the necessary adjustment of Denmark be accomplished by means of a peaceful political and social development. So drastic a change of position as the incorporation of Denmark into the Greater German Lebensraum ought, also in the German interest, to be supported by the overwhelming majority of the Danish people. Naturally Germany had the power today to install another government in Denmark, but such a government, which could have only a fraction of the people behind it, would not be considered a Danish, but a foreign government. It would have to expect passive resistance and constant discontent and would have to be supported by German bayonets. There was no doubt that in Denmark, too, a domestic revolution would take place. But this process would be very slow, since the situation was entirely different from that in Germany and the Dane did not possess the same mobility as the German.

⁴ Enclosure to document No. 181.

I objected that the Government was nevertheless essentially the old one and that it would be difficult to pursue a policy of close collaboration with Germany with the men of the old Government, who represented a system opposed to Germany. M. Scavenius did not consider these differences as decisive and expressed the conviction that the Government would follow his line and also draw the practical conclusions therefrom. Nobody today could ignore the power of the facts. If he should not be able to assert himself, he would not hesitate a moment to resign from the Government. He intimated that his ministerial colleagues were fully aware of this.

In the further course of the conversation it appeared that M. Scavenius also realizes that Denmark has to prepare for agreements with Germany on military policy. He said, however, that the country was not yet fully aware of this, and that the hope was still prevalent that after termination of the war Denmark would be completely set free in a military sense.

M. Scavenius saw one grave difficulty in the question of North Schleswig. He had previously urged the Danish Government to come to a direct agreement with Germany. He had met with deaf ears however. To take up the problem now as a separate question he considered hardly possible for any Danish Government. If Germany could not refrain from again bringing the problem up for discussion, it would still be best to do this in connection with the reorganization of Europe.

M. Scavenius had at the very commencement of my activities here stressed in speaking to me the need for a more decided orientation of Denmark's policy in the direction of Germany, because he foresaw the rise of Germany and its position as the dominant power in Europe. His present attitude, therefore, does not arise from temporary opportunistic considerations, but from honest and upright conviction. Even if the new course is adopted at first without any important change in the present régime, the fact of the change of course in foreign policy nevertheless signifies an advance that is not to be underestimated.

The question arises as to whether and to what extent we should avail ourselves of the readiness of the Danish Foreign Minister to further our plans in the direction desired in so far as they affect Denmark. May I request instructions.⁵

RENTHE-FINK

⁵ In a minute by Sonnleithner of July 16 (947/300212) Welzsäcker was told: "The Foreign Minister requests you to instruct Minister von Renthe-Fink to treat in a dilatory manner his contact with the new Danish Foreign Minister, but on the question of North Schleswig particularly to maintain complete reserve, refraining from all interference and confining himself to reporting to the Foreign Ministry."

No. 156

104/112294-87

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the State Secretary

A 3192

Moscow, July 11, 1940.

The renewed diplomatic activity which the Soviet Union has displayed during the last few weeks has naturally become a main subject of discussion among the members of the Diplomatic Corps here. Some things are not yet completely clear, as for instance the question as to why the Soviet Union *just at this time* proceeded or allegedly will yet proceed against a number of countries. Most of my colleagues are of the opinion that the Soviets, who are always very well informed, know or at least assume the end of the war to be imminent.

Regarding the action taken against Rumania, it has aroused general surprise here that the Soviet Union has also demanded the northern part of Bucovina. There had never been any statement of Soviet claims to this region. As is known, the Soviet Government has justified its claim by the fact that Bucovina has a Ukrainian population. This only applies to the northern part of the country, and the Soviet Union has finally contented itself with this part. I cannot get rid of the impression that it was Ukrainian circles who have advocated and put through in the Kremlin the claim for cession of northern Bucovina. On several occasions, as for instance during the negotiations regarding the German-Soviet border in Poland, a very strong Ukrainian influence in the Kremlin was evident.¹ M. Stalin told me personally at that time that he was prepared to make concessions north of the boundary line where it runs through White Russia, but that this was impossible in the south where Ukrainians live. Consequently, the cession of the city of Sieniawa, very much desired by us, was canceled by the Soviet Government after it had first agreed to it. It has not yet been possible to determine where this strong Ukrainian influence originates. There is no especially influential Ukrainian known to be among the immediate entourage of the leaders in the Kremlin. A clue might be obtained from the fact that young Pavlov (now in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin), who is the special pet of MM. Stalin and Molotov, once was described to me by Stalin as "our little Ukrainian."

The entire political interest in Moscow is now focused on events in the Baltic States and what will happen in relation to Turkey² and Iran.

¹ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 109 and 376.

² On July 12 Tass published a statement denying rumors in the foreign press that the USSR had sent Turkey an ultimatum containing territorial demands. The Tass statement was reported by Schulenburg in telegram No. 1343 of the same day (271/176055).

Most people believe that the three Baltic States will be changed into entities completely dependent on Moscow, i. e., will be incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Legations of the three Baltic States here in Moscow expect to be completely dissolved and to disappear in a very short time. It is generally believed that the Soviet Government will demand the withdrawal of all foreign Missions in Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn. The excitement among Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians here is extremely great. However, actual developments will have to be awaited.

This, no doubt, applies likewise to Turkey and Iran. Both Ambassadors here assert that neither in Moscow nor in Ankara nor in Tehran have any demands been made up to the present. However, it is certain that the situation is serious. I may add that, at least in Iranian circles here, there is much resentment against us, because of the publication of the sixth White Book.³ They believe that the White Book has induced the Soviet Government to take action against Iran. However, the Iranian Ambassador here is too clever not to see that the documents in the White Book were only a pretext for the Soviet Government's conduct and that Moscow would simply have found another pretext if this one had not presented itself at the moment.

Finally an interesting detail:

The Turkish Ambassador here is telling his friends among the diplomats that he received a telegram en clair—which he even produces—from Saracoglu on July 6, in which the latter denies the content of his conversation with Massigli and refers in this connection to telegraphic assertions by Massigli to that effect. It is worth noting that in the same breath the Turkish Ambassador declares that it was very annoying that his conversation with American Ambassador Steinhardt thus had also been revealed.⁴

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

³ See Editors' Note, p. 124.

⁴ One of the papers in German White Book No. 6 was a telegram of Mar. 14, 1940, from Massigli, French Ambassador in Turkey, to the Foreign Ministry in Paris. Saracoglu was reported to have shown Massigli a telegram from the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow regarding a conversation with Steinhardt on Soviet fears of bombings in the Baku oilfields. When Saracoglu asked for Massigli's views on this, he replied that bombers could reach Baku by flying over Iran or Turkey. According to Massigli's alleged telegram, he surmised from Saracoglu's remarks that Turkey would make no difficulties about this.

No. 157

323/193875-76

The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 295 of July 12

RIGA, July 12, 1940—3: 39 p. m.

Received July 12—9: 45 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 276 of July 11.¹

Today's appointment with the Minister President to discuss current resettlement problems gave me an opportunity immediately, using telegraphic instruction No. 276, to present Germany's expectations and ask him what the probable development would be. Kirchenstein, who, although an old revolutionary, is by no means familiar with questions of practical politics and diplomacy, expressed great optimism about maintaining Latvian independence for the present. Parliament, which the new government expects to be formed about July 20, will immediately appoint a committee constituted for drawing up a new constitution. In view of the smallness of the country and of external conditions, the position of president of the state would presumably be abolished. Detailed proposals for immediate union with Moscow and tending toward nationalization of factories and encroachments on private property were, to be sure, conceivable, but in his opinion would not obtain a majority in Parliament, despite its anticipated predominantly Communist composition. The Minister President claimed he had reliable reports to the effect that the workers' committees in industry had had a beneficial influence and that production had by no means decreased but had already increased. Moscow had not indicated to him that it had any wishes whatsoever for complete union. Consequently, despite the reservations called for by the times, a peaceful development without any basic encroachments on private property was most likely. The so-called (group garbled) farmers, who did not work the land themselves, will, however, be expropriated in the interest of the smallholders, as Ulmanis too had already demanded. He asked me to discuss with the Secretary General all the individual complaints mentioned in the telegraphic instruction concerning German wishes and reservations, since he was not familiar with the subject matter. In the subsequent conversation with Nuksha, the latter showed more skepticism with regard to Latvian independence. There was no doubt that power was available to effect absorption without any resistance. Latvian hopes clung to the fact that the remolding of Russian-Latvian relations was not only a concern of those two parties

¹ See document No. 153, footnote 1.

but also affected the interest of other big blocs of states, which could not watch developments passively. He had reason to believe that Moscow itself was still uncertain about the degree of absorption of the Baltic States and was cautiously trying to learn the views of the big governments thereon. Consequently there was a possibility, without overstepping the bounds of friendly discussion, to exert an influence on the course that developments would take. I confined myself to reminding him concerning a delimitation of the spheres of interest. German rights and interests had thus far not been injured in any way. If it should become a question of injuries from the Russian side or from radical communism manifesting itself locally, I think I can for the time being obtain remedial action by exerting influence on the Latvian Government or contacting the Russian Legation, but should like to call attention again to the statements in report A 1093 of June 22.²

KOTZE

² Not found.

No. 158

865/206261

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 552

BERLIN, July 12, 1940.

In connection with Zamboni's démarche of yesterday¹ I told the Italian Ambassador the following today:

After once more reviewing the situation, the OKW had in the meantime decided to abandon the plan of creating a German base at Oran.

On the other hand, the OKW was interested in a base at Casablanca, and this would be discussed at the Armistice Commission. If the Italian Army Command wished for its part to establish a base at Oran, this would be very much welcomed by Germany.

The Ambassador made notes and took cognizance of my communication with satisfaction.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 151.

² Weizsäcker noted on July 15 that he had learned through Gaus that the Italian Ambassador in a telephone message to Fuschl had stated that "the question of bases in Oran and Casablanca had been once more taken up with the Duce. The Duce had let it be stated that he was in agreement with the proposal for a German base at Oran without any reservation." (St.S. No. 557: B14/B002073)

No. 159

B15/B002552-53

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 2339 of July 12

MADRID, July 12, 1940.

Received July 12—10:55 p. m.

Top secret for the Foreign Minister.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 1023 of July 11.²

Since the discretion which is absolutely necessary cannot be guaranteed in the Spanish Foreign Ministry because of connections leading to the English Embassy and other English circles, I have spoken of the case of the Duke of Windsor strictly confidentially and personally with the Spanish Minister of the Interior³ (brother-in-law of the Generalissimo) and requested his and Franco's personal support. In that connection I did not make use of the ideas about the future mentioned in your telegraphic instructions, but used instead the report about the Intelligence Service threatening the Duke.

The Minister showed complete understanding. He will make a report to the Generalissimo today and after getting his consent, quite likely by tomorrow, will send to Lisbon under a suitable pretext an absolutely reliable Spanish emissary who has been a friend of the Duke for a long time.⁴ The emissary will request the Duke, with the Duchess, to return to Spain for a short time "before his departure for the Bahamas" since the Minister of the Interior would like to discuss with him certain questions regarding Spanish-English relations and to give him important information affecting the person of the Duke. The pretext for the journey would be a hunting invitation. The Duke will be requested, because of the watch kept on him, to conceal his destination.

Should this plan succeed, the Minister of the Interior, in addition to a discussion of, for instance, the Gibraltar question, will inform the Duke of a thoroughly reliable report (communicated to me in your telegraphic instructions) supposedly received by the Spanish Security Service concerning the threat to the life of the Duke. The Minister

¹ Marginal notation: "Do not distribute. Directive of the State Secretary. One copy to the State Secretary."

² Document No. 152.

³ Ramón Serrano Suñer.

⁴ The emissary was Miguel Primo de Rivera, district leader of the Falange in Madrid. See document No. 284. In telegram No. 2358 of July 13 Stohrer reported: "The Minister of the Interior told me following a meeting with Franco that the confidential emissary would leave tomorrow for Lisbon" (B15/B002561).

will then add an invitation to the Duke and Duchess to accept Spanish hospitality, and possibly financial assistance as well. Possibly also the departure of the Duke could be prevented in some other way. In this whole plan we remain completely in the background.

A further telegraphic report may be made.

STOHRER

No. 160

B15/B002556

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2342 of July 12

MADRID, July 12, 1940.

Received July 13—1:30 p. m.

The Spanish Foreign Minister recently described to me a conversation with the English Ambassador here in which he had emphasized again the view which Franco had already expressed to the Ambassador that England had lost the war. The Ambassador had at first vigorously disputed this and declared that England would fight to the end. When the Minister, referring to the role of Spain as an intermediary in connection with the German-French armistice, said to the Ambassador that Spain was ready to serve England also at any time and that in all likelihood he—Sir Samuel Hoare—would be the intermediary selected, the Ambassador answered: "It is possible that it will sometime come to that."

STOHRER

No. 161

175/137098

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, July 13, 1940—12:50 a. m.

No. 1165 of July 12

Received July 13—5:05 a. m.

- 1) For OKW
- 2) For OKH Attaché Branch
- 3) For Air Ministry Attaché Group

The King requested the two armed forces Attachés to appear for an audience on July 12 and gave them for transmittal to the Commanders in Chief of the Army and the Air Force the official request for the dispatch of military missions, which he said he had already made to the Reich Government through the Head of the Mission.¹

¹ See document No. 80.

The King, alluding to the difficult military and political situation, urgently desires the open or concealed assignment for training purposes of officers who are tank and air force experts, together with the necessary equipment. He said he has earnestly resolved to align himself with Germany and therefore thought he could certainly receive help from there.

Reports will follow.²

WAHLE
FABRICIUS

² Not found.

No. 162

104/112811

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, July 13, 1940—7:04 p. m.

No. 1368 of July 13

Received July 13—9:10 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1164 of July 8¹ and my telegram No. 1348 of July 12.²

Molotov summoned me today and stated the following: Stalin had carefully re-examined the situation with respect to the strip of Lithuanian territory and has concluded that our claim to this strip of territory and the Soviet obligation to cede it are incontestable. In the present circumstances, however, the cession of this strip of territory would be extremely inconvenient and difficult for the Soviet Government. Therefore, Stalin and he himself earnestly request the German Government to consider whether, in conformity with the extraordinarily friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, a way cannot be found which would leave this strip of territory permanently with Lithuania. Molotov added that we could of course at any time move the population of German origin out of Lithuania as well as out of this strip of territory. Molotov stressed again and again the difficulties which would at present result for the Soviet Union from the cession of this strip of territory, and he made his and Stalin's request seem very urgent by repeatedly expressing hope of a German concession. Request instructions by wire.³ Perhaps the Soviet request can be used to put through our economic and financial demands with respect to the Baltic States.⁴

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 139.

² See document No. 139, footnote 5.

³ See document No. 275.

⁴ See document No. 153.

No. 163

365/206275-80

*The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German
Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram en clair

No. 58

FRIEDENS-HWIX July 13, 1940—7:30 p. m.

Received July 13—9:10 p. m.

The activity of the Armistice Commission to date may be summarized by reference to the articles of the Armistice Agreement,¹ as follows:

Article 1

Carried out. The request of the French delegation that encircled units be granted free withdrawal after laying down their arms was rejected.

Article 2

Carried out. The French delegation wanted agreement between the demarcation line and local administrative boundaries. The proposal was rejected.

Article 3

Paragraph 1: The French delegation is using the obligation of the French Government to assist the German occupation authorities as a basis for requests in the greatest variety of matters, e. g., release of noncombatant prisoners of war, which they have promised for action on these requests.² Requested listing by names. The French also suggested that in the interest of restoring normal conditions the Paris newspapers should be granted certain concessions and admitted to the occupied zone on a large scale. They were told that this was the responsibility of the holder of administrative authority or the respective local military commanders. Concerning the scope of the rights of the occupying power in cases of differences of opinion, especially as to the definition of booty of war. The French object to certain requisitions. The Government's proposal to transfer the administration to Paris,³ or Versailles, is being treated in a dilatory manner.

Article 4

Demobilization and disarmament of the Army is proceeding satisfactorily. A total strength of about 100,000 has been permitted as a

¹ For text, see vol. ix, document No. 523.

² The text of the original appears to be garbled at this point.

³ Such a proposal was reported by Hencke in telegram No. 36 of July 7 (121/119692).

residual army for metropolitan France. The French would like to keep Navy, Air Force, and Garde Mobile personnel in excess of that number. The requests were rejected as a matter of principle, but the French were told that they could submit substantiated applications for exceptions. The troops in the French possessions, colonies, protectorates, and mandated areas are not included in the above-mentioned strength of 100,000. The size of the forces for the French possessions in the Mediterranean (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Syria) will be fixed by Italy. Demobilization to peacetime levels is stipulated for all other French possessions. The surrender of arms and equipment of troops withdrawn to the unoccupied zone is now proceeding. Demobilization and disarming of the Navy has been suspended. Demobilization and disarming of air force contingents in North Africa has been suspended by Italy. The French are to be left some air force contingents in metropolitan France for operational use against England. Their size has not yet been definitely decided. Disarmament of remainder of the Air Force in the mother country now in progress.

Article 5

The German demands have not yet been announced to the French.

Article 6

The storing of arms, ammunition, and war material in the unoccupied zone in accordance with German instructions appears to be proceeding satisfactorily. The German definition of war material is: "Everything pertaining to the armament, equipment, and supply of troops." The French decree prohibiting manufacture of new war material in the unoccupied zone has been enacted.

Article 7

Surrender of fortifications, etc., in the occupied zone, under direct supervision of the German military commander has been completed. Reports on prepared demolitions are coming in regularly.

Article 8

Completely suspended at the moment.⁴

Article 9

The mine specialist of the French Navy, with information on mines, coastal mine fields, etc., is expected in Wiesbaden within the next few days.

Article 10

Paragraph 1: The French Government is evidently trying to comply with the terms. A violation by the French Admiral in Alexan-

⁴ See document No. 111.

dria, who, contrary to his Government's instructions, gave in to British pressure and failed to fight or scuttle his ships.*

Paragraphs 2 and 3 have been complied with by the French through legal enactments. Violations in Syria, where French Army personnel crossed over to Palestine. Also flight of a number of French fliers to England via Spain.

Article 11

Paragraph 1. A decree prohibiting sailing of merchant vessels, etc., has been enacted by the French Government. Negotiations on resumption of trade relations and consequently also regarding permission for merchant vessels to sail are being conducted by the Hemmen economic delegation.

Paragraph 2: The majority of the merchant vessels finding themselves outside of France have returned, according to the French delegation.

Paragraph 3: A survey of German merchant vessels in French ports is now under way.

Article 12

An order has been issued grounding all planes in France, the French possessions, colonies, protectorates, and mandated areas. Enforcement and control in North Africa and Syria is the responsibility of Italy, which has released some of the combat forces in that area for operations against England. Authorization of limited civilian aviation within the whole territory controlled by France is now under consideration, but discussions have been suspended on the German side pending acceptance by the French of our demands relative to flying across the unoccupied zone and using the ground installations there. We shall in any event secure the necessary freedom of movement for German planes in the unoccupied zone. The German side is prepared in principle to release a part of the air force contingents in the mother country for operations against England (cf. article 4). German directives regarding dismantling of the remaining military aircraft have been issued. The French promise strict compliance.

Article 13

Surrender of French military installations, establishments and stores in the occupied zone, and implementation of the remaining provisions of this article are proceeding satisfactorily.

* A protest to the French on this matter by the Chief of the German Naval Subcommission was reported by Hencke in telegram No. 57 of July 13 (121/119726).

Article 14

Resumption of radio communication within the unoccupied zone, between metropolitan France and other French territories, and finally between metropolitan France and French ships has been authorized subject to special conditions; also communication between the French Government and its foreign Missions. Cipher used must be made known to us.

Article 15

Is being worked on by the Hemmen economic delegation.

Article 16

Regarding repatriation of the population, the holder of administrative authority has issued the requisite instructions after hearing the French delegates.

Article 17

Is the subject of negotiations conducted by the Hemmen economic delegation.

Article 18

The French wish to make a distinction between German troops in the occupied zone for occupation purposes, and such troops as are being readied there for the assault on England. They wanted information on their strength in connection with the costs of the occupation force, which they must assume. Information was declined; they will be informed only on the amount of the costs that must be borne by them.

Article 19

Paragraph 1: The surrender of prisoners of war and civilian internees is in full operation. As regards persons under detention or serving sentences for acts committed for the benefit of the German Reich, the French have accepted the German interpretation which requires the inclusion of foreigners. Implementation is also in progress.

Paragraph 2: Except for the Grynszpan case,⁶ no extradition demands have as yet been made on the German side.

⁶ Herschel Grynszpan, who on Nov. 7, 1938, had shot and fatally wounded the Third Secretary of the German Embassy in Paris, vom Rath, (see vol. iv, documents Nos. 269 and 355) had not come up for trial before a French court at this time.

In June 1940 Grynszpan was in a convoy of prisoners moving from Orleans to Bourges, when the convoy dispersed, the prisoners escaping. Grynszpan reported to the prison at Bourges, but being refused admission moved to the unoccupied zone of France, where he again surrendered. He was finally traced to the prison in Toulouse, and in July was handed over to the German authorities (documents on this phase of the case are filmed on serial 9832).

A plan to bring Grynszpan to trial before the Volksgerichtshof and to exploit this trial for propaganda purposes was discussed at length, but the trial was postponed and never took place. Documents on this phase of the case are filmed on serial 1285.

Paragraph 3: The requested lists of prisoners removed from France, which, according to the replies of the French, could refer only to prisoners of war in England, and the lists of sick and wounded prisoners and civilian internees not in a condition to be transported, have been partly received.

For purposes of spot inspections, the Prisoner of War Commission has left already, and the Civilian Internee Commission will leave next week.

Articles 20 and 21

Nothing to report.

Article 22

Preparations are now under way to get the German control commissions for Army, Navy, Air Force, and armaments industry ready to start working. The Führer has reserved to himself the setting of the date for sending them into the unoccupied zone (concerning the Prisoner of War Commission, cf. article 19).

With a view to ensuring military supervision of demobilization and disarmament, as well as of the remainder of the Army and of the supplies which have been captured, the following demarcation line has been agreed with the Italians: The highway Bellegarde-Pont d'Ain-Miribel (the highway and adjoining localities to Italy)—eastern boundary of Lyon (the city of Lyon itself to Germany)—the Rhone river down to its mouth in the Mediterranean. West of this line, Germany is in control, east of it, Italy. In Corsica, control is exercised by the Italians. No demarcation line is provided for control operations with respect to the armaments industry and implementation of the armistice terms relating to prisoners of war and civilian prisoners.

Coordination with the Italian Armistice Commission is assured by liaison teams of both sides in Wiesbaden and Turin.

Articles 23 and 24

Nothing to report.

Total impression: The French are generally endeavoring to comply with the armistice terms. It is necessary from time to time to apply pressure in order to get quicker action on information requested of them. It is also necessary at times to be emphatic about rejecting improper requests and complaints of the French. The French are having certain technical difficulties with communications with their Government, but this is now being remedied by the German side.

HENCKE

No. 164

104/112312-13

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, July 13, 1940—9:17 p. m.

SECRET

Received July 14—9:15 a. m.

No. 1364 of July 13

Molotov informed me today that Cripps, the British Ambassador here, had been received by Stalin a few days ago upon request of the British Government. On instructions from Stalin, Molotov gave me a memorandum of this conversation.

Cripps inquired regarding the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the following questions:

1. The British Government was convinced that Germany was striving for hegemony in Europe and wanted to engulf all European countries. This was dangerous to the Soviet Union as well as England. Therefore both countries ought to agree on a common policy of self-protection against Germany and on the re-establishment of the European balance of power.

2. Irrespective of this, England would like to trade with the Soviet Union, provided that England's exports would not be resold to Germany.

3. The British Government was of the opinion that unification and leadership of the Balkan countries for the purpose of maintaining the status quo was rightly the task of the Soviet Union. In present circumstances this important mission could be carried out only by the Soviet Union.

4. The British Government knew that the Soviet Union was dissatisfied with the regime in the Straits and in the Black Sea. Cripps was of the opinion that the interests of the Soviet Union in the Straits must be safeguarded.

Stalin's answers are given as follows:

1. The Soviet Government was, of course, very much interested in present events in Europe, but he (Stalin) did not see any danger of the hegemony of any one country in Europe and still less any danger that Europe might be engulfed by Germany. Stalin observed the policy of Germany, and knew several leading German statesmen well. He had not discovered any desire on their part to engulf European countries. Stalin was not of the opinion that German military successes menaced the Soviet Union and her friendly relations with Germany. These relations were not based on transient circumstances, but on the basic national interests of both countries.

The so-called European balance of power had hitherto oppressed not only Germany, but also the Soviet Union. Therefore the Soviet Union would take all measures to prevent the re-establishment of the old balance of power in Europe.

2. The Soviet Union did not object to trading with England, but she contested the right of England or any other country to interfere with German-Soviet commercial relations. The Soviet Union would export to Germany, in accordance with treaty provisions, part of the nonferrous metals she bought abroad, because Germany needed these metals for the manufacture of the war material she delivered to the Soviet Union. If England did not recognize these conditions, trade between England and the Soviet Union was impossible.

3. In Stalin's opinion no power had the right to an exclusive role in the consolidation and leadership of the Balkan countries. The Soviet Union did not claim such a mission either, although she was interested in Balkan affairs.

4. Regarding Turkey Stalin declared that the Soviet Union was in fact opposed to the exclusive jurisdiction of Turkey over the Straits and to Turkey's dictation of conditions in the Black Sea. The Turkish Government was aware of that.¹

SCHULENBURG

¹In telegram No. 1227 of July 17 Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg to tell Molotov that the memorandum on the Stalin-Cripps conversation had been transmitted to the German Government which "took note of the contents of the memorandum with interest and greatly appreciated this information." (270/175458)

No. 165

585/242624

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 286 of July 13

SOFIA, July 13, 1940—10:45 p. m.

Received July 14—1:30 a. m.

[Pol. IV 1957 g.]¹

The Foreign Minister informed me that some time ago he had acquainted the Russian Chargé d'Affaires with the rumors current in Bulgaria that there was bad feeling² in Moscow toward Sofia (cf. report A 1530 of July 1³). He, as he added, attached importance to a clarification all the more because Bulgaria was counting on Russian understanding for her revisionist desires relative to the Dobruja. Upon instruction from Moscow, the Russian Chargé had made the following statement:

1) Soviet Russian-Bulgarian relations were in all respects correct.

¹This file number is taken from a copy in the files of the Embassy in Turkey to which the telegram was sent for information; copies were also sent to the Embassies in Italy and in the Soviet Union and to the Legations in Greece, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia (3562/E023417).

²Thus in the Ankara Embassy copy. The copy from the State Secretary files which is printed reads here "strife" which was obviously an error in transmission.

³Not printed (3562/E023408-09).

2) Soviet Russia recognized the legitimate Bulgarian demands on Rumania and for an outlet to the sea.

3) Soviet Russia would support these Bulgarian desires at any conference that may be held.

Even though this Russian declaration has reassured the Bulgarian Government in some respects, it is nevertheless considered here of decisive importance that it should become more clearly apparent that Bulgaria will owe the fulfillment of her revisionist desires to Germany. It is feared by many here that Italy on the one hand and Russia on the other will thrust themselves forward as the ostensible benefactors.

RIECHTHOFEN

No. 166

F10/039-048

*Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*¹

FÜHRER HEADQUARTERS, July 13, 1940.

DUCE: After your departure from Munich I received a report that your train was held up by an air raid alarm. I became conscious of the fact how greatly your life, too, is endangered. I should like therefore to ask you kindly to accept two railroad cars with anti-aircraft equipment as a personal gift from me. The construction of such cars and their completion take in any case so many months that you are likely to find use for these for some time. The accompanying crew may remain until an Italian crew is fully broken in. Field Marshal Göring's train, when attacked, promptly shot down an English plane with these 4-barreled anti-aircraft guns. To a height of at least 1500-2000 meters their effectiveness is excellent.

Please regard this gift simply as a token of concern from a friend.

At the moment I am in the midst of the preparations for the second phase of the struggle. These preparations are very extensive. Hence they require a certain time for execution. At this moment the organizational changes, or rather the organizational realignment and equipment of the individual units assigned to carry out this operation, are taking place.

A considerable number of German divisions which are no longer needed are being transported home and demobilized. They can at any time be recalled within 48 hours and be ready to go. I have already told you that one part of the divisions employed in the west never came in contact with the enemy. I consider any man who is drafted into the Army without being utilized as an economic burden, but anyone

¹ The Italian text of this document is filmed on F10/044-48.

brought into the economy not merely as an economic, but also as a military gain. Parallel with these measures a careful overhaul of the entire equipment of the Army and Luftwaffe is taking place. The deliberations conducted by the High Command of the Wehrmacht have led so far to the following result:

A landing by German troops in England is an undertaking whose success appears certain only if all the preparations are made with the most painstaking care. Such thorough preparation is also in full accord with the character of my General Staff. It requires so precise a coordination among command, troops, matériel, transport facilities, supply services, etc., that the success of the first assault is assured only if it is possible to calculate exclusively with known factors. That applies not only to the troops and to matériel but also—as already stressed—to the command. The demands the first assault impose upon the various units are too great to be readily met by commanders who have not occupied themselves for months with these assignments.

Next there is the special fitness of the commanders to be selected for the tasks assigned to them. We have learned extraordinary lessons in Norway and have seen there, just as during the first strikes in the west, how much the success of such very bold undertakings depends on the fitness of individuals. Even within the ranks of our own Wehrmacht mistakes did occur and had unfortunate consequences. Thus, for example, the task force dispatched to take hold of the Maastricht bridges failed, or at any rate did not accomplish its mission, while on the other hand the task force to which had been assigned the more difficult objectives of taking Fort Eben-Emael and the canal bridges near Maastricht was able to carry out its assignments splendidly. Yet, Duce, these assignments had been previously practiced on models almost for months, and tested on objectives in similar locations again and again.

The attack on England has now also been discussed and studied in all its numerous details by the units in question or by the commanders. Contrary to the methods of the World War the principle of it is attaining a maximum of effect with a minimum of men.

This can be achieved only by the most intense study of the task and equipping the men, after thorough deliberation, with the only suitable weapons. My responsible advisers are convinced that it would no longer be possible today to replace any of the units intended for those first assaults even with another German unit, without giving the latter another 4 to 6 months of time for preparation. But there is also another factor, namely that at the landing operation, which is so extremely dangerous, a certain percentage of material losses must be expected. For replacement purposes it is therefore important to use uniform weapons and ammunition as far as possible. The same applies to the accompanying transport vehicles. It can not be expected that in the country itself any still serviceable automobiles will fall into our hands. Supply difficulties therefore dictate uniform types as far as possible, so that spare parts could be used interchangeably and stranded cars at the worst be promptly used for replacements. I hardly need mention tanks in this connection.

Beyond that there are numerous other reasons—especially those connected purely with the exercise of command—that make it seem impossible to operate with two different armies in a theater which is anyhow so limited. At least in the first stage that seems out of the question. Only after a firm foothold has been permanently established and the area of operations secured could this question be taken up again.

However much, Duce, I appreciated your offer—of making a substantial number of Italian divisions available for the attack on England²—as an act of comradeship and kindness, at the same time we must give consideration to everything that is likely to secure a successful outcome for this very bold decision. With my advisers I have also gone fully into your further offers, Duce, to provide ships or aircraft. Here it will probably be easier to find a possibility for cooperation between our units. However, Duce, the decisive point seems to be this: We are confronted with a foe who still represents an enormous World Power. I have made to Britain so many offers of agreement, even of cooperation, and have been treated so shabbily that I am even now convinced that any new appeal to reason would meet with a similar rejection. For in that country at present it is not reason that rules, but probably the smallest portion of wisdom in history. I believe, however, that for this reason we must all the more put our struggle on the broadest possible basis and neglect nothing in any way likely to hurt this powerful adversary and help in our cause. It therefore does not matter in the least, Duce, where these various blows will fall. They all will help to shake that State, remove that unscrupulous gang of warmongers and finally make the country ready for peace. Count Ciano has informed me that Italy is getting ready for an attack on Egypt and the Suez Canal. Any such strike, Duce, is an enormous gain.

I was therefore delighted to hear that your Navy has succeeded in holding firm with such distinction and was especially glad of the attacks of your Air Force on British convoys and warships.

Permit me to tell you therefore that I follow your own struggle with an ardent heart and ardent wishes. I shall do my best to assist, in order to share your burden as soon as this is in any way possible. In this I wage an eternal struggle against time, which is unfortunately needed to prepare the operations which one would prefer to launch this very moment.

With cordial and comradely greetings,

Yours,

ADOLF HITLER

² See document No. 28.

No. 167

1084/817053

*The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the
Commander in Chief of the Army*

CHEFSACHE

JULY 14, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

No. 1330/40 g. K. Chefsache

To be transmitted by officer only

The Führer has not yet come to any final decision regarding the future of the Belgian State. In the meantime he wishes every possible assistance to the Flemings, including the return of Flemish prisoners of war to their homeland. No special favors are to be granted to the Walloons.

Several attempts have been made by the King of Belgium to alleviate conditions for his country and his people; he repeatedly asked for an audience with the Führer; he finally sent Minister Kiewitz¹ to the Führer twice with various requests (for example, release of *all* prisoners of war, which would also include the Walloons, to go back to their homeland, the grant of a certain amount of influence in the administration of the country, contacts with Belgian officials, etc.).² The Führer has made no decisions and has given instructions *to treat all these questions in a dilatory fashion for the time being.*

After a place of residence in Belgium has been assigned to the King, and he has been granted permission to receive visitors, Minister Kiewitz is instructed to keep an eye on the situation. In the event that observations or evidence should appear of danger to the occupation authorities and to the course of political developments, the Führer would want to be informed by the military commander. Constant contact between the latter and Minister Kiewitz is taken for granted.

*The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht*
KEITEL

¹ The German Adjutant with King Leopold.

² No record of these requests has been found.

No. 168

865/206688-90

The Director of the Legal Department to the Director of the Economic Policy Department¹

Telegram en clair

No number

Received July 15, 1940—1:45 p. m.

Teletype message No. 16

Following is the text of the new letter, mentioned to you on the telephone,² for your personal and confidential information:

"Your telegram³ shows me that any further exchange of ideas on the subject would be pointless. In keeping with the principles of sincere and comradely cooperation, which are taken for granted between the heads of the highest authorities of the Reich, I have explained my position to you in every detail. I did this also because I was under the impression that your information was one sided and that only this clarification would be required in order to eliminate the disparity in our views. From the manner and form in which you have dealt with this matter, I perceive, however, that it is apparently your intention to challenge the foundations on which rests the work of my Ministry. It is not for you to take upon yourself the right to do so. The tone you strike is, moreover, out of place in respect to me. In closing the subject I therefore wish to make the following points:

"1. The case in hand does not in any way involve a question of competency. The situation as to this is crystal clear: Only the Foreign Minister, responsible to the Führer, has the authority to conduct official negotiations with foreign governments. Accordingly no one but he can give instructions to negotiators, etc., empowered for foreign negotiations, instructions which, in the economic sphere, would naturally require prior detailed agreement as to substance with the economic offices.

¹ This message, whose point of origin and time of dispatch are not indicated, bears the notation: "By direction of Under State Secretary Gaus."

² No record of this telephone conversation has been found. The letter is evidently one from Ribbentrop to Göring in continuance of the controversy over the competence of their respective Ministries on economic questions affecting foreign countries. See document No. 142.

³ Göring's telegram has not been found. In a memorandum for the Foreign Minister of July 11, however, Wiehl recorded that State Secretary Neumann of the Four Year Plan had called State Secretary Weizsäcker by telephone and told him that "Field Marshal Göring had sent the Foreign Minister a telegram approximately to the effect that he had agreed to the appointment of Minister Hemmen as chairman of the Armistice economic delegation only on condition that Herr Hemmen be subordinate to him in this capacity and would receive his instructions. The Führer had charged him with the general right to issue instructions in such economic matters. If this condition were not fulfilled he would recall Minister Hemmen.

"State Secretary Neumann remarked in conclusion that in the interest of seeing that the exchange of letters did not become increasingly sharp he wanted to point out that Field Marshal Göring's telegram had been sent to the Foreign Minister before the Field Marshal had known of the content of the above-mentioned letter [of July 9] of the Foreign Minister to him." (1004/307366)

I have laid down in my letter of July 9,⁴ my conception of the only possible manner in which these matters have to be handled, and I shall not deviate from it in any circumstances.

"2. The functions in the sphere of economic negotiations which in your opinion could be left to the Foreign Ministry are either purely matters of protocol or else inherently impossible. The latter applies to the responsibility for answering the preliminary question, which you would assign to the Foreign Minister, as to whether or not, from foreign policy considerations, economic negotiations should be begun. For it is altogether impossible to treat such a question abstractly and in isolation, because in practically every case it depends entirely on *how* the negotiations are to be conducted.

"3. The point of view which you adopt could be realized in practice only if the economic offices were to conduct a foreign policy of their own independent of the Foreign Ministry. It is quite obvious that economic negotiations with a foreign state can be conducted only within the framework of the general policy pursued with respect to that state, and that they are an important and integral element of such a foreign policy. If, on the other hand, the economic departments were in this manner to engage in foreign policy independently of the Foreign Ministry, this would inevitably lead to a situation where this foreign policy was determined by considerations relating to the world economy, and no longer by the power position of the Reich, as called for by the National-Socialist principles of government. This would parallel the ideas which Rathenau sought to realize in 1919 by the creation of a Ministry of World Economics in Berlin, to which the Foreign Ministry would be attached as a department.⁵ Besides, your proposal is an attempt to establish a dual command for all negotiations with foreign countries, as between Foreign Ministry and the economic departments. Such a dual command in dealing with foreign countries is absolutely out of the question and no Foreign Minister would be able under such conditions to take responsibility for carrying the Führer's foreign policy into effect.

"4. The armistice negotiations in Wiesbaden are negotiations of a purely military character. They are the direct outcome of the military operations and are concerned with the implementation of the terms on the basis of which hostilities were suspended. By contrast, the Economic Commission, which is not subject to the Armistice Commission, has in matters of substance nothing to do with the armistice negotiations proper, but has as its task the adjustment of purely economic questions by means of German-French negotiations. The question of the recall of its head by you therefore does not arise.

"According to your statement the Führer has told Colonel General Keitel that all economic questions relating to the war zone come under your purview. This coincides with my own view, as the implementation of economic measures in the occupied zone, which must be instituted solely by German Government agencies, is a matter of no concern to the Foreign Ministry which, since no negotiations with for-

⁴ Document No. 142.

⁵ In his book *An Deutschlands Jugend* (Berlin, 1918), Walther Rathenau, industrialist, publicist, and Foreign Minister (1922) had advocated the establishment of a world economic organization, a League of Industry.

sign governments are involved, is disinterested. If, for instance, there should be any intention of assigning to the Economic Commission, in addition to its own proper functions, also measures of a purely economic character in the occupied zone, which would be carried into effect on the German side without any negotiations with the French Government, I would agree to having these, too, taken over by Minister Hemmen. Herr Hemmen would in that case naturally receive his directives on this subject from you or the other internal German government offices."

End of Gaus message, July 15.

No. 169

365/206290

The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

No. 61 of July 15

WIESBADEN, July 15, 1940—11 p. m.

Received July 15—11:30 p. m.

The note of the German Armistice Commission demanding from the French Government the granting of eight airfields in the region of Casablanca, surrender of the African weather stations, the placing at our disposal of the railroad from Tunis to Rabat and of French merchant vessels for transport of supplies across the Mediterranean, was delivered to the French delegation this evening.

Text is following by courier.¹

WELCK

¹ The text has not been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. A French translation of a note of July 15 on this subject appears in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 463-464. Also there is the text of a reply from General Weygand, stating that the German requests were beyond the Armistice terms and that reply would be made by Marshal Pétain, as Head of the State, to Hitler. See document No. 208.

No. 170

3485/E019445-47

*The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in France to the Chief of the Military Administration in France*¹

PARIS, July 15, 1940.

Pursuant to the commission received from the Foreign Minister my staff has begun its work of compiling a list of the French politicians and political movements that are accessible to us.

¹ This document, which is unsigned, is on a letterhead reading "Minister Abetz," and is addressed to "the Chief of the Military Administration General of Infantry Streccius".

In the camp of the rightists we have got in touch with Senator Henry-Haye, Deputy Pierre Taittinger, Deputy Jean Chiappe, Deputy Pierre Béranger, former Premier Pierre-Étienne Flandin, and Deputy Jean Goy, the president of the national veterans' organization (U. N. C.), numbering one million members.

Of the moderate and socialist leftists the deputies with whom we have been in touch are: former Minister of the Interior Eugène Frot, the Deputy of Indochina, Comte de Beaumont, and the Socialist Deputies Barthélemy, Sellier, and Morizet.

The extreme left includes from the ranks of the Communists Deputies Jean Catelas, Maurice Tréant, and Robert Foissin, while the most important representatives of the anti-Marxist labor movement who have got in touch with us are Jacques Doriot and Mayor Marschall of St. Denis.

Contact with the clergy, especially with Archbishop Suhard, is assured through the pro-German parish priest of Île St. Louis.

Regular contacts have been established with Marshal Pétain, Minister Laval, Marquet, Piétri, and General Weygand, by means of which, upon request, reports may be received or suggestions may be transmitted daily.

In view of Laval's efforts, supported by Pétain, to form a French unity party, in which Laval is to be the leader, Marcel Déat the secretary-general, and Weygand and Marquet are to have key posts, it is necessary to maintain contact with all sorts of movements so as to be able to promote or impede such a development, in accordance with the instructions issued by the Führer's headquarters. In this connection the greatest attention should be given to the socialist politicians of the trade unions and to the Communist party, because Laval intends to include the socialists of the Second International in this unity party and the basis for the formation of an opposition will vary greatly with the success of this effort.

In order to be able, if necessary, to influence directly the further development of domestic politics in France, my staff has founded, in addition to the news periodicals already established by the propaganda staff, press organs expressing political opinion, whose editorial staffs are composed of Frenchmen who are loyal to us and can be directed by us not only through censorship following publication, but even in the planning of the contributions.

In this connection mention should be made first of all of the leftist revolutionary daily, *La France au Travail*, the conservative weekly, *La Gerbe*, and the pro-Doriot *La Vie Nationale*.

A new edition of the leading French weekly, *L'Illustration*, under our direct management, as well as of a series of trade journals, is in preparation.

In keeping with the French tendency to group intellectual and political movements around newspapers and periodicals, the aforementioned publications have already rallied a collection of the most varied forces.

The following have grouped themselves around *La France au Travail*: the Association of Law Students and the Association of Medical Students, which at present have a membership of 3,000 students in Paris; the Association of Anti-Semitic Workers, with 500 members; the Intellectual Workers, with 1,000; the Metallurgical Workers of the Seine, with 300,000 followers; the Union of Entertainers, with 250 members; and the Independent Journalists, with 300 representatives.

La Gerbe has won the support of the large French youth organization of Marc Augier, with a membership of 35,000, and the peasant movement led by Leroy-Ladurie, the Union of Agricultural Syndicates, with an active membership of hundreds of thousands.

Vie Nationale is supported in St. Denis by 10,000 and in the other workers' suburbs of Paris by a total of 100,000 anti-Marxist workers.

In view of the general perplexity prevalent in all strata of the population since the collapse of France and the existing opposition to any attempt at the formation of a political front by persons who previously rose to prominence in Parliament, it will be possible, in accordance with the instructions received from the Führer's headquarters, to influence the political development not only of occupied but also of unoccupied France.

No. 171

2281/481406-11

Adolf Hitler to King Carol II of Rumania

FÜHRER HEADQUARTERS, July 15, 1940.

YOUR MAJESTY: Events, together with several consultations arising from them, have prevented me until today from giving you my views on the suggestions which Your Majesty has communicated to me.¹ I must ask you to accept the extraordinary situation and the perils inherent in it as the explanation for the unqualified candor of the thoughts I shall express. I have informed the Duce of this letter.² There are two possibilities of meeting the issues which are causing anxiety to Your Majesty and all of Rumania:

¹ See document No. 80.

² See document No. 185. Hitler's communication to Mussolini about the letter has not been found.

1. The tactical approach, that is, to try to salvage what can be salvaged by skillful adjusting to situations as they arise.
2. The method of a basic decision to seek a final solution and carry it into effect, even at the risk of sacrifices.

Concerning the first method, Your Majesty, I am unable to say anything at all. Throughout my life I have been a man of basic decisions and it is only from them that I expect any decisive success. Every attempt to overcome the dangers menacing your country by tactical maneuvers of any sort whatsoever must and will fail. The outcome sooner or later—and perhaps in a very short time—may even be the destruction of Rumania.

Only the second method is practicable in my view. I do not delude myself about the difficulties, domestic as well as in foreign relations, which have to be overcome in the process. Still, I can conceive of it as achieving, at least for the future, first a durable peace and second the progressive prosperity of all concerned.

The second method, and the only one I can recommend to Your Majesty, is a reconciliation in good faith with Hungary and Bulgaria. I am referring to both of these countries because I think it would be a disastrous fallacy to believe that granting concessions to one of them would drive a wedge between the two, and that this might make it easier to stand up to the second one. At most only a temporary gain of time could be accomplished by that, Your Majesty. New tensions would obviously arise and a new crisis would be bound to break out at once at the first opportunity. That opportunity would not fail to materialize; in fact, such deferring of a decision would itself bring it about, inevitably and within a very short time.

As regards the purely legal aspect, there is nothing I wish to say. A decisive factor, it would seem to me, is the political power aspect of this problem. After the World War Rumania, favored by exceptional luck, acquired territories from three states, which I believe she cannot retain in the long run from the standpoint of political power. It would be different if Rumania had succeeded in achieving the internal assimilation of these territories in ethnic and political respects, or if the military impotence of the neighboring countries were to remain permanent. The first alternative failed to materialize, and the second should not be expected by anyone who has any knowledge of the laws governing the evolution of nations. If Rumania is compelled today to return again, by way of concession, the territories that fell to her share, this is no more than human foresight had to expect to happen some day. It seems to me to be a great gain already that Hungary—as I think I have reason to believe—is not pressing for a purely legalistic definition of her claims, but is willing to negotiate them on the basis of an equitable compromise.

I may now very briefly outline to Your Majesty the attitude held by Germany:

The German Reich has no territorial interests east of the line separating the German and Russian spheres of interest, or east of Slovakia and the German-Hungarian and German-Yugoslav boundaries, or south of the German-Yugoslav and the German-Italian boundaries. Its political interests beyond these boundaries find fulfilment largely in the establishment of friendly collaboration in all fields with the nations inhabiting these areas. The same is true of Germany's economic interests. Germany consequently has no territorial interests either in Hungary, Rumania, or Bulgaria. It has ties of friendship, among which those with Hungary and Bulgaria have existed and been cultivated for a long time.

Rumania's offer to observe a friendly attitude toward Germany in the future will certainly only be welcomed by Germany, the more so because in the past and until very recently, as has been positively established from the documents discovered, the attitude toward Germany of the official Rumanian policy, at any rate, was unfortunately hardly friendly, but rather quite hostile. The reasons for this, I must say, are incomprehensible to me in so far as ascertainable political factors are concerned. The ultimate consequences of that attitude were more detrimental to Rumania herself than they were to Germany. If Germany, in spite of this, entertains the sincere desire to make a contribution to the preservation of peace in all these countries, she is first of all prompted also by an understandable economic interest. I have now, however, made the following unequivocal declaration to the Hungarian Government, too:^a

In the event that there should be no possibility of a peaceful understanding between Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, Germany for her part might conceivably announce that she would henceforth disinterest herself entirely from any further developments in southeastern Europe. The German Reich is powerful enough to protect itself promptly and by its own strength against the threat of any aggression. However, I shall never permit Germany's Wehrmacht to be sent into battle for issues which are all out of proportion to the sacrifices entailed by a war. If Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria believe they cannot reach an agreement, it is my conviction that this attitude will benefit none of these countries but on the contrary will punish them all. In this case I would not feel called upon to do anything to check the ensuing development. The military situation of the Reich has developed so favorably as to enable us, if need be, even to do without the oil deliveries although this would surely mean cer-

^a See document No. 146.

tain privations. But I have already said, we would be able to accept this as a sacrifice; yet it would surely be less costly than to involve the Reich in conflicts which exist only because the other participants could not find it in themselves to permit just reason to prevail over passions and emotions. Any just reasoning, however, must lead to recognition of the fact that a revision has become unavoidable in the long run and that the quicker it is made, the greater its benefits will be. Not until a reasonable settlement of all questions pending between Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria has been reached would there be any sense in Germany's exploring the possibilities of closer collaboration and possibly assuming commitments of considerable proportions.

If Your Majesty should now be able to review the Rumanian point of view in this sense and should be inclined to inform me of this, I would immediately make this known to Mussolini as well as the Hungarian and Bulgarian Governments.

If, on the other hand, Your Majesty should find yourself unable to agree with my line of reasoning, I shall not pursue it further but shall merely inform the Hungarian and Bulgarian Governments that the German Government on its part does not see its way to addressing itself to the solution of those problems.

Should it be possible, however, to achieve a satisfactory settlement between the three countries through such an attitude, it would mean more for the happiness and the future of all three concerned than any supposed tactical success of the moment, which sooner or later would inevitably only lead to new crises.⁴

Your Majesty's, etc.

ADOLF HITLER

⁴On July 16 Weizsäcker telegraphed Fabricius to the effect that this letter represented Hitler's definitive reply to all the King's suggestions and that the latter should be informed accordingly (175/137109).

No. 172

821/193833

The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

KAUNAS, July 15, 1940—10:14 p. m.

No. 151 of July 15

Received July 16—2:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 187 of July 11¹ and 193 of July 13 (W3428 g.).²

¹ See document No. 153, footnote 1.

² See document No. 153, footnote 3.

In accordance with instructions I carried out the démarche today with Foreign Minister Krėvė-Mickevičius. Krėvė-Mickevičius, to whom the démarche was obviously very welcome, emphasized that Lithuania would meet all the German wishes in full in so far as she possibly could. He would be very pleased if it were possible not only to maintain trade with Germany on the scale hitherto existing but also to establish still closer economic relations. He expressed himself similarly on the other points, but repeatedly made the reservation: in so far as it lay in Lithuania's power. He thereby indicated that maintenance of Lithuania's independence, which the present Government too was concerned about, would have a most favorable effect also on German-Lithuanian economic relations. Since he asked for a written statement of our wishes, I conveyed them to him in the form of a short aide-mémoire.³ He for his part will also reply in writing.³

ZECHLIN

³ Not found.

No. 173

585/242626-27

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

No. 17 of July 15 from Fuschl FUSCHL, July 16, 1940—12:45 a. m.
Received Berlin, July 16—1:15 a. m.

[No. 419 of July 16

from the Foreign Ministry] ¹

Sent July 16—1:20 a. m.

Please call on the Bulgarian Foreign Minister and inform him of the Munich conversations with the Hungarian Minister President and Foreign Minister ² as follows:

Count Teleki and Count Csáky had already announced some months ago that they would come to Berlin for a visit. Since at the beginning of last week the Führer had temporarily gone to Munich from the front, an opportunity had presented itself for having the Hungarian visit take place now. Moreover, Count Ciano happened to be in Germany for a visit, so that it was possible to conduct the conversations with the Hungarian statesmen in his presence.

During the conversations the Hungarians were told by Germany as well as Italy that the Axis Powers now as ever desired a peaceful evolution in the Balkans and that if Hungary should decide to use force against Rumania they would take an attitude of *désintéressement*

¹ This number is cited in Richthofen's reply to this instruction, telegram No. 274 of July 16 (585/242630).

² See document No. 146.

in the ensuing course of events. The Hungarians were advised to settle their revisionist demands in direct negotiations with Rumania and to keep these demands within reasonable bounds. The Governments of the Axis Powers, for their part, would endeavor to ascertain whether the Rumanian Government was willing to settle the Hungarian as well as the Bulgarian claims for revision through peaceful negotiations. From this the Bulgarian Foreign Minister should gather that Germany and Italy had no intention of somehow placing the Bulgarian demand for revision after that of the Hungarians.³

RIBBENTROP

³ In telegram No. 274 sent at 11:30 p. m. on July 16 (see footnote 1) Richthofen reported that the Bulgarian Foreign Minister had received this information with great satisfaction but expressed the belief that Rumania would agree to negotiations only under strong pressure.

No. 174

585/242628

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

No. 4 of July 16	Special Train, FUSCHL, July 16, 1940.
from Fuschl	Received Berlin, July 16—2:05 p. m.
No. 420 of July 16	
from the Foreign Ministry	Sent July 16—2:20 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2 of July 15.¹

Please inform the Foreign Minister there in strict confidence also of the following:

The King of Rumania has recently approached the Führer in a number of instances, both by letter and through diplomatic channels, requesting that the latter inform him of his views on pending Rumanian problems. The Führer has now replied to the King by letter² to the effect that he could merely advise him to come to terms simultaneously with both Bulgaria and Hungary in an amicable way and on a reasonable basis. We shall keep the Bulgarian Government informed of the results of this step taken by the Führer if the occasion arises.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Not found.

² Document No. 171.

No. 175

B15/B002562

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MADRID, July 16, 1940.

No. 2384 of July 16

Received July 16—11:05 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 2358 of July 13.¹

The Foreign Minister's confidential emissary has returned from Lisbon.² Through him the Duke of Windsor has communicated to the Foreign Minister the following:

His designation as Governor of the Bahamas was made known in a very cool and categorical letter from Churchill with the instruction that he should leave for his post immediately without fail. Churchill has threatened W. with arraignment before a court martial in case he did not accept the post (this appears to have been communicated orally only to the Duke). Through the Colonial Minister the Duke then received a postponement for a month and a half (apparently because the Duke declared he must receive from his house in Paris certain effects and objects for the move).

The confidential emissary further reports that the Duke has declared that he has given up all his military offices and is now only a Governor. The Duke sees in the appointment recognition of the equal status of his wife. The attitude of the English Embassy in Lisbon, on instructions from London, is very reserved toward the Duke.

The Foreign Minister has just asked the Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon, Nicolas Franco, who was here briefly, to warn the Duke most urgently once more against taking up the post.³

STOHRER

¹ See document No. 159, footnote 4.

² See document No. 152, footnote 1.

³ See document No. 224, footnote 1.

No. 176

136/74229-31

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal

Telegram

No. 25 of July 16 from Fuschl

FUSCHL, July 16, 1940.

Received Berlin, July 16—11:35 p. m.

No. 391 of July 17

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent July 17—4:00 p. m.

The Ambassador in Madrid wired on July 12¹ and 13² as follows:

(1) "The Spanish Minister of the Interior³ informed me further about his exchange of views with the Portuguese Ambassador here.⁴ Referring to the alleged rather acute apprehension in Portugal that Germany might launch an attack upon Portugal across Spain, the Minister explained to the Portuguese Ambassador that any action against Portugal on Germany's part was conceivable only because of the Portuguese tie with England. It was therefore in Portugal's interest to detach herself from England. The first step in that direction would be the conclusion of a military alliance with Spain. This would have to be done at once, for acts of violence by England against Portugal were possible and in that case Spain was bound to intervene with or without German aid, with or without Portuguese consent. After sounding out Salazar, the Portuguese Ambassador replied to the Minister of the Interior that the Portuguese Government recognized the truth of these arguments and was willing to consider the matter. To my explicit counterquestion whether Salazar was agreed to denounce the English-Portuguese alliance, the Minister of the Interior gave an affirmative answer and added that naturally the Spanish-Portuguese military alliance would have to be concluded first.

"The Minister of the Interior emphasized that the Generalissimo shared his view.

"The Minister further informed me in strict confidence that the matter had been discussed here a few days ago by the Spanish Foreign Minister,⁵ the Portuguese Ambassador and the Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon,⁶ but nothing came of it. The Foreign Minister had not pursued the matter vigorously; he seemed to be of the opinion that Spain should act from time to time according to circumstances (it should be noted that there is great tension between the Spanish Minister of the Interior and the Foreign Minister).

"The Spanish Minister of the Interior asked me, while keeping his sources of information secret, to take up of my own accord with the Spanish Foreign Minister the question of a military alliance between Spain and Portugal and to request the German Government to sup-

¹ Telegram No. 2340, not printed (136/74217-18).

² Telegram No. 2353, not printed (136/74219).

³ Ramón Serrano Suñer.

⁴ Pedro Theotónio Pereira.

⁵ Col. Juan Beigbeder y Atienza.

⁶ Nicolas Franco.

port this idea by influencing Salazar through the Legation in Lisbon, naturally both only on condition that the German Government should welcome this development and find it useful from its point of view. Please telegraph instructions as soon as possible."

(2) "During my conversation with the Spanish Foreign Minister today, he too mentioned Spanish-Portuguese relations; the Minister told me in strict confidence that negotiations with the Portuguese Government about a closer cooperation of the two Governments were under way and showed me in passing a portion of a Spanish counterproposal which adds to the apparently highly generalized version of the Portuguese draft the clause that 'in pursuing this aim the Portuguese and Spanish armed forces shall establish contact with each other.'

"The exchange of views between the Spanish Foreign Minister and the Portuguese Government does seem therefore to have made greater progress than the Spanish Minister of the Interior assumed. Nevertheless, the Spanish counterproposal mentioned above seems to me still far short of the military alliance desired by the Minister of the Interior."

End of telegrams from Madrid.

The Ambassador in Madrid was thereupon instructed as follows: '

"If a military alliance between Portugal and Spain were concluded, which would entail the detachment of Portugal from England and possibly the formal denunciation of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, this would definitely be in the German interest. I request you therefore to promote this plan in a manner that seems suitable to you and that, in accordance with the suggestion of the Minister of the Interior there, you resume discussing the matter with the Foreign Minister there, too. I ask you not to take any step in this matter involving the Portuguese Ambassador there. The Legation in Lisbon is being instructed to maintain an appropriate attitude in its statements."

End of telegram to Madrid.

I am communicating to you the above telegrams for your personal and strictly confidential information.

I request that you refrain from a special démarche with Salazar. On the other hand I request you, if opportunity offers in conversations with Salazar, also to express the view on your part that one must take into account the possibility that England, in her desperate situation, might decide to take forcible measures against Portugal. Spain would not be able to watch such English action against her interests across Portuguese territory without taking action herself, and Germany was backing Spain. If Portugal would quickly decide for an alliance with Spain and to detach herself from England, such a development that would draw Portugal into the war would in all probability be avoided. England would in that case not dare to take forcible action against Portugal.

RIBBENTROP

' Telegram No. 1058 of July 16, not printed (136/74228).

No. 177

8589/E602751-55

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, July 16, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

OKW/WFA/L No. 33 160/40 g. Kdos.

By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 16

ON THE PREPARATION OF A LANDING OPERATION AGAINST ENGLAND ¹

Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation still shows no sign of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare a landing operation against England, and if necessary to carry it out.

The aim of this operation is to eliminate the English homeland as a base for the carrying on of the war against Germany, and if it should become necessary to occupy it completely.

To this end I order the following:

1. The *Landing* must be carried out in the form of a surprise crossing on a broad front approximately from Ramsgate to the area west of the Isle of Wight, in which Luftwaffe units will take the role of artillery, and units of the Navy the role of the engineers. Whether it is practical before the general landing to undertake *subordinate actions*, such as the occupation of the Isle of Wight or of County Cornwall, is to be determined from the standpoint of each branch of the Wehrmacht and the result is to be reported to me. I reserve the decision for myself. The preparations for the entire operation must be completed by *mid-August*.

2. To these preparations also belong the creation of those conditions which make a landing in England possible:

a. The English Air Force must be so beaten down in its morale and in fact, that it can no longer display any appreciable aggressive force in opposition to the German crossing.

b. Mine-free channels must be created.

c. By means of a closely concentrated mine-barrier the Straits of Dover must be sealed off on both *flanks* as well as the western entrance to the Channel at the approximate line Alderney-Portland.

¹ In connection with a conference held by Hitler at the Berghof on July 13 the Halder Diary records the following: "The Führer is most strongly occupied by the question why England does not yet want to take the road to peace. Just as we do, he sees the solution of this question in the fact that England is still setting her hope on Russia. Thus he too expects that England will have to be compelled by force to make peace. He does not like to do such a thing, however. Reason: If we smash England militarily, the British Empire will disintegrate. Germany, however, would not profit from this. With German blood we would achieve something from which only Japan, America and others will derive profit."

d. The area off the coast must be dominated and given artillery protection by strong coastal artillery.

e. It would be desirable shortly before the crossing to tie down the English naval forces in the North Sea as well as in the Mediterranean (by the Italians), in which connection the attempt should now be made to damage the English naval forces which are in the homeland by air and torpedo attacks in strength.

3. *Organisation of the command and of the preparations.*

Under my command and in accordance with my general directives the Commanders in Chief will command the forces to be used from their branches of the Wehrmacht. The operations staffs of the Commander in Chief of the Army, the Commander in Chief of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe must from August 1 on be located within a radius of at most 50 km. from my headquarters (Ziegenberg). Quartering of the restricted operations staffs of the Commanders in Chief of the Army and Navy together at Giessen appears advisable to me.

Hence for the command of the landing armies the Commander in Chief of the Army will have to employ an Army Group headquarters.

The project will bear the code name *Seelöwe*.³

In the preparation and carrying out of the undertaking the following duties will fall to the various branches of the Wehrmacht:

a. *Army*: Will draw up first of all the operational plan and the transport plan for all formations to be shipped as the first wave. The antiaircraft artillery to be transported with the first wave will at the same time be attached to the Army (to the individual crossing groups) until such a time as a division of tasks in support and protection of ground troops, protection of the ports of debarkation and protection of the air bases to be occupied can be carried out. The Army furthermore will distribute the means of transport to the individual crossing groups and establish the embarkation and landing points in agreement with the Navy.

b. *Navy*: Will secure the means of transport and will bring them, corresponding to the desires of the Army and according to the requirements of seamanship, into the individual embarkation areas. In so far as possible ships of the defeated enemy states are to be procured. For every ferrying point it will provide the necessary naval staff for advice on matters of seamanship, with escort vessels and security forces. It will protect, along with the air forces employed to guard the movement, the entire crossing of the channel on both flanks. An order will follow on the regulation of the command relationship during the crossing. It is further the task of the Navy to regulate, in a uniform manner, the building up of the coastal artillery, that is, all batteries of the Army as well as of the Navy, which can be used for

³ On the conference of July 31 dealing with invasion plans, see Editors' Note, p. 370.

Further directives and other documents concerning preparations for Operation *Seelöwe* and its eventual postponement are printed in "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual*, 1948, pp. 117-140.

firing against sea targets, and to organize the fire control of the whole. As great an amount of *very heavy artillery* as possible is to be employed as quickly as possible to secure the crossing and to protect the flanks from enemy operations from the sea. For this purpose, railway artillery (supplemented by all available captured pieces) less the batteries (K5 and K12) provided for firing on targets on the English mainland, is to be brought up and emplaced by using railway turntables.

Independent of this, the heaviest available platform batteries are to be opposite the Straits of Dover, so emplaced under concrete that they can withstand even the heaviest aerial attacks and thereby dominate permanently within their effective range the Straits of Dover in any circumstances.

The technical work is the responsibility of the Todt Organization.

c. *The mission of the Luftwaffe is:* To hinder interference from the enemy air force. To overcome coastal defenses which could do damage to the landing places, to break the first resistance of enemy ground troops and to smash reserves which may be coming up. For this mission closest cooperation of individual units of the Luftwaffe with the crossing units of the Army is necessary. Furthermore, to destroy important transportation routes for the bringing up of enemy reserves, and to attack enemy naval forces, which are coming up, while they are still far away from the crossing points. I request proposals on the use of parachute and glider troops. In this regard it is to be determined in conjunction with the Army if it is worth while here to hold parachute and glider troops in readiness as a *reserve* to be quickly committed in case of emergency.

4. The Wehrmacht Chief of Communications will carry out the necessary preparations for communications connections from France to the English mainland. The installation of the remaining 80 km. East Prussian cable is to be provided for in conjunction with the Navy.

5. I request the commanders in chief to submit to me as soon as possible:

a. The intentions of the Navy and Luftwaffe for achieving the necessary conditions for the crossing of the Channel (see figure 2).

b. The construction of the coastal batteries in detail (Navy).

c. A survey of the tonnage to be employed and the methods of getting it ready and fitting it out. Participation of civilian agencies? (Navy).

d. The organization of aerial protection in the assembly areas for troops about to cross and the means of crossing (Luftwaffe).

e. The crossing and operations plan of the Army, composition and equipment of the first crossing wave.

f. Organization and measures of the Navy and the Luftwaffe for carrying out of the crossing itself, security of the crossing, and support of the landing.

g. Proposals for the commitment of parachute and glider troops, as well as for the detailing and command of antiaircraft artillery, after an extensive occupation of territory on English soil has been made (Luftwaffe).

h. Proposal for the location of the operations staffs of the Commanders in Chief of the Army and of the Navy.

i. The position of Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe on the question whether and what subsidiary actions *before* the general landing are considered practical.

k. Proposal of Army and Navy on the over-all command *during* the crossing.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 178

8614/E604175-77

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, July 16, 1940.

a. o. W VIII b 2535.

HAVANA CONFERENCE: ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

Our main economic policy task in exerting influence at the Havana Conference is to avert Roosevelt's plan to unite all of America in an economic cartel for the alleged purpose of assuring the Ibero-American countries a market for their products,¹ but in reality in order to destroy the economic connections between Ibero-America and Germany.

Our counterpropaganda takes a double course. On the one hand our Missions were and are regularly provided with arguments opposing this plan from the Ibero-American standpoint, for suitable utilization in conversations and in the press. For this purpose use is made in particular, among other things, of press comments in the individual Ibero-American countries. The most important of these arguments is that through the cartel Ibero-America would lose its economic independence and fall into complete dependence on the United States. (We shall dispense with a list of these telegraphic instructions in detail.)

On the other hand we are emphatically demonstrating to the Ibero-American countries our importance as supplier and purchaser. Our Missions have been instructed by circular telegram Multex 142 of July 2, 1940,² signed by the Reich Foreign Minister himself, to point out in every way that after the war Greater Germany will be able because of her large population and ability to purchase to offer the Ibero-American countries a larger market than any other country, and to satisfy all their desires for products with her increased production facilities. Subsequent to this the Missions were instructed by circular telegram Multex 147 of July 5, 1940,³ to focus the counterpropa-

¹ See document No. 127.

² Document No. 92.

³ Not printed (8614/E604164-65).

ganda which had been ordered upon the most important export needs of each country, and to point to the probably greatly increased demand in post-war Germany not only for raw materials but also for consumption goods. Among other things there would be adequate opportunities for German deliveries in exchange, as a result of the armament program of many Latin American countries, and of their desire to utilize still unexploited mineral resources by way of national companies. In Brazil, which is particularly important for supplying us even after the war, and where the Federal President is now visibly trying to free himself from North American influence, our Ambassador has been authorized, in addition, to inform the Federal President, confidentially for the time being, that Germany is willing even now under certain conditions to conclude an agreement on mutual deliveries in the first postwar year to a value of 300 million reichsmarks (compared with about 170 million reichsmarks of mutual annual purchases before the war) (telegram No. 545 [sic] of July 10, 1940 *).

Submitted herewith to Senior Counselor Kordt, Office of the Reich Foreign Minister.

PAMPERRIEN

* See document No. 145.

No. 179

2361/488078-88

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

No. A 3640

ANKARA, July 16, 1940.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: The "Delcassé" case.

Following the history-making victories of the German armies in France, the eyes of the world have turned in breathless anticipation to the closing act: the struggle against the hegemony of the British Empire.

Among the figures which the British Empire has moved on the chessboard of decisions, to maintain its position, Turkey has received a particularly significant role. To be sure, she has not in the past by any means fulfilled all the expectations which her bosses would have been justified in expecting on the basis of the treaties; however, she retains her decisive importance for saving the Empire even in this last phase of the struggle. As long as the mother country has not been conquered, "nonbelligerent Turkey" assures the status quo in the Near East. For instance, an Italian attack on Syria from the Dodecanese thrusting toward Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq is not

feasible as long as the Turkish threat to the flank exists. It would be different if, for example, Soviet Russia wanted to exploit the situation to push forward to the sea in the direction of the Persian Gulf. This strategical importance of Turkey is invaluable to England. For this reason, too, they have closed their eyes in London to the past lack of activity on the part of this ally, and recently they again praised the Turkish alliance in enthusiastic terms.

Sir Hughe Knatchbull was doubtless also guided by this thought when as the sole diplomat he adorned the box at the great Turkish National Assembly to hear the statement of the Turkish Minister President. This act of courtesy was certainly highly appreciated by M. Saracoglu—with whose policy and existence the government statement by Refik Saydam was concerned—when he hurried to the box, which was otherwise empty, and drew the Ambassador of His British Majesty into a long and intimate conversation.

The Turkish Minister President's statement was unequivocal. One might have expected the Turkish Government to state publicly that M. Massigli, Ambassador of the present friend and ally, France, had informed the Allied Governments entirely incorrectly about Turkey's true intentions.¹ Nothing like that happened. The Minister President restricted himself to saying that Turkish policy had been directed exclusively toward protecting Turkey's own interests; that Turkey had never agreed to a hostile act against Turkey's friend, Russia; but that she was ready and resolved to resort to force against any attack on her independence and her borders.

In the days preceding this statement a bitter struggle had taken place between the different groups in the Government camp and the Great National Assembly. A not inconsiderable number of influential politicians who had always sharply criticized Turkey's alliance policy were of the opinion that the two-faced policy revealed by the documents² had brought Turkey to the verge of a war with Russia. The Russian press statements³ had not left the slightest doubt as to this fact. The important thing was therefore to regain the confidence of the Moscow Government, which had vanished entirely since the

¹ See document No. 96.

² See Editors' Note, p. 124.

³ On July 5, the Soviet press and radio published a number of documents from German White Book No. 6 referring to Allied designs against the Soviet Union which allegedly had been discussed by Massigli and Saracoglu. An example of Soviet editorial comment are these statements by *Izvestia*: "In the course of the conversations the Turkish Foreign Minister voluntarily expressed his willingness to support, as much as he could, the execution of this monstrous plan. But this is not all. In these friendly conversations, Iran's role in the impending marauding expedition was also discussed. Yet how can these astonishing facts be reconciled with the commonly known fact that Turkey and Iran have treaties of nonaggression with the Soviet Union which have not yet been denounced even today?"

days when the pact was concluded; ⁴ to replace the Foreign Minister, who was the leader responsible for this policy; and to hand the French Ambassador his passports.

From my reports of late it is evident that this group of clear-sighted politicians, concerned about the well-being of their country, gained influence at an increasing rate. They considered the conclusion of a trade agreement with the Reich ⁵ as a bridge over which Turkish policy would move into the camp of the Axis Powers.

In the many conversations which I have had with important persons during the last few days the question was put to me time and again for what purpose Germany had published the documents. Without instructions from Berlin I naturally backed the demands which the German press and radio derived from the publication of the documents. I stressed that in the first place the eyes of the world were to be opened to the criminal attempt on the part of the Western Powers to make war on Germany by involving entirely disinterested third nations. I said the Turkish public was to be made aware how close to the verge of war their country had been brought under the irresponsible political leadership of the Saracoglu clique. If they thought the German Reich had undertaken the publication in order to incite Russia to war against Turkey, it was entirely up to them to convince the Russians of the sincerity of "official" Turkish policy by removing M. Saracoglu and M. Massigli. These statements of mine were immediately made known to the Turkish President by a Cabinet Minister—*à titre privé*—and were received with thanks by him. There are two reasons why the decision of the Chief of State nevertheless did not go in this direction:

The President as well as the entire Cabinet accepts responsibility for the alliance policy with the Western Powers. During the last 9 months M. Saracoglu has consolidated his position so well that the State President doubtless had to be afraid of being made responsible himself if he now dismissed his Foreign Minister.

The second and more important reason is the fact known to everyone familiar with the Turkish psyche that the liberation of Turkey from the capitulations only 20 years ago left behind a particularly sensitive feeling against ever doing anything anywhere which might appear to be the result of pressure exerted by a European Great Power. The Turkish press accordingly pointed out that the public German demands for M. Saracoglu's dismissal had obviously mistaken Ataturk's Turkey for the Ottoman Empire. One of the highest officials in the Foreign Ministry asked me in a horrified manner: "Why are you creating a second Delcassé case?" I tried to explain to him that this historic parallel was somewhat faulty, and that at the present moment it was entirely unimportant to the German

⁴ This refers to the Anglo-French-Turkish pact of Oct. 19, 1939.

⁵ See document No. 213.

Reich what personage carried on the business of the Turkish foreign policy. But he explained that he had drawn this parallel only in order to tell me that just as in France they had never forgotten the forced dismissal of Delcassé,⁶ so also in Turkey they would not forget in the development of our future relations that at a critical moment we had forcibly removed the spokesman for Turkish policy. "Why," he continued, "didn't you content yourself in Berlin with publishing those documents directed against Finland and France? Then we could certainly have taken the action which logically followed. Unfortunately, this is now psychologically impossible for us."

After they had refused to remove M. Saracoglu there was nothing left but to rely once more on the policy of alliance with England. In case of Russian demands, they are prepared. Mobilization is completed, and they are ready to fight if territorial demands are made.⁷ Perhaps they hope in this case for a certain amount of support from the British fleet.

Now that Turkish policy has been settled anew by the declaration by the Minister President, the outward impression is given that everything is in the best order. The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow supposedly wired that no serious threat need be expected from the Russians. Thereupon the President went to his summer quarters in Yalova.

So as to round off the picture of the present political situation I will mention a lengthy conversation with the Iranian and Afghan Ambassadors. The former was horrified that Russia had taken the publication of the documents as an occasion for writing threatening articles against Iran. The Afghan Ambassador disclosed to me that his Government had sent him an urgent telegram instructing him to find out in a conversation with me what are really the aims of the Axis Powers with regard to the small countries in the world. "Churchill," he says, "continues to assure the world that he is fighting only for the rights and the independence of the small countries. But so far we have heard nothing from Germany, which is today the undisputed master of the European Continent, as to what attitude she will take on the new order of the world in this regard." He asked whether I could not induce my Government to give the small countries clear and distinct assurance as to their future, if only in order to check British propaganda, which was still extremely strong in the Near and Middle East. Germany, he said, had a great many friends in the world, many more than she knew of, but she had to show them the direction which the new order of the world would take.

I told the Ambassador that he should only study the principles of National Socialism and he could be sure that after achieving victory

⁶ T. Delcassé had resigned as French Foreign Minister on June 6, 1905.

⁷ See document No. 156 and footnote 2.

we would proceed accordingly. Now, however, the issue was whether to decide for or against England.

PAPEN

No. 180

183/86201

The Foreign Minister to the Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry

Teletype via the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

No. 26 of July 16

FUSCHL, July 16, 1940.

Received July 17—12:05 p. m.

With reference to the attached report of July 10.¹

For the time being, the demand must not be made that the Swiss Government permit the reestablishment in Switzerland of a *Landesgruppenleitung* and of *Kreisleitungen*. I do not consider it opportune in the present situation for us to put forward measures for the organization of German nationals abroad. Every such measure would give new impetus, which we wish to avoid at present, to the "fifth column" hate propaganda such as is used against us especially in South America. It is therefore fitting to wait until the end of the war.

As for unjustified deportation of German nationals from Switzerland, it is quite proper to react in every such case with sharp reprisals. I am told that, in accordance with this policy, the recent deportation of an *Ortsgruppenleiter* from Switzerland was immediately answered with the deportation from Germany of a well-known Swiss personage.²

I should like to desist, for the present, from any general warning to Switzerland that the same procedure would be followed in any similar future cases.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Not found.

² Dr. Schulz, president of the Swiss Club in Berlin, had been deported (Weizsäcker memorandum No. 508 of July 2: 183/86182-83).

No. 181

2768/586318-17

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*¹

St.S. No. 569

BERLIN, July 17, 1940.

Pol. VI 2010.

The Danish Minister came to see me this afternoon, as announced, accompanied by Minister Mohr, who holds the position of General

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

Secretary in the Danish Foreign Ministry. M. Zahle gave to me the enclosed note for the Reich Foreign Minister. Some oral remarks by M. Zahle consisted merely in a paraphrase of the introductory and closing words of this note. They were intended to demonstrate the value which the new Foreign Minister, M. Scavenius, places on a close and friendly cooperation with Germany. The sending of M. Mohr and his participation in the visit was intended to give the delivery of the note a ceremonial air.

Since the statement by M. Scavenius which the note contained was already known to me, we did not discuss its contents at all. The only thing touched upon in the conversation was that the Danish Government apparently will make the decision within the next few days to leave the League of Nations.²

I told M. Zahle that the Herr Foreign Minister regretted very much that he was unable because of absence from Berlin today to receive him himself. I promised to present the note to the Foreign Minister immediately and to mention the importance which M. Scavenius wished to have placed upon his communication.

In connection with this I asked a number of questions about the composition and internal cohesion of the new Danish Government. I thereby indicated indirectly that the party affiliation of the Cabinet members, from the most extreme Right to the Social Democrats, will not exactly make easy the fulfilment of the new Danish policy announced by M. Scavenius.

North Schleswig was not discussed.

M. Zahle stated, as he had already recently, that M. Scavenius desired to visit the Foreign Minister in Berlin at some convenient time.

Submitted herewith along with the note to the Foreign Minister.³

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, July 17, 1940.

Mr. MINISTER: On the occasion of his appointment as Foreign Minister M. Erik Scavenius, as Your Excellency may know, made public on July 9, 1940, a statement which had the approval of the entire Cabinet, in which he laid down the natural lines of development for increased cooperation between Denmark and Germany. As it seemed

² The Danish withdrawal from the League of Nations was announced 2 days later.

³ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "A formal reply to the note will be necessary." Ribbentrop's formal reply of July 27 was handed to the Danish Minister on July 29 (2768/536320).

desirable to M. Scavenius that this statement should also be brought to the attention of the German Government through the usual diplomatic channels, I accordingly have the honor, in accordance with instructions which I have received, to acquaint Your Excellency with the text thereof. It reads as follows:*

"At the time that I take over the Foreign Ministry it is natural that I should make some statements regarding Denmark's foreign policy. In doing so I should like to draw a parallel between the situation during the World War and that of today.

"It has been the task of the small state to follow a policy which would keep the country out of the conflicts of the large states. More closely defined this task is to see that Denmark is in no circumstances involved in a conflict with her great neighbor to the south. This policy has met with understanding and support on the part of Germany both during the World War and during the present war, with the difference, of course, brought about by the changed methods of carrying on war.

"Keeping this difference in mind, one may compare the events of August 1914 with those of April of this year. In both cases it was the aim of German policy to exclude Denmark from belligerent activities, since that country by its location protected the Baltic Sea front as far as Britain was concerned. As a result of the altered conditions of warfare this task in the present war fell principally on the German land and air forces, while in the World War it had largely been taken care of by the German Navy alone. It must be noted that this circumstance, that is, the presence of German military forces within the country, even with as little friction as has fortunately been the case, has naturally made the problem of understanding on the part of the Danish people more difficult. In the World War the presence of the German fleet prevented England from even attempting to force an entry into the Baltic Sea and to create for Germany a third front. Thus the neutrality of Denmark was preserved and this is always recalled with gratitude in Denmark.

"During the League of Nations era now concluded the course of Danish policy was maintained. Denmark refused to participate in the policy of the League of Nations directed against Germany.

"As a result of the great German victories, which have aroused astonishment and admiration throughout the world, in Europe a new era has begun which will bring a new political and economic order under the leadership of Germany. It will be the task of Denmark to find her place in a necessary mutual and active cooperation with Greater Germany. The Danish people are confident that they can preserve their independence in the new order in Europe and they hope to meet with understanding for their individuality and for their traditionally peaceful political and social development."

*The Danish text is in E. Scavenius, *Forhandlingspolitikken under besættelsen* (Copenhagen, 1948), p. 60. It likewise appeared in the Danish Government's publication *Beretning til Folketinget afgivet af den af Folketinget under 8. Januar 1948 nedsatte kommission i henhold til Grundlovens § 45* (Copenhagen, 1948), vol. v, *Bilag*, p. 337.

During my brief stay in Copenhagen Minister Scavenius charged me to request Your Excellency to be assured that the Royal Government considers it of the greatest importance that Denmark should take part in constructive cooperation in the political and economic fields with her great neighbor. It will always be the effort of the Danish Government to strive with all its power to provide for Denmark and the Danish people a useful future within the framework of the political and economic way of life now being recreated along new lines.

I take the opportunity, etc.

HERLUF ZAHLE
Royal Danish Minister

No. 182

B19/B008655

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, July 17, 1940—9:57 p. m.

No. 1399 of July 17

Received July 18—3:10 a. m.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 1134 of July 3 (WV 2462 II)¹ and 1200 of July 13.²

During today's talk with Molotov regarding the question of nickel ore, Molotov showed great displeasure that, in addition to the 60 percent of the nickel ore output already granted us, we expected to share in the readjustment of the conditions of the concession. Molotov clearly indicated that the Soviet Government considered the Petsamo region its exclusive domain, where it had stipulated new special privileges for itself in the Peace Treaty of 1940³ and where it would not like to see any third power appear—and obviously not Germany either. Molotov described the information regarding German-Finnish negotiations concerning a possible concession as something entirely new, of which thus far even Paasikivi had not informed him in any way.⁴

Finally, Molotov repeatedly emphasized that the Soviet Government was particularly interested in the territory of Petsamo for political and economic reasons. The Soviet Government believed that German interests are fully satisfied by the grant of the larger part of the nickel ore output there.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 98.

² See document No. 150, footnote 1.

³ The text of the Peace Treaty of Mar. 12, 1940, in English translation is in *Finland Reveals her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940-June 1941*, pp. 85-89.

⁴ For the Foreign Ministry's reply on this point see document No. 259.

No. 183

9498/E669141

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 1405 of July 17

Moscow, July 17, 1940—11:30 p. m.

Received July 18—12:50 a. m.

W III b 4104.

With reference to your telegram No. 1203 of July 14.¹

Molotov informed me today that the Soviet Government has not purchased any Rumanian oil shares and does not intend to do so. The Soviet Union recognizes that Germany has a primary interest in Rumanian petroleum.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Not printed (9498/E669189).

No. 184

1242/337043-50

The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

No. 348

WIESBADEN, July 17, 1940.

W-Frie 94.

Subject: Treatment of the demarcation line between occupied and unoccupied French territory.

The French side has requested that the demarcation line, which has hitherto been practically closed to all traffic, be opened for the transit of persons and goods.¹ This is a question of vital importance to the French. The German side, too, has a not inconsiderable interest—especially for economic reasons—in relaxing the restrictions on traffic across the demarcation line.

For about a week the Special Commission for Economic Questions has been conducting preliminary negotiations with the French delegation. The German side has made the relaxation of restrictions on traffic over the demarcation line subject to the condition that the German control of transit of persons and goods be transferred to the outer borders of France, that is, to the Franco-Spanish and Franco-Swiss borders and the Mediterranean ports east of the Rhone. This

¹ On July 15 a memorandum to this effect had been handed over by the French to the German Armistice Commission. For its text see *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, p. 56, footnote 1. The French text and a German translation were transmitted to the Foreign Ministry by telegram No. 22 of July 18 from the Special Commission on Economic Questions with the German Armistice Commission (1242/336999-337002).

control would mainly be exercised by German customs officials. The German demand has been accepted in principle by the French side.

The Armistice Commission, in a report of July 15 to the OKW, has given a detailed statement of its position on the questions that have arisen in connection with the demarcation line and has asked for a decision in principle. Since this report also touches upon important political and military questions, a copy of it is being submitted.

With regard to details, reference is made to the reports of the Special Commission for Economic Questions.²

By order:
WELCK

[Enclosure]

The German Armistice Commission, Chefgruppe Ia, to the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Armed Forces Operations Office, Section L

WIESBADEN, July 15, 1940.

Subject: Treatment of the demarcation line.

The question of the future treatment of the demarcation line between the occupied and the unoccupied territory plays an important part in the negotiations with the French delegation, and requires a decision in principle. A question to be clarified in this connection is the extent to which the demarcation line is to remain a barrier to persons, foreign exchange, goods and communications.

At the present time the demarcation line is still an absolute barrier for traffic of any kind. This state of affairs will be impossible to perpetuate because the administrative and economic unity of France is to be preserved and has been guaranteed by the Armistice Treaty. This is emphasized by the fact that the French Government has been offered the prospect of moving to the Paris region.³ It would be impossible to prohibit traffic with the unoccupied zone to a government established in the region of Paris. A further consideration is that singly neither the occupied nor the unoccupied part of France is economically viable.

On the other hand, military and intelligence requirements demand that communications must not be allowed to pass without control from the occupied zone to any country outside France and so indirectly to England. It is likewise necessary to prevent the undesired export of economic assets and commodities from France to foreign countries. This intelligence and economic control would naturally

² A detailed examination of the French memorandum cited in footnote 1 was transmitted to the Foreign Ministry by telegram No. 23 of July 18 from the Special Commission on Economic Questions with the German Armistice Commission (1242/337003-10).

³ See document No. 163.

have to be exercised at the demarcation line, which is the frontier of the occupied zone. This would also be consistent with article 17 of the Armistice Treaty, which prohibits any transfer of economic assets and stocks of commodities from occupied to unoccupied territory without the consent of the German Government. Establishment of a control system at the demarcation line, however, would not only impair the administrative and economic unity of France to an almost intolerable degree, but from the organizational point of view it would scarcely be capable of application. Control of persons, foreign exchange and goods along the far-flung demarcation line which passes over open terrain would require a staff of trained personnel which Germany would find practically impossible to provide. Moreover, control of travel at the demarcation line would not accomplish its security purpose because it could not prevent Frenchmen possessing regular passes from acting also as carriers of intelligence.

In view of these facts it has been proposed, as a better solution, to transfer the control of passenger and goods traffic to France's external frontiers, i. e., the Franco-Spanish border, the Mediterranean ports, and the Franco-Swiss border. The traffic between occupied and unoccupied zones would thus be freed, with control shifted to frontiers far easier to watch by reason of their extent and topography.

To be sure, the request for such a control at the external frontiers of the unoccupied zone cannot be directly based on the Armistice Treaty. But it could in the opinion of the Armistice Commission be readily construed as a counterpart for our waiver of control at the demarcation line, which is very irksome to the French. The French are bound to recognize that a system of control along some line must necessarily be insisted upon in the interest of the conduct of the war and on behalf of the enforcement of the Armistice Treaty.

The High Command of the Army, the Foreign Intelligence Department [*Amt Ausland/Abwehr*], and the Special Commission for Economic Questions, through their representatives, have agreed to this solution in principle.

Specifically, control would be exercised as follows:

1. With respect to passenger traffic the demarcation line would remain merely a military security line. Police control of travelers crossing the demarcation line will be waived. Conversely, the order making military passes mandatory will have to be maintained, at least along that portion of the demarcation line which coincides with the southern boundary applying to the control of refugee movements.

2. There will be no currency and goods traffic control at the demarcation line.

3. German and Italian control organs are to be set up for the control of travel, and of the movement of foreign exchange and of goods at the external frontiers of unoccupied France. This would be done

by assigning to German control the Franco-Spanish frontier, the Mediterranean coast west of the Rhone estuary, and the Franco-Swiss frontier, while Italy would have control of the Mediterranean coast east of the Rhone estuary. Agreement on this would still have to be arranged with the Italian Armistice Commission.

Control would have to be effected by German supervisory personnel which would be appropriately supplied by the Customs Frontier Guard Service. The prerequisite for this, in any case, would be the release by the OKH of the customs service personnel that are currently still included in the frontier guard units. In the present situation this should be possible without any difficulties.

4. Logically, there ought to be also control of telecommunications (telephone, teletype, and telegraph) between unoccupied France and the countries outside. This would however require establishment of an extensive control organization and drastic interference in the telecommunications of the unoccupied zone. Apart from the doubtfulness of satisfactory results, the French Government would regard such measures as a severe encroachment upon its remaining sovereignty in the unoccupied zone. Much easier, on the other hand, would be the control of telecommunications between the occupied and the unoccupied zone, because the entire telecommunications network of the occupied zone is already under German administration. We propose therefore this solution in agreement with the representatives of the Chief, Wehrmacht Signal Communications and of the *Forschungsamt*. The gap in the security system involved in passing up control of telecommunications between unoccupied France and foreign countries must be accepted in the circumstances.

5. Control of the French postal service between occupied and unoccupied zones is impracticable if the demarcation line is not intended to remain an internal barrier; the personnel requirements for it and the resulting delays would be prohibitive. On the other hand the establishment of German postal censorship offices in the unoccupied zone for mail to foreign countries appears to be not possible for the same reasons as in the case of telecommunications. As a compromise solution it is proposed to require the French Government to route all foreign mail from the unoccupied zone destined for Spain and Switzerland through German postal censorship offices in the occupied zone (e. g., Bordeaux and Besançon). Trans-Mediterranean foreign mail, correspondingly, would have to be routed through an Italian postal censorship office. Supervision of compliance with this obligation could be undertaken as one of the duties of the German and Italian control organs at the external frontiers of the unoccupied zone (section 3).

6. The proposed control measures can achieve their purpose only if they are equally extended to the passenger, foreign exchange and goods traffic as well as the telecommunication and postal services between the French mother country and the French overseas possessions, especially North Africa, since otherwise a completely uncontrollable method for forwarding to foreign countries would develop. The French Government would have to accept this, too, in return for freeing the demarcation line.

The Armistice Commission requests an early decision in principle on the questions set forth above which exert far reaching influence on its own negotiations as well as those of the Special Commission for Economic Questions.⁴

STÜLPNAGEL

⁴ See document No. 192.

No. 185

F10/087-088

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

ROME, July 17, 1940/XVIII.

FÜHRER: Permit me first of all to thank you for the mobile anti-aircraft guns which you kindly presented to me.² This is an attention on your part which testifies to comradely courtesy, and whose full significance I know how to value. As soon as time permits I shall visit the battery and have it put into action.

I fully understand your response to my offer of Italian units for the landing in England. As I see it, this should mainly be of symbolic value, that is, express in visible form our comradeship in arms. I understand perfectly what you have told me, and will not insist further—all the less since our aim is the same, even though we fight on different sectors. If you see a possibility for direct intervention by the Italian Air Force please tell me. We now possess units of new, very fast and efficient machines. The preparation for a large-scale attack on Egypt is now completed. To reach Alexandria it is necessary to traverse 600 kilometers of real desert during a season when the thermometer records 56 degrees [C] in the shade. This fact has weakened the English units, who are unable to cope with such temperatures. I hope I can begin the offensive at the same time as your attack on England.

On the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th the English fleet in the Mediterranean was very badly hit. The denials of the English Admiralty are grotesque. I need not tell you that Italian Army reports tell the truth, even when this does not seem entirely necessary.

Your Ambassador in Rome will have informed you of my complete agreement with your letter to King Carol.³ If he is wise he will not

¹ Translated from a German translation that was apparently prepared in the German Foreign Ministry. An Italian text of this letter is in *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti* (Rome-Milan, 1946), No. 30, pp. 54-55, but there are several discrepancies between this Italian text and the German translation of it.

² See document No. 166.

³ Document No. 171.

miss this opportunity of reaching a compromise which Teleki himself desires.

French policy, which is not clear, is being followed here with much attention, especially in the colonial possessions.

But the most important thing is to strike the decisive blow at Great Britain. No doubt whatsoever bothers me: The Revolution will be victorious!

Please accept, Führer, my always friendly and comradely greetings.
MUSSOLINI

No. 186

897/291872

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1475 of July 18

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1940—4:23 p. m.

Received July 19—2:50 a. m.

Inf. 227 g.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 693 of June 24 (Inf. 8463) and 706 of June 28 (D IV M25).¹

The arguments from Rogerson's book, *Propaganda in the Next War* likely to have the most effect on the American mentality have been assembled in a particularly striking manner by the isolationist Senator Nye and dealt with by him in a major speech in the Senate. This fundamental speech with many excerpts from Rogerson's book was printed in the *Congressional Record* of April 25, 1939, and distributed to 100,000 persons by the channel known to you.

After lengthy negotiations it has now been possible to obtain assent to the distribution of the speech by the same channels to another 100,000 specially selected persons.

This undertaking is not altogether easy and is particularly delicate since Senator Nye, as a political opponent of the President, is under the careful observation of the secret state police here [*der hiesigen geheimen Staatspolizei*].

This telegraphic report and the instructions referred to have been destroyed here.

THOMSEN

¹ Neither found.

No. 187

19/12450

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1477 of July 18

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1940—8:10 p. m.

Received July 19—8:20 a. m.

For the State Secretary personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 746 of July 6.¹

Handelsrat Westrick wishes to elucidate and supplement his (one group missing) of June 27² as follows: "The newly-founded group mentioned by me is headed by Mr. James Mooney of General Motors. The activities of this group can be traced back to the conversations of M. in Berlin.³ M. informed me of his endeavors, but I did not commit myself in any way. I felt, however, that I should communicate this information to the Foreign Ministry, and more so since I was told that the English Government was to be informed of the efforts of the group. Yesterday M. sent me word that his efforts had failed for the time being. In this connection he asked me to suggest in Berlin that before an attack on England the German point of view and aims should once more be publicly defined; he and his group expected such an announcement to have a widespread effect on American public opinion. I believe that I should transmit this suggestion, because 2 days earlier Henry Ford had personally proposed to me the same thing. M. recommends further that Germany declare that neutral ships used solely to transport children from England would be respected if timely notice were given to Germany, and that Germany would also be willing to recognize a certain neutral zone in England, still to be determined, into which women and children might be taken." End of report.

With regard to the last paragraph I refer to telegram No. 1441 of July 15.⁴

THOMSEN

¹ Not found.

² For Westrick's report of June 27, see document No. 40.

³ See vol. VIII, document No. 656.

⁴ In this telegram Thomsen had suggested that in order to combat propagandist appeals to American emotionalism, a declaration be made by Germany regarding permission for evacuation of children from Britain to America. He regarded the moment as favorable for such a declaration (19/12432-33).

No. 188

1504/371055-60

Prince Max Hohenlohe¹ to Senior Counselor Hewel

BERLIN, July 18, 1940.

DEAR HERR HEWEL: In your letter of June 30² you requested that if I should hear of any attempts of the English to get in touch with us, I should let you know.³ From a private sojourn in Switzerland I have to report the following:

From conversations with Professor Burckhardt and Paravicini, the former Swiss Minister in London, I found out that Burckhardt, before his departure for Berlin, and also after his return, had seen Mr. Kelly, the British Minister in Switzerland.

According to MM. Paravicini and Burckhardt the latter could convey to Kelly merely some superficial impressions from Germany. These did not meet the expectations of Kelly who had assumed that Burckhardt might possibly see the Führer and be informed in detail about his plans.

In this respect I should like to observe that I found out in a conversation with Burckhardt that he, as a Swiss and with his well-known cultural leanings, is afraid that a German-English understanding would be too much at the expense of France.

Burckhardt and Paravicini insisted that I should call on Kelly. This I declined to do, whereupon Kelly sent me, through the Spanish Minister in Bern, an old friend of mine, an express indication of his desire to speak with me. As the Spanish Minister proposed a meeting in his house, I consented on condition that the initiative would have to come explicitly from Kelly. On these terms an informal meeting took place.

Immediately after my arrival Mrs. Kelly, a native Belgian, took me aside and urged me to lose no time and promptly to discuss peace

¹ Prince Max von Hohenlohe-Langenburg of Schloss Rothenhaus near Görkau in the Sudetenland.

² Not printed (1504/371067-70). Hewel had written: "I would be interested in hearing from you, if you again hear of English attempts to approach Germans for the purpose of orientation. While we will certainly make no use of such channels, it is nevertheless interesting to observe exactly the tendency in England."

³ Unsigned marginal note: "Expressly in a purely noncommittal fashion."

possibilities with her husband. Kelly asked me to go with him to an adjoining room. There he told me after a few introductory remarks that he would like very much to talk with me, as an old friend of his own friends in England, about the situation and the future. He was, to be sure, only Minister to Switzerland and therefore available only as a messenger. I stated that if he was merely a messenger to Churchill it was meaningless and the talk could be broken off at once. He replied that he was aware that our common friends in England were Butler, Vansittart, and also Halifax, with followers. (This remark apparently refers to my talks about the Sudeten question at the Foreign Office in 1938.⁴)

Upon his query as to which were the groups in Germany with which I was in touch, I told him plainly that what I was telling him was my personal impression and that I had in the course of the last few years always rightly warned them, the English, as he had himself previously intimated. As a matter of fact there was only one opinion in Germany, which was that of the Führer; everything else was advice from emigrés. I had to tell him right away that it was a waste of time talking propaganda to me, but that I should be glad to discuss with him frankly and plainly England's serious position and the consequences bound to result therefrom if the present policy is continued.

In general he agreed with my view and in the course of the conversation, during which I kept strictly to the lines of your letter,⁵ Kelly right at the beginning frankly stated that England's position was difficult and that there seemed to be no other choice than to fight on for the honor of the Empire, until a reasonable peace⁶ could be made. He had to admit that the Führer and the greatness of his conception as well as his constructive power had been hitherto underestimated. It was, however, difficult to arrive with him at a lasting settlement of questions, since experience had not facilitated reliance on his word and it was difficult to imagine what sort of definitive guarantees could be given. Nevertheless it would be easier to negotiate with the Führer if one did not have to fear that some of the persons around him would urge him to strive, beyond any such agreements, for world domination. To which I replied that if the present wrong English policy should continue they might well live to see themselves eliminated not only from the European balance of power,

⁴ See vol. II, document No. 249.

⁵ Unsigned marginal note: "Strictly private observations. Not intended for this purpose."

⁶ The two preceding words are given in English in the original.

but also from the global balance of power. He realized the difficulties and merely repeated that it was very hard to find guarantees for a general and lasting settlement.

When we came to talk about America, he did not take exception to my arguments concerning the difficulty for the Empire to continue the war from the American Continent and did not manifest any great hopes regarding assistance from the United States, either by war, or by keeping up the blockade of Europe on the one hand and of the South American countries on the other hand.

We then talked about the forces in English domestic politics and I mentioned that he surely knew, as I did, how untrustworthy a person Churchill was, how he was often under the influence of alcohol (liquid courage) and that I could not believe that this man was the embodiment of the English people. Kelly assented to my criticism of Churchill to the extent of saying that Churchill was a bull who was running his head against the wall, but that Butler's, Halifax's, and also Vansittart's temperaments were different. I replied that this was what I imagined, for I could not see the English dying for the honor of their country among the ruins of the last house of London, if other solutions were available.

He again and again reverted to the question whether I could not expound to him more concrete plans and in this, as well as in the other part of the conversation, he persistently pointed to the obscure attitude of Italy and also to her ambitions. What his intention was in mentioning this could not be ascertained.

My general impression of the conversation, which was conducted by Kelly with great emotion and a good deal of temperament, was that he was engaging in it with frankness and a desire to develop these contacts further. I did not go along with him, however, for the suspicion that conversations are intended to gain time is an obvious one. I therefore soon concluded the conversation with the warning that what the emigrés had predicted for Germany would now happen to England, namely that to the peril of her Empire, England's healthy spirit is being broken by the rule of Churchill and his clique.

The Spanish Minister told me on my departure that Kelly had asked him whether there was a possibility of getting in touch with me even after my departure for Germany.

In conclusion I should like to tell you that after a few days' stay in Berlin I shall repair to Rothenhaus and avoid all further contacts,

unless you desire otherwise or Kelly's desire is conveyed to me and meets with your approval.⁷

With cordial regards and Heil Hitler.

MAX HOHENLOHE

[P. S.] About a conversation with the Aga Khan I shall report in the next few days,⁸ although he does not strike me as a particularly trustworthy person.

⁷Hewel's reply is document No. 220. Hohenlohe later reported on encounters with Kelly in Bern as follows:

"On December 5 of this year Mr. Kelly, the British Minister in Switzerland, spoke to me in the lounge of the Hotel Bellevue in Bern. On December 9 he did this again on his own initiative, drew me into a corner and asked first of all whether I had transmitted the content of our last conversation in July to the German authorities. When I answered evasively, Kelly went on to say that he believed his personal opinion at that time on the question of a German-English settlement had perhaps given me a wrong impression. He had lately come to the conclusion that an agreement between England and the National Socialist regime was not impossible. But he could not conceive of the British Government being willing to enter into negotiations with Germany on the basis of German promises alone; its willingness to do so would rather depend on whether and to what extent Germany was prepared to give guarantees. When I replied that after all the withdrawal of the German troops from the occupied areas before a conclusion of peace was quite out of the question, Kelly said nothing.

"I did not go into the matter further, since I assumed that the conversation was for the purpose of information and that Kelly spoke because of his concern lest the development of the war should lead to events resulting in large, perhaps acute, losses in internal political strength and economic power for the proprietary class in England. Kelly himself belongs to this class and seemed to me inclined now toward a compromise with Germany." (1504/371047)

⁸See document No. 228.

No. 189

3355/E009236-38

*Minute by Ambassador Ritter*¹

BERLIN, July 19, 1940.

Minister Mohr (Secretary General in the Danish Foreign Ministry) called on me on July 18th. The conversation lasted 40 minutes. The conversation turned at once to the letter of the Danish Minister to the Foreign Minister of July 17, and the statement of Danish Foreign Minister Scavenius contained therein. (Memorandum of the State Secretary of July 17.²)

Mohr repeatedly expressed the urgent wish that negotiations take place very soon in Berlin on the economic questions arising from this statement: "new order in Europe in an economic respect under the leadership of Germany."³ Since we have not yet settled in what form

¹Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer] Customs and Currency Union Denmark."

²Document No. 181.

³The passage here appearing within quotation marks is not an exact quotation from Scavenius' statement.

and in what tempo the future economic relation of Denmark to Germany is to be regulated politically and legally, I have avoided speaking of definite arrangements (customs union, currency union, economic union). From his discussion of individual agricultural and industrial questions, however, I gathered that Mohr was thinking during the conversation of such arrangements. Thus, for example, he expressed the fear that various branches of Danish industry could no longer be maintained in future because the existing tariff protection against German competition would lapse. He mentioned in this connection the Danish textile industry and the shoe industry.

Mohr said that any negotiations on the part of Denmark would probably be conducted by a M. Sthyr. During the World War Sthyr had been in the Danish Government service, but then devoted himself to duties of a private business nature.⁴ In the negotiations contact should be maintained with the existing Governmental committees. For this purpose the chairman of the Danish Governmental committee will probably be assigned to assist M. Sthyr.

I made clear in the conversation that the initiative for such negotiations lies with the Danish Government. Nothing was agreed upon as to further procedure.

The initiative of the Danish Government is, in my opinion, a politically important fact, and one which can be turned to good account. Without prejudice to the intentions heretofore existing as to the tempo in which the occupied areas should be associated with or incorporated into the Greater German economic sphere, I consider it proper that we accept this Danish initiative and that an economic treaty be speedily concluded with Denmark. Such a first treaty, resulting from the initiative of the Danish Government, would be significant both with respect to the other occupied states (Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg) and also in a general political sense abroad. I consider it necessary, therefore, that a decision be obtained from the Foreign Minister at once as to whether such negotiations should be started immediately.⁵ The aim of such negotiations can only be a general economic union. If the Foreign Minister agrees to this it must first be discussed with the domestic authorities concerned.

RITTER

⁴ Knud S. Sthyr was head of the Dansk Cement Central A/S.

⁵ See document No. 229.

[EDITORS' NOTE. On July 19, 1940, Hitler made a major speech before the Reichstag. The German text is printed in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, August 1940 (Essen, 1940), pages 603-622. The official translation as released by the German Ministry of Propaganda is published in the *Foreign Affairs* section of the *New York Times*, July 20, 1940, pages 1-4.

ganda is printed in German Library of Information, *Facts in Review* (New York, 1940), volume II, No. 32, pages 362-375.

Count Ciano went to Berlin for the Reichstag ceremonies. His diary records that he had a conference with Ribbentrop on July 19 and one with Hitler on July 20. No record of either conference has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. A memorandum of the conference with Hitler on July 20 is, however, published in Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe* (Milan, 1948), pages 574-576.]

No. 190

19/12456

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1940—4:51 p. m.

No. 1482 of July 18

Received July 20—3:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 666 (P 268 g.)¹ and my telegram No. 1345 of July 3.²

As I have reported, isolationist Republican Congressmen at the Republican Convention succeeded in affixing firmly to the party platform the language of an isolationist foreign policy that will not let itself become entangled in a European war. Nothing has leaked out about the assistance we rendered in this.

It seemed advisable therefore to undertake similar action during the Democratic Convention in Chicago. The special officer for press relations has seen to it that several reliable isolationist Congressmen went to Chicago in order to exert influence on the delegates with the purpose of including, at least formally, in the Democratic platform as well, a pledge of nonparticipation in a European war.

I have reported by despatch about the manner in which this was done.³

In addition to other means, the Congressmen used for the purpose the tried and proved promotion aid [*Propeller-Hilfsmittel*] on a sensational advertisement in the leading Chicago newspaper. Accordingly, there appeared in the *Chicago Tribune* on the 15th, the opening day of the Convention, an effective full-page advertisement similar to that in the *New York Times* of June 25, on the occasion of the Republican Convention. For travel assistance and cost of the ad-

¹ Not found. See document No. 91.

² Document No. 91.

³ Reports by Thomsen on the subject referred to here have not been found.

vertisements \$4,350 have been disbursed, which please refund to the Embassy. Regarding the accounting I refer to telegraphic instruction No. 749 (Pers 1783 g) of July 8.⁴

THOMSEN

⁴ Not found.

No. 191

B15/B002572

*Circular of the State Secretary*¹

Telegram

Multex No. 165

BERLIN, July 19, 1940.
Pol. II 2550.

Drafting Officer: Counselor Dr. Auer.

In view of the increased isolation of England from the outside world all well-grounded reports on her morale and economic powers of resistance, the relations of the Government with the people, happenings within the British Government, and relations with other powers are of special interest. So far as possible please report currently on these topics, especially on statements by the British representatives at your post and reports received by the Foreign Ministry there from London, as well as other factual reports received directly.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ This circular telegram was directed to Missions in Europe and the Embassies in Ankara and Washington.

No. 192

365/206355

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, July 19, 1940.

Minister Hemmen told me by telephone from Wiesbaden about his visit with Colonel General Brauchitsch in Fontainebleau. What should be noted from the conversation is that Brauchitsch told Hemmen that the Führer does not yet wish to do away with the demarcation line in France at the present time. In any case before it is abolished Brauchitsch should report once again to the Führer.¹

WIEHL

¹ Marginal notes: "Ministerialdirektor Wiehl: Does this also make it impossible for the present to carry out the plan to send our customs officials to the Mediterranean coast, etc.? W[eizsäcker] 22."

"Will depend on the course of the negotiations; probably the French will make difficulties. [To the] Under State Secretary. W[iehl] 23."

No. 193

2281/481879-81

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

No. 310 g

ROME, July 17, 1940.

Sent July 19.

Subject: Italian peace terms.

From an altogether reliable source I learn the following regarding the terms Italy is said to demand in any peace settlements:

Count Ciano had gone to the Berlin conversations concerned lest Germany intended to accord France special consideration and continue the magnanimous policy that was evident at the armistice.¹ In Berlin he realized that similar concern prevailed there with respect to Italy's attitude to France. Count Ciano found to his relief that Germany regarded relations with France much as Italy did.

The Italian Foreign Minister had the outlines of a peace plan prepared for the conversations. According to that, Italian demands included Nice, Corsica, Tunisia, and part of Algeria. The remainder of Algeria, together with French Morocco, is to go to Spain, but might possibly be left to remain with France. Italy moreover asks for a wide land connection between Libya and Ethiopia, whereby a large portion of the Sudan would fall to Italy, while the rest of the Sudan would come under full Egyptian sovereignty. With Egypt, Palestine, and Syria bilateral treaties would be concluded by which Italian influence in those areas and Italian interest in their raw materials, particularly cotton and oil, would be secured. Italy hopes to be able to conclude such a treaty with Iraq, too, and is determined to accord Egypt every consideration in matters of her sovereignty and independence. She is furthermore asking for French and British Somaliland and wants Libya expanded up to Lake Chad.

My informant does not know whether Italy is asking for a land connection with the West African coast on the open Atlantic. [Nor does he know what is to be done with South Africa. But there is talk in the circle around Count Ciano that Germany will ask in Africa for a wide strip which, starting about the Togo coast, runs diagonally across Africa from west to east, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and comprises the whole area of Central Africa, including the Belgian Congo.]²

V. MACKENSEN

¹ This refers to Ciano's talks in Berlin on July 7. See document No. 129.

² The sentences in brackets were deleted before dispatch.

No. 194

9501/E669654-55

The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 482 of July 19

BUDAPEST, July 20, 1940—2:50 a. m.

Received July 20—5:45 a. m.

W III a 3599.

I. Negotiations concluded; ¹ signing tomorrow. The German-Hungarian Treaty is thereby extended to July 31, 1941.

Most important results:

1) A treaty on a petroleum concession covering approximately 18,000 km. (southeastern Hungary), negotiated as a framework treaty, in accordance with our demands.

Commitment by the Hungarian Government to conclude by August 10 a private concession treaty, on the essential points of which there is agreement.

2) The previous formulas for the quantities of wheat, rye, and feed to be delivered considerably improved. Probable amount of total deliveries in the grain-crop year 1940-1941, according to present crop conditions, including approximately 500,000 tons of flour—approximately 200,000 tons of which will be wheat and approximately 200,000 tons corn (last year Hungary delivered no corn at all). Otherwise also, an increase in a great number of agricultural quotas of interest to us.

3) Repayment of premiums eliminated. This means a raise of 4 to 5 percent in the exchange rate of the reichsmark and a saving to the Ministry of Finance of approximately 10 million reichsmarks.

4) The credit system for free foreign exchange, introduced by Hungary in January, after the reduction in the exchange rate of the so-called free foreign currencies, which in practice amounts to a re-introduction of the [exchange ²] differential, is abolished.

5) Conversations regarding war material deliveries concluded to the satisfaction of both sides. Hungary openly expressed desire for deliveries of howitzers, tanks, and planes.

6) Hungarian import quotas of interest to us increased considerably. German tariff wishes satisfied. A satisfactory agreement has been reached regarding deliveries by Germany of products important to Hungary.

Use was not made of an authorization by the Ministry of Economics for increasing the rayon quota.

¹ The reference is to the joint meeting of the German and Hungarian Government Committees on economic questions which took place in Budapest June 28-July 20. Documents concerning these negotiations as well as agreements and protocols signed on that occasion are filmed on serials 9499 and 9500.

² The word "exchange", on the Budapest copy of this telegram (9506/E670030-32), was omitted in the text as received in Berlin.

7) Trade and payments with reference to the Protectorate, both for the time before annexation and for the time after annexation, satisfactorily regulated. Agreement signed regarding the granting of former Czechoslovakian tariff rates to Germany.

8) German concession: raising the wheat price from 20 to 23 pengös. In view of the crop situation, however, and the impossibility of getting wheat from overseas, price is still relatively favorable. I urge you to make sure that in no case a higher price is approved in the other countries of the southeast, since this would create a difficult situation for the Hungarian Government, which was emphatic in its demand for a price of 25 to 26 pengös.

II. This time also, in accordance with the political situation, negotiations were conducted by the Hungarians in an obvious effort to meet the German demands to the limits of Hungary's possibilities. The more important questions were settled in direct negotiations with the Minister President.

CLODIUS
ERDMANNSDORFF

No. 195

19/12468-70

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1940—6:47 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received July 21—9:07 a. m.

No. 1493 of July 20

For the Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

For the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe.

For OKW—Foreign Department [*Ausland*].

(1) In the speech in which Roosevelt accepted the nomination for President the most important passage from the military point of view was that which declines a peaceable understanding or even a compromise with the new Germany.

A personage of the first rank, who is a close friend of mine and mortal enemy of Roosevelt, commented that by now the period of the war was over in which London let other countries fight for its cause. Today the same was being done by Washington, which now was using England for its purposes and letting her fight.

The declaration of the Democratic party against entering the war did not hamper Roosevelt in his designs. As the exponent of the Jews, who especially through Freemasonry control the broad masses of the American people, Roosevelt wants England to continue fighting and the war to be prolonged. If England should collapse, the wire-

pullers hope that it will be possible to save the English fleet so that, by sailing first to Canada and basing itself on United States ports, it could provide further means of continuing the war until such time as the rearmament of the United States would be in full swing.

Such a policy of compliance with the directives of the Jews has been rejected by Mr. Woodring, the previous Secretary of War,¹ who in many respects is close to us. He had therefore to make room for Mr. Stimson, who a few days before his appointment publicly declared that if the English fleet should slip away to America, the docking facilities, etc., that it could not find in Canada should be made available to it.

(2) The circle about Lindbergh has become aware of this development and now tries at least to impede the fatal control of American policy by the Jews. Toward Willkie, the candidate of the Republican party, Lindbergh's attitude is to wait and see whether Willkie will be able to avoid the bondage to Jewry.

Meanwhile a very trustworthy personage close to Lindbergh has asked me to inform German authorities that the wife of Commander P. E. Pihl, American Assistant Naval Attaché in Berlin, who is a sister of Willkie, has pronounced sympathies for Germany and might greatly influence her brother.

(3) I have repeatedly reported on the mean and vicious campaign against Lindbergh, whom the Jews fear as their most potent adversary. Now the widely known and influential Al Williams has also succumbed to Jewish influence, in that he was forced to resign.² It is probable that this fearless man, who is of great importance to us will continue to fight all the more independently. On the other hand, he will naturally be deprived of the insight in internal affairs which he had hitherto enjoyed as a reserve Major.

Another very prominent writer, C. B. Allen, who has been on close terms with me for years and until recently held an important government position in civil aviation, has joined the circle about Lindbergh; he will now devote himself independently to research.

I repeat my recommendation to avoid strictly any discussion in the press and also in conversations with Military Attachés, etc., of relations with Lindbergh and other Americans fighting the Jews. To prevent giving rise to incorrect impressions among the Americans it is, as recent experience has shown, advisable only in exceptional cases to discuss with American officers or other Americans the question of

¹ Harry Woodring had been replaced by Henry L. Stimson on June 19. Thomsen had commented on the Stimson appointment in telegram No. 1246 of June 20 (19/12335-36).

² Alford J. Williams, Jr., writer on aviation for the Scripps-Howard newspaper group and former naval aviator, resigned his commission in the Marine Corps Reserve in July 1940.

America's attitude toward the war or the question of American armaments—that is, problems on which I am reporting extensively. The reports of Americans naturally deal mainly with subjects which people discuss with them in Germany.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

No. 196

175/187128

Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department

BERLIN, July 20, 1940.
zu Pol. I M 10226 g.¹

The King of Rumania summoned our Military and Air Attachés on July 12 and informed them that he had now seriously decided to side with Germany.² He asked the two Attachés to transmit to the German High Commands his official request for the dispatch of military missions. He had already requested this from the Führer through the Chief of Mission, but so far had not received an affirmative reply. He urgently desired the assignment as soon as possible of expert German officers for training in problems of modern tactics, especially those pertaining to the armored and air forces. He would have no objections to disguised military missions, either. As for the rest, the subsequent statements of the King concerning military questions produced a completely amateurish impression, in the opinion of the two service Attachés, and also permitted the inference that apparently the King is not correctly informed about the true state of affairs in the Rumanian armed forces.

According to information from the High Command of the Wehrmacht of July 17, the Führer has now decided that the armed forces are not to undertake anything concerning these requests, but that the Foreign Ministry will receive instructions to answer the questions of the Rumanians through diplomatic channels.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht has asked to be informed concerning this decision.

KRAMARZ

¹ Pol. I M 10226 g.: From the Pol. I M journal it is evident that the number should be Pol. I M 10236 g., which is report No. 651/40 of July 16, 1940, from the German Military Attaché in Bucharest concerning his talk with King Carol. The file containing this report is, however, missing.

² See document No. 161.

No. 197

B15/B002574

The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2446 of July 20

MADRID, July 20, 1940.

Received July 21—12:25 a. m.

The Under State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry informed me that a telegram of the following content had been received from the Spanish Ambassador in London:

The moment seems rather unfavorable for peace proposals, as the morale of the English people is better than ever and this is joined with a firm determination not to accept any compromise. The reasons for this are:

(1) The tremendous increase in air strength, which in combination with other defense measures has served to calm popular feeling.

(2) The possibility of American aid.

(3) Patriotic sentiment and warlike spirit, which the English Government knows how to kindle in the masses. The collapse of France has surprised the English. However, as soon as they recover from their surprise, it will not, in the opinion of the Spanish Ambassador, be a simple matter to conquer England.

HEBERLEIN

No. 198

2361/488084-85

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

No. 3687

THERAPIA, July 20, 1940.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Turkey and the war against England.

The historic and earnest appeal which the Führer addressed yesterday evening¹ to the British Empire will not fail to make an impression in the world. It is another question whether the leading men in the British Government or an increasing opposition will summon the courage to face the obvious historic facts. At any rate, however, we have to expect that the struggle against the British Empire will have to be fought through.

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 249.

A quick decision which is in accordance with the interests of the Axis Powers—especially since Roosevelt's reelection² opens new perspectives for the enemy—can probably be attained only if the British Empire is attacked simultaneously at different points of its vital interests. These military considerations illuminate anew the importance of Turkey in the chess game of the forces. Since the attempt to bring about a change of course in Turkey through publication of the documents has not been successful,³ I would recommend, considering the importance of this position for the enemy, that the same result be attempted with other means.

If there is a prospect in the near future of a joint German-Italian operation—if possible with the participation of the Soviet Union—against the interest of the Empire in the Near and Middle East, then it is immediately clear that a neutralization of the Turkish forces would necessarily facilitate such an operation to a considerable degree.

The most natural thing to do is to offer Turkey the assurances that she was offered as the price for accession to the Mutual Assistance Treaty by the Western Powers. When our Italian ally—also as a result of the victorious conduct of the war by Germany—has won the hegemony in the Mediterranean it could not be difficult to exchange the group of the Dodecanese Islands for a strategic position of equal value and make Turkey the same offer as was made to her unsuccessfully by London.

As matters stand today, this country—though one may not accord too high evaluation to her military forces—remains an extremely unpleasant threat to the flank of any operation against the British Empire in the Near East. I do not by any means share the optimistic opinion of my Italian colleague that Turkey will in any case soon turn away from England. And I believe that as a former comrade-in-arms of the Turkish Army,⁴ I evaluate more correctly the psychological situation of this country.

The coordination of the Russian interests with those of the Axis of course remains the most important diplomatic prerequisite; if it is possible to obtain a joint settlement of the Straits question which takes account of the Soviet Russian interests, Turkey would no longer offer resistance to the pressure of an ultimatum by the three Powers, and would no longer be able to form a base for the British Empire.

PAPEN

² This apparently refers to Franklin D. Roosevelt's renomination by the Democratic Party Convention on July 18, 1940.

³ See document No. 179.

⁴ Von Papen served in Turkey in 1917 and 1918.

[EDITORS' NOTE. A conference of representatives of the 21 American Governments was held at Havana, July 21-30, 1940. Topics

on the agenda related to neutrality, protection of the peace of the Western Hemisphere, and economic cooperation. The principal subject discussed was that of a common policy with regard to the territorial possessions in the Western Hemisphere of European Powers which had been occupied by Germany.

Texts of the resolutions adopted and an account of the proceedings are in the *Report of the Secretary of State of the United States of America on the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Held at Habana, Cuba, July 21-30, 1940* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941).]

No. 199

19/12464-67

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff

BERLIN, July 21, 1940.

The portion dealing with foreign policy in the radio address delivered by President Roosevelt from the White House on the evening of July 19,¹ in which he accepted the nomination for the Presidency is exceptionally well worth reading. Never before has Roosevelt in a speech or other utterance spoken so plainly and undisguisedly about the aims and intentions of his foreign policy. Never before has he so frankly boasted of having seen and done everything correctly. This speech may well be called a piece of foreign policy exhibitionism. With fanatical hatred the President declares the totalitarian countries to be "the enemy" and stigmatizes not only their domestic conditions, but above all the dangers of an external expansion of their ideologies and their bellicose foreign policy. Although he does not mention any nation by name, it is plain that he is aiming at Germany, Italy, Japan and also at Soviet Russia; the same Soviet Russia that until August 23, 1939, he found so democratic and sympathetic; it is obvious that in his vilification of totalitarian countries he is aiming mainly at Germany and Italy. This appears from the context and from the fact that he is especially concerned with the present war, which he calls not an ordinary war, but a revolution. The President points with pride to the fact that he had in good time recognized the danger from the totalitarian countries, and that he had at an early date taken a stand against these countries, that he had encouraged and strengthened resistance against them and had always stood for the view that in dealing with them the proper course was one not of

¹ For the text of Roosevelt's speech accepting the nomination for the third term, see *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York, 1941), vol. ix, pp. 293-303.

yielding and appeasement, but only resistance. He calls this policy striving to preserve the peace, while it was actually encouragement of the encirclement of Germany and incitement to opposition, that is to war.

Persistent continuation of such incitement is one of the chief aims of this speech, at least of the part dealing with foreign policy. England is to be prevented from changing her course, English resistance is to be strengthened and the war is to be continued. Already in his telegram to Reynaud during the night of June 16,² he plainly indicated the great importance the American Government attached to France's continuation of her resistance against Germany. That appeal was in vain, but in the case of England he evidently hopes to succeed and the sentiments that came through from London yesterday seem to indicate that he will not be disappointed. Never has Roosevelt's complicity in the outbreak and the prolongation of this war come out so clearly as in the speech of July 18 [sic]. The speech shows how correctly we have always judged Roosevelt and proves how baseless was Sumner Welles' remark to the Führer in the conversation of March 2,³ that Roosevelt was no enemy of Germany.

Besides the foreign policy purpose of the speech, to encourage England to go on with her resistance, the President naturally has the intention, for purposes of domestic politics, of making it plain to his own electorate how necessary it is, in view of the serious world situation, that he remain at the helm of the ship of state and how risky it would be to place the helm into "inexperienced hands" (that is, Willkie's).

Finally the extravagant abhorrence of tyranny is designed to take the wind out of the sails of those who consider Roosevelt as seeking a dictatorship and for that very reason are distrustful of a third term for him.

Despite the outrageous provocation, I believe that it would be a good thing if the German press would in this case continue on the whole its reserved attitude with respect to Roosevelt, so that the President would not be able to use the argument that Germany was interfering in the election campaign. It would be a good thing, however, if the considerations presented above should find expression, as far as that is feasible, in the Italian, Japanese, Spanish, Hungarian and perhaps even in the Russian press, so as to let the American public realize the situation into which the United States has been brought by the misguided foreign policy of Roosevelt.

Respectfully submitted to the Foreign Minister.

DIECKHOFF

² See Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. ix, pp. 266-267.

³ See vol. viii, document No. 649.

No. 200

71/50686-87

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, July 21, 1940.

With respect to the two enclosed memoranda, "The Situation in the Area of the Mediterranean and Near East (with annex)," and "Conversation of the Iraq Minister of Justice with Ambassador von Papen,"¹ wish to state my views as follows:

1. Page 10 of the annex to the memorandum "The Situation in the Area of the Mediterranean and Near East" contains an endorsement of the establishment of a northern Arab empire under the leadership of Iraq, together with the statement that either Germany or Germany and Italy together must assume the protection of this greater Arab empire.

On the other hand, Ambassador von Papen told the Iraq Minister of Justice in their talks (report of July 6, 1940²) that the future development of the political situation in the Near East was of interest primarily to Italy and that he could therefore be regarded only as an intermediary for proposals and wishes addressed to Italy via the Reich Government.

In my opinion there can be no doubt that we must give Italy absolute precedence in organizing the Arabian area, a fact that has already found indirect expression in the delimitation of the demobilization zones for the French Army on the basis of the armistice treaties.

This, consequently, rules out any German claim to leadership in the Arabian area, or a division of that claim with Italy.

2. This political *désintéressement*, however, should not be taken to signify that we renounce any economic interest in that area, in which connection two questions, namely the question of air routes and that of the Iraq oil, come to the fore. We shall be able to achieve the solution of these two questions in concert with Italy, while energetically protecting our own interests.

3. All views about the Arabian area received here indicate a unanimous anti-Italian attitude among the Arabs. We ought not to allow ourselves to become involved in this Arabian game and ought not arouse their hope that they could get from us support against Italy. This means that our policy, including our radio propaganda in the Near East or directed toward North Africa and western Asia, must be conducted, as in the past, on the sharpest anti-British and a muted anti-French note.

4. On page 8 of the memorandum on the talk of the Iraq Minister of Justice with Ambassador von Papen, a proposal of the Iraq Minister of Justice is discussed to continue the conversations with Iraq through the Iraq Minister in Ankara, and to do this via Minister Grobba. It suggests as their immediate objective to seek the resumption of relations with Iraq. There is presumably no objection against

¹ Neither found.

² Document No. 125.

the initiation of such conversations, provided that everything is avoided that could be interpreted as a move against Italy. In view of the Iraq Foreign Minister's servile attitude toward England and considering the fact that Iraq is under British occupation, the prospects of success must at this time be viewed as slight.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.³

WOERMANN

³ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting:

"Opinion of the State Secretary. I concur with Herr Woermann. As long as we are still in the war, we should tell the Arabs only what we are fighting against, namely England, and only speak of the 'liberation of the Arab world,' without detailed reference to any goals for the future."

No. 201

B15/B002577

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

DUBLIN, July 22, 1940.

No. 410 of July 21

Received July 22—3:15 p. m.

The impression in the Ministry of External Affairs here about the situation is as follows: A speedy conclusion of peace on reasonably tolerable terms on the basis of conditions brought about by the German success to date would be favored in general by Chamberlain, Halifax, Simon, and Hoare, whose dispatch to Spain was noteworthy from this point of view, also conservative circles (the Astors, Londonderry, etc.), high officialdom (Wilson), the city, the *Times*. Prospects for continuation of the war are generally regarded with pessimism. While the middle and lower classes of the people are depressed and are longing for a speedy peace, the ruling class is still preponderantly in favor of going on with the war. Any possible future decisive step toward conclusion of peace can hardly be expected from the British populace, who are traditionally loyal and bound to constitutional procedure, but rather from a group in the ruling class. According to opinion here the English attitude would be influenced considerably by a reasonable attitude on the part of Roosevelt, whose speech of July 19¹ was therefore much regretted here. Hope of recovery of England's lost position on the European Continent (1 group garbled) has probably already been largely written off in England. Close relations with the U. S. A. are accordingly valued the more highly. The experience with respect to the American reaction following Munich raises fear of the danger of a further recoil on the part of the U. S. A. by reason of an insufficiently firm attitude on the part of

¹ See document No. 199.

England. Roosevelt would be the only one who could influence public opinion in the U. S. A. in a favorable direction, if he were to declare himself on the advisability of a speedy conclusion of peace.

HEMPEL

No. 202

104/112332

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassies in Turkey and the Soviet Union

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, July 22, 1940.
zu Pol. VII 2037 g.¹ Ang. 1.

For the information of the Ambassador.

According to a reliable secret source,² the English Ambassador, Cripps, told the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow that 2 weeks ago he had handed to Stalin in person a letter from Churchill.³ He had found Stalin inclined to collaborate with England, and had pointed out to him the necessity of Russo-British-Turkish cooperation.⁴ Stalin had answered that he had sought in vain a compromise with Turkey during the stay in Moscow of the Turkish Foreign Minister,⁵ who, however, rejected their wishes concerning the Straits. With the approval of Churchill, Cripps was asking the opinion of the Turkish Ambassador. At the same time the British Ambassador in Ankara had approached the Foreign Minister there. He, Cripps, believed that a Russo-Turkish compromise could be arranged by England.

The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow replied that the viewpoint of the Turkish Government regarding the Straits was clear. Their legal status was fixed by the Convention of Montreux⁶ and could not be changed by Turkey. He considered it impossible to transfer to Russia certain rights which this convention gave to Turkey. He would however, inform the Turkish Government and notify Cripps of its attitude.

WOERMANN

¹ Pol. VII 2037 g.: Not found.

² Telegram No. 478 of July 18 from the German Minister in Hungary indicates the nature of this source. The Hungarian Foreign Minister had given this information to Erdmannsdorff (with more details than in the version printed here) claiming that it was based on a telegram from the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow to his Government, which the Hungarians had got "from an absolutely reliable source." (265/172363-64)

³ See Winston S. Churchill, *Their Finest Hour*, (Boston, 1949), pp. 135-136.

⁴ Cf. document No. 164.

⁵ See vol. VIII, document No. 268 and footnote 1.

⁶ For the text of the Montreux Convention, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXXIII, p. 213. On the role of the Montreux Convention in Turkish-German relations see vol. V of this series, ch. VII.

No. 203

407/214783-88

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, July 22, 1940.

The Lithuanian Minister called on me today and stated the following:

In view of the important events in his country he considered it his duty not to let these events pass into history without taking action. He had summarized his attitude toward events in Lithuania in a letter to the Reich Foreign Minister. The presentation of this letter amounted to a unilateral act on his part, for which he alone assumed responsibility. He himself did not wish to cause any embarrassment to German policy by this act.

The matter arose in the following way: Some time ago, as a precaution, Foreign Minister Urbšys instructed all Lithuanian Ministers to take such a step in case of a transfer of sovereignty to the Soviet Union. On the basis of a communication between the Lithuanian Ministers he felt sure that a corresponding note would be presented today in all capitals in which Lithuania was represented. The Minister then handed me the enclosed letter, which contains "a most solemn and determined protest."

I told M. Škirpa that for the time being I wanted to keep the document myself, and I assumed from his statements that he did not expect any comment on it. However, I could not tell him whether the German Government would be prepared to accept such a note at all, and I would therefore have to reserve the right to return it to him.

The Minister then stated that particularly in view of the known attitude of Germany he had omitted one point in the note, which the other Lithuanian Ministers would include in their notes to the Governments to which they were accredited, namely, the request that the incorporation not be recognized. The Minister asked whether he could not at least orally present this request here. I rejected this, whereupon the Minister stated that the request was to be considered as not having been made. Finally, the Minister said that he intended to make known his action by an announcement from the Berlin office of the Elta Agency,¹ since this appeared to him necessary for the assertion of his personal attitude toward events.

I requested the Minister to refrain from this, and he promised to comply.

Transmitted to the Reich Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for instructions whether the note should be retained here.² The Latvian and Estonian Ministers may be expected to

¹ Lithuanian news agency.

² See document No. 219.

present similar notes here. The Latvian Minister has already made an appointment with me for 5:30 p. m. today.

WOERMANN

[Enclosure]

The Lithuanian Minister to the Reich Foreign Minister

3991

BERLIN, July 21, 1940.

HERR REICHSMINISTER: I have the honor, Excellency, to bring the following to your attention:

As is already known, on June 14, 1940, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presented an ultimatum to Lithuania under flimsy and unjustified pretexts, in which it was demanded:

1. that the constitutional Government of Lithuania be forced to resign immediately;
2. that the Minister of the Interior and the Chief of the State Security Police be tried without preferring charges based on law; and
3. that free and unlimited entry of Soviet military forces into Lithuania be granted.

On the following day the Russian Red Army, after having attacked the Lithuanian frontier guards, crossed the Lithuanian border and occupied all of Lithuania. Furthermore, a puppet government was forced upon us by a high Soviet official sent from Moscow for this purpose, and the entire administration was put under the control of the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

In order to incorporate Lithuania fully into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, elections to the Seimas (Parliament) were ordered on July 14, resulting in the greatest falsification of the will of the Lithuanian population.

In order to quell any expression of resistance, even before the elections all Lithuanian clubs and organizations were suppressed, the Lithuanian press was seized and its editors removed by force, and the more or less influential personalities in public life were arrested. People who previously were considered open enemies of the Lithuanian State were appointed to Government offices, particularly in the State Security Police.

The Communist party was the only political organization which was allowed to function legally. And it then exerted the decisive influence on the scheduled elections. Only one list of candidates was permitted, namely, the one that was agreeable to the Communist party.

In order to force the necessary participation in the elections anybody who did not wish to vote was threatened with being declared an enemy of the people, and personal attendance was strictly checked.

It was immediately obvious that the Seimas, elected under such circumstances, was only a blind tool in the hands of the Communist party and thereby of the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics. Today, on July 21, 1940, the Seimas adopted a resolution to establish the Soviet system within the country and to incorporate Lithuania into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Russia.

All these measures of the Government of the USSR amount to a flagrant violation of all treaties signed between the Republic of Lithuania and the USSR, in particular however:

1. of the Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920,³ by which the USSR as successor of the former Russian Czarist Empire recognized unconditionally the independence and autonomy of Lithuania, and by which she renounced forever all rights of sovereignty which Russia previously had over Lithuania (see article 1) ;

2. of the Non-Aggression Pact of September 22 [28], 1926,⁴ and of its renewals of May 6, 1931, and of April 4, 1934. In this Pact the USSR obligates herself to respect the sovereignty of Lithuania as well as her territorial integrity and inviolability under all circumstances (see article 2) and to refrain from any use of force (see article 3) ;

3. of the Mutual Assistance Pact of October 10, 1939,⁵ in which the Government of the USSR repeated a solemn assurance to Lithuania not to violate in any way the sovereignty of the Lithuanian State, as well as its internal order.

In view of all these circumstances I feel compelled as the Minister appointed by the constitutional agencies of the Republic of Lithuania and accredited to the German Reich to lodge the most solemn and determined protest against the oppression of my country and the deprivation of sovereignty and national independence of Lithuania by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and to declare that because the above-mentioned resolution of the Seimas was imposed by Russian occupation authorities it amounts to nothing but the most outrageous falsification of the expression of the will of the Lithuanian people and that it is in the sharpest conflict with the constitution and interests of the Lithuanian State, as well as the free right of self-determination of nations, and that, therefore, it cannot be recognized as valid in any way.

I avail myself, etc.

K. ŠKIRPA

³ For text see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. III, p. 105; *British and Foreign State Papers, 1920*, vol. cxiii, p. 1121.

⁴ For an English translation of the text see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1926*, pt. III, vol. cxxv, p. 890.

⁵ For English translations of the text see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. I, p. 705; Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, p. 380.

No. 204

407/214780-81

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, July 22, 1940.

The Latvian Minister called on me today and gave me the enclosed letter to the Foreign Minister, in which he as Minister of the "legitimate Government of Latvia" protests against the incorporation of Latvia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In this connection the Minister remarked that he would not think of creating any difficulties for Germany. None could, in his opinion, result from his entering this protest here.

I told M. Kreewinsch that I would keep his letter personally for the time being. I would notify him later whether the letter could remain here or not.

In connection with the memorandum of the conversation with the Lithuanian Minister¹ there is transmitted herewith this report to the Reich Foreign Minister through the State Secretary, with the request for a decision.²

WOERMANN

[Enclosure]

The Latvian Minister to the Reich Foreign Minister

BERLIN, July 22, 1940.

HERR REICHSMINISTER: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:

The Parliament which convened on the 21st instant in Riga has proclaimed Latvia a Soviet Republic, and it has addressed to Moscow the request that Latvia be incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This resolution lacks any legal basis, since the Parliament itself owes its existence to elections which were held under the terror of Russian occupation and which could not in any way be considered a free expression of the popular will. Previous to this, the invasion of Latvia by Soviet troops was already a violation of all existing treaties between Latvia and the Soviet Union.

As Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the legitimate Government of Latvia I consider it my duty respectfully to inform Your Excellency of my protest against the above-mentioned action.

Accept, etc.

EDG. KREEWINSCH

¹ Document No. 203.² See document No. 219.

No. 205

371/208098-95

Memorandum by the Minister to Slovakia

BERLIN, July 22, 1940.

GERMAN REMONSTRANCES TO SLOVAKIA

1) The German Reich has guaranteed the political independence of Slovakia in article 1 of the Treaty of Protection of March 18-23, 1939;¹ therefore it cannot tolerate any internal disintegration of Slovakia that would endanger this independence.

2) The Slovak Republic has undertaken in article 4 of the Treaty of Protection to conduct its foreign policy at all times in agreement with the German Government. This presupposes merely as a matter of course that developments in domestic politics have to be made consistent with the foreign policy laid down by treaty. The Slovak Government has recognized this and promised on July 19, 1939, "to continue directing domestic political developments in Slovakia in a spirit unqualifiedly positive and friendly toward Germany."²

3) It is to be noted that Slovakia has not fulfilled her treaty obligation in foreign policy and has completely failed to recognize the obligations necessarily resulting thereunder in the field of domestic policy.

a) Foreign policy:

First there is to be noted as a matter of principle the unfortunate personnel policy of Foreign Minister Dr. Durčanský (high treason of Szathmáry, Harminc, Viest, who fled to Paris or London),³ which is doubly dangerous in time of war. The same kind of treaty violation is the note of the former Slovak Minister Zvrškovec, of March 29 last, to the Italian Foreign Ministry,⁴ in which he states that Slovakia is a neutral country and requests at the same time that the English Government be informed of this, in order that England may recognize *Slovakia's neutrality with all its consequences*. Such a far-reaching step by the Minister can have been taken only by instruction of the Foreign Minister.

¹ Vol. vi, document No. 40.

² The original statement has not been found.

³ The activities of these Slovak diplomats who joined the Allies late in 1939 were discussed in a Sicherheitsdienst report on Durčanský which was sent to the Foreign Ministry on June 6 (3011/588218-32); see vol. ix, document No. 309, footnote 4.

⁴ The text of this note was sent by Mackensen to the Foreign Ministry on June 5; Mackensen added that the Italians had assured him that they would comply with the German request not to do anything in the matter (3998/E058215-16).

b) Domestic policy:

The Minister of the Interior, Dr. Durčanský, has failed to coordinate Slovakia's internal policy with the foreign policy laid down by treaty and in accordance with the Slovak commitment of July 19, 1939.

The Jewish question has in no sense been brought nearer a solution; consequently these worst enemies of Germany are still looked upon in Slovakia as valuable and indispensable fellow citizens. Thus, on the arbitral board of the Bratislava stock exchange newly appointed last June, 14 of the 41 members, or 34 percent, are Jews. Four of the 12 stock exchange councilors are Jews. In the timber division 3 of the 4 members are Jews.

The increasingly evident economic betterment of a small circle of politicians, their relatives, and their supporters, compared with the real distress among the people themselves, has resulted in social divisions and increasingly frequent strikes. Moreover, during the last few weeks a systematic communist or communistically camouflaged agitation against Germany has been noticeable, since Germany as the protector of Slovakia and consequently also of the Slovak Government is blamed for this development, that is, for the inaction of the Slovak Government.

c) Political Catholicism:

In his speech in Prešov (east Slovakia) on June 30 last at the meeting of the Slovak Catholic student organization the State President, Dr. Tiso, unequivocally professed his adherence to political Catholicism in the presence of the Chargé d'Affaires of the Nunciature: We can and must have full autarky [sic] in spiritual matters. . . . We Catholics do not need to take lessons from anyone; we have our system . . . Therefore Catholicism must enter public life . . . Catholicism must guide politics . . . any other politics is gangster politics . . . Without Catholic ethics there would be no culture . . . In politics we are aggressive Slovaks because we are Catholics. (A translation of the whole speech as given in *Slovak*, issue 154 of July 2, is enclosed.⁵)

A consistent application of these principles will have the inevitable result that in perhaps 2 years 90 percent of the people will be enemies of this system; that is, the Slovak people will in conformity with its Slavic soul have become communistic.

The reestablishment of a Schuschnigg⁶ state would destroy all the conditions for an implementation of articles 1 and 4 of the Treaty of Protection.

BERNARD

⁵ Not reprinted (371/208096-102).

⁶ Kurt Schuschnigg, Austrian Federal Chancellor, July 1934-March 1938.

No. 206

2097/458199-201

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, July 22, 1940.

e. o. W IV 4018.

GERMAN-SOVIET TRADE

(1) German-Soviet trade has developed altogether quite satisfactorily since conclusion of the new basic agreements.

It should be recognized that especially in the past 2 months the Soviet Government has made considerable efforts in transportation and production to accomplish deliveries of raw materials urgently needed by us. The deliveries of grain, petroleum, cotton, mine timber, and metals are of considerable benefit to us. The effect of the German-Soviet Economic Agreement¹ in the present situation can therefore be positively ascertained.

Complications can be expected to arise owing to the fact that compensatory deliveries by Germany naturally are scheduled to begin later [than the Soviet deliveries]. The German deliveries lag behind Soviet deliveries to a much greater extent than had been provided for in the Agreement. This is primarily due to the very difficult negotiation procedure and the general slowness of the Russian agents.²

(2) The following detailed figures are of interest:

Total Soviet deliveries to date	RM 160 million
of which there were in May	" 32 "
in June	" 53 "
in July continuously rising development.	

(3) The items representing greatest quantity and highest value of all Soviet deliveries are, as of June 30:

'grain	376,000 tons	RM 52 million
petroleum	279,000 tons	RM 39 million

In May mineral oil deliveries stood at 61,000 tons, in June at 102,000 tons. The corresponding figures for grain are 76,000 tons and 197,000 tons respectively.

¹ Signed Feb. 11, 1940; see vol. VIII, document No. 607.

² Cf. vol. IX, document No. 238.

(4) Definite agreements for delivery have been made for the following Soviet goods:

grain	1,000,000 tons
mineral oil	1,000,000 tons
phosphate	500,000 tons
cotton	100,000 tons
manganese	80,000 tons
flax	10,000 tons
timber	RM 33 million

Altogether the value of Russian goods contracted for so far runs close to RM 450 million. Further agreements, among others on 100,000 tons of chromium ore, are imminent.

(5) Furthermore, the following items which by the Agreement were to have been delivered over a period of one year have already been delivered 100 percent by the Soviets:

copper	5,000 tons
nickel	1,500 tons
tin	450 tons

Beyond that, they declared themselves ready, in accordance with Stalin's promise last February, to release to us part of the raw materials purchased by the Soviet Union during recent months in third countries,³ namely:

copper	5,800 tons
tin	535 tons
concentrate of cobalt	75 tons
scrap nickel	75 tons
rubber	1,300 tons

(6) Soviet orders in Germany came at the end of June of this year to about RM 600 million. Fulfilling these orders naturally takes longer, since they are almost exclusively capital goods, production goods, and war materials. German deliveries as of June 30, 1940, came to RM 82 million; this includes a deposit of RM 25 million for the cruiser *Lützow*.⁴

SCHNURRE

³ Cf. vol. VIII, document No. 584. Some disagreement had arisen over what Stalin had promised. On July 4 Schulenburg reported confirmation by Mikoyan that the Soviets were prepared to sell to Germany "half of the nonferrous metals and raw materials purchased in third countries since Feb. 11, 1940." Mikoyan had further stated that despite the difficulties the Soviet Government would continue its efforts to increase purchases in third countries (telegram No. 1298:-2097/453196-97).

⁴ See vol. IX, documents Nos. 229 and 332.

No. 207

4468/E087556-60

Memorandum by Reichsleiter Rosenberg[JULY 22, 1940].¹PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS RESULTING FROM THE DISCUSSIONS
ON NORWEGIAN AFFAIRS

The course of events in Norway and the discussions being conducted with Reichskommissar Terboven have produced a number of questions of principle and methods that concern not merely Norway. Terboven pointed out possible difficulties in Norway that were demonstrated in the developments in Denmark. Similar questions of method are impending in Holland and there is also the whole mental attitude toward Sweden.

With the consent of the Führer I spoke about the "Common Nordic Destiny" in the conviction that all these problems can be more easily solved once it is possible to convert all the Germanic nations spiritually to a great idea and accordingly to assure adherence to this spiritual direction.

I have therefore the honor to submit to the Führer the following considerations:

1

Commissioning of a person with full powers to coordinate the attitudes toward Germanic countries.

Such an office for coordination would not have the function of interfering with internal arrangements of Reichskommissariats, etc., but rather to discuss and coordinate the general attitudes in Germanic countries in the matters of ideology and procedure and to report orally, either singly or together, to the Führer on the various points of view. Such an assignment could be confidential.

2

The Nordische Gesellschaft² should be expanded as the medium of exchange for the cultural, ideological, and scientific development of German-Germanic [*deutsch-germanischen*] relations.

The Nordische Gesellschaft has been taking care of this task for all these years and would have in future the mission of deepening these ideas of a common Germanic destiny. It ought therefore be

¹ The date has been supplied from another copy of this memorandum (4468/E087550-55).

² Regarding previous work of the Nordische Gesellschaft in the Scandinavian countries see vol. v, documents Nos. 427-429, 431, and 432, and vol. ix, document No. 283.

declared to be the coordinating body of the German-Scandinavian and German-Dutch societies. It would be charged with arranging invitations and receptions along with the relevant society in the country concerned.

The Nordische Gesellschaft is organizationally and financially completely sound and is probably the only international association that has done its work without a state subsidy. In the case now under consideration, however, some assistance might be given to it.

The coming "Germanic Day 1941" in Lübeck should be celebrated with suitable arrangements.

3

The external department for Germanic research of the Hohe Schule in Kiel should be expanded.

In execution of the assignment I received, to arrange for the research activities of the Hohe Schule, various institutes are to be founded as external departments of the Hohe Schule, among them an institute for Germanic research in Kiel. This institute will have as its purpose research in the whole of Germanic history and the cultural relations between Scandinavia and Germany. It is to be a research center, in order to introduce the researchers from the Germanic area to the German way of thinking in the field of scholarship as well. As this institute is located in the same Gau as the headquarters of the Nordische Gesellschaft, a constant loyal cooperation is assured from the outset.

4

With regard to the special agreements with Reichskommissar Terboven, the following instructions to him would be indicated pursuant to our conversation :

(a) The Nasjonal Samling is to be assisted by every means as the coming party of the Norwegian people and Vidkun Quisling is to be unequivocally recognized and supported as the leader of the Nasjonal Samling.

(b) As long as a Norwegian state government under the leadership of Vidkun Quisling does not appear possible because of the tactical situation at the moment, it must be arranged that the essential departments of the coming state council [Reichsrat] be headed by persons approved by Quisling and who give assurance of the preparations that appear necessary to the Nasjonal Samling in the transition period. This means that in the future state council a safe majority for the wishes of the German Reich and the Nasjonal Samling is to be assured.

(c) That there be attached as advisers to the Reichskommissariat several persons who are acquainted with Scandinavia and who, possibly through personal connections, can bring about some moderation in the psychological treatment in the transition period.

(d) That a place be systematically made for the Nordische Gesellschaft and its activities in Scandinavia, particularly at present in Denmark and Norway.

A[L^{FRED}] R[^{OSENBERG}]

No. 208

F1/0366-0367

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

TOP SECRET

WIESBADEN, July 22, 1940.

No. 483

RM 29 g. Rs.

Subject: Letter from Marshal Pétain to the Führer.¹

I have learned the following in strict confidence about the content of the letter from Marshal Pétain to the Führer that was sent on to the High Command of the Wehrmacht by General von Stülpnagel:

Marshal Pétain states first that he is pained by General Huntziger's report that Germany is demanding air bases in North Africa.²

The Marshal continues that this demand is not compatible with the terms of the armistice. The defeated France accepted the armistice because although its terms are hard they are not dishonorable. France would never have signed dishonorable terms. Pétain is convinced as a soldier and a patriot that the Führer, who is also a patriot and a soldier, will understand him.

In the Armistice Agreement there is no mention of restriction of French rights of sovereignty in her overseas possessions. This fact facilitated France's signing of the Agreement. To accept the German demand, however, would mean that parts of North Africa would be delivered up to the German military authorities for better or for worse.

¹ Pétain's letter has not been found. A Pol. I M (Grote) memorandum of July 20 recorded that Counselor of Legation von Welck of the Foreign Ministry staff with the Armistice Commission had reported the following:

"Marshal Pétain has written a letter to the Führer regarding the German demand for cession of air bases in Casablanca. This letter was transmitted yesterday evening to the Reich Chancellery. Concerning the content it could only be established that the German demand is not indeed categorically rejected by the French but is considered as going beyond the terms of the armistice. It seems that the French want to derive from this the right to conduct separate negotiations on this question with the aim of transforming their position with relation to Germany to one of a negotiator with equal rights. The exact text of the letter to the Führer was not communicated to Counselor von Welck, evidently in order to prevent other officials from receiving the information in advance of the Führer." (365/206347-48)

² See document No. 169 and footnote 1.

The French Government had resolved to fulfill its obligations under the Agreement strictly and faithfully; it had already proved its loyalty to the contract with the blood of French seamen, and would do so unconditionally in the future as well.

In the opinion of Marshal Pétain the German demand goes beyond a quid pro quo for the discontinuance of a number of armistice terms, whereby France is enabled to defend herself against England. Germany doubtless had the power to force her will upon France. But the Marshal would consider a free agreement between the two Governments on the German demand to be more valuable and more likely to be successful than dictation from Germany. This would also facilitate a rapprochement of the two nations in the future.

I should like to point out expressly that the above is only a general statement of the contents, since I was only able to read the letter through once quickly. I should also like to point out that the letter is treated here as "Top Secret Military."

HENCKE

No. 209

2361/488087-98

*The Grand Mufti to the Ambassador in Turkey*¹

BAGDAD, July 22, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to confirm by the present letter my preceding one [sent] with my friend Naji Bey.² He has advised me of his interview with you, for which I beg you to accept my sincerest thanks.

Subsequent to the aforesaid interview, in accord with all our friends, I have instructed my private secretary to undertake a journey to Berlin and Rome in order to initiate the preliminary negotiations with a view to a close and direct collaboration between the Arab countries and the Axis. My secretary, who is the bearer of this letter, is traveling incognito, but he is very well known to our friends in Berlin. I beg you, Excellency, to honor him with your full confidence, and to extend to him all facilities necessary to accomplish his journey.

With confidence in the fine prospects of our future relations, I beg you to accept, Excellency, my sincerest greetings.

The Grand Mufti of Palestine
MOHAMED AMIN EL HUSSEINI

¹ This letter is written in French.

² See enclosure to document No. 125.

No. 210

175/187181

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 575

BERLIN, July 23, 1940.

I informed the Hungarian Minister and Italian Counselor of Embassy Zamboni this forenoon as follows:

1) The Rumanians had asked that the Rumanian Minister President and the Rumanian Foreign Minister be permitted to come to Germany to deliver to the Führer the written answer of King Carol with additional verbal explanations. The gentlemen would be received by the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister. We expected them on Friday.¹

2) The Bulgarians had also been asking for a long time whether they could visit Germany. The visit had been set for the end of the week. They would be received by the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister.²

3) The preceding information was strictly confidential as long as Germany had not issued an official communiqué concerning it.

I told M. Zamboni in particular, who was interested to know the meeting place, that we were not accustomed ever to make such information public in advance. I asked him to take this into consideration.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See documents Nos. 233 and 234.

² See documents Nos. 244 and 245.

No. 211

B15/B002582-83

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, July 23, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received July 23—9: 50 p. m.

No. 2474 of July 23

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 2385 of July 16.¹

The confidential emissary of the Minister of the Interior just returned from Lisbon yesterday.² He had two long conversations with the Duke of Windsor; at the last one the Duchess was present also.

¹ Not found.

² See document No. 159 and footnote 4.

The Duke expressed himself very freely. In Portugal he felt almost like a prisoner. He was surrounded by agents, etc. Politically he was more and more distant from the King and the present English Government. The Duke and Duchess have less fear of the King, who was quite foolish [*reichlich töricht*], than of the shrewd Queen who was intriguing skilfully against the Duke and particularly against the Duchess.

The Duke was considering making a public statement and thereby disavowing present English policy and breaking with his brother.

The Duke and Duchess were extremely interested in the secret communication which the Minister of the Interior promised to make to the Duke. To the question about what it concerned, the confidential emissary declared that he was not himself informed but that the report was no doubt of a serious nature. The Duke and Duchess said they very much desired to return to Spain and expressed thanks for the offer of hospitality. The Duke's fear that in Spain he would be treated as a prisoner was dispelled by the confidential emissary, who in response to an inquiry declared that the Spanish Government would certainly agree to permit the Duke and Duchess to take up their residence in southern Spain (which the Duke seemed to prefer), perhaps in Granada or Malaga, etc.

The Duke said that some time previously he had surrendered his passports to the English Legation with a request that Spanish and French visas be secured (for a possible personal visit to his Paris residence). The English Legation however was clearly unwilling. In these circumstances he asked the Spanish Minister of the Interior to advise him how he could cross the Spanish frontier again and to assist him in the border crossing.

In a long conversation with the Minister of the Interior the possibility of the return of the Duke and Duchess to Spain was discussed, with the result that the Minister of the Interior, who is unusually interested and active in this case probably will at once send another confidential emissary to Lisbon in order not to attract attention by again sending the first emissary, who is well known. This new confidential emissary is to persuade the Duke to leave Lisbon as if for a long excursion in an automobile and then to cross the border at a place which has been arranged, where the Spanish secret police will see that there is a safe crossing of the frontier.

A further telegraphic report follows.^a

STOHRER

^a See document No. 216.

No. 212

174/136362-63

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 714 of July 23

Tokyo, July 23, 1940—10:35 a. m.

Received July 23—10:30 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 708 of July 20.¹

The Konoye Cabinet, the composition of which was reported in DNB telegrams Nos. 121 and 124, has been confirmed by the Emperor.² The Cabinet was favorably received by the public and the press. It is generally recognized that Konoye chose his co-workers independently, attaching primary importance to personal ability, and that contrary to the practice employed in forming previous Cabinets, he has to a considerable extent eliminated the influence of parties and contending political factions. It is a striking fact that the most prominent personalities in the Cabinet are particularly well acquainted with Manchukuo. This is true primarily with regard to the very energetic Chief of the Planning Office, Hoshino, who will (group garbled) most influential in the Cabinet although he is only Minister without Portfolio. The Minister of War, Tojo, a particularly capable and energetic General, was as Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army a bitter enemy of Russia, but after the conclusion of the German-Russian Pact, he nevertheless actively continued his fundamentally pro-German policy. Foreign Minister Matsuoka, a product of the Japanese Foreign Service, for many years occupied the important position of president of the South Manchurian Railroad. He is known in international circles owing to his appearance as the Japanese delegate at the League of Nations in Geneva, where in 1932 he very emphatically advocated the Japanese standpoint in the Manchurian conflict and announced Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations.³ I have known all three men very well for years. Konoye himself decidedly strengthened his old relations with the Embassy before undertaking to form a government. Of the other members of the Cabinet, Minister of Economics Kobayashi who, as reported, recently expressed himself in an exceedingly positive manner regarding his experiences in Germany,⁴ deserves to be mentioned, as well as

¹ Not printed (174/136359).

² The Yonai Cabinet had resigned on July 16. Prince Konoye had announced the completion of his Cabinet on July 21.

³ In telegram No. 699 of July 18, Ott had already reported: "Matsuoka just now informed me confidentially, by way of Admiral Godo, that he has accepted the post of Foreign Minister and requests friendly cooperation." (174/136353)

⁴ The report referred to has not been found.

Finance Minister Kawata and Minister of Communications Murata. Their appointment is hailed as a happy combination of the leading representatives of commerce, finance and business.

The development of one single party will be continued by Konoye. Several Cabinet posts, which up to the present time have provisionally been united under one Minister, are going to be filled later, I understand, by representatives of the reform movement from the ranks of the coalition party.

I reserve judgment in regard to the political evaluation of the Cabinet. At any rate it is certain that the new Government will seriously seek alignment with the Axis Powers.

The same report is being sent to Shanghai and Hsinking.

OTT

No. 213

9906/E693965

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 571

THERAPIA, July 23, 1940.

Since all points have been settled, the economic agreement is going to be signed.¹ The Minister of Trade has already informed the public in order to give encouragement to the hopes of business circles, which had sunk to a low point. Furthermore, *République* is publishing an optimistic editorial although I categorically stated to Nadir Nadi² that the treaty which we had succeeded in bringing about through our very accommodating attitude ought to have built a bridge to better political relations. As long as the Turkish Government, however, was placing its bets on England we would have no incentive for expanding economic relations. The press representatives here are instructed to comment upon the treaty to that effect, and at the same time to point out to Turkey the great opportunities speaking in favor of an alignment with the Axis Powers.

PAPEN

¹ Negotiations concerning an economic agreement had begun shortly after the German-Turkish exchange of notes on June 12. See vol. ix, document No. 434. Documents concerning the negotiations are filmed on serial 9906. The agreement itself, signed on July 25, is filmed on 9884/E693488-524.

² Proprietor and editor of the paper *Umhuriyet*, the French language edition of which was *La République*.

No. 214

265/172867-89

Memorandum by the Director of Political Division VII

BERLIN, July 23, 1940.

Pol. VII 2092 g.

The Turkish Counselor of Embassy M. Alkend told Counselor Ripken and me the following on the occasion of a meeting, with the request that we treat it as strictly confidential. He added that he was giving the information only as a friend and unofficially, and that the Ambassador knew nothing of his communication.

At the end of June Ambassador Gerede as well as he, Alkend, himself, had received the news from friends in Turkey that the Turkish President intended to reorganize the Cabinet in order to prepare for a change in the entire policy of Turkey. The President had planned to appoint Ambassador Gerede as Minister President. M. Alkend added that Turkish Embassy circles here were not at all in accord with the working methods of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Above all they had noticed that the Foreign Ministry had hardly reacted to the reports of the Ambassador. Therefore the Ambassador had seen to it that a carbon copy of his reports was always sent directly to the President. In retrospect one could call Ambassador Gerede's reporting very fortunate, for in most cases what Gerede had predicted did take place. In particular he had pointed time and again to the extraordinary strength of the German Army and had prophesied a German victory in the west. This reporting had probably induced the President, who had ties with Gerede as a former comrade-in-arms, to decide on this choice. Ambassador Gerede, however, had had the strongest misgivings about accepting the post, however, for he was acutely aware of the difficulties which would confront him. He had conferred repeatedly about this with him, Alkend, and upon his advice had finally said that he was willing. Gerede had mentioned that in that case he would also like to take over the Foreign Ministry.

Then at this moment the White Book documents¹ had been published. In view of this fact it had been impossible for those in charge of the Turkish Government to undertake this change now, particularly since during these days there had also been a Cabinet change in

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 124.

Rumania.² A change in the Cabinet at this time would have given the impression that it was attributable to German initiative. The Turkish Government had therefore had to appear before the National Assembly and obtain a vote of confidence through the statement by the Minister President.³

Alkend continued that these events had been received in the Embassy here with very great regret. But in the interest of the prestige of Turkey they had been unavoidable. However, it was entirely possible that in the course of time a situation might arise which would permit the State President to return to his intention of radically reorganizing the Cabinet. He hoped that the plan would be carried out, some time in the future.

M. Alkend went on to say that he had spoken with a very well informed official of the Foreign Ministry and asked him whether it was true that Russia had demanded of Turkey that she return the two Caucasian provinces which were formerly Russian and were ceded to Turkey after the World War, and that she cede two military bases at the Dardanelles. The official had answered this question in the affirmative and had said that the President himself had edited the reply to the effect that Turkey had lost over two-thirds of her territory in the World War and that the remaining Turkish national territory had the tightest frontiers that a Turkish national state could accept. Turkish soil had been won step by step with Turkish blood. To restrict it further would be to crowd the Turkish people to an intolerable degree. Turkey would not forget the help Russia had given her at the time of her fight for liberation. She therefore reckoned with Russia's having an understanding for this attitude. Alkend added that the Caucasian provinces were excellently adapted to military defense and to conquer them would most probably be rather difficult for Russian troops. As far as the Straits were concerned, the international Montreux Convention was decisive, and Russia had seen that no enemy warship had been able to penetrate into the Straits. If Russia insisted on her demand, the only thing left was war.

Herewith to the State Secretary through the Deputy Director of the Political Department and the Under State Secretary.

MELCHERS

² On July 4, the Tatarescu Cabinet in Rumania had been replaced by a Government headed by Ion Gigurtu.

³ See document No. 179.

No. 215

1221/333094-95

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Pol. 2 Nr. 3 Russia

BELGRADE, July 23, 1940.

Received July 26.

- Pol. V 7560.

Subject: Yugoslavia and Russia.

With reference to my report of July 14, 1940, Pol. 2 Nr. 3 Russia.¹

As I have already reported, the arrival of the first Soviet Russian representative in Yugoslavia since the World War gave a strong impetus not only to the Communist, but, above all, to the Russophile tendencies of the country. These Russophile tendencies are to be found not only in Serbia, but also in Croatia, and in both cases go back to the times when these small Slavic nations saw in Russia their natural protector in the struggle for their freedom and independence. To be sure, these circles realize that Soviet Russia is something other than Czarist Russia, but they do not at the bottom of their hearts regard it as decisive. This Russophile tendency, which is rather widespread, particularly among the peasantry, recently received a not inconsiderable addition in strength from Francophile circles, which are now seeking to substitute for the collapse of their hopes of a French victory the hope that alignment with Soviet Russia might offer protection, however slight, against the Italian-German danger. In political circles that are to be taken more seriously, although here, too, few illusions are entertained on this score, and even in important circles in the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soviet Russia represents a certain hope. For just recently, I understand, the view is being circulated in these same circles that after the present war is terminated, a German-Russian conflict sooner or later is inevitable. If Germany triumphs, she will attack Russia; if Germany succumbs, she will be attacked by Russia. It is believed in these former Francophile circles that in either case only an easing of the political situation could result from this for the Balkans and in particular for Yugoslavia.

Whether and to what extent these ideas are promoted by officials close to the Russian Legation is at present not yet evident. I have thus far not yet made the acquaintance of my Russian colleague, Plotnikov, and have therefore formed no impression of his personality. For the present it can only be stated that he is obviously trying to make friendly gestures toward Yugoslavia. Thus he has not neg-

¹Not printed (380/210377-78). This report described the arrival in Belgrade on July 7 of Plotnikov, the new Soviet Minister.

lected to adapt himself scrupulously to the usages here by not only visiting the grave of the Unknown Soldier, but also the grave of King Alexander in the mausoleum of Oplenac, 80 km. distant from Belgrade, and depositing wreaths there.

Poletayev, the representative of Tass, who arrived here with Minister Plotnikov, has, however, in the short time that he has been here, by his uncouth behavior and his heavy drinking, alienated many of the sympathies which persons in certain circles were very enthusiastically prepared to bestow on him.

HEEREN

No. 216

B15/B002585

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 2488 of July 24

MADRID, July 24, 1940.

Received July 24—7:30 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 2474 of July 23.¹

A new confidential emissary of the Minister of the Interior will go to Lisbon tomorrow² and take to the Duke of Windsor a detailed letter from the first confidential emissary whom he has known for many years. In this letter the first confidential emissary says that he has not yet heard what the important message is which the Minister of the Interior wants to give to the Duke, but he has the impression that it has to do with a warning of the great danger which threatens the Duke and Duchess. In the letter the Duke is further urged to go with the Duchess to a well-known resort in the mountains near the Spanish frontier, and from there to make excursions which bring him suddenly to a certain place on the frontier where by accident one of the secretaries of the Minister of the Interior together with the first confidential emissary will meet him "by chance" and invite the Duke and Duchess for a short visit at an estate near the frontier on the Spanish side. In this way it is to be hoped that the Ducal couple will come unmolested over the border.

STOHRER

¹ Document No. 211.

² Cf. document No. 235.

No. 217

871/208092

The Minister in Slovakia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 240 of July 24

BRATISLAVA, July 24, 1940—9:40 p. m.

Received July 25—3:00 a. m.

1) The Soviet Minister Pushkin called on me today, one day after my return from Germany, in order to learn further particulars about the future fate of Slovakia.

A visit of Slovak statesmen to Germany¹ and a change in government² were taken for granted by Pushkin as facts and were therefore merely touched upon. Pushkin showed great interest in the question of the future boundary of Slovakia; he asked the concrete question whether the boundary with Germany would be changed and whether Bratislava would remain Slovak. When I stated that such rumors were malicious fabrications, the Minister said that after all this was of no concern to Russia anyway, since Slovakia was in the German sphere of interest.

2) Pushkin stated that he had personally listened to the speech of "Herr Hitler".³ The passages on German-Soviet relations were especially welcome for their clarity. Interests had been delimited. Russian territorial claims in the Balkans had been satisfied by [acquisition] of Bessarabia and Bucovina. When I asked whether Russia was thinking of protecting Baku and Batum by advancing the boundary, Pushkin was at first evasive, but then said: "Oh, you know about that".

He then referred to the necessity of protecting the petroleum fields under all circumstances in accordance with the German-Russian trade treaty.⁴ The fifth and sixth German White Books⁵ had been of extreme interest to Russia.

BERNARD

¹ See document No. 248.

² On July 30 it was announced that Minister President Tuka had taken over also the post of Foreign Minister and that Sano Mach had become Minister of the Interior. Durčanský, who had held both the posts of Foreign Minister and Minister of the Interior, had left the Cabinet.

³ See Editors' Note, p. 249.

⁴ The reference here is evidently to the Economic Agreement of Feb. 11, 1940. See vol. VIII, document No. 607.

⁵ See Editors' Note, p. 124. German White Book No. 5 was entitled *Weitere Dokumente zur Kriegsausweitungspolitik der Westmächte: Die Generalstabsbesprechungen Englands und Frankreichs mit Belgien und den Niederlanden*.

No. 218

2140/466158-59

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 589

BERLIN, July 24, 1940.

The Hungarian Minister called on me today in order to inform me that the Hungarian Government had received information to the effect that Rumania had placed an order with the Skoda Works for large quantities of infantry ammunition, guns, and machine-guns, with the explicit stipulation, moreover, that delivery be speeded up. This information had created a certain uneasiness in Budapest, because it was feared that accelerated deliveries of German arms to Rumania would strengthen Rumania's will to resist the Hungarian demands. I replied to the Minister that if his communication to me was supposed to convey that the Hungarian Government suspected us of having consented at the present moment, for political reasons, to the execution of such an ordnance contract, I had to deny this. Germany's attitude toward Hungary had been defined by the clear-cut statements of the Führer, with which the Minister was familiar.

Herr Clodius, whom I called in for the second part of the conversation, then explained to the Minister in detail how generously Germany had complied with Hungary's wishes for deliveries of arms in recent years. If no precise date could be given just at the present moment for the delivery of the remaining planes, tanks, and light field howitzers to Hungary, the reasons for this were purely military, and they had met with full understanding in Budapest at the negotiations conducted there in the last few days.

On the other hand, Germany had never concealed from Hungary the fact that certain arms deliveries to Rumania were unavoidable in order to provide an equivalent for the very considerable Rumanian oil deliveries, indispensable to Germany during the war. The Hungarian Government had known for a long time that in doing so we did not go beyond what was economically necessary. Negotiations about the delivery of infantry ammunition, guns, and machine-guns to Rumania by the Brünn arms factories were in progress since the fall of last year.¹ The deals were closed in various stages; the most recent one happened several months ago,² however. There was therefore no connection at all between these delivery contracts and the political events of the past 2 months. The fact that the delivery

¹ Cf. vol. VIII, document No. 166.

² See vol. IX, document No. 338.

terms were relatively short was explained simply by the fact that the production periods for infantry ammunition, guns, and also light machine-guns were much shorter than for heavy ordnance. This applied to contracts with all countries. We had never, moreover, refused to deliver similar light arms to Hungary. To draw a parallel between the delivery of these light arms to Rumania and the present impossibility of delivering planes and certain heavy weapons to Hungary was entirely unjustified because entirely different kinds of weapons were involved.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 219

115/117746

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, July 24, 1940.

I returned today in a friendly manner the notes regarding the incorporation of their countries into the Soviet Union to the Lithuanian and Latvian Ministers¹ and justified this by stating that we could accept from Ministers only notes which they presented here in the name of their Governments. At the same time, in accordance with instructions, I did not indicate that they were returned by order of the Foreign Minister.

The Estonian Minister likewise wished to hand me a similar note today. I requested him to refrain from doing so, giving the appropriate reasons.

The Lithuanian Minister informed me that of his own accord he had sent the Lithuanian Government a telegram of protest against the resolution of incorporation into the Soviet Union, stating among other things that he did not consider this resolution binding on the Lithuanian people, the nation or himself. The Latvian and Estonian Ministers told me that they had not sent a similar telegram and did not contemplate doing so.

Furthermore, I told the three Ministers that they and the other members of the Legation, including families, if they so desired, could remain in Germany. The three Ministers expressed their very great appreciation for this and also requested me to thank the Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

¹ Enclosures to documents Nos. 203 and 204.

No. 220

1504/871052-53

Senior Counselor Hewel to Prince Max Hohenlohe

JULY 24, 1940.

DEAR PRINCE HOHENLOHE: I studied your letter of July 18¹ and gave it to the Foreign Minister to read. We were much interested in what you wrote of your stay in Switzerland. As politics are at the moment, they do not permit in the Minister's view a continuation of such contacts, since thereby wrong impressions might be created on the other side. The Minister therefore requests you to do nothing more at the moment in that direction. The speech of Halifax² has definitely destroyed our belief in a conciliation party over there and the Führer also does not wish that further attempts be made to build bridges for the English. If the English want their own destruction, they can have it. Nor do I believe that we can achieve anything over there through unofficial channels at this time, for otherwise the English would at least have restrained themselves a bit in their official utterances.

I should be much interested in hearing from you as to the position the Aga Khan is taking at this time.³ I know him quite well and was in correspondence with him for a long time until the war. The cunning fox is naturally sitting in Switzerland and waiting to see how things go.

We are constantly on the move at present and extremely busy. That is why this letter is only a short one.

With cordial regards,

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

[unsigned]

¹ Document No. 188.

² Lord Halifax's speech broadcast on July 22, 1940, answered Hitler's Reichstag speech of July 19. Text in the *London Times*, July 23, 1940, p. 5; the *New York Times*, July 23, 1940, p. 4.

³ See document No. 228.

No. 221

3644/E032847-48

*The Chairman of the Finnish Government Committee to the
Chairman of the German Delegation*¹

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

HELSINKI, July 24, 1940.

MR. CHAIRMAN: In confirmation of our oral agreement on the question of the delivery of nickel ore from the Petsamo region to Germany I have the honor to inform you as follows:

1) The Finnish Government undertakes to ensure the regular delivery of nickel ore from the mines of Kolosjoki, Petsamo. The quantities cannot for the time being be fixed. The delivery will comprise a definite quantity, which will be equivalent to not less than 60 percent of the output envisaged.

2) The Finnish Government will ensure that the mining of nickel ore from these mines is begun as soon as possible, so that the deliveries can begin as soon as it is technically possible. It will also see to it that all the necessary conditions are created in the nickel mines for ensuring as uniform and regular delivery as possible. The German Government declares that it is prepared, to the extent desired by the Finnish side, to make available the technical help that may be necessary and to deliver German machines, installations, etc., for the production.

3) Payment for the nickel ore delivered shall be effected through the German-Finnish Clearing Agreement.²

4) The business details of the deliveries, such as prices, any prepayments that may be necessary, delivery dates, quality specifications, and transportation questions are regulated in a private contract concluded on July 23, 1940, between Petsamo Nickel Company and I. G. Farben-Industrie.³ The two Governments have taken note of this contract.

Accept, Mr. Chairman, the assurances of my highest consideration.⁴

R. v. FIEANDT

¹ In the file is the draft of an identical note from the chairman of the German delegation, Schnurre, to the chairman of the Finnish Government Committee (6509/H072850).

² The German-Finnish Clearing Agreement of June 29, 1940, not printed (9208/H249647-52).

³ Not found.

⁴ In a strictly confidential letter of July 24, to Minister Blücher (3644/E032849-50), Fieandt wrote:

"In connection with my letter of today to Minister Schnurre I have the honor to inform you of the following:

"In the original text of the exchange of notes between Minister Schnurre and myself Finnish deliveries of nickel ore during the years 1940-41 were provided for. In the final stage of the Berlin negotiations this limitation to the years 1940-41 was omitted, in order to bring out that the delivery program did not refer to an arrangement with a time limit, but to an unlimited permanent arrangement. In the commercial contract between I. G. Farben-Industrie and the Petsamo Nickel Company there is provision for termination on short notice. I wish to state on behalf of the Finnish Government that if, as a result of the exercise of the right of termination, the private commercial contract is terminated, in that case the obligation of the Finnish Government to negotiate with the German Government concerning subsequent compliance with the [terms of] the exchange of notes between Minister Schnurre and myself would still remain in force."

No. 222

141/126650

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Portugal

Telegram

No. 411

BERLIN, July 24, 1940.

Sent July 25—12:45 a. m.

zu Pol. II 2597¹

With reference to your telegram No. 735 of July 23.²

Any instructions from the King of the Belgians to Belgian personages there who are loyal to the Government would presuppose that a Belgian Government existed and that the King was in a position to issue instructions. This supposition is incorrect, since all powers are in the hands of the German Military Commander. The King is not in a position to exercise the prerogatives of sovereignty. It would be best to avoid even the semblance of any such exercise. I request you therefore not to comply with any requests or suggestions of this kind you might receive locally.³

WOERMANN

¹ Pol. II 2597: Not found.

² Minister Huene had reported that certain Belgian officials were living in Portugal and were still loyal to the King. He suggested that a message from the King and financial aid would strengthen their position (141/126649).

³ A memorandum of June 29 by Grote of Pol. I M recorded a statement by Hitler that he did not take note of the existence of a Belgian Government (141/126630).

No. 223

B19/B003862

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1462 of July 24

Moscow, July 25, 1940—3:58 a. m.

Received July 25—7:40 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1391 of July 17.¹

As I have confidentially learned from a reliable source, the rumors of a Soviet ultimatum to Finland reported today from Stockholm, are unfounded. On the other hand, Molotov has this afternoon handed Paasikivi a definitive draft of the treaty proposed by the Soviet Union concerning the Åland Islands, whereby, in addition to the previously known obligation to demilitarize the islands, Finland undertakes not to cede them to any other Power; furthermore, the Soviet Consul in Mariehamn is to have the right to supervise compliance

¹ Not printed (104/112322).

with the treaty provisions. In the ensuing conversation Molotov referred to the anti-Soviet attitude of Finnish public opinion and certain governmental circles. In the opinion of the Soviet Government this was due to Tanner. While the Soviet Government had no intention of interfering in domestic Finnish affairs, it nevertheless believed it had a right to expect consideration of its wishes with respect to the selection of the opposite negotiators. Molotov suggested to Paasikivi that he present this view personally to his Government in Helsinki.

The reason for this unusual step is here seen in Stalin's or Molotov's personal dislike of T.

SCHULENBURG

No. 224

B15/B002588

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 2495 of July 25

MADRID, July 25, 1940.

Received July 25—2:40 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 2492 of July 24.¹

The confidential emissary of the Minister of the Interior had the following to add about his interview with the Duke and Duchess: When he gave the Duke the advice not to go to the Bahamas, but to return to Spain, since the Duke was likely yet to be called upon to play an important role in English policy and possibly to ascend the English throne, both the Duke and Duchess gave evidence of astonishment. Both appeared to be completely enmeshed in conventional ways of thinking, for they replied that according to the English constitution this would not be possible after the abdication. When the confidential emissary then expressed his expectation that the course of the war might bring about changes even in the English constitution, the Duchess especially became very pensive.

I would emphasize that, as already reported, I said nothing to the Minister about the considerations involving the future which

¹ In this telegram Stohrer reported: "The Spanish Foreign Minister just informed me that the Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon had made the *démarche* with the Duke of Windsor as instructed and that the Duke and Duchess are ready to return to Spain." (B15/B002586)

were contained in your telegraphic instruction No. 1023 of July 11,² and that accordingly the confidential emissary, who in any event knows nothing of my own or of any German interest in the matter, discussed the question of the throne actually on his own account as an old friend of the Duke.

STOHRER

² Document No. 152.

No. 225

B15/B002589

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2501 of July 25

MADRID, July 25, 1940.

Received July 25—6:00 p. m.

With reference to your circular telegram No. 165 of the 19th.¹

Reports from England are extremely difficult to come by here, since communications between here and there scarcely exist any more. English newspapers can be had only with great delay and with large gaps. I have requested the Foreign Minister to make available to me all reports reaching him from England, which he promised to do, with the reservation that unfortunately the Spanish Embassy in London did very little reporting. Also the Spanish Government has no agents in England.

At this time there are only two reports at the Foreign Ministry from the Embassy in London, which have some interest for us:

(1) English newspapers reprint the reports of the *New York Times* stating that a part of the gasoline received by Spain from America is exported again to Germany and that England for this reason is extending the blockade to Spain. I recommend a strong denial.

(2) General de Gaulle has a decreasing number of adherents. No French politicians of note, on whose support De Gaulle was counting, have come over to him. His popularity decreases steadily. The majority of the French who fled to England want to return to France. The failure of the De Gaulle movement is especially noteworthy in the colonies.

I shall continue to forward by telegraph all available intelligence material on England.

STOHRER

¹ Document No. 191.

No. 226

121/119751

*The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the
Military Commander in France to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 270 of July 25

PARIS, July 25, 1940.

Received July 25—9:45 p. m.

For the Minister's Secretariat.

Brinon has returned to Paris. He has been personally commissioned by Laval to study all questions regarding the resumption of relations with Germany. He reports that Pétain is fully in agreement with Laval's policy. Laval has reported in a positive way concerning the results of the Paris visit. Difficulties within the Cabinet caused by Weygand and also Ybarnegaray. The latter has been informed by Laval that he is unwelcome. However, no measures have been taken so far. Scapini was appointed in place of François-Poncet as representative for prisoner of war questions.

Prosecution of those responsible for the war has been decided on, that is, of Daladier, Gamelin, Reynaud, Mandel, Blum and Cot. To be carried out by a special court to be set up, approximating the People's Court, made up of seven members to be appointed by the Government.

All known Jews have been told to leave Vichy, and are prohibited from staying in the Departments of Allier and Puy-de-Dôme.

SCHLEIER

No. 227

365/206386-87

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M

SECRET

BERLIN, July 25, 1940.

Pol. I M 10491.

REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE ARMISTICE COMMISSION (No. 26)

1. According to information from the Intelligence Department [*Abwehr*], 21 Jews had arrived in Châlons by July 23, to be handed over to the Germans by the French. Of these Jews, allegedly 19 were arrested because of actions in favor of Germany and brought by the French to be extradited for this reason. The Armistice Commission intends to require the French to take them back, since with regard to Jews and emigrants the voluntary principle obtains, i. e., they are to

be brought back to Germany only if they themselves express a wish to that effect.

2. On the occasion of General Stülpnagel's report to the Führer, the Führer expressed the wish that execution of the armistice terms be accelerated. Authorization to dispatch the military control commissions was issued. The exact date has still to be set by General Stülpnagel. The Führer also promised an order which will settle all the questions related to the line of demarcation. In regard to the transfer of the seat of the Government back to Paris, as desired by the French, the Führer said in a conversational way that September might be considered as a possible date. The Führer also stated that the Foreign Ministry together with the OKW would prepare a note informing the French that Germany did not recognize any sort of Polish Government and demanding the internment of the Polish soldiers in France.¹

3. Up to July 23, 700,000 soldiers had been demobilized out of a total of 1,700,000.

Regarding the material demobilization, differences have arisen between the Italian and German Armistice Commissions. The Italians lay claim to the entire amount of war material in the portion of the unoccupied area subject to their control. In their opinion, the equipment for the interim army should be taken entirely from the war material located in the area subject to German control. Negotiations are going on between Wiesbaden and Turin to settle this difference.

4. It has been suggested by the OKW and the civil administration in Alsace that the French be required to hand over certain art objects. General Stülpnagel is reluctant to handle this claim within the framework of the Armistice Commission, since he believes that this question should perhaps be reserved for the later peace negotiations. Senior Counselor Hencke took the view that it is a matter which comes mainly under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry. (Separate telegram follows.²)

5. The naval group has several reports on England's supply situation. According to them, the supply of grain and also of ores and heavy metals is tolerably satisfactory. There is a disastrous shortage of lumber, light metals, and meat.

6. Still unconfirmed reports state that the French ocean traffic with French Indochina has been restored and that the English are not making any difficulties. The report is being checked.

7. The French are very much interested in having the censorship of communications between the occupied and unoccupied areas discon-

¹ Telegram No. 90 of Aug. 1 from Hencke (365/206452) stated that such a note, dated July 27, had been transmitted to the French. The note itself has not been found.

² Not found.

tinued. The Armistice Commission is not unwilling to comply with the French wish, on condition that German authorities control all cables, etc., leading out of France. The French have expressed the desire in this connection also to obtain permission to communicate by code with the French Missions, without communicating the code to us. The OKW seems disposed to comply with this wish of the French. Senior Counselor Hencke stressed the jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry. (Separate telegram follows.³)

GROTE

³ Wiesbaden telegram No. 73 of July 25, 10:50 p. m., not printed (365/206398-99).

No. 228

1504/871063-66

Prince Max Hohenlohe to Senior Counselor Hewel

SCHLOSS ROTHENHAUS, near Görkau,
SUDETENLAND, July 25, 1940.

DEAR HERR HEWEL: With these lines I request you to inform me whether my letter of the 18th¹ has been delivered to you. Below I am informing you of (1) a conversation with the Aga Khan and (2) a request of Baron de With, formerly the Dutch Minister in Berlin.

[I.] At the hotel where for years I have been spending some time in Switzerland, the Aga Kahn does the same. During my last stay there I fell to talking with him. In the course of our chat on generalities he asked me whether I knew you. I said yes. He asked me to convey to you his best regards and to tell you that he, and also his wife, are delighted to recall the days in Germany and that he will always remain grateful for the consideration accorded to him in general and especially on your part. He asked me to convey to you the following with a request that you relay it to the Führer. The Khedive of Egypt, who is also there, had agreed with him that on the day when the Führer puts up for the night in Windsor, they would drink a bottle of champagne together. He knew that the King of Egypt would do likewise with them, if he were present. If Germany or Italy were thinking of taking over India, he would place himself at our disposal to help in organizing the country; he was counting for that on his well-known following and on several young maharajas. He asked expressly that this be transmitted. In his opinion the Führer would attack England directly, yet he thought it would be easier and require less of an effort in German troops, matériel and fewer losses to conquer Egypt than for an attack on England proper.

¹ Document No. 188.

Trade in the Mediterranean could be made secure and now that the Weygand army no longer existed, the individual nations on the eastward march [*auf dem Marsche nach Osten*] would shake off the alien yoke. Russia should be given every satisfaction, even with surrender of Istanbul and certain parts of India. In that way the oil would be shut off also. He went into lengthy explanations concerning governmental systems in India and party struggles in that country and said that the secret of administering India was that the Government had always to act more generously than the parties. Referring to England herself, he said that America's material war aid should not be overestimated, since England was lacking in trained man power for the aircraft, etc., furnished. England could soon be largely cut off from vital supplies. The struggle against England was not a struggle against the English people, but against the Jews. Churchill had been for years in their pay and the King was too weak and limited [*beschränkt*]. Lord Beaverbrook was the only man who had the courage, power, and standing to bring about a change in England, even against Churchill, since the latter had for a long time been in his pay. He himself had always advised against war, but now it was too late and if he were to go with these ideas to England Churchill would lock him up despite his high rank in England and India. He reverted to our talk at the time of the accession to power of the Führer, when I was in England on invitation from the then Prince of Wales and the Aga Khan came to dinner. He had seen Windsor as late as in April and the latter was thinking just as he was and was on close terms with Beaverbrook. On this I must remark that, although the Aga Khan is not always altogether reliable, his judgment since I have known him has not been bad by any means. During the conversation he gave me the impression that he considered Italy better suited to rebuild India, that he had greater sympathies for Italy than for Germany, and that he had in general an interest in the destruction of the present system in India, perhaps also in order to fish in troubled waters. It should be further noted that, although he does not have his funds in England, he has them placed in such a way that he is now in Switzerland hard up for money, to such an extent that he asked me whether I could afford to help him out with some cash for a while.²

² On Aug. 2, 1940, the Foreign Minister in a telegram to the officer in charge of the German Consulate at Geneva directed: "I request that if you have contact with the Aga Khan you maintain it and in case an opportunity occurs you say to him in a fashion impossible to misunderstand, or have communicated to him, that after Lord Halifax's refusal of the Führer's and Chancellor's appeal to reason we intend to destroy England." (B15/B002631)

Prince Hohenlohe forwarded information to Hewel about an interview with the Aga Khan on Dec. 9, 1940 (1504/371043-46, 371049), but Hewel responded on Jan. 23, 1941, that while the Aga Khan's views were of interest, his financial interests were so bound up with the interests of Britain that he could hardly be used (1504/371041-42).

II. In Bern I met the former Dutch Minister in Berlin, Baron de With, with whom and with whose wife I have been acquainted and on friendly terms since 1913 and who during the war and in the post-war period rendered commendable services to us, especially in Vienna, in matters of relief, etc. He informed me that his mother, of ripe old age, was very ill at present and that he wanted therefore to return to Holland. And besides, being now released from his oath, he should very much like to go back to Holland with his family, since his property there is now his only source of income and all his friends are there and in Germany. He mentioned that on the day of his departure Minister Dörnberg had told him on the telephone that he had the choice of remaining in Germany or, if not, he would have to stay abroad. Since he was, however, bound by his oath, he saw no other way than to go to a neutral, but not an enemy country, there to be released from his oath and his position. This has now been done and he should like, while refraining from all political activity, to devote himself to the management of his property. He asked me to sound you or Minister Lammers out whether that would be possible. If permission were given he would put a request to the German Legation in Bern to issue a visa directly to Holland for him, his family, and his servants, or he would apply, through the Swedish Minister in Berlin who is in charge of Dutch interests, to the competent authority. He requested me only to make a preliminary inquiry since he is afraid of receiving a negative reply. I spoke with Baron Bibra in the German Legation in Bern, who would be glad to recommend this case. I should be grateful to you for letting me know whether you wish to do anything in this matter, since he has asked me for a reply so that he can take the necessary steps.³

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

MAX HOHENLOHE

³ From a further letter of Hohenlohe dated Aug. 12, it appears that Hewel had replied on Aug. 1 that De With's return to the Netherlands was not desired (1504/371050-51).

No. 229

247/164151-52

Minute by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, July 26, 1940.

On July 25, in the presence of Ministerialdirektor Wiehl, the Foreign Minister referred to my conversation with Minister Mohr of July 19 [18],¹ and stated that the Führer had decided that negotiations

¹ See document No. 189.

should be opened looking toward an economic union with Denmark. The Foreign Minister instructed me to conduct these negotiations.

I explained to the Foreign Minister briefly my program for the negotiations. The first problem was to determine the views of the Danish Government. In the conversation with Minister Mohr, the Danish views were intentionally left unexplored. I considered it necessary, therefore, first to effect a clarification about aims with the Danish Foreign Minister, and perhaps also with the Danish Minister President. In this connection I would give strong emphasis to economic union as the German objective.

I was also of the opinion that such negotiations had to be handled with a certain urgency. It would not be well to let an opposition in Denmark itself or abroad become vocal.

I intended, therefore, after consulting the domestic authorities, to go to Copenhagen for one or two days, without benefit of the press, in order to effect this clarification. A Danish delegation would then possibly be invited to Berlin, and I would then make it plain that the negotiations had to be concluded in a few days.

The Foreign Minister agreed.²

RITTER

² Weizsäcker told the Danish Minister that Ambassador Ritter would be prepared to take up discussion of economic relations with Denmark in Copenhagen at once (memorandum St.S. 595, July 29: 247/164155-57).

A Danish official account of the preliminaries and the course of the negotiations with Germany in July and August 1940 concerning the conclusion of a customs and currency union appears in the Danish Government's publication *Beretning til Folketinget* . . . vol. v, *Bilag*, pp. 48-64, and documents on these negotiations are published in the annex to the same volume, pp. 335-410.

No. 230

148/129060-61

The Chargé d'Affaires in Cuba to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 140 of July 25

HAVANA, July 26, 1940—12: 40 a. m.

Received July 26—3: 05 p. m.

Press Adviser Sell of the Washington Embassy has turned in the following memorandum which I am forwarding just as it is:

"The Havana Conference¹ gave opportunity for informal talks with a great number of North American delegation members and journalists of whom a certain percentage, even though not large, is not altogether hostile to Germany.

Quite a few are accessible to our arguments, but there was a general, and thus somewhat shocking, fatalistic conviction that war will come

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 258.

soon, because two systems as opposed as Germany and the United States could not co-exist and America must strike before Germany is so firmly in the saddle in Europe and Latin America that the United States would find itself isolated and forced to abandon its present way of life. A Washington journalist who claims that he is well informed told me quite positively that Roosevelt would declare war on Germany in October. A pretext would be easily found, either within the framework of the proposals introduced here by the United States, or by whipping up (group garbled) in the United States over German air attacks on English cities or other such things. Others thought this unlikely, although they conceded that even now some very effective propaganda was at work about 'German warfare on English women and children' and 'the German trampling of British culture' (cf. also Hull's speech of Monday²).

Fully aware of this actual or apparent situation, Fulton Lewis, with whom I have been on friendly terms for 12 years, got in touch with me yesterday. He admires Germany and the Führer and is a highly respectable American journalist and political commentator of the Mutual Broadcasting Company, who a few months ago, after a single broadcast, received over 60,000 enthusiastic letters. L., who travels a good deal, and in connection with the Republican and Democratic conventions met Americans from all classes and parts of the country, stated that people did not want any war, but were rather helpless before Roosevelt's cunning tactics, especially now when by a cornucopia of enormous orders in all the states he had reduced the Congress to a rubber stamp [*Bejahungsapparat*] without a will of its own. He asked therefore to be permitted to make the following suggestion which he had talked over with several responsible persons: The Führer should address to Roosevelt telegrams of no more than 200 words (the recent speech of the Führer was too long for the average American and by describing war operations, etc., had diverted some attention from the subject that really matters here), reading approximately as follows: 'You, Mr. Roosevelt, have repeatedly appealed to me and always expressed the wish that a sanguinary war be avoided. I did not declare war on England and, on the contrary, always stressed that I did not wish to destroy the British Empire. My repeated requests to Churchill to be reasonable and to arrive at an honorable peace treaty were stubbornly rejected by Churchill. I am aware that England will suffer severely when I order total war to be launched against the British Isles. I ask you therefore to approach Churchill on your part and prevail upon him to abandon his senseless obstinacy.' Lewis added that Roosevelt would, of course, make a rude and spiteful reply; that would make no difference. Such an appeal would surely make a profound impression on the North American people and especially on South America and would not be interpreted as weakness at all by responsible circles.³

TAUCHNITZ

² The text of Secretary Hull's opening speech at the Havana Conference is printed in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. III, p. 42.

³ See document No. 296.

No. 231

121/119757-58

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2509 of July 25

MADRID, July 26, 1940.

Received July 26—12:00 noon.

Today the Foreign Minister gave me a memorandum drawn up for the use of the Ministry, concerning the latest reports by the Spanish Ambassador in France on the political situation in France. Its principal contents:

The main problem of the French Government is the attitude of Germany. The Spanish Ambassador in France, who often sees the most prominent men of the new order, finds them full of uncertainty concerning what the Führer has in mind in regard to (evidently 1 group missing). Laval has told the Spanish Ambassador that Germany wants to dominate everything. As a reason he states that the German newspapers in Paris are conducting a violent campaign against what they refer to as the "senile Vichy Government." In the industrial areas the Germans are winning the positive sympathies of the workers through benevolent measures and a good and successful administration as contrasted with democratic slowness. In the face of this, the French Government cooped up in Vichy is struggling with the greatest difficulties; it is afraid of the possibility that a new government will be set up in Paris, through which Germany could conquer France psychologically and gradually push the Vichy Government aside. The Spanish Ambassador does not believe that the Germans are thinking of such a plan of procedure, which in his opinion would be doomed to failure. He points out, however, that it is not enough for the French Government to be satisfied with a transformation into a more or less totalitarian government with suppression of the parliamentary and democratic system. It is also not enough to adopt the doctrine of the victor in order perhaps then to get around it. Rather, it is the opinion of the Ambassador that France, in order to win the confidence of Germany, must very clearly define her policy toward England, even if this should lead to a state of war with England. Laval sees this very clearly, as does Mistler, chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs. Marshal Pétain, too, expressed himself very sharply with regard to England in talking with the Ambassador.

With her possessions in North Africa and the Weygand army in Syria France can do service in the fight against the English, not in

order to transform herself into an ally of the victor, nor to avoid all the consequences of defeat, but in the interest of Europe. But for this—and this complicates the present ticklish French problem still more—the Pétain Government requires authority in these North African areas. This authority, however, seems doubtful to the Spanish Ambassador, and his doubts have been strengthened by his conversations with Baudouin and Laval. This is the point where the Pétain Government can have difficulties in its relations with Germany. The 14th of July was celebrated in Algiers, Morocco, and Tunis as if nothing had happened. If the Germans should demand of the French the occupation of several harbors in this zone, the Spanish Ambassador does not know whether even with the best intentions the French Government possesses sufficient authority for this or, if it should, whether the generals and residents would feel thereby impelled to still greater disobedience and give allegiance directly or indirectly to the forces of the rebel government that are being incited by England. Laval would like to speak with Marshal Göring or with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, in order in the first place to solve the question of installing the government in Paris, so that it may then enjoy as much authority as possible in Paris, which would also be useful to the Germans. The present Cabinet, with all its inadequacies and limitations, is therefore the only possible one for France in the present circumstances, and also the only one that will not lend itself to play the English game.

STOHRER

No. 232

280/152284

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 557 of July 26

BELGRADE, July 26, 1940—12:00 noon.

Received July 26—4:00 p. m.

Foreign Minister Cincar-Marković, whose recovery is making slow progress, invited me to his private home today in order to express to me personally his warmest thanks for the good wishes of the Foreign Minister, which had given him extraordinary pleasure and moved him deeply.

In the course of the ensuing conversation, the Foreign Minister mentioned the fact that just before his illness, he had discussed with the Prince Regent the idea of a visit to Germany for the purpose of again making personal contact with the Foreign Minister. Now it would, of course, be some time before he was able to travel again.

From the further statements he made, it was evident that certain attacks in the Italian press were at present causing him serious concern. If Italy thereby intended to pave the way for later claims to Dalmatia, portions of south Serbian territory, etc., the future looked bleak to him, for Yugoslavia would in that case fight to the finish. Mindful, however, of many a conversation that he had had with the Führer, he was confident that Germany would not allow such Italian claims.

I maintained a noncommittal attitude.

HEEREN

No. 233

66/48413-23

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RAM 19.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND RUMANIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT GIGURTU, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE RUMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, AT FUSCHL, ON JULY 26, 1940, 12 NOON

The Reich Foreign Minister opened the discussion by referring to the great changes in the international situation which had taken place in the course of the past year. Germany now had such a firm grip on the Continent that the Anglo-Saxons would no longer be able to effect a landing in Europe. In spite of all her attempts to draw other countries into the war for her own ends, England was now exhausted militarily. This also threw a significant light on the value of the British promises regarding a guarantee. In this connection he had to admit frankly that Germany had been bitter about the fact that a country like Rumania, with which the German Reich had no dispute, had freed itself only hesitantly from the fatal Titulescu policy and had accepted the British guarantee which at the time it was given was directed exclusively against Germany. Germany had never given Rumania any cause for anxiety and therefore the acceptance of the British guarantee had caused great displeasure in Germany. The true intentions of England and France had clearly emerged from the documents found recently.¹ The British had first declared that these documents were forged; then they had minimized their importance, and were now trying by elaborate explanations to talk their way out of the matter. When, for example, they tried to cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents by calling it strange that the German

¹ See Editors' Note, p. 124.

Army kept on finding new documents, one could answer that an army advancing victoriously would obviously continue to find new archives, whereas an enemy in retreat had no opportunity to do so. These documents had also provided certain unpleasant information about the attitude of Rumania, which for a long time had followed a policy that could not exactly be called anti-German, to be sure, but which must be called absolutely pro-British. All this belonged to the past, but in order to clarify the situation it was necessary to mention it, and everything showed that the Rumanian policy in the past had unfortunately not been as clear as it apparently was intended to be now. If Rumania had believed in the Führer, things would probably have developed quite differently. Years ago the Führer had stated plainly to the Rumanian Minister Djuvara that Germany's interest in the Balkans was of a purely economic nature and was therefore aimed at peace and order.² He had explicitly added that after the Czech question had been settled Germany's territorial wishes in that direction were completely satisfied. Djuvara had taken cognizance of this statement with the greatest satisfaction and had immediately informed Bucharest thereof himself. Nevertheless, Rumania had not taken a stand against the rumors spread by the Agence Havas and other anti-German elements regarding alleged German plans of aggression. This unclear attitude on the part of the Rumanian Government had contributed to the Führer's decision to clarify the relations with Russia. The Baltic countries, moreover, had made mistakes similar to those committed by Rumania. They had been taken in by Mr. Eden's deceit, and Latvia and Lithuania had for a long time been a source of anti-German propaganda.

Turning to the future the Foreign Minister remarked that the German interests in the Balkans went no further than the wish to see quiet, peace, and order prevail there. Germany's interests were mainly economic. She wished to buy grain, oil and other raw materials in the Balkans. She had no territorial interests whatsoever. Hungary and Bulgaria were now demanding certain revisions which in Germany's opinion were completely justified. The Foreign Minister believed if there were a sensible attitude on all sides a solution of these demands was not impossible.

King Carol had decided on the second of the two alternatives mentioned in the letter from the Führer, that of a loyal and peaceful solution.³ It would have been a catastrophe for Rumania, to be sure, if the first alternative had been followed. Germany had very much welcomed the choice of the second alternative inasmuch as it was the only way to bring about stable conditions and actually save Rumania.

² See vol. v, document No. 196.

³ See document No. 171.

Perhaps Rumania believed that Germany took this attitude because she needed the Rumanian petroleum. As to this he must refer to the fact that Germany was becoming more independent from month to month in her petroleum supply. This did not mean that she did not intend to import any more petroleum, but should only be taken to mean that, if need be, Germany would bring the war to a victorious close even without importing oil.

After a brief reference to the Munich conversations with the Hungarians,⁴ and tomorrow's negotiations with the Bulgarians,⁵ whose visit had been planned for a long time, the Foreign Minister emphasized once more that Germany was in sympathy with the revisionist wishes of these countries, as had also been stated in the Führer's letter to King Carol. Germany, however, could only give advice and did not wish to decide on the fate of the Balkans. The great period of treaty revision had arrived. It was a matter of acting in time in order to avoid tension which, if continued, might lead the peoples to take matters in their own hands and force their governments to take some sort of action. This applied to Hungary as well as Rumania. Wise statesmanship must endeavor to carry out measures as soon as possible once they had been judged necessary. The disaster of the lost World War had also disturbed the balance of power in the Balkans; Rumania had become unnaturally large and had obtained territories which she had not won through her own efforts. If the resulting situation were not cleared up by wise political leadership a catastrophe could not be avoided.

The Foreign Minister then referred to certain reports which he had received to the effect that the attitude of Rumania was stiffening and that she intended to undertake only minor border rectifications. (The Rumanians denied this vigorously.) To this the Foreign Minister declared that he could only advise Rumania to bring about a clear and definitive settlement with Hungary and Bulgaria as soon as possible. This was a hundred percent in the interest of Rumania herself. Then he again emphasized the time element. The settlement had to come as quickly as possible.⁶

Gigurtu thanked the Foreign Minister for the frankness with which he had spoken, which enabled him, Gigurtu, to present the Rumanian viewpoint frankly, too. The present Rumanian Government did not wish to defend the previous Rumanian policy, to be sure, but, for the sake of justice, he must nevertheless state that on the basis of a

⁴ See document No. 146.

⁵ See document No. 244.

⁶ In telegram No. 634 of July 30 Welzsäcker instructed Erdmannsdorff in Budapest to inform Csáky that Ribbentrop had advised the Rumanians to enter immediately into direct conversations with the Hungarian and Bulgarian Governments and that the Rumanians had positively promised to do so (73/52618).

thorough study of the relevant documents he had ascertained that since 1935 Rumania had opposed all attempts by the Czechs, the British, the French and the Russians to draw her into a treaty system directed against Germany. He mentioned this attitude on the part of Rumania more or less as an extenuating circumstance.

Regarding the acceptance of the British guarantee Gigurtu said that the guarantee had been unilateral and that the Rumanian Minister President had declared in the Chamber at the same time that Rumania was willing to accept guarantees from other countries as well.

Furthermore, by concluding the economic agreement with Dr. Wohlthat, Rumania had made it clear that she was seeking close cooperation with Germany on this natural economic basis.⁷ Rumania had never sought any dispute with Germany. She had entered the World War on the side of Germany's enemies only because of her opposition to Austria and Hungary. Since 1935 she had willingly placed herself at Germany's disposal in regard to the latter's plans for expansion of the German economic sphere and had loyally cooperated from the very beginning as could be seen from the increase in German-Rumanian trade. At the outbreak of the war Rumania had immediately declared her neutrality and he had himself delivered the King's word to Field Marshal Göring⁸ with the remark that this declaration of neutrality was "but a step toward an alliance with Germany." Rumania, situated in the middle of the Slavic territory and splitting the Slavs in two parts, could plan her role only with the help of Germany. Economically she belonged entirely within the German sphere of interest. It could therefore not be a matter of indifference to Germany whether Rumania was larger or smaller, or whether she was humiliated. She also wanted to adapt herself fully to the Führer's plan for a new order in Europe. Likewise she could carry through her domestic tasks in the field of social welfare only with the support of Germany, i. e., by being incorporated into the National Socialist economic system.

Gigurtu then turned to the Rumanian three-year plan, the goal of which was to increase the Rumanian exports of semi-finished products and agricultural products to a total amount of 1 million marks or 4 million tons, not including petroleum exports. The production of oil would also be speeded up, since the restrictive influence of the foreign companies, especially in regard to stockpiling, was now eliminated.

⁷ For text of the Treaty for the Promotion of Economic Relations Between the German Reich and the Kingdom of Rumania, signed March 23, 1939, see vol. VI, document No. 78.

⁸ No record of this conversation with Göring has been found. According to a memorandum by Weizsäcker, however, arrangements had been made for a meeting of Gigurtu with Göring on Sept. 9, 1939 (169/82737).

Furthermore, Rumania wanted to compensate for the territorial losses in Bessarabia and in the areas to be ceded to Hungary and Bulgaria by the reclamation of 2 million hectares of new land along the Danube. This, however, required a great exertion of will power on the part of the Rumanian people, who had just been humiliated and would perhaps have to cede new territories in the near future. The opinions in the Royal Council had therefore been sharply divided. The older members had wanted war, while the younger generation had advocated peace and reconstruction. Psychologically the situation was difficult because the continuous yielding created a certain passivity among the population which was not at all favorable for the reconstruction work.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that to strengthen the morale of the Rumanian people it was necessary to tell them the whole truth. The Rumanian people must be made to understand that through a stroke of luck and without their own efforts they had acquired territories which they had to relinquish again in their own interest.

Gigurtu said that he would ask the Führer, who understood so well how to treat the masses psychologically, for advice as to the best manner in which to explain the situation to the Rumanian people, for it was necessary to keep up their morale in order to strengthen their productive power and will to work. To do so it was necessary, however, for him, Gigurtu, to bring something home from Germany. He would try to base the settlement with Hungary and Bulgaria on the formula of boundary revision plus exchange of population, for a large-scale boundary revision alone would create a Rumanian irredentist movement and lead to new complications in the future.

The Reich Foreign Minister remarked at this point that Hungary had stated that she would make reasonable demands and for her part, too, try to work toward pacification.

Gigurtu reverted to the question of what he could "bring back" to his people. In this connection he mentioned a border guarantee and economic aid to Rumania. Rumania could also solve the Jewish question definitively only if the Führer carried through a total solution for all of Europe. The Reich Foreign Minister remarked that Germany would definitely settle the Jewish question as far as she was concerned and perhaps would also be able to find a solution for all of Europe.

In reply to a question regarding the procedure for the negotiations, Gigurtu stated that a private delegation of three Transylvanians was to have been sent to Budapest to make the preliminary overtures but that their departure had been postponed as a result of the visits to

Salzburg and Rome. Rumania had not yet got in touch with the Bulgarians. In this connection the Rumanian Foreign Minister stated that Yugoslavia had been asked by Rumania to sound out Bulgaria and Hungary in her own name regarding the territorial and ethnographic demands of these countries, without mentioning Rumania. The Yugoslavs, however, had not carried out this suggestion properly. This prompted the Reich Foreign Minister to remark that direct negotiations between the countries concerned would be better. The Rumanians agreed and in conclusion Gigurtu made several concrete requests of Germany. They concerned German aid as regards armaments, especially antiaircraft artillery, antitank guns and planes as well as an armaments credit of 600 million reichsmarks for a period of 10 years.

Gigurtu further mentioned Gafencu's being sent to Moscow. He had a stronger personality than the previous Rumanian Minister there and his appointment had become necessary, since quite a number of questions would have to be taken up in the near future between Russia and Rumania. He also knew Count Schulenburg very well from former days. It was the aim of Rumania to establish a "border-friendly" [*grenzfreundlich*] relationship with Russia. An alliance with Russia would be too dangerous for Rumania, since the great Russian nation would probably then absorb Rumania. Therefore Rumania wished to adapt her policy to the Axis.

In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister pointed out to the Rumanians once more most emphatically that if a solution of the unsettled problems with Hungary and Bulgaria were not reached soon serious consequences might result. Rumania must settle these matters first of all. Not until this was done would it be possible to see how German-Rumanian relations would develop. Rumania must be sincerely and seriously determined to undertake a real revision of the injustice perpetrated in 1919.

In reply to a remark by Gigurtu that the Germans in Transylvania surely would not speak of any injustice, the Reich Foreign Minister said that the Transylvanian Germans were entirely outside the discussion.

Returning to the general questions, the Reich Foreign Minister told the Rumanians that it was best not to postpone questions which were ripe for solution, but to attack them directly with determination.

The conversation was brought to a close after having lasted for approximately 1 hour.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 234

FB/0120-36

Unsigned Memorandum

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND RUMANIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT GIGURTU, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, RUMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MANOILESCU, MINISTER FABRICIUS, AND THE RUMANIAN MINISTER IN BERLIN, AT THE BERGHOF, ON JULY 26, 1940

Minister President Gigurtu first thanked the Führer for having afforded him the opportunity for this conversation and expressed the hope that it would show a way for finding a solution to the existing difficulties on the basis of justice. For Rumania the situation was very difficult; not so much because of the necessity of having to make territorial concessions at the coming negotiations with Hungary and Bulgaria, but rather because of the time set for these negotiations, only a short time after the cession of Bessarabia to Russia had been exacted from the Rumanian people. This has put the people into such a frame of mind as to make it extremely difficult for the King to yield again. Nevertheless, Rumania was prepared for concessions, since she was entirely clear about her own situation and was aware of the Führer's desire to establish a new order in Europe, of which Rumania wanted to become a part. The Rumanian Government, however, hoped that its neighbors would also be reasonable and would keep their demands within limits that would make it possible to attain a permanent state of peace in the Balkans. For it would be deplorable and useless if Hungary and Bulgaria should make such great demands that a new Rumanian irredentism would grow out of them once more. However, in this respect both the King and the Rumanian people had complete confidence in the Führer's sense of justice.

As for domestic policy, it was a question of instilling different views in the Rumanian people. For the past 10 years the King had been pursuing the objective of putting an end to the excesses by the parties of the country. Two years ago a comparatively unsuccessful temporary solution had been carried out.¹ Now a Unity party had been established, with the King as the leader and the Minister President as his Chief of Staff. As a matter of fact, he had been elevated to this party office 24 hours before his appointment as Minister President. With the help of this Unity party, Rumania planned to reorganize everything according to the German model, and above all to carry out reforms in the economic and social spheres. This, however, was possible only in close collaboration with Germany. In the economic

¹ See vol. v, document No. 179.

sphere, considering the fact that 80 percent of Rumania's population consisted of peasants, it would be primarily a matter of changing the price structure, which at the moment was still entirely oriented toward industry, in favor of the peasants. Rumania wished to adapt her agriculture to German needs in such a way that a community of interests would thereby be created with Germany. A three-year plan drawn up by the Rumanian Government would increase Rumanian exports of agricultural and intermediate products to a maximum of 5 million tons at a total value of a billion marks. For the latter amount Rumania would import the equivalent in German goods and thereby become an important market for German industrial products.

That the cession of Bessarabia to Russia was necessary had by this time been clearly recognized in Rumania. For, after all, it would not have been possible to hold out for very long against Russia militarily. Nevertheless, it was quite distressing to have to surrender territory without a fight. Rumania had endured this in order to save her future. She was aware of the fact that there would be further losses, especially of arable agricultural areas, through the imminent surrender of territory to Hungary and Bulgaria. However, this loss could be compensated again through a reclamation project by means of which large tracts of land along the Danube would be drained and protected from floods. In this way the nation would rapidly recover. The difficulty lay in the mood of the people. It was impossible on the one hand to exact large cessions of land from the Rumanian people, and on the other hand at the same time to demand greater productivity and preparedness for war. For this Rumania required the assistance of the Führer. She was prepared to make concessions, though fully conscious of the difficulties involved, for she hoped thereby to achieve peace. This was only possible, however, if the Führer would somehow provide Rumania with a guarantee.

Specifically Gigurtu requested Germany's aid in supplying Rumania's armament needs and easing payments by the granting of extended time limits, since the financial situation of Rumania was extremely precarious. By an agreement with Hungary and Bulgaria, Rumania hoped to be able to reduce the expenditures for her mobilized Army considerably, and if the Russians would also furnish guarantees she could even demobilize completely.

The Rumanian requests for armament aid referred particularly to the Air Force, and antiaircraft and antitank batteries. Moreover, Rumania would very much like to be introduced to the new art of warfare and the use of these new weapons through the dispatch of a German military mission.

Turning to the Jewish question, Gigurtu remarked that they had started on a solution, to be sure, but that no final settlement could be

undertaken without the assistance of the Führer, who must carry out a total solution for all of Europe.

Finally Gigurtu also requested the advice of the Führer about the treatment of the present difficulties from the standpoint of domestic policy. Considering the great experience the Chancellor of the German Reich possessed in the psychological treatment of the masses, it would be of great interest to the Rumanian Government to learn from him how it could convince the Rumanian people of the necessity to make sacrifices in favor of Hungary and Bulgaria.

The Führer replied that it was difficult to give such advice, and first of all defined the German interests in Rumania as follows: Political interests had frequently been imputed to Germany in an area where she had no such interests and could not have them. Paris and London had made this charge in order to mobilize the countries in question against Germany. A veritable craze of false charges had broken out and had also been supported for many years in Rumania by the so-called Titulescu policy. This Rumanian Foreign Minister had played a role that was exceedingly unfortunate for the future of his country, for it was obvious that the state of affairs established in 1919 was untenable in the long run and that eventually the real interests would assert themselves. Only Germany, however, was genuinely interested in Rumania, while England and France merely used this country for their own purposes as a pawn in the game of power politics. Without Germany there could be no balanced continental economy. The German Reich was not only a large supplier—other countries were that, too—but was also of great importance as a consumer. She not only wished to do exporting, but also to satisfy her own needs. She therefore represented the sole economic factor of value to Rumania and the Balkan countries. This point both Titulescu and Gafencu had overlooked.

The Führer then spoke of his conversation with King Carol, who had stated to him at the Obersalzberg ² that a cession of the Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary was not acceptable and who had expressed the desire of ensuring a direct line of communication with Germany through the construction of a large auto highway. The Führer had rejected this, since he did not wish to expose himself militarily in an area where the system of communications was at a low stage of development, and because a highway construction project such as the King envisaged would require billions, the amortization of which could be assured only by decades of stable trade. At that time the Führer had stated to King Carol very clearly that Germany's political interests ended at the Carpathians (opposite Slovakia), and that therefore she would not permit another power to push across the

² See vol. v, document No. 254.

Carpathians. Complete agreement had been reached with Slovakia. Germany was not in the habit of handing out guarantees as other countries did, and had left Slovakia complete freedom, too. Only upon the express desire of that country had she taken over its protection, and would now proceed against anyone who might lay hands on Slovakia. Although Germany's political disinterest in Rumania had been plainly demonstrated to the King of Rumania by the clear delimitation of the sphere of German interests at the Carpathians, rumors suddenly arose of a German ultimatum to Rumania; England stated that she would not tolerate an advance by Germany in the direction of Rumania, etc. In Rumania herself not a single voice was raised to protest against these completely senseless rumors and to set matters aright in accordance with the Führer's clear statement to the King. Then England's irresponsible promise of a guarantee was accepted by Rumania, and on the surface appeared to be a kind of confirmation of the above-mentioned rumors.⁵ In these circumstances the Führer had decided to express his disinterest so clearly that there could no longer be any doubt of it. Besides the alleged ultimatum to Rumania, still other plans with respect to Finland, the Baltic States and the Ukraine had been imputed to him, at the instigation of the British warmongers. In order to bring about a complete clarification of all these questions, the Reich Foreign Minister had gone to Moscow and there achieved a clear delimitation of spheres of interest with the Russians. While the German Wehrmacht would have immediately attacked any intruder within its own sphere of interest, Russia had been told that Germany would be absolutely indifferent to things occurring outside the German frontier of interest. This had been a very sober declaration involving grave consequences, for which, however, certain statesmen of the countries affected had only themselves to blame, since they had acted with extraordinary irresponsibility—not to use another word. Perhaps there would have been no war at all, had the statesmen of these countries not permitted themselves to be misused by England.

In these circumstances the war, which England had prepared for a long time, had come after all and had made a settlement with Russia seem expedient. However, no partitioning agreement had been concluded with the Russians; the latter, rather, marched into Poland only after that campaign had been practically completed in a military sense. Moreover, Germany could not accept responsibility for everything, but could only intercede for those countries which, like Slovakia, had identified themselves with her destiny.

The Führer then turned to Rumania's special problems. He did not overlook by any means the psychological difficulties involved.

⁵ Cf. document No. 56.

Russia declared that although she had always backed Rumania and had fought at her side, this country had wrested from her important territories in her hour of weakness, which she now had to reclaim. Hungary declared that she had not been defeated by Rumania in the World War, yet had been forced to cede territories nevertheless. Bulgaria's stand could be expressed in a similar manner, while Rumania replied that a large number of Rumanians lived in the territories concerned and that therefore for reasons of national honor she was prevented by certain imponderables from making concessions for the satisfaction of the aforesaid demands. The Führer emphasized anew that Germany was completely disinterested, both politically and territorially. Ethnologically, too, she had no interests in the Balkan area, since the German communities were too much scattered and lived in different countries. The Germans in Rumania, by the way, had always expressed the desire to remain with Rumania. The Führer had also emphasized this point to the Hungarians. Economically Germany was interested in all the Balkan countries, since they represented virtually ideal partners-in-trade for Germany in the exchange of agricultural products, and also petroleum in the case of Rumania, for industrial products. The same, of course, was also true in reverse. Germany was the best and most dependable customer for the products of the Balkans. From this followed also Germany's political interest in the Balkans, which was not a selfish territorial interest, but lay merely in maintaining political conditions which permitted the cultivation of economic relations. At the same time her interest in free economic areas not yet tied to other blocs was, of course, all the greater. Because of these economic interests, however, Germany was not prepared to undertake political adventures that would probably lead to a catastrophe and thereby also to the destruction of the economic interests. Germany did not wish to endanger the peace and security of the Balkans by any political measures. At the time the Russian wishes concerning Bessarabia were made known to Rumania, Germany had therefore advised her to yield, in sober recognition of the hopelessness of a military conflict for Rumania, especially since in case of an armed clash with Russia, military action by Hungary and Bulgaria had to be expected. As one who knew the Turkish Army the Führer was in a position to say that Rumania could scarcely have counted on its assistance, while Yugoslavia, despite her promises, would most probably never have taken action against another Slavic power. For that reason the Führer had advised Rumania to make a peaceful settlement; at the same time, however, he had brought similar influence to bear on Budapest, and had advised Hungary not to add fuel to the fire and not to let herself become involved in an undertaking the beginning of which was clear,

to be sure, but the further development of which could not be foreseen. Of course, it had not been possible for him (the Führer) simply to forbid the Hungarians to take any action, since he would not have been able to offer them anything in return, and he also did not wish to stand before Hungarian public opinion as the hated man who opposed the revision of the injustice of 1919. He had therefore left the Hungarians an entirely free hand, although he had emphasized that everything they did would be on their own responsibility. He had warned them of the possibility that the conflict might spread to the ideological realm and had called their attention to the danger of a racial war and the rise of a Slavic wave.⁴ The Balkans were an extremely dangerous tinderbox where a war of all against all else could easily develop, leading to an impossible situation. In case of a conflict Hungary might conceivably conjure up ghosts which she would find it hard to lay afterwards, and which had once before caused her a great deal of trouble. He had therefore promised the Hungarians merely that he would convey his views to King Carol, who had turned to him for his opinion on these questions. Unlike England and France, Germany, as stated, was interested in seeing that peace and tranquillity prevailed in these areas on the basis of a reasonable and just settlement between the three countries. The situation of Hungary was made more difficult by the fact that the Jews of that nation, and the Freemasons, who are oriented toward western Europe, purposely inflated the Hungarian demands with the intention of causing Germany difficulties by creating confusion and in order to set afire the Balkan countries, not alone in a figurative sense, but as in the case of Rumania also in the literal sense of the word, just as France and England also planned to do. The documents found by Germany, the authenticity of which the Rumanian Minister at Vichy could verify at any time with the French Government, revealed these English-French intentions very clearly.

On the other hand, it was in Germany's interest to avoid a conflict and to achieve a solution that would bring about stable conditions and be acceptable to all parties concerned. A compromise had to be found between the former and present possessions. He (the Führer) professed this advice as one who was entirely disinterested from the standpoint of power politics and territorial gain. As far as the extent of the sacrifice to be made was concerned, the formula for an agreement would have to do justice ethnographically to all parties concerned. This could be accomplished on a long-term basis through an exchange of populations, which would take the edge off the territorial cessions and lead to the 100 percent satisfaction of all wishes with regard to nationality.

⁴ See document No. 146.

As to the procedure to be adopted, the Führer stated that the territory inhabited by Germans had to remain with Rumania. If these Germans were permitted to maintain their cultural autonomy, Rumania would find them to be loyal citizens and industrious workers. However, in no event would they permit themselves to be Rumanianized.

In answer to the question posed by the Rumanians as to how one might best explain the necessity for sacrifices to the people, the Führer said that here absolute veracity was in order. One had to explain to the Rumanian population that they had to accept sacrifices to avoid new tensions, in the interest of their economic and financial well-being, which could only be founded on political stability and peace.

Once such a state of tranquillity and stability had been achieved, he (the Führer), together with Italy, might be prepared to give some kind of guarantee. He believed that in this matter he could speak for the Duce also. This would not involve a guarantee in the English sense. The beneficiaries of the guarantee would not be called upon to make blood sacrifices for Germany. Thus, for instance, Germany had not sent the Slovaks into battle any more after the conclusion of the Polish campaign, although they had been willing to join the war in the west. The Führer was conscious of the tremendous responsibilities he would assume by granting such a guarantee to Rumania. He would not do this without self-interest, since he was concerned about economic stability and would be in a position to assume firm commitments to purchase Rumania's agricultural surplus over a period of decades. A long-term economic treaty, however, was possible only when political peace was secured. This would be Germany's incentive for assuming the previously-mentioned obligations regarding a guarantee. Germany would welcome it if as many countries as possible would join in making this guarantee. That would reduce the risk of each participant. In any event she hoped that Italy would take part in the guarantee. However, in certain circumstances Germany would also be prepared to assume the guarantee alone. At the present moment, however, she could not make such a declaration, since everything was still in a state of flux and there was a danger that the conflict might break out on all sides. For in contrast to other countries, Germany would in all circumstances live up to such an obligation regarding a guarantee just as she would do in the case of Slovakia, without, however, interfering in the internal affairs of these countries. Only the democracies would do such a thing. Germany had enough to occupy her at home.

In regard to the method of negotiating, the Führer remarked that entering into direct contact with Hungary and Bulgaria would ap-

pear to him as the best way. He had also written the King that Rumania had to be careful not to play off against each other the two partners in the negotiations, Hungary and Bulgaria, since such tactics could never bring about a really sound permanent solution. All he had said was given to Rumania merely by way of advice. Moreover, he would repeat—and it was not just talk for him to say this—that in case an agreement were arrived at, Germany would weigh her interests carefully and might consider them so vital under certain conditions that she would be ready to fight if someone were to tamper with these interests.

With regard to deliveries of material for armament, the Führer stated that during the present life and death struggle Germany needed her own weapons herself, but that perhaps captured enemy equipment could be furnished. Germany possessed 165 attack divisions (of a total of 200 divisions) which had to be supplied with equipment, and the German Luftwaffe was more than twice as large as the English and had corresponding material needs.

To an interjection by the Rumanians that they needed the anti-aircraft batteries from Germany for the protection of their oil refineries, the Führer replied that for such matters there was only one form of protection: a major power standing behind Rumania which would be able to annihilate any attacker, so that the risk of such an attack would be too great.

The Rumanian Foreign Minister raised certain doubts concerning the implementation of any agreement that might be reached with Hungary and Bulgaria. He pointed to the irascible temperament of these two partners in the negotiations, and especially anticipated difficulties in carrying out the exchange of populations. He inquired whether Germany would be able to furnish any sort of assistance in the implementation of the agreement. The Führer first countered with the question how many persons in the territory under dispute were involved. The Rumanian Foreign Minister replied that on the basis of statistics of the year 1930, the total number of inhabitants was 5,550,000, of which 1,340,000 were Hungarians. Statistics from the year 1910 arrived at approximately the same number of Hungarians, that is, 1,664,000, from which 180,000 Jews and 100,000 gypsies had to be deducted.

By way of a purely personal suggestion the Führer raised the question whether a census and plebiscite could not be undertaken in the Szekler area to determine more accurately the distribution of the population and whether the people wanted to belong to Rumania or Hungary. It should be considered whether this could not be supervised by Italian and possibly Spanish commissioners. Germany, after all, as

a power concerned (because of the Germans in Transylvania) could not be considered for this task.

The Rumanian Foreign Minister pointed out in this connection that the new boundary ought to be drawn in such a way that Hungary and Rumania would retain the same number of nationals of the other country in their territory, so that the situation could be definitively cleared up by means of a subsequent exchange of these alien population elements. Gigurtu termed this an exchange of "soul for soul."

To a question by the Führer as to how much territory Rumania had received in 1919 and how much she was prepared to relinquish to Hungary, Gigurtu replied that the Rumanian territorial increase had amounted to 123,000 square kilometers, of which Rumania was ready to cede 14,000 to Hungary. At this point Manoilescu made a gesture which hinted that this was not the final word of the Rumanians. Gigurtu added that agreement between Hungary and Rumania would be comparatively easy if Hungary would adopt the viewpoint expressed in Count Csáky's recent moderate speech. It was the goal of the Rumanian Government to bring about a close relationship with Hungary in the more distant future, because the two countries formed an island, as it were, in the Slavic ocean and would certainly perish if they fought a war with each other every 30 years.

The Führer then turned the conversation to the original Hungarian demand for the restoration of the 1000-year-old boundary of King Stephen's realm and said that such things were of course impossible, for by applying a similar criterion Germany, for instance, could claim that she once extended as far as Sicily, while Italy's claims on the basis of the Roman Empire would go still further.

The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out in this connection that the Hungarians wished to recover half of the territory lost in 1919.

The Rumanian Foreign Minister then submitted several prewar population charts of Hungarian and Austrian origin which showed the Transylvanian territory predominantly settled by Rumanians. He proved the same thing on the basis of more recent population statistics.

Following this Gigurtu inquired whether for the sake of easing the internal political situation of Rumania simultaneous revision negotiations among other Balkan States would not be advisable, so that the Rumanian Government might be able to point out to its people that other countries also had to make concessions. However, the Führer advised against such a procedure.

The Rumanian Foreign Minister further inquired whether recourse to arbitration could be contemplated in case the negotiations with Hungary and Bulgaria reached an impasse. This idea, however, was

rejected by the German side on the grounds of unsatisfactory experiences with the Vienna Award, especially with respect to Hungary.⁵

In a conversation subsequently carried on during tea, the previously-discussed topics were resumed in part. In answer to a question by the Rumanian Foreign Minister whether ideological viewpoints would not also be of significance in the future collaboration between Rumania and Germany, the Führer replied that only concrete interests were to be taken into consideration in the collaboration and that the identical ideologies could at best enter in as an additional bond. The ideal situation in this respect had been attained by Italy and Germany. There was no clash of interests whatsoever between the two countries. They had the same basic ideology, and moreover, aside from the really amazing parallelism of their careers, a deep personal friendship existed between the Führer and the Duce.

Another topic which was resumed at the tea was the Jewish question. Gigurtu described in detail the strong penetration of Rumania's economic life by Jewish elements (commerce up to 70 percent), which could not be removed without injury to the economy. However, he was determined to move ahead step by step with the process of eliminating the Jews.

The Führer pointed out on the basis of numerous examples from the development in Germany that despite all talk to the contrary the Jews had proved to be absolutely dispensable.

Gigurtu then turned to a discussion of the nationalization of the oil industry. It was feared in Rumania that Germany would not be pleased with such a measure, since she possibly wished to assume the succession of the British and French stockholders and direct the production in Rumania herself. The Führer replied that this was by no means the case. Germany did not object in the least to the nationalization of the Rumanian oil industry and its management by Rumania. If she were to assume the succession of the British and French stockholders, she would be perfectly satisfied with receiving the dividends punctually and would not concern herself with anything else.

Next Gigurtu spoke in detail about his plans concerning the reconstruction of the Rumanian economy, especially of agriculture, and the raising of the peasant's standard of living.

After about 2 hours the conversation was concluded.⁶

⁵ See vol. v, document No. 272.

⁶ Subsequently, the two Rumanian statesmen proceeded to Italy and were received on July 27 by Mussolini and Ciano. The substance of these conversations was reported in telegrams Nos. 1415 and 1416 from Mackensen sent on July 29. (175/137171-76)

See Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 576-79.

No. 235

B15/B002591-93

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, July 26, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received July 26—6:50 p. m.

No. 2520 of July 26

For the Foreign Minister.

After detailed discussions with Schellenberg, the carrying out of the following plan is being attempted in connection with, and in continuation of, the already-announced maneuver involving the confidential emissaries:¹

The influence upon the Duke and Duchess exerted by the confidential emissaries is already so effective that a firm intention by the Duke and Duchess to return to Spain can be assumed as in the highest degree probable.

In order to strengthen this intention, the second confidential emissary, who was detained yesterday, in line with instructions,² was sent off today, July 26, with a letter to the Duke very skillfully composed psychologically by the first confidential emissary; as an enclosure to it was attached the very precisely prepared plan for carrying out the crossing of the frontier. According to this plan the Duke and his wife should set out officially for a summer vacation in the mountains at a place (providing opportunity for hunting) near the Spanish frontier, in order to cross over the frontier at a precisely designated place at a particular time in the course of a hunting trip. Since the Duke is without passports,³ the Portuguese frontier official in charge there (a captain who is personally obligated to the Spanish Minister) will be won over. At the time set according to plan, the first confidential emissary of the Minister is to be staying at the frontier with Spanish forces suitably placed in order to guarantee safety.

Schellenberg with his group is operating out of Lisbon in closest working relation to the same purpose.

For this purpose the journey to the place of the summer vacation, as well as the vacation itself, will be shadowed with the help of a

¹ See documents Nos. 159, 175, 211, and 216.

² In telegram No. 2506 of July 25 (B15/B002590), replying to the Foreign Ministry's telegram No. 1121 of July 24, Stohrer reported that the departure of the confidential emissary for Lisbon had been postponed. Telegram No. 1121 has not been found.

³ See document No. 211. In a subsequent telegram of July 26 (No. 2531:-B15/B002595) Stohrer transmitted a report from the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon "according to which the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, after energetic pressure, had now obtained through the English Embassy in Lisbon a visa for Spain. Confirmation of the report still has to be awaited. The plan elaborated in the previous telegram will in all events be followed through anyway, since a counteraction by the I. S., even in connection with granting the visa, is possible."

trustworthy Portuguese police chief who is an acquaintance of Kriminalkommissar Winzer, attached to the Embassy. There is also the closest working relationship here with the Schellenberg group.

At the exact moment of the crossing of the frontier as scheduled the Schellenberg group is to take over the security arrangements on the Portuguese side of the frontier and continue this into Spain as a direct escort which is to be unobtrusively changed from time to time.

For the security of the entire plan the Minister has selected another confidential agent, a woman, who can make contact if necessary with the second confidential agent who was sent off today, that is the 26th, and can also if necessary get information to the Schellenberg group.

In case there should be an emergency as a result of action by the English Intelligence Service, preparations are being made whereby the Duke and Duchess can reach Spain by plane. In this case, as in the execution of the first plan, the chief requisite is to obtain willingness to leave by psychologically adroit influence upon the pronouncedly English mentality of the Duke, without giving the impression of flight, through exploiting anxiety about the I. S. and the prospect of free political activity from Spanish soil.

In addition to the protection in Lisbon, it is being considered in case of necessity to induce willingness to leave by a suitable scaremaneuver to be charged to the I. S.

If the entire plan should succeed, security in Spain will be regulated by the Schellenberg group after agreement with the Spanish Minister.

Further details can at present not yet be reported, since the planning is just beginning. Schellenberg is in reliable connection with me by code.

Schellenberg requests that the Chief of the Security Police be informed of the planning.

STOHRER

No. 236

584/239524

The State Secretary to the Ambassador to the Holy See

Telegram

No. 47

BERLIN, July 26, 1940.

With reference to your telegram No. 87 of June 28.¹

After the Nuncio had lately, seemingly on his own initiative, twice touched on the question as to what has happened to the feeler of the Vatican regarding a peace initiative of the Pope, I told the Nuncio today the following.

¹ Document No. 48.

For some time we have had enough information about the reply from London to the feeler of the Vatican in the peace question to consider that the English attitude must be regarded as negative.

The German answer regarding the feeler of the Vatican has in fact been made by the Führer's speech of the 19th of this month.² The reply made by Lord Halifax in his radio address of the 21st has fully confirmed our view of the obstinacy of the British Government. Obviously England wanted war, which she would get, with all its horrors.

22nd

The Nuncio, on his own part, also found the English intransigence incomprehensible. In contrast to that he fully appreciated the Führer's unequivocal declarations of October 6, 1939,³ and of the 19th of this month. In his opinion now there was nothing to be done about it. It took two to arrange a marriage.

I am not certain whether the Nuncio will report to Rome on our conversation and recommend that you, if you deem it advisable, give the Vatican a final word about the feeler.

WEIZSÄCKER

² See Editors' Note, p. 249.

³ On Hitler's address before a special session of the Reichstag on Oct. 6, 1939, see vol. VIII, Editors' Note, p. 227.

No. 237

265/172871-72

The Acting Director of the Information and Press Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 1287

BERLIN, July 26, 1940.
e. o. P. 13264.

Drafting Officer: Counselor Dr. Staudacher.

From a reliable, strictly secret, source it has become known here that the Turkish Ambassador there, in order to exonerate Turkey in regard to the efforts by the Western Powers to expand the war, has pointed out repeatedly to the Foreign Commissariat there "gross forgeries" in the DNB version of the contents of our document 23 of the fourth publication from the secret political files of the French General Staff (Ambassador Massigli's report about information of the English Chargé d'Affaires at Ankara dated April 1, 1940¹). For

¹ Document No. 23, published in the German press, is document No. 82 in German White Book No. 6, *Die Geheimakten des französischen Generalstabes* (Berlin, 1941). See Editors' Note, p. 124.

your information you are apprised of the fact that unfortunately a faulty translation distorting the meaning did creep in during the DNB foreign editing: In their own translation back into French from the official German text, "defensive" was twice rendered by "attack," the translation not being based on the original French version of the documents.

Please point out to the Foreign Commissariat in a manner which appears suitable and when an opportunity offers itself that any attempt to contest the genuineness of the documents on the grounds of such faulty translations is refuted by the fact that the Foreign Ministry submitted to the world photostats of the original document as the definite official basis, thus also refuting any imputed intention to carry out tendentious deceptions. In any case the last publication was not made primarily on account of the role of Turkey, but in order to prove the concrete machinations of the English and the French to expand the war.

In particular the further statement can be made that Fillipov, the Tass representative here, was the first foreign correspondent in Berlin to whom the Press Department gave these photostats of the publication of documents in question, so as to have them passed on to Moscow.

Further copies of the photostats will be sent with the next courier.²

SCHMIDT

*Note:*³ It has been ascertained that our Embassy in Moscow did not receive photostats directly from the picture section of the Press Department. On the other hand, Fillipov, the Tass representative here, was the first foreign correspondent to be given the photostats in question, especially document 23 which is under discussion; he received several copies from Counselor Staudacher, with the express recommendation that they be submitted in Moscow.

² On Aug. 31, the Foreign Ministry sent to the Embassies in the Soviet Union, Italy, and Turkey, and to the Legations in southeast Europe, for their strictly confidential information, translations of what were alleged to be additional documents supplementary to the Anglo-French-Turkish Pact of Oct. 19, 1939, (League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167). One of these documents was an alleged Protocol No. 3 in which France and the United Kingdom obligated themselves to cooperate effectively with Turkey and to give her, at her request, every aid and support of which they were capable as soon as a military advance caused by a European power reached the boundaries of Bulgaria or Greece. The other document was an alleged military convention which provided for measures of mutual assistance against an Italian attack in the Balkan area. (285/181802-10)

³ This note appears on the draft of this instruction, presumably in explanation of its background.

No. 238

270/175374-79;
270/175381-82

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

BERLIN, July 26, 1940.

Pol. V 870 g. Rs.

With reference to our instruction of July 17—Pol. V 836 g. Rs.¹

According to a reliable, strictly secret source² Gavrilović, the Yugoslav Minister at your post, has reported the following to the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade about his conversations with the English, Turkish and French Ambassadors in Moscow and with Molotov, upon whom he called in the above order between July 14 and 18:

1) The English Ambassador told M. Gavrilović that England would resolutely carry on the war to the end. Italy was defeated in the Mediterranean and the Soviets were aware of this. The fall of France had produced great fear of Germany in the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government feared a sudden and unexpected German attack and was therefore trying to gain time. The Soviet Government believed that the Germans would not yet be ready for a war against it this winter.

Sir Stafford Cripps remarked further that Yugoslavia's standing with the Soviets was much better than that of Bulgaria, which was now backing the Germans fully. The Soviets wished to develop their relations with Yugoslavia further. Germany, which was interested in preserving peace in the Balkans, was trying to bring about an understanding between Turkey and the Soviet Union. According to the view of the English Ambassador the Soviet Union would be satisfied with a revision of the Treaty of Montreux,³ to which, in his personal opinion, Turkey would agree.

¹ Not printed (270/175455-56). It informed Schulenburg of the contents of an intercepted report by the Yugoslav Minister to the Soviet Union, Milan Gavrilović, telling of his reception by Kalinin, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR. According to Gavrilović, Kalinin had criticized Germany's methods in trading with Yugoslavia and in this connection had stated "that the Germans would not secure peace in this manner; that the Germans were always demanding more and more; that one must fight against this, be vigilant and stand together."

There is a reference to this Kalinin-Gavrilović conversation in an entry in the Halder Diary under the date of July 22, where the following statement by Etzdorf, the Foreign Ministry's Representative with the High Command of the Army, is recorded: "The real mood of Russia, however, finds expression on other occasions (Kalinin's conversation with Yugoslav Minister). Here the call is issued for the struggle against Germany. 'To join together in a bloc.'"

² In the Foreign Ministry files are several reports or summaries of reports sent to their Governments in the course of July by the Greek and Yugoslav Ministers in the Soviet Union. Indication as to the origin of some of these intercepts is given in telegram No. 1354 sent from Rome on July 15 where Mackensen reported that "Anfuso today handed Bismarck the Italian translation of a decoded telegram of July 6 from the Greek Minister in Moscow to the Greek Foreign Ministry about a 2-hour conversation with the British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps." (270/175451-52)

³ For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 218.

For the rest, Cripps emphasized his good relations with the official personages of the Soviet Government. Molotov, who during his 2 weeks' leave had not seen the German Ambassador, in spite of the latter's requesting three times that he be received, had during the same period twice asked the English Ambassador to see him.

2) The Turkish Ambassador expressed the conviction that Germany was trying by all available means to set the Soviet Union against Turkey through all sorts of intrigues, since she had the greatest interest in involving the Soviet Union in a long war. Thus far the Soviet Union had not made any demands upon Turkey. Turkey would accept only such conditions as were in accordance with Turkish interests. The Turkish Ambassador made no secret of the fact, however, that he had certain apprehensions about the future.

Haydar Aktay confirmed to M. Gavrilović that the Soviet Government was showing an ever-increasing interest in Yugoslavia. Bulgaria, which had formerly been very close to the Soviet Union, had lost her position. Haydar Aktay and Gavrilović agreed that Italy and Germany had always been "uncertain factors" [*dunkle Punkte*] for their countries, since they could not move independently of Italy and Germany. The Turkish Ambassador added that Turkey was resolved in any event to defend herself with arms. Only Turkey and Yugoslavia were still of any account in the Balkans.

Haydar Aktay also told the Yugoslav that the Italian Ambassador ' had been instructed by his Government to initiate a rapprochement with the Soviet Union ' and that he was making strenuous efforts to that end, so far, however, without success.

He then spoke of the strength of the Red Army. The mechanization of the Army had advanced much further than was assumed. The Red Army, which according to his information comprised 180 divisions, was even at present more strongly organized than others. Apparently all this was directed against Germany, whereas Japan was only a secondary consideration.

One had to reckon even now with the rupture of relations between the Soviet Union and Germany as a fact. The Soviet Union was consolidating its positions at the expense of Germany in order to be sufficiently strong if it should be attacked by Germany. Since the Soviet Union also expected to have Italy as an opponent, it did not want Italy to take over England's position in the Mediterranean.

3) The French Ambassador, ' who gave Gavrilović the impression that he was not on the side of Marshal Pétain's Government, stated that now everybody had come to grips in one way or another with the fact of Germany's lightning success in France. The Soviets had foreseen everything, with one exception—the collapse of France. This had made them uneasy, too, but no one could see through the game of the Soviets, since they concealed their intentions completely. The French Ambassador thought that the Soviets would take some action against Turkey, but in what manner and to what extent no one knew as yet.

The Soviets were making gigantic efforts in the military field. Their army was today better and stronger than the old Tsarist army.

' Augusto Rossi.

' See document No. 290.

' Éric Labonne.

He doubted very much, however, that the Soviets would enter the war at all.

4) The reception by Molotov lasted 50 minutes. The conversation was very friendly. Gavrilović began by saying that the position of Yugoslavia in these stormy times was very difficult. The nation was in agreement, however, that if its independence was threatened it had to defend it.

Molotov acknowledged that the situation of Yugoslavia was complicated and asked about the relations with Bulgaria.

Gavrilović replied that in his opinion the present Bulgarian Government was aligning itself with Germany and Italy and would do so until the end. He therefore believed that Bulgaria and likewise Hungary would not undertake anything without the consent of Germany or Italy.

Molotov agreed and remarked for his part that the relations of the Soviet Union with Bulgaria were not bad. The Soviet Government was giving the Bulgarians support to some extent. Bulgaria wished to re-examine her entire position.

In reply to Molotov's question whether Yugoslavia could not reach an understanding with Bulgaria, Gavrilović said that all attempts had always failed on account of the "catastrophe" of Bulgaria's present alignment with Germany. It would be easy to come to understanding with the people, for they were just as good as the Yugoslavs.

Yes, all peoples were good, Molotov thereupon remarked. For various reasons, however, governments sometimes had to follow this or that policy, sometimes even an adventurous policy—that too happened.

When the conversation turned to Germany, Gavrilović said that the German Minister in Belgrade¹ had told him frankly that his appointment as Minister in Moscow did not please the Germans, since he was going to Moscow in order to trouble the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. He had replied that he was too insignificant a man and the representative of too small a country to be able to trouble the relations between two such big countries as the Soviet Union and Germany; he was going to Moscow so that, given the increased cooperation between these two Great Powers, he might assert the interests of his country, too.

Molotov remarked in reply that Yugoslavia was not a small country. When shortly thereafter the conversation turned to *Mein Kampf*, the race theory and the inferiority of the Slavs as a race, he became emphatic.

"They [the Germans] will not achieve everything that has been written for them in *Mein Kampf*," said Molotov with deep conviction.

Gavrilović: "I am afraid they will!"

"No, this will not happen, life is against it," Molotov repeated several times.

In reply to Molotov's question about Italy, Gavrilović said that she was not friendly toward Yugoslavia, but Yugoslavia did not fear Italy. Italy had become stronger, but the Germans were still stronger.

"Yes," replied Molotov, "the Germans are stronger, more systematic, but the German people are also not good."

¹ Viktor von Heeren.

Gavrilović: "Yes, we know them; we were under their occupation."

"We too were, the Ukraine, that is," replied Molotov, "but our army was also in Berlin once, and the Germans know that very well," he added with emphasis.

Molotov then also inquired about the Russian émigrés in Yugoslavia and remarked that he was sorry for them, but what was there to be done about them.

In conclusion he wished M. Gavrilović much success in his work; in this connection he again acknowledged that Yugoslavia's situation was difficult. He repeated twice that he would help him if M. Gavrilović should approach him.

Gavrilović sums up his impressions as follows:

1) The Soviets are perhaps supporting certain Bulgarian revisionist aspirations. At the same time they are opposed to the self-assured attitude of official Bulgaria. They believe that in this way they can influence the Bulgarian people in their favor and against official Bulgaria to a still larger degree. 2) They do not fear the Germans; at least they act that way, but they are feeling the effects of German policy. 3) They are encouraging Yugoslavia to oppose the Germans, if the occasion should arise. Gavrilović does not think, however, that they will go to war with Germany at present for the sake of their more distant, indirect interests; this depends rather on further developments. 4) The Soviet Union is making hurried preparations. It is counting on Yugoslavia aligning herself with it, if the occasion should arise, and for this reason cultivates their mutual relations.^a

By order:
WOERMANN

^a In a report of Aug. 6 Schulenburg criticized the above document in detail and gave it a generally negative evaluation (270/175370-73).

No. 239

174/136864-65

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

SECRET

BERLIN, July 26, 1940.

A reliable source reports from Tientsin on July 3:

The Japanese consider themselves masters in China. They want to get rid of all foreigners regardless of nationality and color of skin, but are unable, technically and economically, to take over the China business themselves.

The reasons why the raw materials which are needed by Germany and which have been bought by Germans to be transported over the

¹ This document bears the stamped letterhead of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the High Command of the Wehrmacht. A notation at the end of the document reads: "To State Secretary Weizsäcker, Under State Secretary Woermann, Under State Secretary Habicht, Ministerialdirektor Wiehl, Geheimrat Schmidt. For your information. By order. Boehm [?]"

Trans-Siberian railroad did not get beyond Manchukuo are the following:

(a) Until the Germans marched into Paris, ill will of the Japanese obstructed shipment.

(b) After the armistice with France, the ill will disappeared, but one still cannot talk about any preferences shown to Germans.

(c) The Japanese blockade of the English and French settlement at Tientsin² affected practically all German trade as well.

(d) The English still had a sort of preferential position in spite of their political friction with Japan.

(e) Since the fall of 1939 the British Ambassador in Tokyo has worked continuously on the Japanese Government in Tokyo against the transportation of goods to Germany over the Trans-Siberian railroad.

(f) The employees of the South Manchurian railroad, which is under Japanese management, have been bribed with English money to obstruct the shipment of these goods to Germany. According to a Chinese source, the corruption of Japanese officials in China as well as of leading officials of the Japanese Army administration is on the increase.

A change in favor of Germany would only be possible through political pressure, the strength of which would depend again on the military position toward England. Japanese decisions are not being made in occupied China by Japanese officials, but are made exclusively in Tokyo.

American businessmen characterized the Japanese position very well: The change of the Japanese attitude in China dates from the march into Paris and the capitulation of France. The Japanese were looking for the formula, they were imitating Germany closely.

² The Japanese blockade of the English and French settlement at Tientsin lasted from June 14, 1939, to June 20, 1940.

No. 240

124/122431-36

*The German Adjutant With the King of the Belgians to the Chief Wehrmacht Adjutant With the Führer*¹

LAEKEN PALACE, July 26, 1940.

DEAR COLONEL: I have just received through the Military Commander in Belgium copies of two Top Secret Military documents, Chef OKW No. 1330/40 of July 14, 1940² and OKH Gen.St.d.H., Gen. Qu. I B (V) No. 2169/40 of July 20, 1940.³

¹ Col. Rudolf Schmundt.

² Document No. 167.

³ Not found.

From both of these documents certain apprehensions regarding political developments in Belgium and the attitude of the King of the Belgians are evident.

As I am leaving tomorrow for Spain to conduct the King's children home and therefore shall be absent for a week (with Lieutenant von Seydlitz as my substitute), I should like to report to you on the following facts, which you may convey to interested authorities at your discretion, to correct any erroneous assumptions and to prevent in good time any ideas from arising that might be based on them.

It seems quite possible to me that besides the reports of the Military Commander additional reports might have reached the highest authorities, through other channels, possibly from persons who are unacquainted with the background of the situation here, and are unprepared for it and who therefore have formed opinions or apprehensions that do not altogether correspond to the real circumstances.

Actually there is no reason that I know of for following the *political developments* with pronounced misgivings at this time, and all those who are working here in responsible positions will confirm this.

(1) The country is firmly in the hands of the German occupation and, under the orders of the Führer, is being governed in exemplary fashion *by the Military Commander alone* (with whom I am constantly in closest touch and agreement).

(2) He is meeting with *willing support everywhere in responsible Belgian circles*. That Belgian officials in general work rather ponderously and with great attention to detail, and cannot be regarded as at all eager to take responsibility, is due to their education and to the fact that naturally under the laws of war they must overcome many fears that we ourselves are spared.

(3) The Belgians, Flemings and Walloons alike, are making an honest effort to get along with us. They have for the most part long ago become accustomed to the idea that their future is and remains for good or ill linked to the fate of Greater Germany. The irreproachable conduct of our soldiers is reciprocated by them with similar orderliness and often with full confidence. The people speak of the German Luftwaffe as "our flyers" and "our antiaircraft guns" because they know that they are also protected by them.

(4) The view, well-founded in the past, that the Wallonian Belgians are all full of hate for us, is no longer true in that sense. Admittedly the Walloons still harbor some resentments from 1914 and others due to Franco-British propaganda. But the English behaved so badly and in the end so cowardly in this country, and the French treated precisely the French-speaking Belgians—both soldiers and refugees in France—so disgracefully, that at least a lasting sobering up from the Wallonian predilection for France and the formerly widespread Anglomania has set in. This is to our benefit even though it takes effect but slowly, if we commit no mistakes in their treatment and spare certain sensibilities.

(5) The Flemings still appear rather disunited among themselves. All the rights they had demanded in the former Belgian State have in

the meanwhile been secured for them by the German Military Administration. It is precisely among them that attachment to the King is most pronounced.

This brings me to the person of the King.

I have now been assigned to him for 2 months and see him almost daily. After taking a most reserved attitude in the beginning, he has now come to have confidence in me. He does not hesitate to discuss everything frankly with me on long walks (or rather training marches) through the park. For making known some wishes to me or having twice addressed requests to the Führer through my intercession he hardly deserves reproof. This is what I am here for. From such knowledge of his personality and from constant observation of everything that happens here I am able to declare with fullest responsibility:

(1) The King, for whose escape at the moment of the collapse the English Government held planes and a cruiser ready, and on whom it exerted strong pressure to go to England, by staying with his Army has, according to the German way of thinking at any rate, given proof of being "a decent fellow" [*ein anständiger Kerl*]. His enemies (our enemies) are calling him therefore a "traitor."

(2) The impression of complete uprightness is strengthened as one gets closer to him as a human being, and this applies to everyone. This conclusion is not modified by the fact that he was raised as a not fully responsible ruler in a pluto-democracy on the English pattern, as the "sonny boy"⁴ of the Belgian State as it were, and that he discovered only too late in what a fix his party governments, especially that of Pierlot, had put him. One might almost say that his very uprightness prevented him from trying to overturn in good time the principles of the "constitution" that had been hammered into him. Now he sincerely regrets it.

(3) He is prudent and deliberate in his words and acts, yet it were wrong to believe that he was a hypocrite or smooth diplomat. No, he is a Bavarian-speaking mountain-climber, fond of the outdoors, manly, frank by nature, strong in misfortune, of simple habits, free of prejudices and pretensions for his person, altogether without "big talk" [*ohne Angabe*], as the Berliner would say, certainly devout, but by no means ascetic, which I conclude from, among other things, the fact that he often plays golf with young ladies in the wide spaces of the park.

(4) The King, who is making a serious effort to do justice to the new developments in Europe (and who even earlier furnished proofs of such understanding as, for example, in the labor question) is a sincere admirer of the achievement and the person of the Führer. When he has asked him for something (and it was in nearly every case a request for his soldiers which he made as the former Commander in Chief of the Belgian Army, that is, military requests) it was done as expression of his confidence in the Führer. *The King knows that he cannot engage in any political activity and does not try to.*

⁴ These two words appear in English in the original.

(5) He, as well as his immediate entourage, is behaving with complete loyalty. In the beginning of his stay at Laeken he received with German permission the Italian and American Ambassadors, the Nuncio and Cardinal van Roey, each of them once, and then, some time ago, on brief private farewell-visits the Ambassadors and Ministers of Italy and of non-belligerent countries who had been accredited to him and whom the Foreign Ministry had called on to leave Brussels. The King, on his own initiative, declined on principle to receive any other "political" visitors. Such visitors at best get as far as the *Chef de Cabinet* or the adjutant on duty.

Every Belgian visitor to the palace, if he is not refused entry at the gate, must enter his name in a visitors' register that is submitted to me and from which I regularly send excerpts to the Ic¹ of the Military Commander. Besides a reliable official of the Secret Military Police [*Geheime Feld-Polizei*] with many years' experience in military intelligence and police surveillance (Secret Military Police Special Officer Bunting) is on duty here at the Palace. He and I have never found the slightest reason for doubting the entirely correct and unconditionally loyal attitude of the King. This applies equally to his closest confidants:

- (a) Principal Adjutant Major General van Overstraeten,
- (b) *Chef de Cabinet* M. Frédéricq.
- (c) Private Secretary Count Capelle,
- (d) Commandant of the Palace, Major van den Heuvel.

When in a few cases the King wished to receive himself certain Belgian personages (e.g., the presidents of the Belgian Red Cross, and of the Refugee Relief Society) he always asked in advance for my consent.

(6) The incoming mail of the King so far has given no reason for any doubt. In the beginning he received some letters through the German service establishments (military commands) or by delivery to the guard. These letters, which arrived openly, contained merely expressions of confidence or routine requests, mostly for assistance, just as we receive them by the hundreds every day at the offices of the Führer; now such letters are delivered by the Belgian postal service. Yesterday I stood for quite a while alongside the King at his desk and, while studying some maps in connection with bringing home his children, I was able to look over at my leisure the mail spread out there. There was nothing of political or other than routine content. I have repeatedly made the same observation on the desks of the persons of his entourage mentioned above.

I do not believe that in the present situation we have any real reason for suspicion or censorship of mail which, incidentally, might be arranged without difficulty by a spot check on the part of our postal censorship.

The King surrendered to us with every punctilio and confidence. He has a claim to the chivalrous treatment of which the Führer has indeed repeatedly assured him and directed me to accord him, and which he manifested in his own generous conduct toward the King. As long as

¹ i.e., the intelligence officer.

there are no compelling reasons or evidence to the contrary on the part of the King I think that it is proper and in our own interest to continue in that way.

That is why I am worried on one point:

On July 15 the OKH, by teletype message Gen.St.d.H. Gen Qu I B/Qu2 No. 17074/40,⁶ announced that *all* Belgian prisoners of war, except professional soldiers, were to be released for return to Belgium. This was published in the press here and gratefully received by the whole population as a favor granted by the Führer in person. The King, through Minister of State Dr. Meissner, transmitted the expression of his heartfelt gratitude for this noble-minded act to the Führer.

However, the first paragraph of OKW letter No. 1330/40 of July 14⁷ makes the differentiation between Flemish and Walloon prisoners which was customary previously.

I beg you to have this promptly corrected. Apparently the two directives have merely crossed up.

We are well on the way to gaining the sympathies of those sections of the population that matter. The King is sincerely pleased with this trend and, if he could, would himself work in that direction. A change of our attitude in the prisoner question, which also would be very much to the detriment of our interest in the revival of the Belgian economy, would lead to a perceptible setback.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

KIEWITZ

⁶ Not found.

⁷ Document No. 167.

No. 241

2931/567019-20

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 733 of July 27

Tokyo, July 27, 1940—8:00 a. m.

Received July 27—9:15 p. m.

Pol. VIII 924.

With reference to your telegram No. 597 of July 22 (Pol. VIII 1624 g.).¹

1. Regarding possible mediation by a third power in the Japanese-Chinese conflict the following official position of recent date is available: When questioned regarding an alleged British attempt to mediate

¹ Not found.

in the China conflict, a Foreign Ministry spokesman declared on July 19 that Japan had not asked any foreign power to mediate. If any foreign power of its own accord took the initiative, it could gain Japan's approval only if it acted on the basis of the well-known Japanese conditions.

On July 23 Prime Minister Prince Konoye stated to the press when taking over the Government that the statements which he had made during his first term as Prime Minister would remain the guiding principles for the solution of the China conflict; of course, the present changed situation would have to be taken into consideration. The demand for elimination of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and simultaneous support for the Nanking Government was being upheld. The *Japan Times*, which is close to the Foreign Ministry, warned third powers yesterday in an obviously inspired article against mediation in the Chinese-Japanese conflict without previously notifying Japan, since there might otherwise be danger of misinterpretation.

The Army's efforts to bring about agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, as reported in telegram No. 614 of July [June] 24,² have presumably become less likely to succeed since the Army has in the meantime certainly stiffened its attitude. The demands of the Army will probably aim at capitulation, in view of the strengthening of its position as the result of the Cabinet changes and the improvement in the war situation owing to recent Japanese successes, especially the capture of Ichang as well as the fact that Chiang Kai-shek's imports from Burma and Indochina were simultaneously cut off. Consequently I can at the present time scarcely see any possibility of solving the China conflict through the mediation of a third power and by a compromise limited to China.

2. The changed world situation brought about by German victory has to an increasing extent brought to the fore in Japan ideas of subordinating the solution of the China conflict to the creation of a large economic area in East Asia under Japanese hegemony. It is thought that with the inclusion of Indochina, Burma, and parts of the Netherlands Indies Japan might be enabled to act more generously toward China and to permit Chiang Kai-shek to participate in this endeavor of a Greater Asia in a manner acceptable to him. If the new Cabinet undertakes the practical implementation of Japan's policy of large-scale territorial organization, the possibility for a compromise advantageous to the contending parties and the mediator may arise at a later stage.

OTT

² Document No. 6.

No. 242

B19/B008668

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1486 of July 27

Moscow, July 27, 1940—5:44 p. m.

Received July 28—1:20 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1292 of July 26.¹

The Soviet attitude toward Finland is characterized by the fact that the Soviet Government keeps Finland under pressure with ever new demands. The further intentions of the Soviet Government with respect to Finland are wholly obscure. It is possible that Molotov's foreign policy address, which is expected to be delivered at the session of the Supreme Soviet on August 1,² will throw some light also on this question.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Not printed (B19/B008668). Weizsäcker requested a telegraphic report of the Ambassador's views regarding further Soviet intentions toward Finland.

² See document No. 279, footnote 4.

No. 243

B14/002104

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1407 of July 27

ROME, July 27, 1940—7:00 p. m.

Received July 27—7:16 p. m.

Here the impression prevails that in dealing with the principles of European reconstruction the German press expresses in too one-sided a manner the German point of view and the German claim to leadership and pays little attention to the Italian position in conformity with the Axis principle. In this respect I refer, among others, to Megerle's article on "The Basis of the New Europe."¹ In conversations with leading Italian personages uneasiness is frequently noticeable at the lack of any emphasis of fascist Italy's importance as an Axis partner of equal standing when the German press deals with the aforementioned subject. The current conversations with statesmen from the Balkans might give the German press an opportunity to relieve such apprehensions. In addition, it might perhaps be advisable to issue a basic directive to the German press or at least to call

¹ A reprint of this article, "Grundlagen des neuen Europas," which appeared in *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung* for July 13, 1940, was found in Weizsäcker's file (2165/470578-81).

for some major German editorials placing greater emphasis on the Axis idea.

MACKENSEN

No. 244

F8/0158-0160

Unsigned Memorandum

RM 20.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND BULGARIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT FILOV, IN THE PRESENCE OF BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER POPOV, AT FUSCHL, ON JULY 27, 1940

The Reich Foreign Minister first of all expressed his pleasure at being able to receive the Bulgarian representatives, recalling their comradeship-in-arms in the past. In the last few months great upheavals had taken place in Europe which had not failed to leave their mark on Bulgaria also and which would have still further effects. The German policy toward the Balkans was no doubt known to Bulgaria. It could be summed up briefly to the effect that Germany always had a tender spot for her old friends in the Balkans; for the rest, she wanted to do business with all Balkan countries and therefore would urge above all tranquillity and peace. She had absolutely no interest in warlike complications in this part of Europe. It was obvious to everyone in Germany that a revision had to come in the Balkans very soon. Neither Bulgaria, nor Hungary, nor Russia could have resigned themselves permanently to the unjust conditions established in 1919. Russia had taken her revisionist demands into her own hands. When the ultimatum was presented to Rumania, Germany had counseled the Rumanians to yield. Whether Rumania would have gone to war at all was difficult to say. Germany had not interfered in these matters, but merely gave her advice when asked for it. King Carol had approached the Führer with proposals for closer German-Rumanian cooperation. The Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister had used very plain language with the Rumanians yesterday.¹ The Führer did not mince words but spoke to the Rumanians in plain terms about their past policy associated with the name of Titulescu. If Rumania had conducted herself differently, matters would have taken perhaps an entirely different course also in regard to general policy. As it was, however, Rumania unfortunately had permitted herself only too readily to become a pawn of Anglo-French intrigues directed against us.

¹ See documents Nos. 233 and 234.

The Reich Foreign Minister then referred to the conversation of King Carol with the Führer at the Obersalzberg² in the course of which the Führer had stated very clearly that Germany was territorially disinterested in the Balkans. The limit of her interests ran along the Carpathians, owing to the fact that Germany had undertaken the protection of Slovakia. A few days later, the Rumanian Minister in London, Tilea, had put in circulation the propaganda lie of Germany's alleged ultimatum to Rumania.³ However, in spite of the King's conversation with the Führer, not a single voice was raised in Rumania to quash this lie. This silence had of course produced the impression abroad that there had been after all some truth to the rumors of an alleged German ultimatum. It had become clearly evident in this connection that Rumanian policy had played a double game, a fact, moreover, which had been clearly proved by the documents found in France. Gafencu's policy, as is evident from the memoranda from London which have been found concerning his conversations there, showed anything but good faith.⁴ In the course of the correspondence between the Führer and King Carol, the King had had a lengthy letter delivered yesterday⁵ in which he stated his views about suggestions made by the Führer in an earlier letter. At that time the Führer had advised King Carol to yield on Bessarabia, since Rumania after all would be able to stand a war only for a short time. Besides, in regard to the Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionist desires, the Führer had strongly warned against maneuvering and playing off the one country against the other, since such tactics would very soon lead Rumania into total catastrophe. The Führer had suggested to King Carol that he should realize that by her own power Rumania could never have obtained the territories which had fallen into her lap in 1919 by a stroke of good fortune—or misfortune for the losers. Whatever was not gained by one's own effort was built on sand and therefore Rumania now had to effect a rapid and thorough revision with respect to Hungary and Bulgaria, since otherwise she would be headed for a catastrophe. Germany's position could be accurately defined in simple terms by stating that the Reich was not at all interested in the Balkans territorially, but was interested economically. This was not to be construed to mean, however, that it could not do without the Balkans. It was advantageous for the Reich to import from the Balkans agricultural products and mineral oil. But even the latter was no longer of absolute importance to Germany. It would be erroneous to think that Germany could not manage without Rumanian

² On Nov. 24, 1938; see vol. v, document No. 254.

³ Cf. document No. 56, footnote 4.

⁴ Gafencu had been in London from Apr. 23-26, 1939.

⁵ Not found.

oil. Her own production was rising, her capacity for synthetic production was increasing from month to month, and moreover she had carried out conversion to other motor fuels on a large scale. Therefore, Germany would never plunge into political adventures on account of oil. The Führer was of the opinion that if war broke out in the Balkans, German economic interests would be lost anyway and that it was therefore not worthwhile to become involved in such a conflict. Hungary and Rumania knew very well that if no settlement could be reached, the moment would come when the Führer would declare his *désintéressement* in the Balkan countries.

As for the revision with respect to Bulgaria, Rumania had reaffirmed in the explanations about King Carol's letter, made orally by the Minister President, that she would choose the other alternative, i. e., the road of honest and swift negotiation with her neighbors. Gigurtu had stated that direct negotiations with Hungary and Bulgaria would be started immediately after his trip to Rome.⁶ Berlin and Rome would continue to watch the negotiations and supply further advice, if needed. The Reich Foreign Minister had pressed for these direct negotiations as opposed to the roundabout way over Yugoslavia. The Rumanian suggestion that general negotiations about revisions in the Balkans should be started so that the Rumanian people could be told that other countries too were making sacrifices, was met with Germany's answer that such a procedure was not expedient; and it was said that if the problems were to be solved speedily, it would be necessary to limit the negotiations first to Bulgaria and Hungary, without injecting other issues.

The Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that in the conversations with the Rumanians of the previous day no details had been discussed, but he informed the Bulgarians confidentially that in his opinion Hungary and Rumania were still very far from a settlement. He had advised the Rumanians on that account not to take a narrow view of matters and to bear in mind the fact that failure to reach a settlement with Hungary and Bulgaria could lead Rumania to a catastrophe. Gigurtu had replied that he thought it would be easier to arrive at a settlement with Bulgaria. The Reich Foreign Minister had gained the impression that Rumania had already made up her mind to satisfy the Bulgarian demands. If Germany could assist Bulgaria by word or deed in the further course of the negotiations between Bulgaria and Rumania, the Reich Foreign Minister wished to be so informed. Germany naturally had ready understanding for her old allies and the Führer would not forget that they had been comrades-in-arms.

⁶ The memorandum of Gigurtu's conversation with Mussolini and Ciano on July 27 is printed in Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 576-579.

Nevertheless, Germany had no intention of playing the go-between, but merely wished to offer her advice. If a settlement were reached, it could result in a strengthening of Germany's relations with the Balkans. Economically the effect of this would be, for example, that Bulgaria's entire export surplus of certain agricultural products would be contracted for by Germany over a period of 10 years, perhaps even at fixed prices. Germany and Italy would be dominant in a new Europe and see that conditions in the Balkans would be absolutely stable; this might be expressed economically in long-term contracts. An economy, planned on a vast scale, independent of gold and beneficial to the individual national economies, would be established. Germany's victory and therefore also Europe's stability were absolutely assured, so that even in the storm center of the Balkans conditions of peace and tranquillity would prevail, which should be of advantage to Bulgaria as well as Germany. Rumania had had to give up Bessarabia and would make still further concessions, for her expansion in the postwar period had been artificial. Titulescu had held the limelight at Geneva and elsewhere, but in reality there was nothing in back of him. To be sure the necessity of confining herself to her natural size was painful for Rumania. The Rumanians, however, realized that they had to act speedily, and Gigurtu had implied this repeatedly. The Reich Foreign Minister felt that both Gigurtu and the Foreign Minister had been entirely sincere in their desire to settle the matter of the revision speedily and in good faith. In his detailed letter to the Führer, King Carol, to be sure, had explained that owing to internal political considerations certain limits had to be set to the concessions. Now, moreover, the grave blunder has become evident which the King committed by eliminating Codreanu⁷ and the forces close to him. These forces were wanting at this very moment. To a certain extent account had to be taken of these internal conditions in Rumania, for there was no point in letting a revolution develop there which perhaps would set fire to the whole Balkans, and which might move the conflict to an extremely dangerous ideological⁸ plane. The ethnographic charts submitted by the Rumanians, which in part came from Hungary herself and from the old Austria, showed in the opinion of the Germans that Hungary's demands against Rumania were not fully justified.⁹

To a question by the Reich Foreign Minister whether a direct contact with the Rumanians had already been established the Bulgarian Foreign Minister replied in the negative and expressed doubt about

⁷ On Nov. 30, 1938; see vol. v, document No. 260, footnote 1.

⁸ This word was added in Ribbentrop's handwriting.

⁹ These words were substituted in Ribbentrop's handwriting for the original version which read: ". . . in no way justified."

the good faith of the Rumanians in making good their promise to negotiate. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that Germany had threatened to disinterest herself in case the negotiations should fail and that such a *désintéressement* would certainly be very unpleasant for Rumania. He believed, however, that Rumania had the sincere desire to carry out the revision and, for the rest, he would have further developments closely followed by the German Minister in Bucharest. Mussolini had been informed and would also on his part bring pressure to bear on Rumania.

The Bulgarian Minister President pointed out once more that no direct negotiations had taken place to date, but that Rumania had only made promises to settle the entire question after the conclusion of the European war. He stated that he on his part also took a skeptical view of the Rumanians' sincerity, adding, besides, that the southern Dobruja was a Bulgarian region of 7,500 square kilometers, where in the year 1913 there were only 6000 Rumanian inhabitants in a total population of 300,000. Now the situation had changed as a result of Rumanian colonization. In the Dobruja there were 150,000 Bulgarians, 80 to 90,000 Rumanians and 70,000 Turks. Relinquishing the northern Dobruja, Bulgaria wished to limit her revisionist demands only to the southern Dobruja, that is, to the boundaries which had existed in the year 1913. For Bulgaria the question of the Dobruja had a very strong sentimental aspect. In the World War, Bulgarian and German soldiers had fought side by side under Mackensen, and, for instance, captured the city of Silistria. After the cession of the Dobruja, the Bulgarian population had on flimsy grounds been deprived of half of its land by the Rumanians through a nefarious land law. Such a procedure was unparalleled in recent history. A hundred years ago the French had applied it in Algeria.

At the moment the Bulgarian population of the Dobruja was being terrorized by the Rumanians. Its most essential articles of necessity were being requisitioned and now, due to the unbearable conditions in the Dobruja, refugees from there had arrived in Bulgaria. In the circumstances Bulgaria could on no account accept anything approaching a compromise, content herself with half the territory and for the rest allow herself to be bought off with an exchange of populations. An exchange of populations was entirely out of the question. Bulgaria simply did not have the land for settlement at its disposal and on that account had to insist in all circumstances on full restitution of the southern Dobruja.

The conversation was concluded after lasting 40 minutes.

No. 245

F3/0137-0145

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

JULY 27, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE BULGARIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, THE BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, AS WELL AS THE BULGARIAN MINISTER IN BERLIN, AND THE GERMAN MINISTER IN SOFIA

After the Bulgarian Minister President had first conveyed to the Führer his country's congratulations on the successes that Germany had recently achieved, the Führer informed the Bulgarians of the reasons why in the matter of the Rumanian revision Germany wished to give advice to the parties concerned. This had been done because both Hungary and Rumania had approached Germany with such a request. Germany had not been at all importunate, but merely wished to volunteer her good offices in so far as she might contribute to a clarification of the situation by her advice. She herself was in no way interested in the Balkans territorially or politically. Germany at most had an indirect political interest in the Balkan countries, since she considered them as belonging to her economic sphere.

To Hungary's repeated requests that Germany should state her position on her revisionist demands, the answer had been very simple. The ethnic as well as the psychological background of this problem had to be taken into account. The Führer had therefore informed the Rumanians yesterday that a solution to the Hungarian-Rumanian revision problem could only be found if neither party would rigidly cling to its position. It was also his impression that the situation had opened up and that a solution was not impossible if both sides were reasonable. Germany had stated to Rumania that the present state of affairs was untenable and that her sympathies lay entirely with the revisionist demands of Bulgaria and Hungary. At the same time, however, Hungary had been asked to carry out the necessary revisions in a spirit of mutual harmony, because it was easier to start a war than bring it to an end and because the chances for success were always difficult to estimate in advance. Moreover, calculations regarding superiority in manpower and matériel were often inaccurate, while the quality of the military leadership was usually demonstrated only in the course of the war. Finally the social factor still had to be taken into consideration. A war might easily lead to revolutions and shift to an ideological plane. The Rumanians were yesterday informed

¹ Marginal note: "[For] F[ührer]."

by Germany that the German Government was interested in the preservation of the economies of the Balkan countries. However, in the event of a conflict of all against all which might easily develop from a dispute between two or three parties at first, the economy of the Balkans would be completely ruined. But since Germany was primarily interested in the economy, it was obvious that in such a case where economic life would be in any event completely destroyed by warlike developments, she would not be willing, in addition, to make military sacrifices for a cause already lost. She would then be forced to disinterest herself completely in the Balkans.

The Führer emphasized the analogy with the Baltic States. Here too, Germany had disinterested herself in order to put an end once for all to the lies and rumors about her supposed aggressive intentions circulating in these countries. To be sure, it had been demonstrated in the case of the Baltic States that when one country disinterested itself, it did not necessarily follow that all other countries concerned did the same.

The Führer then turned to a discussion of the difficulties that obstructed a Hungarian-Rumanian settlement. The new statistics presented by the Rumanians as well as the ethnographic map, which were in part from Hungary herself or from the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, showed the full gravity of the territorial and ethnographic problem. In addition to the Germans, who wished to remain with Rumania, Transylvania had a population of $\frac{1}{3}$ Hungarians and $\frac{2}{3}$ Rumanians. The problem became still more complicated by the fact that the Hungarians were settled in the east and the Rumanians in the west of the country. For these reasons, the problem could be solved only by a reasonable division of territory combined with an exchange of populations. A "solution by the sword" would by no means settle the problem, but might cause the entire Balkans to go up in flames. In this event Germany would completely disinterest herself. She would regret that, because of her economic interests, but even Rumanian oil was no longer absolutely essential for Germany.

If matters took a normal course, Germany would also be interested in the internal order of the Balkan countries belonging within her economic sphere. In contrast to England she consequently always supported firmly established national governments that could provide orderly conditions of everyday life. The significance of this in respect to economic exchanges had been seen in the case of Spain when, owing to the activity of the Red Government, Spanish exports to Germany dropped to an extraordinary degree.

Germany of course would most energetically support the demands of her Bulgarian companions-in-arms in the World War. Bulgaria had fallen upon evil days together with Germany and now ought to share in her resurgence also.

The Führer then informed the Bulgarian statesmen in broad outline about his correspondence with King Carol and emphasized that at the Führer's suggestion the King had sensibly decided to enter immediately upon negotiations for revision with Bulgaria and Hungary. He had his Minister President and his Foreign Minister confirm this decision in yesterday's conversations. The Rumanians had repeatedly stressed on that occasion that it would be easier to reach a settlement with Bulgaria than with Hungary. They had declared their willingness to establish contacts with the Bulgarian and Rumanian [sic] Ministers at once and to bring about a prompt solution of the revisionist demands of both countries. The Führer stated moreover that he was very grateful to the Bulgarian Government and the King that Bulgaria had not pushed him on the subject of revision. This had made his position easier. For the rest, he had supported the Bulgarian interests to the same extent as those of Hungary and was convinced that Bulgaria would achieve her revisionist demands without running the risk of a war.

The Rumanians had asserted that their internal political situation would be eased if revision negotiations were carried on at the same time by other Balkan countries, because in that case Rumania would not be the only country which had to make sacrifices. Germany did not agree to this idea because earlier experiences had shown that a general discussion was not conducive to a speedy solution of problems of revision. For that reason the Führer had advised that agreement be reached first of all between Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. If this is achieved, he would be willing together with Italy and Russia, to assume the external guarantee of that status, which would thus be the result of a voluntary settlement among the three countries. Under certain conditions Germany would even assume the guarantee by herself, because these three states formed part of her economic sphere.

In these circumstances, Germany would then also be in a position to extend to these three countries the advantages of her great capacity to absorb their surplus products. Germany could, for example, commit herself to take the crop surplus of these countries every year over long periods of time, e. g., 10 years, which would at the same time greatly contribute to the stability of prices.

The Führer then once again stressed the difficulties which one had to take into account with respect to Rumania, which had just lost Bessarabia and now was demanding further territorial sacrifices from her people.

He asserted in this connection that on the basis of the experiences with the Vienna Award,² where Hungary had shown herself extremely ungrateful,³ arbitration was out of the question for Germany.

² Of Nov. 2, 1938; see vol. iv, document No. 99.

³ Cf. vol. v, document No. 272.

As for Bulgaria's wishes with respect to deliveries of war material, contained in a list submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister,⁴ the Führer stated that now with the conclusion of operations in the west he thought it would be easier to meet these requests. In this connection he referred to the immense war booty in arms and ammunition taken by Germany.

The Bulgarian Foreign Minister received the German statement on arms deliveries with great satisfaction. Greatest vigilance was in order because of Turkey, which under a variety of pretenses was still concentrating her troops on the Bulgarian border.

To a question by the Reich Foreign Minister whether a Communist threat still existed in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister replied that communism had been completely eradicated. As for Bulgaria's attitude toward Russia, he stated that it was based on three elements: Bulgaria's gratitude for the liberation from Turkey, accomplished in 1878; her spirit of independence; and her fear of being swallowed by her great Russian neighbor.

When the Bulgarian Minister President expressed misgivings about a possible further advance of the Russians toward the Balkans, the Führer replied that in his opinion Russia was fully cognizant of the difficulties that stood in the path of such an undertaking, and that at most one had to reckon with the old attraction of the Dardanelles for Russia.

The Bulgarians then defined their revisionist demands by stating that they had to ask for restitution of all of the southern Dobruja ceded in 1913. In no circumstances would they become a partner to compromises or half-way solutions by means of an exchange of population. With the aid of a map they then presented their demands in detail, repeating the arguments they had already presented to the Reich Foreign Minister in the forenoon. The demand for the southern Dobruja was a moderate one, for both in the Peace of San Stefano as well as in the Peace of Bucharest of 1917, the Bulgarian border ran considerably farther to the north, so that waiving this point must be already regarded as a substantial concession of Bulgaria to Rumania.

Besides, Rumania had seized the southern Dobruja treacherously when Bulgaria's northern border was denuded of all troops owing to the war with the Turks. Bulgaria had most bitterly resented this betrayal and now justly demanded restitution.

The Bulgarians then repeated their statements on the population figures presented in the forenoon and the complaints about the confiscation of land in connection with Rumanian forced colonization as well as the bad treatment of the Bulgarian minority.

⁴ The list has not been found.

The Führer declared himself convinced of the justness of the Bulgarian demands on the basis of these statements and instructed the Reich Foreign Minister to inform Rumania of the Führer's views in support of the Bulgarian demands. In his opinion the Bulgarian demands were moderate and reasonable and should under no condition be made the object of bargaining.

The Bulgarians received this statement with great satisfaction and said that, if Bulgaria were able to achieve her demands in this manner, with the assistance of the Führer, and this were made known to the Bulgarian people, communism would entirely cease to exist in that country.

Finally the Bulgarian Minister President asked the Führer with reference to his last speech in the Reichstag⁵ and the delimitation of interests with respect to Russia, whether Bulgaria lay within Russia's sphere of interest. The Führer replied in the negative, stating that this delimitation of interests with Russia related only to the Baltic region and Bessarabia. Nothing had been agreed upon concerning the Balkans. Of course, he had had to concede Russia the right to rectify wrongs of the past, since he claimed this privilege also for Germany.

The Bulgarians were also highly pleased with this statement. During the subsequent conversation at tea, the topics discussed earlier were taken up again in detail, with the Bulgarians increasingly showing their satisfaction over the understanding German attitude toward the Bulgarian wishes.

After about 2 hours, the conversation was concluded.⁶

⁵ See Editors' Note, p. 249.

⁶ A summary of this conversation was sent by Ribbentrop's Secretariat to the Embassy in Rome on July 28 with the request to convey this information to Ciano (585/242645-48).

No. 246

371/208090

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, July 27, 1940.

BRIEF ON ECONOMIC QUESTIONS FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SLOVAK PRESIDENT AND THE SLOVAK MINISTER PRESIDENT¹

In the consultations between the Ministries concerned with the preparation of the Greater European economic sphere² of the future, the question was discussed whether Slovakia is to be included or not in

¹ See document No. 248.

² See document No. 103.

the closer circle of the States linked in a customs and currency union (Germany, the Protectorate, the General Government, Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg).³ It was the unanimous view that inclusion is necessary and advisable. The Slovak economy is completely dependent on Germany. Moreover, Slovakia is not in a position to import even approximately the same amount of goods from Germany that we receive from Slovakia. The result has been that at the moment Slovakia has a credit balance of about 100 million RM in Germany, which cannot be transferred. Moreover, Slovak leaders, among others the chairman of the Slovak Government Committee for the Settlement of German-Slovak Economic Relations and especially the president of the Slovak National Bank, Professor Karvas, have already of their own accord expressed the wish that in the economic reorganization of Europe Slovakia should not be joined to the agrarian countries of the southeast but to Germany.

In these circumstances perhaps a private reply could be made, in case the question of a customs and currency union between Germany and Slovakia is raised by the Slovaks during the impending discussions.

Herewith to be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.⁴

WIEHL

³ See vol. ix, document No. 367.

⁴ A handwritten notation indicates that this memorandum was transmitted to Ribbentrop by teletype. On further developments see document No. 320.

No. 247

3579/E024274 :
3579/E024276-77

The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service to the Foreign Minister

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL

BERLIN, July 27, 1940.
D H 33 g. Rs.

DEAR PARTY COMRADE RIBBENTROP: Enclosed I send you a copy of a protocol drawn up on July 25, 1940, between the Security Service of the Reichsführer SS and the *Chef de Cabinet* of the French Minister of the Interior Marquet, with the request that you take note of it.

According to the need, alternate use can now be made of the official liaison (Abetz) with Laval and the unofficial liaison with Marquet, now created and conducted for intelligence purposes by the Security Service of the Reichsführer SS, for the purpose of tackling special problems according to the wishes there.

I am informing you of this with the request that you provide me with suitable directives in case of need.

I would mention that the liaison with Marquet is also of great importance for the Security Service and Security Police, in so far as M. makes it possible for us to install covertly in all departments informants of the Security Police and the Security Service, just as the English did until recently.

I have forwarded a copy of this letter with the enclosure to the Reich Marshal and SS-Gruppenführer Schaub.¹

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

HEYDRICH

[Enclosure]

PARIS, July 25, 1940.

CONVERSATION THAT TOOK PLACE AT AVENUE FOCH 72, PARIS, ON JULY 24, 1940, BETWEEN M. COUSTAU, "CHEF DE CABINET" OF FRENCH MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR MARQUET AT THE MAYORALTY IN BORDEAUX,² AND DR. PETER, THE LIAISON BETWEEN THE MAYORALTY IN BORDEAUX AND THE GERMAN MILITARY CITY COMMANDANT, ON THE ONE HAND, AND SS-STANDARTENFÜHRER DR. THOMAS, THE SS-STURMBANNFÜHRER GONTARD, DR. KNOCHEN, AND ROEMELBURG, ON THE OTHER HAND

At the beginning of the interview the following was ascertained:

On July 21, 1940, Dr. Peter received from French Minister of the Interior Marquet the order to establish a liaison with the German authorities, leading directly to someone in the confidence of the Führer. On July 23, 1940, the order was repeated and the instructions given to establish this liaison in Paris. In order to give the contact the necessary legitimacy, Coustau, the aide and *Chef de Cabinet* of French Minister of the Interior at the Mayoralty in Bordeaux, was assigned to Dr. Peter.

Chef de Cabinet Coustau confirmed that Dr. Peter was authorized by the French Minister of the Interior to establish liaison via a German office with someone in the confidence of the Führer, in order in this way to communicate the views and wishes of Minister of the Interior Marquet to the confidant of the Führer. The office of the Reichsführer SS in Paris was regarded by Dr. Peter and *Chef de Cabinet* Coustau as such an office.

¹ A copy of this letter and of the protocol of conversation which accompanied it was transmitted by the Foreign Ministry to Ambassador Abetz on Aug. 5 (3579/E024275).

² Marquet was Mayor of Bordeaux.

Chef de Cabinet Coustau stated:

In the anxiety concerning the future of France and in the unmistakable desire for an honorable rapprochement and collaboration with Germany, Minister of the Interior Marquet wished first of all in this confidential way to reach an agreement on all questions affecting the two countries. Marquet did not consider the present government of France suited to the task which events have imposed on it. The French nation must participate actively and favorably in the reconstruction of Europe contemplated by the Führer. The French nation must no longer be given a government, which through its composition and in the pursuit of its aims not only hindered the French nation but even prevented it from participating in the reconstruction of Europe.

Pétain was too old. Laval was a trained parliamentarian and an experienced business man. He preferred to let everything take the same course as it had taken. Weygand had wanted recently to have the Church especially join forces with the military. In Vichy the influence of the Jews was also being strongly felt again.

A change in the old system was not to be expected, given the composition of the present government. As ever, the old parliamentarians were exerting their baneful influence and nobody had the courage to escape from or even reject their influence.

The present government was not in a position to guide France properly in her precarious situation and to prepare her for her tasks in the reconstruction of Europe. Laval was opposed to any drastic measures against the old system and its representatives. The French Government still opposed the will of any man who wanted to effect a drastic change. The governmental machinery was still running because the old ministerial officials of the former system were still there and filling up paper. Marquet was convinced that the reorganization of a France that would be ready for collaboration with Germany and for the reconstruction of Europe could only be created with the support and assistance of the Führer. For this reason, also, he had taken this course of making a first contact.

Minister of the Interior Marquet asked that he be informed as to the reaction to his proposal.

Dr. Thomas stated that he wished to apprise a confidant of the Führer of the proposals made by the *Chef de Cabinet*.

Drawn up in German and French and signed:

COUSTAU
DR. JEAN MARCEL PETER

DR. L. KNOCHEN
GONTARD
BOEMELBURG

No. 248

871/208024-29

Unsigned Memorandum

BERGHOF, July 28, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND SLOVAK PRESIDENT TISO IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, SLOVAK MINISTER PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER TUKA, MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR MACH, AND MINISTER V. KILLINGER

Tiso first repeated the congratulations which he had already sent by telegram on the German victory and at the same time expressed to the Führer his and the Slovak people's best wishes for the future of the German Reich. Slovakia would remain as a nation under the protection of Germany and would gladly participate in the new order in Europe as the Führer planned it. When he, Tiso, now reaffirmed this allegiance to Germany, he did so in order that the voice of the Slovak people might be heard; for according to a proverb in his homeland a mute child is not understood even by its mother. Slovakia, however, was happy under the fatherly care of the Führer and therefore wished to express her thanks by doing her modest part in helping to build the new Europe.

The Führer thanked President Tiso for his words. The German Reich was fighting the present war for more than its own interests. Old Europe was outmoded and had to be replaced by something new. Economically, colonization had started from Europe, but two States had in practice monopolized the benefits thereof for themselves alone. The economic area of Central Europe had not had any share in the benefits of colonization because it had been split up into many individual parts in comparison with the large unified political units such as the British Empire, Russia, and the United States. Nevertheless this Central European area particularly had made an extraordinary contribution to the culture of the entire Continent. The countries of this area and Denmark, Belgium, and Sweden had just not been able to continue living in this way any longer; they all needed an increased economic influence in the world.

There had to be a long-range political settlement of European conditions. For only when one no longer needed to fear being exposed at any time to enemy bombing attacks could one make long-range economic arrangements.

Destiny had now forced Germany to wage this struggle for the reorganization of Europe and she would end it victoriously. In the reorganization of Europe Germany would be guided first of all by her

political interest, which was in effect an interest in defense aiming at eliminating dangers which might threaten the Reich. The Führer pointed out that he had tried to eliminate these dangers in a peaceful manner by treaties. He showed in detail how generous his last proposal to Poland had been, and how, instead of seeing his ideas accepted, he had been met only with terror and scorn. The British had sabotaged Mussolini's last peace proposal of September 2,¹ because they did not want to permit a consolidation of conditions in Europe. Germany, however, wished to bring about this consolidation. On October 6 France and England had again been offered peace.² The American Under Secretary of State, Welles, had inquired about the German war aim on his visit at the beginning of this year.³ The Führer had replied that it was peace. In this connection the economic problems would also naturally have to be solved. The colonies which represented a German property acquired by purchase had to be returned to her. In his recent speech the Führer had for the last time extended his hand to England and had not demanded any dishonorable terms from that country.⁴ Since England did not want peace, the struggle now had to be fought to a conclusion, but Germany's political aims by no means consisted in the subjugation of other nations. She merely wanted to secure her own defense and bring about close economic collaboration with such nations as by their internal orientation were especially suited for such collaboration. An economic association was to be formed in that way, and other nations also might join it.

The Führer then took up individual nations and said, as he had already done in the conversations with the Rumanians⁵ and Bulgarians,⁶ that Germany did not have any political but merely economic interests in the Balkans and that he was anxious to preserve tranquillity and peace in that area.

As for relations with Slovakia, the political interest there consisted in the protection of the Carpathians, necessary mainly for military reasons. Germany would not permit any other great power to advance over the Carpathians without a struggle. Economically, she wanted to carry on good business with Slovakia as with other countries. Here the Führer emphasized especially Germany's great capacity as a consumer, which made it possible for her on a long term basis not only to deliver products, but also to buy them and in this manner form a military economic bloc which would carry on its trade

¹ See vol. VII, document No. 554.

² See vol. VIII, Editors' Note, p. 227.

³ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 640 and following.

⁴ See Editors' Note, p. 249.

⁵ See document No. 234.

⁶ See document No. 245.

on the basis of the labor and industry of the peoples, independently of gold, which ought to be characterized as an international Jewish swindle. This required stability in the political sphere. The idea of an independent Slovakia, for which Germany had a heartfelt concern, was by no means in harmony with the views of all European Chancelleries. In other countries, on the contrary, they spoke of 1000-year-old boundaries, of foreign national aspirations, and social problems.

The Führer then stressed the guarantee which Germany had given Slovakia and which in the event of any attack on that country would bring the German Army into the battle. It was a guarantee which was backed up by 200 divisions and which did not require any military contributions from the country receiving the guarantee, unlike the practice of the English. In return, Germany demanded that Slovakia should adhere loyally and unequivocally to the German cause in her domestic politics. No coercion would be exercised. If Slovakia so desired, Germany would defend only the Carpathian border and would, for the rest, withdraw precisely as she had from the Baltic States, which did not even wish to conclude a nonaggression pact with Germany and now unquestionably regretted the consequence of this attitude.

The Führer then pointed up Rumania's ambiguous attitude, as he had done in the statements made to the Rumanians and Bulgarians, and in that connection emphasized that the policy of that country as well as the attitude of the Baltic States had decided him to make the settlement with Russia.

The idea of German-Slovak collaboration, however, must not only prevail in the government but be rooted in the people. In Italy and Germany no newspapers or books were being published and no speeches were being made that pointed in any other direction than that of German-Italian collaboration, because the Führer and Mussolini wished to buttress the alliance between the two countries among their people. The sinking of the French fleet by the former English ally at Oran had been possible only because the Anglo-French alliance had been purely a matter of the governments, financiers, Freemasons, and journalists, in which the two peoples had had no part. On the contrary, the English had looked down upon the French, and the French had been far from favorably disposed toward the English. The most important thing for two countries that wanted to collaborate was therefore to bring the peoples together. That was the only reason why Germany was watching developments in Slovak domestic politics. The peoples must not go different ways. For it had to be realized that in Europe there were forces at work (Jews, Freemasons, and similar elements) that wished to prevent harmony between the

two peoples. One had to stress the positive qualities in the other nation and seek for that which was common to both. In one's own country one must support those who took a positive attitude toward collaboration and not those who were trying to undermine it. For the rest, he could formally assure President Tiso once more, in the presence of Minister President Tuka and Minister of the Interior Mach, that except for her military interest in the Carpathian border Germany had no other interest in Slovakia. Her only aim was to see the country with its people healthy and strong and give it an independent, autonomous, and sovereign ethnic and political substance. President Tiso received this statement with great satisfaction. He could subscribe to every letter of it and would continue to work enthusiastically for collaboration between the two countries. The Führer would not be disappointed by the Slovak people.

He asked, moreover, that he might always be given an immediate opportunity to explain briefly to the Führer in person any doubtful questions that might come up, so that misunderstandings could not even arise. Tiso then took up Slovakia's alleged leanings toward Russia in the framework of a Pan-Slavic policy. He had experienced what Pan-Slavic policy meant during the last 20 years with Czechoslovakia and Poland, and from these experiences he had no desire to go into such a field for the third time, with Russia. Besides, there were the most serious cultural and religious obstacles in that respect as far as he personally was concerned. The leaflets circulated in Slovakia that advocated such a policy, Tiso said, were machinations of Jews, Magyars, and Czechs designed to blacken Slovakia in the eyes of Germany.

When he brought up the matter of the 400,000 Slovaks still living under Hungarian rule, the Reich Foreign Minister interjected that he had told M. Tiso upon inquiry that at the moment a settlement of this problem was out of the question, but that some time later perhaps the moment for it might come.⁷ He would, however, have a serious talk with the Hungarians about the treatment of the Slovaks after he had taken note of the material promised by Tiso.

After a few explanations of the nature of German-Russian collaboration the Führer told Tiso that he was welcome at any time to have a personal conference with him whenever he had any wishes or there was anything that weighed on his mind.

The Führer then invited the Slovaks to tea and the conversation was concluded after about half an hour.

⁷ Record of the prior conversation between Ribbentrop and the Slovaks to which reference is made here has not been found. Cf. document No. 263 and footnote 4.

No. 249

104/112348

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, July 29, 1940—7:10 p. m.

No. 1500 of July 29

Received July 29—8:20 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1472 of July 16.¹

Molotov summoned me today and stated that the Soviet Government was very much interested in receiving information about the subject of the recent discussions of Germany and Italy with the Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian and Slovak statesmen.² I replied that I did not have any information yet but would request it.

I request speedy instructions by wire,³ particularly in view of the speech on foreign policy Molotov is expected to make on August 1.⁴

SCHULENBURG

¹ Not printed (104/112338). This telegram reported that the Soviet press was treating the journeys of Bulgarian and Rumanian statesmen to Berlin and Rome as important news but without any comments, and suggested that the Soviets be officially informed of these conversations.

² See documents Nos. 146, 234, 245, and 248.

³ See document No. 258.

⁴ Molotov's speech of Aug. 1, to the Seventh Session of the Supreme Soviet is printed in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 461-469.

No. 250

186/74242

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MADRID, July 29, 1940.

No. 2562 of July 29

Received July 29—10:45 p. m.

I hear from a reliable source that Franco intends after all to appoint soon his brother-in-law, the Minister of the Interior, as Minister President and probably at the same time as Foreign Minister. A decision is said to be due any day now, but it is not to be published before Serrano Suñer has taken his trip to Germany. The Generalissimo and the Minister of the Interior attribute the greatest importance to this.

I am therefore again emphasizing the view expressed in my detailed report No. 1525 g. of July 27¹ on Serrano Suñer. The report will

¹ Not printed (F6/0066-0070); a lengthy report analyzing Serrano Suñer's significance in Spain and possible motives for visiting Germany. Stohrer concluded as follows: "In summary therefore I should say that, as seen from here, success of a visit to Germany by Serrano Suñer could only be guaranteed if the

arrive in Berlin with the Naval Attaché in an envelope addressed to the Chief of Protocol by special plane on the afternoon of July 30.

STOHRER

Footnote (1)—Continued

expectations doubtless held by him and the Generalissimo as to the nature of his reception are fulfilled and Spanish susceptibilities thus respected. Otherwise it would be better to defer the visit." Along with this report Stohrer included a memorandum consisting of extracts from his earlier reports mentioning Serano Suñer (F8/0071-0077). For other previous reports from which Stohrer quoted, see document No. 87, *ante*, and vol. III, documents Nos. 586 and 680.

No. 251

215/146554

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1501 of July 29

Moscow, July 29, 1940.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 1252 of July 21¹ and 1262 of July 23.²

Molotov stated to me today the following:

The Soviet Government was itself taking over responsibility for seeing that all German property interests (both Reich German and volksdeutsch) in the Baltic States are safeguarded. The Lithuanian Government had received instructions from Moscow not to apply any of the planned nationalizing measures either to Reich German or volksdeutsch property. The same applied also to Latvia and Estonia.

The Soviet Government requests that from now on these questions be discussed directly with it in Moscow, since the formal union of the Baltic States with the Soviet Union would take place in a few days.³

SCHULENBURG

¹ Not found.

² Not printed (215/146557). This telegram instructed Schulenburg to request the Soviet Government to use its influence in the Baltic States to see that the measures nationalizing various forms of business enterprise were carried out without damage to Reich German interests or the interests of those involved in resettlement plans.

³ In a further telegram (No. 1522 of July 31: 104/112347) Molotov stated that the Soviet Government had also assumed responsibility for the fulfillment of the financial and economic obligations taken over from the Baltic States.

No. 252

19/12492-12514

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff

BERLIN, July 29, 1940.

As a sort of introduction to the memorandum of the Political Department about America's attitude toward Germany during the

present war¹ I have drafted the enclosed memorandum which gives a brief review of the early years of Roosevelt's foreign policy with respect to Germany (March 4, 1933, to September 1939).

Respectfully submitted, through Under State Secretary Woermann, to the State Secretary.²

DIECKHOFF

[Enclosure]

A review of Roosevelt's policies toward Germany during the last 7 years yields substantially the following picture:

I. When the President assumed office on March 4, 1933, he inherited, as far as the relations with Germany were concerned, an essentially calm situation. Although the American press, especially the Jewish-influenced press of New York, had already in February 1933 begun to sound an alarm against Germany, the relations between the two countries were on the whole undisturbed. It would not have been difficult for Roosevelt to put the brake on the press campaign and to exert his great influence in favor of a calm appraisal of the sweeping change in Germany. From the very beginning this was never done, and thus German-American relations were from 1933 on subject to a more and more reckless campaign of agitation in the American press. There, with the American press, lies a large part of the responsibility for the two countries drifting farther and farther apart; with the Roosevelt administration lies the blame for not only not opposing this trend, but even, as time went on, promoting it in increasing measure. There were indeed certain differences in the economic field between Germany and the United States when the President came into office, but with good will they could have been adjusted or at least a *modus vivendi* could have been found that would not have degenerated into conflict. Reichsbank President Schacht's mission to New York and Washington in the summer of 1933³ proved that on the German side there were the best of intentions to reach a compromise. Yet the Schacht mission and later attempts ended without result; in the economic sphere we kept running into obstacles and

¹ Not printed (4490/E097598-620). This memorandum bore the title, "Unneutral Conduct of the United States of America", and under various sub-headings catalogued a number of examples to illustrate the general theme.

² Marginal note: "I have arranged, with the consent of Ambassador Dieckhoff, for a carbon copy of this memorandum to be attached to my memorandum of August 2, 1940, for the Foreign Minister about the unneutral conduct of the United States. W[oermann] Aug. 3."

³ Dr. Schacht's mission to the United States occurred in May 1933. He conferred with President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull and financial leaders. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950), vol. I, pp. 505, 532-534, and *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, (New York, 1948), vol. I, pp. 237-238. German documents on the Schacht mission will be published in vol. I of Series C.

harassments of all sorts which—apart from a brief interruption in 1937—became worse and worse as time went on.

In foreign policy there were no acute problems between Germany and the United States when Roosevelt came into office; they arose later. But from 1933 onward, political relations between the two countries grew more and more unsatisfactory. This was partly due to the campaign in the American press which I have mentioned, partly to the unsuitability of Roosevelt's appointee, Ambassador Dodd, and partly to other reasons. It became more and more evident that the Washington Government placed little value in cultivating relations with Berlin, while it devoted special attention to contacts with London and Paris, and in the fall of 1933 resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, an act which obviously—as things stood at the time—carried an edge against Germany. While no serious incidents or clashes occurred between the United States and Germany, relations continued to cool until 1936. Early in 1937 there seemed to be a possibility of lessening tension and improving relations. By the end of 1936 certain vexatious measures of the American customs administration against the importation of German products had been abrogated and German trade could again develop more favorably. When I came to Washington in May, 1937, I was received by the President and the Government with greater openmindedness than I had expected. The reply which the President made when I presented my credentials was in a favorable vein; in an extended conversation which I had soon thereafter with the President, he showed a certain understanding of German aims and developed ideas of constructive cooperation in which, nevertheless, his basically negative attitude to Germany was unmistakable. The recall of Ambassador Dodd, finally arranged after prolonged delay, and the appointment of Hugh Wilson in the fall of 1937 seemed also to indicate that the American Government had decided to turn a new leaf; at any rate, I was told so in the State Department at the time.

But the important speech of the President in Chicago on October 5, 1937,⁴ which sharply turned against the so-called "aggressor nations" and mentioned the necessity of taking "quarantine" measures against them if need be, clearly indicated what the President thought of the totalitarian countries, although his speech was not so much directed at Germany (which had as yet "attacked" nobody) as at Japan, whose conflict with China was then the focus of attention. The Japanese

⁴For the text of President Roosevelt's so-called "Quarantine Speech" of Oct. 5, 1937, see *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. I, pp. 379-383; also Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. VI, pp. 406-411.

question, due to the *Panay* incident⁵ in particular, dominated the foreign affairs scene in Washington up to the end of the winter of 1937-38; Germany was still in the background.

From the spring of 1938 on the scene changed very rapidly. The incorporation of Austria aroused dismay in Washington and led to an expression of hostility toward Germany (cf. my conversation with Sumner Welles in the middle of March, 1938⁶) that could hardly have been chillier. For a time it seemed as if the American Government would refuse to recognize the incorporation of Austria into the Reich, but finally it had to swallow it resentfully. Nor did it fail promptly and disagreeably to press the petty problem of Austrian debts to America and artificially to inflate it far beyond its importance.

For since March 1938 Germany, too, had become an "aggressor nation" and the Washington Government has consistently adhered to that line. I do not know whether we are informed about the attitude taken by the American Government in the summer of 1938 with respect to the Czechoslovak crisis, but from all the evidence that has become known it may be presumed that, if it did tender advice to Prague, London, and Paris, it was not to yield to but to resist the German demands. Only that can explain the disappointment bordering on dismay which I could observe in the White House and State Department after the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, had become known; the resentment over the soft attitude of the appeasement politicians, who were accused of treason to the cause of democracy, was almost greater than the indignation over the conduct of Germany.

From Munich dates the latest phase of American foreign policy concerning Germany. Henceforth Germany was *the* aggressor, *the* enemy, who sooner or later would threaten the Western Hemisphere as well, and whose urge to expand would from now on have to be vigorously resisted. "To stop Hitler" became henceforth the chief aim of American foreign policy. After my return from Washington early in December 1938, I reported on the fact that we had to expect American policy now to have the clear purpose of keeping Germany down, and that although the American Government would not enter into political or military commitments in Europe it would nevertheless in the event of a European war throw its weight into the scale on the side of our enemies, in order by such support for the "democracies" to prevent Germany from possibly emerging victorious; the only question that remained was how far the American Government

⁵ The U.S.S. *Panay* had been sunk in the Yangtze by bombing from Japanese planes on Dec. 12, 1937. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. 1, pp. 517-563.

⁶ See vol. 1, documents Nos. 391 and 401.

would succeed in carrying Congress and the people with it along this road. The guiding lines of this policy were laid down in the White House and State Department in October and November 1938, with two lines of action to be followed simultaneously :

(1) In the Western Hemisphere every effort was to be made to strengthen the solidarity of the American Republics against any German attacks from the outside, or German subversive attempts within (fifth columns).

(2) Germany was to be informed in even plainer terms than before that in the event of conflict in Europe the United States would lend extensive support to Germany's adversaries. That should, if possible, frighten Germany off. At the same time in the capitals of the countries "threatened" by Germany, language was to be used that would encourage resistance, yet without becoming involved in political commitments, because for these the consent of Congress could not be expected.

From the beginning of November 1938 the stiffened policy toward Germany became pretty clear, and the President turned to it with all the greater vigor, since by the electoral defeat of his party in the first days of November he had suffered a serious domestic blow for which he wanted to compensate by greater activity abroad.

The first step was the calling of a Pan-American Conference in Lima. It met in December 1938 and although it by no means fulfilled all the expectations of the President, it did lay down the desired stronger foundation for Pan-American cooperation. On this, in the event of a European war, it was intended to build further, and later actually was built further, especially in the Conferences of Panama in the fall of 1939 and Havana in the summer of 1940. The aim was: in the event of a conflict in Europe to maintain neutrality outwardly, but in reality to oppose the totalitarian nations, with the greatest possible amount of support from the "democracies" by means of blockade measures. Likewise unexpressed; extension of North American influence as far as possible over the whole Western Hemisphere.

The Jewish incidents of November 10, 1938, presented the President with a useful opportunity to widen the split with Germany. In the White House press conference of November 15, 1938, he commented in a provocative tone on the events in Germany by saying, in exact quotation :

"The news of the past few days from Germany has deeply shocked public opinion in the United States. Such news from any part of the world would immediately produce a similar profound reaction among American people in every part of the nation.

"I myself could scarcely believe that such things could occur in a twentieth-century civilization.

"With a view to gaining a first-hand picture of the situation in Germany, I asked the Secretary of State to order our Ambassador in Berlin to return at once for report and consultation."⁷

Ambassador Wilson was recalled from Berlin "for report and consultation" to Washington. Since then, the post of Ambassador in Berlin has remained unfilled. Wilson ostentatiously resigned his post at the outbreak of war on September 1, 1939.

In December 1938 another affront was inflicted on Germany. Secretary of the Interior Ickes made a speech in which, in an uncalled-for manner, he drew the Führer into the discussion and insulted him;⁸ the protest lodged by our Chargé d'Affaires was rejected by Sumner Welles and the State Department published an improper communiqué on the matter. Even more plain became the hostility and menacing attitude of the American Government in the message of the President to the Congress on January 3, [4] 1939; he coined in it the formula of "methods short of war" which should be applied to the aggressor nations when needed and said the following:⁹

"Words may be futile, but war is not the only means of commanding a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. There are many methods short of war and more effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggressor governments the sentiments of our people. At the very least, we can and should avoid any action or any lack of action which will encourage or assist an aggressor. We have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly—may actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim. The instinct of self preservation should warn us that we ought not to let that happen any more."

The next step to frighten off Germany and to encourage the European democracies was to be the amendment of the Neutrality Act,¹⁰ that had been inconvenient to the Government for a long time, especially the removal of the ban on the exportation of arms and war material to belligerents. But this step was not taken at the time, since sentiment in Congress in the winter of 1938-39 did not seem to be ready for it yet. Meanwhile the diplomatic representatives abroad, headed by Mr. Bullitt in Paris, engaged in lively activity; the reports of the Polish Ambassadors in Washington, Paris, and London

⁷ This quotation is in English in the original. Cf. the record of the press conference in Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. vii, pp. 596-601.

⁸ For the text of Ickes' speech, see the *New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1938, p. 5. Concerning the protest by the German Chargé d'Affaires, see vol. iv, document No. 515.

⁹ The quotation is in English in the original. Cf. the text of the message in Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. viii, pp. 1-12.

¹⁰ The text of the Neutrality Act is printed in Department of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 355-365.

of that time, published in German White Book No. 3¹¹ show how actively the American diplomats—obviously with the knowledge of the President—were trying to influence the English, French, and Polish Governments in the spirit of “Stop Hitler”.

These efforts in numerous instances went hand in hand with intimations that in the event of war the United States if not immediately, then later, would stand behind these Governments. Mr. Bullitt did on his own something more, when as early as December 1938 he brought about the secret dispatch of a French mission to America which was to buy there fighter planes for the French armed forces. Under a directive from the President the American Army had to show certain models to the French commission, in connection with which a serious accident occurred in February 1939, which turned the attention of American public opinion to this game. The Senate became perturbed and the President found it necessary, in order to calm public opinion, to invite the ranking members of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs to the White House.¹² According to reliable reports, the President in this conference at first drew a dark picture of the situation in Europe and described the alleged warlike designs of Germany by which not only the security of the democratic nations of Europe, but also of the whole world, including the security of the Western Hemisphere, was threatened. Not only the countries of Europe were confronted with the danger of coming under German domination, but the security even of the overseas possessions of those countries, especially the possessions in America of England, France and Holland were in jeopardy. Hence the question of security on the Rhine was a question which necessarily affected America, too. If the Rhine frontier was threatened, the rest of the world was, too. As soon as the Rhine frontier had fallen before Hitler, the German sphere of action would be unlimited. The effect of this presidential appeal upon the members of the Senate Committee was at first rather negative; most of the Senators regarded the statement as exaggerated and did not let themselves be influenced by it. But when a few weeks later, in the middle of March 1939, German troops marched into Prague, and the territories of former Czechoslovakia were placed under German protection as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the President used the opportunity to point out that his warnings had been justified. The Senate, however, even then could not be induced to take any step in the direction desired by the President and in par-

¹¹ Auswärtiges Amt, 1940, No. 8, *Politische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges* (Berlin, 1940). See vol. ix, documents Nos. 24, 26, 31, and 158.

¹² Cf. vol. iv, document No. 526.

ticular was not yet prepared to consider the lifting of the arms embargo.

But the situation in London and Paris did change after the entry into Prague; the appeasement policy lost some of its supporters. How far direct discussion by President Roosevelt with British statesmen (both Eden and Lord Lothian had been his guests in the White House in the winter of 1938-39) had contributed to this change of mind, how far the *redressement* in Paris and London was due to the labors of Bullitt, is hard to tell at this time. But it may be regarded as certain that the ceaseless warnings against continuation of the appeasement policy and the relentless pounding-in of the phrase "Stop Hitler!" did not remain without effect upon the men in Paris and London. Nor did the American Government fail immediately after March 15 to condemn vigorously the German action in Bohemia and Moravia. As early as March 18 Sumner Welles declared the German march into Prague to be "wanton lawlessness" and referred to the new arrangement effected by Germany as a merely "temporary" one, which would not be recognized by the United States.¹³ The Czechoslovak Minister in Washington continued to be regarded as the Minister Plenipotentiary of Czechoslovakia; Czechoslovak credit balances in American banks, in order to deprive the German Government of disposition over them, were immediately blocked and the imports of merchandise from former Czechoslovakia were subjected to countervailing duties, which made the importation of these commodities practically impossible. In the middle of April the President sent to the Führer and Duce the well-known message in which he demanded that Germany and Italy should issue binding declarations that they would not attack a certain group of countries in the future.¹⁴ The purpose of this one-sided appeal was plain; if it succeeded England and France gained time to continue rearming and to carry forward the encirclement of Germany and Italy that had been started. If it failed, Roosevelt as protector of the peace had done all he could and the blame of the failure fell upon Germany. A rebuff such as the President was given in the speech of the Führer of April 28¹⁵ had obviously not been expected in Washington.

During the summer of 1939 Bullitt in Paris, Biddle in Warsaw, and Kennedy in London continued the policy of encouraging the democracies to resist Germany, as we learned from confidential sources; persuasion was exerted on Turkey, too, in this direction. In

¹³ The reference is to the statement made by Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, on March 17. For the text see Department of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941*, pp. 454-455.

¹⁴ See vol. vi, document No. 200.

¹⁵ For the text see *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler*, edited by Norman H. Baynes (London, 1942), vol. II, pp. 1606-1656.

Washington the President in June 1939 made a new attempt to have Congress change the Neutrality Act, in order to discourage Germany and to encourage the democracies to stiffer resistance against Germany by such a measure. The attempt failed, since the Congress was even then not yet willing to follow the President on that path. But the President did not let anything stop him from calling public attention to the threat of impending war and thereby creating the public sentiment he desired. Also, the press campaign in the country, both against the "aggressive" German foreign policy and alleged German underground activities on American soil, was promoted on an increasing scale. The same was done, partly by North American Diplomatic Missions, in Latin America. Furthermore Roosevelt directed the Government Departments in Washington to make concrete preparations for the contingency of war; a defense act providing for the expenditure of 2 billion dollars was submitted to and adopted by the Congress, existing measures for counterintelligence against sabotage and spies were substantially strengthened and a "War Resources Board" was set up which was to institute certain preparatory measures for the event of an outbreak of war.

Thus the President, as far as it was possible in the face of the reserved attitude of the Congress, had made all preparations when on September 1, 1939, the conflict between Germany and Poland exploded. His activity during the last weeks and days before the outbreak of war is still somewhat obscure. We do know of his telegrams to the Führer and the President of the Polish Republic in the last days of August,¹⁸ in which he asks both Chiefs of State to exhaust all possibilities of peaceful negotiation, and we know that he transmitted Mosćicki's prompt and affirmative reply without delay to the Führer, obviously with the intent of placing at the door of Germany the responsibility for whatever came. We also know that late in August by his personal order the fast liner *Bremen* was detained in the port of New York for almost 2 days under vexatious pretexts, obviously with the intent of maneuvering the vessel, if war should break out between Germany and England, into the hands of the English. But we do not know what statements he ordered to be made in the last days of August in Warsaw, London, Paris and Rome and in particular do we not know in what manner he influenced the English and French Governments on the fateful 1st and 2nd of September 1939. According to all information available as early as the morning of September 1, that is immediately after the outbreak of hostilities between Poland and Germany, he took the entry of England and France into the war as a foregone conclusion, and there is no indication that he—like

¹⁸ For the texts see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. VIII, pp. 444-450; see also Department of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941*, pp. 477-480.

Mussolini—again intervened in those last decisive hours to the end of preserving the peace. It may rather be supposed that he received with satisfaction reports from his Ambassadors in London and Paris, that Chamberlain and Daladier would stand firm.

Today it is not yet possible to draw the complete picture. But this much we know—from the attitude of the President in the years before the outbreak of the war as well as in the months gone by since September 1, 1939—that he took and still takes a one-sided and hostile attitude toward Germany. I believe that he bears a great, if not a decisive, part of the responsibility for the outbreak of the war and the prolongation of the war.

II. In conclusion one question remains to be answered: What are the reasons that Roosevelt takes so hostile an attitude toward Germany? Why is it that he persists—despite the reluctance of the great majority of the American people who want to have nothing to do with entanglements in Europe—in leading the United States, step by step, deeper and deeper into the European conflicts? How can it be explained that in the last few years he has practically assumed the leadership of the “Democracies” in Europe and has substantially contributed to their finally choosing, not the way of peaceful compromise with Germany, but war?

The attempt to supply a complete answer to these questions will be an interesting and stimulating task for historians of the future. Today it is not yet possible to do this in all respects; nevertheless I believe that certain facts can be recognized and ascertained even today.

Roosevelt is a peculiarly dominating personality. He has personally shaped the foreign policy of the United States in the last 7 years, which can therefore only be explained by his nature, his motives and his aims. Roosevelt is descended from an old Dutch-English family which has been settled in America for 300 years and for generations has belonged to the so-called aristocracy of the country. The Dutch-English strain, the traditions of his family and his New York and New England surroundings shaped the nature of the man; England and Holland, although he would probably not admit this to outsiders, are to him still the motherland, now as in the past. English children's songs and English children's stories (he likes to quote from *Alice in Wonderland* and from older English fairy tales) English prayer books and psalms, English school books and histories influenced him during his youth; English political ideas (the parliamentary system, so-called democracy and freedom of the press) were held up to him as a young politician and the English Magna Charta is a concept he feels not as something alien, but as something of his own. He is an accomplished master of the English language; in speaking or writing, his language is exemplary “King's English”. To be sure, he is an

American and few Presidents have succeeded as skillfully as he did in fascinating the American people—including the populations of the Midwest and West—with typically American slogans and actions; but inwardly he has never cut himself off from Europe, as most Americans consciously or unconsciously do, and at bottom he has always remained an Englishman or Dutchman. This mentality was strengthened and nourished by many journeys to Europe, especially to England, but also to France and Germany; he is well acquainted with these countries, speaks French fluently and is able to read German and to carry on a conversation in German, albeit with effort. He has surely come to realize the numerous defects of the English political system and occasionally comments on them critically, but in the main he admires those old traditions and fundamentally the aristocratic fabric impresses him, just as he is impressed by European princes, no matter whether they are ruling or non-ruling or whether it is a question of the English royal couple (he is the first President who invited an English King to the White House) or the Hohenzollerns, Hapsburgs or Bourbons. The fact that he recently ordered an American man-of-war to take the fugitive Prince of Parma-Bourbon, prince consort of the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, with his children from Lisbon to America and received him in Washington with full honors, was certainly not motivated only by political considerations (deliberate affront to Germany, posing as protector of a country "oppressed" by Germany, appeal to American compassion for the hapless children) but partly by his snobbery.

Until he fell ill with infantile paralysis, which he contracted a few years after the World War, Roosevelt—as uniformly described to me by many persons who know him—was a young man of means, rather superficial and who moved in the English-oriented society; it made no difference that for a while, following the traditions of his family, he held the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Only after he had to a certain extent overcome his grave illness and now, almost completely paralyzed in his legs, had to begin a new life, did the prodigious zest for action and the burning political ambition arise which have so strongly dominated him in the last 18 years. Undaunted by his physical handicap he plunged into politics and in a relatively short while he made his way to become Governor of the State of New York and President of the United States. Here, besides his English family tradition and his predilection for the English way of life, is the second factor contributing to his attitude on foreign affairs. As matters stand, New York politics make it unavoidable that anyone entering them should enter into connections with or commitments to the strong Jewish element that carries much weight in the party machinery, the press, cinema, radio, as well as in the mem-

bership of the New York bar to which Roosevelt belonged. There he met intimately men like Bernard Baruch, Felix Frankfurter, Henry Morgenthau (who is also his neighboring proprietor in Hyde Park), and there were contracted those Jewish friendships which still exist, and which, understandably, have unfavorably influenced the attitude of the President toward the Third Reich, and daily influence it further.

Thus the English ideological and the New York Jewish climates have together produced in Roosevelt from the very outset the predisposition for his negative attitude toward National-Socialist Germany. He is, of course, too clever not to see why the reversal of 1933 took place in Germany, and in the conversations I had with him he repeatedly intimated that he had a measure of understanding for the national aspect (he spoke of the Versailles Treaty with a deprecatory gesture), although probably with the qualification that he did not desire a Germany really strong politically and militarily. With the socialist aspect of the Third Reich he should also be in sympathy, as many of his measures prove. For the system of authoritarian leadership he must undoubtedly inwardly harbor sympathies, for in his reformist activities he has repeatedly collided with obstacles in the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the press, such as do not exist in an authoritarian state. "Herr Hitler has an easier time of it than I", he told me in a talk while we spoke of the cumbersomeness of legislation in the United States, and he said that with an envious sigh. But he does not dare publicly to avow this realization; on the contrary, he believes that he must publicly condemn the system of the authoritarian state to avoid giving the impression that he himself is averse for dictatorship, which he is thought to be by many who know his strong and dominating personality and his enjoyment of power. Perhaps he would have obtained a more correct and just appreciation of the National-Socialist ideology and the German form of government if he had insisted on being informed with less bias and more comprehensively; but as it is he is full of prejudices against this "tyranny" which in his opinion oppresses liberty, law and religion and he considers it a creation of evil. He has therefore assumed from the outset a negative attitude to the new Germany and has worked himself in time—as his speech of July 18 [*sic*], 1940,¹⁷ clearly shows—almost into a frenzy. In the last few years there has been added the apprehension that this ideology might extend beyond Germany and sooner or later, at first by underground methods, reach across to America. Finally he has for sometime considered a militarily invigorated Germany to be a danger, not merely to Germany's adversaries in Europe, but in the last resort to the countries of the Western Hemisphere as well.

¹⁷ See document No. 199 and footnote 1 thereto.

That is how this man views the world, and it is hard to say how far this world picture rests on honest conviction and how far it is persistently put forward for merely propagandist reasons so that certain personal ambitions and undeclared American aims, especially the stronger economic and military domination of the Western Hemisphere, might be easier to pursue. There is no doubt that in the last few years the President has to a growing extent become obsessed with the idea that only he was able to hold the "German danger"—both the ideological and the military one—in check; the weak pilots of the European democracies with their irresolute, vacillating appeasement policy have disappointed him too much for him to place great hopes in them. As early as the end of 1937, during the *Panay* crisis, he used an expression in a telegram to Alfred Landon,¹⁸ the Republican leader who had assured him of the loyal support of the Republican party in the policy toward Japan, which indicated that the leadership ("guidance"¹⁹) in the struggle against the totalitarian states would sooner or later devolve upon America. And today, in the struggle against Germany, this is his ultimate goal:

To take over the guidance of the "democratic" forces in the struggle against Germany. Whatever he could do in that respect, before the outbreak of the war and since the beginning of September 1939, he did with great tenacity and cunning skill. If things had depended only on him, he would have speeded up earlier the rearmament of the United States, earlier and still more plainly given expression to its backing of England and France and would have tried in every way to support the Allies to an even greater extent than was done.

That he has up to now not succeeded in this is due only to the adverse attitude of public opinion in this country, as it has been so far expressed, and is likely to continue being expressed, in the Congress.

DIECKHOFF

¹⁸ For texts of the telegrams exchanged between Landon and Roosevelt on Dec. 20 and 21, 1937, see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. VI, pp. 549-550.

¹⁹ This word appears in English in the original.

No. 253

175/187191

The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary

Teletype

No. 14

FUSCHL, July 29, 1940.

Received Berlin, July 30—12:30 a. m.

1. I have given instructions to Minister Fabricius here to inform the Rumanian Government that the Führer regards the return of southern Dobruja within the boundaries of 1913, including Silistria

and Balcic, as an exceedingly fair and equitable solution, to which Rumania should agree without delay, and that he himself had advised the Bulgarians not to ask for more so as not to get involved in a maze of dickering with the Rumanians.¹

2. You are requested to instruct Minister Fabricius immediately to report whether and when he conveyed the above communication to the Rumanian Government.²

3. You are further requested to convey the same communication orally to the Rumanian Minister,³ who is returning to Berlin next Friday, and to ask him to transmit it at once to Bucharest; it would be best to do this in such a way as to enable the Minister to write down the communication in the above form, so as to preclude any misunderstanding.

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 245. The full text of Ribbentrop's instruction with a request for an immediate telegraphic report was sent by Weizsäcker on July 30 as telegram No. 904 to Bucharest (175/137192). In a subsequent telegram (No. 905 of July 31) Weizsäcker informed Fabricius that the Foreign Minister had expressly requested that the words "to which Rumania should agree without delay" be used in the démarche to be made at Bucharest (175/137193).

² See document No. 262.

³ This was done by Weizsäcker on Aug. 2 (172/135311).

No. 254

B15/B002610

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 2564 of July 30

MADRID, July 30, 1940.

Received July 30—4: 45 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Schellenberg wires from Lisbon:

"Yesterday Windsor was with his Ambassador for a lengthy consultation.

Today there arrived at the Duke's, as announced,¹ the English Minister who calls himself Sir Walter Turner Monckstone [sic], a lawyer from Kent. The Portuguese confidential agent assumes, as do I too, that a cover name is involved. It is possible that it concerns a member of the personal police of the reigning King by the name of Camerone [sic].

Thus far it could not be determined whether the second Spanish confidential emissary, who is expected,² has arrived and how the Duke reacts to the plan."

¹ A report from Schellenberg transmitted from Madrid by telegram on July 28, stated that an English Minister, a friend of the Duke's, was expected in Lisbon on Aug. 28 and the departure of the Duke and Duchess had been postponed until Sept. 1 (3680/E035156-57).

² See document No. 235.

This second Spanish confidential emissary, according to the Minister of the Interior, has been in Lisbon since Friday, but has not yet reported anything.

STOHRER

No. 255

129/120974

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

LISBON, July 30, 1940—12:02 a. m.

No. 766 of July 29

Received July 30—2:50 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 706 of July 18.¹

Today a supplementary protocol to the Portuguese-Spanish Friendship Pact² was signed in Lisbon, which is to be published tomorrow morning. As Ambassador Franco told me in informing me of the fact, the protocol constitutes an amplification of the existing Treaty. The signing amounts to a forward step and to encouragement for Portugal to continue on the path of separation from England. At this time Spain could go no further, but he was convinced that developments would continue in the direction taken.

HUENE

¹This telegram reported information received from Spanish Ambassador Franco regarding preliminary negotiations for the supplementary protocol to the Spanish-Portuguese Friendship Pact (136/74233-34).

²The reference is to the Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression Between Portugal and the Spanish Nationalist Government, signed at Lisbon, March 17, 1939. For the text see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1939*, vol. cxliii, pp. 673-675. For the text of the supplementary protocol see *ibid.*, vol. cxliv, p. 520. A German translation of both documents is in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, September 1940 (Essen, 1940), pp. 720-722.

The text of the supplementary protocol was also forwarded to the Foreign Ministry by the Ambassador in Spain in dispatch No. 3390 of Aug. 1 (4459/E087011-13).

No. 256

188/86204-05

The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERN, July 30, 1940—1:21 a. m.

No. 644 of July 29

Received July 30—8:10 a. m.

The Army Staff reveals through the local morning press that on July 25 General Guisan, on Mt. Rütli, personally gave the order of the day to his troop commanders down to battalion commanders. The text of the Army Staff statement is carried by DNB.

In his order General Guisan states that Switzerland is at a turning point in her history, that it is a matter of the preservation of Switzer-

land; there follows a reference to the Rütli oath and the difficulties "which always appear and which were designated as long ago as the Bundesbrief of 1291 as the guile of the times." These words obviously do not reproduce the entire content of the General's address. That is clear from the essentially frank army field order which Guisan had distributed after issuing the order of the day.

This army order discusses Switzerland's independence, which her neighbors have observed to this day; and

["we would know how to create respect for it to the end; so long as there are millions under arms in Europe and so long as significant forces are in a position to attack us at any time, the Army must remain at its post . . .¹ Our fate is still in our own hands; do not lend your ear to those who, from ignorance or with evil intent, spread defeatist reports. . . . Have faith in our strength, with which, if everyone is filled with an iron will, we will put up an effective resistance. . . . On August 1 you will bear in mind that the new positions which I have assigned to you are those where your arms and your courage will, under the new conditions, best be able to function for the welfare of your native land.["]

There is no apparent reason for this astonishing demonstration.

I suggest considering whether joint or separate démarches of similar content by the Axis Powers would not be in order, expressing our surprise at renewed incitement of Swiss public opinion against Germany and Italy; if anything could make the allied Axis Powers vacillate in their resolve to maintain their previous attitude toward Switzerland, it is such an inopportune demonstration as that of the General. The German Government ought to remind Switzerland, in this connection, of the steps by which it called the attention of the Federal Council to the campaign against Germany and German nationals residing here.² It would have to hold the Swiss Government responsible for any excesses which might arise from the official statements of the Swiss Army leader.³

KÖCHER

¹ Omissions appear in the original.

² Notes had been sent to the Swiss Government on Oct. 18, 1939 (9913/E694102-13) and on Apr. 24, 1940 (9914/E694116-22).

³ On July 31 Woermann wired to Fuschl for Ribbentrop's instructions on this matter (telegram No. 709: 183/86206). No reply has been found, but on Aug. 7 Weizsäcker sent to the Embassy in Italy the text of Köcher's telegram No. 644 with the following instructions: "The Foreign Minister desires that a démarche be made as proposed by the Minister in Bern. Please arrange with the Foreign Ministry there for the Italian Government to undertake a démarche in Bern, not jointly with us, but simultaneously, in the terms suggested by Minister Köcher. Both démarches to be made before the end of this week. Please report by wire." (telegram No. 1057 of Aug. 5: 2281/481498-99)

On Aug. 9 (telegram No. 1487: 183/86215), Mackensen replied as follows: "Ciano informed me by telephone that the Duce was in full agreement with the proposed démarche. Ciano will forthwith instruct the Italian Minister in Bern to consult with Minister Köcher to carry it out." See document No. 335.

No. 257

B15/B002611-12

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 2576 of July 30

MADRID, July 30, 1940.

Received July 30—3:45 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The Spanish Minister of the Interior just informed me that his confidential emissary talked with the Duke on Sunday afternoon¹ and gave him a written communication from his old acquaintance (that is, the first confidential emissary sent to Lisbon).² W. read the letter slowly and carefully. The impression which it made, however, does not seem to have been decisive. The confidential emissary, whom the Minister described to me as very tactful, also made additional statements verbally, and he very forcefully emphasized the necessity of a conference between the Duke and the Spanish Minister of the Interior. The Duke thereupon became very thoughtful, but finally stated only that he must think the matter over. He would give his answer after 48 hours (which would run out Tuesday evening).³

Kriminalkommissar Winzer who has worked closely with Schellenberg in Lisbon during the last few days and who has just returned from there reports that the Duke still seems to be holding to the first of August as the date of departure. Whether this is only a deceptive maneuver or not is difficult to decide.

At my request the Minister of the Interior, in view of this situation, had instructions again sent to his confidential emissary in Lisbon to employ anew all his force of persuasion to persuade W. at least to give up his imminent departure and then to communicate here by telephone the Duke's decision using forms of speech arranged in advance.

In these circumstances and with a view to the possibility that W. holds to his decision to leave, the question arises as to whether we should not to some extent emerge from our reserve. Minister von Huene has, according to the information of Herr Winzer, reported to Berlin that the Duke had on occasion expressed to his host a desire to come in contact with the Führer. Through Minister von Huene or a Portuguese confidential emissary, perhaps we could urge the banker as on his own volition to put to the Duke without any binding force the question of what he would do if he were afforded the

¹ July 28.

² See document No. 235.

³ July 30.

opportunity to get into communication with the German Government. The intermediary would in such a situation have to be empowered, in case the Duke fell in with this line of thought, to say that in his opinion this desire could be fulfilled if the Duke did not depart, but returned to Spain, which also was urgently desirable from the point of view of his personal safety.

Since time is pressing I request full telegraphic instructions.⁴ Immediate transmission of the decision to Lisbon has been provided for. Will forward telegraphic report this evening immediately upon receipt of the telephoned report of the Spanish confidential agent regarding the Duke's decision.⁵

STOHRER

⁴ Not found. Cf. document No. 265.

⁵ Such a report has not been found. Cf. document No. 264.

No. 258

104/112344

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

URGENT
No. 1307

BERLIN, July 30, 1940.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 1472 and 1500.¹

The Foreign Minister requests that you inform M. Molotov at the first opportunity of the latest state visits to Germany, to the following effect:

The visit of the Rumanian Minister President and Foreign Minister in Germany was occasioned by the fact that the King of Rumania and the Rumanian Government lately had repeatedly requested the Reich Government to express its attitude toward the Hungarian and Bulgarian desires for revision. During the visit the Rumanian statesmen were advised by us to meet revisionist claims on a fair and reasonable basis and to negotiate directly with the Hungarian and Bulgarian Governments for this purpose. The Rumanian statesmen promised for their part to initiate such negotiations at this time. During the Bulgarian visit we notified the Bulgarian statesmen to that effect. End of the instructions by the Foreign Minister.

In accordance with instructions I shall similarly inform Ambassador Shkvartsev.²

A report by wire is requested.³

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 249 and footnote 1.

² A memorandum by Weizsäcker of the same day indicates that the Soviet Ambassador had been informed to that effect (271/176642).

³ Report not printed (104/112348).

No. 259

B19/B003666-67

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*¹

Telegram

No. 1310

BERLIN, July [30],² 1940.
e. o. W V 2832.

With reference to your No. 1399 of July 17³ and our No. 1280 of July 24.⁴

1. Please inform M. Molotov that we will waive participation in the Petsamo concession and will restrict ourselves to the fulfillment of the contract between I. G. Farben-Industrie and the Petsamo Nickel Company for delivery of 60 percent of the nickel ore production.

2. For guidance in your statements attention is also called to the following for this concluding conversation with Molotov:

German-Finnish negotiations about a German concession in Petsamo have not taken place. Negotiations and initialed agreements covered only delivery of nickel ore production to Germany. Negotiations about the concession did not occur because Finland did not wish to disturb the Canadian concession arrangement and we postponed the matter until later peace negotiations with England. The Finnish Government was informed of our interest and our desire for corresponding participation only for the contingency of a change in the Canadian concession arrangement. As a result it was not possible even for Paasikivi to give the Soviet Government information about German-Finnish negotiations about a concession.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The text of this telegram was communicated to the Legation in Helsinki as telegram No. 347 (B19/B003667).

² The date on this copy of the document is July 26. The date was changed to July 30 on another copy (8843/E615274-75). Subsequent references to the document (see document No. 301) show that July 30 is the correct date.

³ Document No. 182.

⁴ Not printed (4416/E083863). This telegram told of the conclusion at Helsinki on July 23 of the contract between I. G. Farben and the Petsamo Nickel Company. See document No. 221.

No. 260

284/156923

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 604

BERLIN, July 30, 1940.

Minister Fischböck, of the Reich Commissar's Office for the Occupied Netherlands Territories, informed me today that the Reich Com-

missar has sent a memorandum regarding the Netherlands Indies to the Foreign Minister.¹ The memorandum seems to indicate that in exchange for certain economic concessions in the Netherlands Indies Japanese agreement could be obtained to keep their hands off the Netherlands Indies at the final settlement. I acquainted Herr Fischböck with the telegraphic instructions to Tokyo, No. 412 of May 20,² in which German disinterestedness in such overseas problems was discussed. I added that I for my part would not by any means want to decline an examination of this problem but that I did not believe that the Führer would like to go into the matter again at this stage.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Seyss-Inquart's memorandum has not been found. Cf. Seyss-Inquart's report on the situation and development in the occupied Netherlands territory for the period May 29 to July 19, 1940, in *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1947), vol. xxvi, document No. 997-PS, especially p. 427.

² Vol. ix, document No. 280.

No. 261

6956/E518710-18

Minister of Economics Funk to Minister Lammers

BERLIN, July 30, 1940.
Rk. 11834 B.

DEAR DR. LAMMERS: I am sending you herewith three copies of a special publication¹ in which my recent statements before the German and foreign press are reproduced in greater detail and more correctly than was done in a part of the daily press. The purpose and intention of my statements was to bring back to the realm of actual facts the fanciful speculations about the new order of economic life after the war is over that have appeared in recent weeks in the German press and still more in the foreign press. It was not at all my intention that the press should play up my absolutely objective statements in such a sensational way. For weeks the Foreign Ministry and the Propaganda Ministry had urged me to inform the press about my intentions, particularly in consideration of the fact that alleged plans of Dr. Schacht were being ventilated increasingly in the foreign press—he was said to have a special assignment from the Führer. I

¹ Not printed (6956/E518714-25). The expanded version of Funk's speech of July 25 had been published by the German paper *Südost-Echo* on July 26. Under the title "Die wirtschaftliche Neuordnung Europas" the speech was reprinted in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, August 1940, pp. 630-636. An English translation is printed in *Documents on International Affairs 1939-1946*, selected and edited by Margaret Carlyle (London, New York, Toronto, 1954), vol. II (Hitler's Europe), pp. 29-35.

tried in my statements to give the United States of America certain positive perspectives on the one hand, in order not to provide with ammunition the anti-German tendencies in the United States precisely at this moment. This was indeed rather successful—as I see from the response in the American press; on the other hand I naturally had to oppose sharply the American plans that amount to an elimination of South American trade with Germany and Europe. This has had the result that the opposition in the South American states to the American plans has become considerably more pronounced, with reference made to my statements.

I should now be particularly grateful to you if at a convenient opportunity you would give the Führer a copy of my statements and find out at the same time whether the Führer is in agreement with the principles and methods I have developed and also with the tactics I have followed. This is extremely important for my further work on the future economic problems, some of which is of course already much further advanced than is evident from my statements. If you could find out the opinion of the Führer and inform me accordingly I should be very much obliged to you.³

Yours, etc.

WALTHER FUNK

³ Marginal notes:

(1) Submitted to the Führer.

(2) Minister Funk informed in accordance with the Führer's views.

(3) One copy handed to the Führer, one taken for myself.

(4) Herr Reichskabinettsrat Dr. Willuhn. Please discuss with me on occasion. L[ammers] Aug. 8."

[EDITORS' NOTE. The Halder Diary contains the following record of conferences held by Hitler at the Berghof on July 31 (for Raeder's record of the part of the conference in which he participated, see "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual*, 1948, pages 122-125):

"11:30 Berghof:

Grand Admiral Raeder: By September 13 all preparations will be sufficiently advanced, so that the landing can start, unless especially unfavorable conditions occur.

Weather: September 20-28 generally bad weather in the channel. At the end of September and beginning of October better weather. In this period also recruiting of additional personnel possible. Calling up of people strongly affects shipping on inland waterways and economy (coal, iron, food Berlin-Hamburg). Fishing boats must be requisitioned as tugs; thereby the supply of fish is endangered. Commerce with the northern countries will be greatly affected, with the Baltic States less so.

Proposal: Postponement of the date until after spring. Difference of view between Army and Navy: Putting time of attack in the morning unfavorable for Navy. Darkness does not permit reconnaissance. *2 hours after high tide is best time.*

Landing at dawn means night-sailing. Therefore at least a night with half moon.

In the month only a few days which meet these conditions. 22-26 August (not ready), 22-26 September. These fall in the bad weather period.

Landing at Lyme Bight leads to the region where the enemy is strongest. Numerous enemy destroyers anyway. Our disembarking requires 36 hours.

An extended landing area cannot be defended, therefore demand for compression of landing in tightest area.

Summary:

- 1) September 15 the earliest date.
- 2) Primary demand of the Navy for secure landing.
- 3) Best time of year May-June.

Führer: In crossing pay attention to:

- a) natural weather conditions, against which no force can be exerted (agrees with the point mentioned of a high tide raised by a storm),
- b) enemy action.

As for enemy action the Army now has to deal only with a poor English Army. Its experience in war not evaluated. New formations not possible so far. In 8-10 months new formations possible: equipment in spring for 30-35 divisions. On the spot that means a great deal. Perhaps centers of production can be sufficiently destroyed by an air attack to hamper the outfitting. Propaganda possibilities. Over against this is the possibility of hopes based on Russia and America.

Doubtful ability of the Italians to hold out, particularly in East Africa. In general what can be done in the meantime: aside from air-warfare. If attack on E[ngland] is not possible now, then only in May. How can we bridge the time until May? Luftwaffe-U-boats.

Gibraltar? (Bring Spain in).

Army proposal: Support of Italians in North Africa. 2 armored divisions.

Führer: This diversionary maneuver must be tried,

Effect on France?

Really decisive effect only through attack on England.

Grand Admiral Raeder proposes to commit only the 10 regimental groups north of Folkstone.

Until May—*Bismarck* and *Tirpitz*—altogether 4 cruisers. Destroyers: from September on one a month, 12 torpedo boats now ready, 18 by spring. 20 motor torpedo boats, more in the course of the winter.

Fighting forces from overseas in significant numbers not involved.

Führer: What will ratio of both fleets be until spring '41?

Answer: Depends upon effect of Luftwaffe. There is still lacking [*es fehlt noch*] the *Royal Oak*, *Queen Elizabeth*, altogether 13 battle-ships. Possible that in the course of the winter we will get *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* to Brest.

Führer: More difficult if matters go on. Air warfare now beginning. It will be seen at what ratio we shall arrive.

If result of the air war is not satisfactory, then preparation will be halted.

If there is impression that English are being smashed and that after a certain time the effect is being felt, then attack.

Put up with economic difficulties for 10 days longer. Change of construction of flat-bottomed boats, in case of postponement into next year, can be continued during the winter.

Diplomatic influence: Spain. Question of North Africa discussed. *Führer* considers effect on enemy harbors. Effect on fleet? Stukas against armor plates.

Command: Preparations will continue, decision in 8–10 days concerning actual attack.

Army: Be ready by September 15 broad basis.

Führer: Asks about effect of U-boats.

Raeder: Basing on Lorient and Brest doubles the effect.

Luftwaffe attacks St. George's Channel, Navy North Channel.

Trondheim in the autumn fully secured against large ships. Protection against submarines being increased.

Narvik secured. For Kirkenes heavy artillery in March. Proposes continuation of U-[boat] program beyond fall of 1941. He needs raw materials and workers for that.

Raeder leaves.

Führer:

a) Emphasizes his skepticism concerning technical possibilities: Is satisfied with accomplishment of Navy.

b) Emphasizes weather.

c) Discusses possibilities of enemy action.

Our small navy 15 percent that of enemy, 8 percent size of enemy in destroyers. E-boats equal 10–12 percent of enemy.

Defense against naval attacks = 0.

There remain: Mines (not altogether reliable). Coast artillery—good! Luftwaffe. Decision will always take into account that we risk nothing in vain.

d) Assumed: England does not take initiative [*tritt nicht an*]: Elimination of hopes which could move England to hope for a change. The war as such is won. France drops out of the British convoy system; Italy ties down British forces.

U-boat war and air war can decide the war; will last, however, 1–2 years.

England's hope is Russia and America. If hope on Russia is eliminated, America also is eliminated, because enormous increase in the importance of Japan in the Far East will result from the elimination of Russia.

Russia Far Eastern sword of England and America against Japan. An unpleasant wind here for England. Japanese like Russia have their program, which is to be realized before the end of the war.

The Russian victory-film concerning the Russian war!

Russia the factor on which England is mainly betting. Something has happened in London! The English were entirely “down,” now they are up again. Monitored conversations. Russia unpleasantly impressed by the quick development of the western European situation.

Russia never need say more to England than that she does not want Germany to be great, then the English hope like a drowning man that things will be entirely different in 6–8 months.

Should Russia, however, be smashed, then England's last hope is extinguished. Germany is then master of Europe and the Balkans.

Decision: In the course of this contest Russia must be disposed of. Spring '41.

The quicker we smash Russia the better. Operation only makes sense if we smash the state heavily in one blow. Winning a certain amount of territory only does not suffice. A standstill during the winter hazardous. Therefore better to wait, but decision definite to dispose of Russia. Necessary also because of situation on the Baltic. No use for a second Great Power on the Baltic: May '41. Five months' time for carrying out. Preferable still in this year. Can't be done, however, if it is to be carried out as a single operation.

Aim: Annihilation of Russia's vital energy. Broken down in:

First drive Kiev resting on Dnieper. Luftwaffe destroys crossings Odessa.

Second drive Baltic States in direction Moscow.

Finally convergence from north and south. Later special operation against oil area Baku. To what extent Finland and Turkey can be interested remains to be seen.

Later: Ukraine, White Russia, Baltic States to us. Finland to the White Sea.

7 Divisions	Norway (make autarkic) munitions
50 Divisions	France
3	Holland, Belgium
<hr/> 60	
120	for the East
<hr/> 180 ¹	

The more units we come with, the better. We have 120 plus 20 leave-divisions. Initial organization by drawing one battalion from each division. After a few months again one battalion in 3 sections from the division. Extract one-third.

Camouflage: Spain, North Africa, England. New formations in areas protected from the air [*Luftgeschütz-Räumen*].

New formations: In the Eastern area: 40 divisions made up of battle-proved men.

Exposition concerning proposed Balkan settlement: Proposed Hungary-Rumania settlement. Then guarantee Rumania.

Flight from Salzburg: 1:45 p. m. Arrived Fontainebleau 8 p. m.”]

¹ The comprehensive order for building up the Army to 180 divisions was issued by the OKW on Sept. 10 (9108/E640436-48).

No. 262

175/187197-98

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1270 of July 31

BUCHAREST, July 31, 1940.

Received July 31—3:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 904 of July 25 [30].¹

I carried out the instruction of the Reich Foreign Minister this morning at 9 o'clock with the Minister President, and at 10 o'clock with the Foreign Minister. While the former accepted the Führer's advice calmly, the latter was taken aback. He had hoped to be able to save Balic and particularly Silistria for Rumania, because only one third of the population of Silistria is Bulgarian, and the only highway to Constanta goes from there; besides, Silistria had not belonged to Bulgaria in 1913. It was especially hard for him that the

¹ See document No. 253, footnote 1.

Bulgarian wishes had to be satisfied at once in their totality. Then what would happen with respect to Hungary? Manoilescu was so discouraged at first that he talked of resigning from his office.

I remarked that I could not share his view. He had himself told me of his gratitude to the Führer for his willingness to take an interest in Rumania despite the mistakes of Rumania's past foreign policy. In these circumstances it could really not be so difficult for him to respond quickly to a suggestion of the Führer. This would surely not fail to make an impression, because it would demonstrate that the new course in Rumania was completely oriented toward the Axis. In the end Manoilescu seemed not to close his mind to this viewpoint, and said he would present the matter to the King immediately. He said that as of now the plan for the *modus procedendi* was as follows: With the Council of Ministers having been informed yesterday about the conferences in Salzburg,² the Crown Council was to be informed today. After that, Ambassador Cadere, in Belgrade, would immediately be dispatched to Sofia, and Minister Bossy, in Rome, to Budapest. Both were well known in those capitals. They were to ascertain the wishes of Bulgaria and Budapest, and invite the responsible Ministers to send missions to Bucharest immediately. Only he did not know whether any change might result from the communication I made today.

The King has invited me to luncheon today, together with Minister Romalo. I shall discuss the question of Dobruja with him.

FABRICIUS

² See documents Nos. 233 and 234.

No. 263

871/208088-89

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia

Telegram

Teletype No. 16 from Fuschl
No. 203 from the Foreign Ministry

FUSCHL, July 29, 1940.
Sent Berlin July 31.

For Minister von Killinger ¹ personally:

1) Please induce the Slovak Government to approve the establishment of a German Consulate in Prešov and at the same time to assume the commitment not to permit any consulate of other countries in this place.

¹ On July 30 it was announced that Killinger had been appointed Minister to Slovakia.

2) Furthermore, please induce the Slovak Government to recall M. Sidor immediately from his post as Minister to the Vatican, since he is politically unreliable.³

3) As for Durčanský, please see to it, pursuant to the Salzburg discussions,³ that although he may keep his seat in the Parliament and his party position, he does not exercise these functions.

4) And finally, please settle the question of the German advisers in Slovakia as quickly as possible; as already discussed orally,⁴ one adviser each is needed for police questions, the Jewish question, propaganda questions, economic questions, and the organization of the Hlinka Guard. For the last-mentioned position the authorized agent of the Danube Steamship Company, Herr Pehm, is being considered. With regard to the selection of the other advisers I request that you immediately get in touch with Minister Luther, who has received from me the necessary instructions in that matter. It will still have to be decided what the best way to treat the position of the advisers is, that is, whether they should be assigned ostensibly to the German Legation or whether it is better to build them directly into the Slovak Government service. I ask you to send me specific proposals in this matter as speedily as possible. In any case it must be made certain that the advisers are directly subordinate to you and that they have to report to you exclusively, and not to any domestic German departments. If more personnel is needed for carrying out the tasks of the advisers, please make a request to that effect whenever this is the case. Please report likewise what allocation of special funds (foreign exchange), if any, is needed.⁵

RIBBENTROP

³ In report No. 288 g. Rs. of Aug. 5 Killinger said that he had discussed the Sidor problem with Tuka who recommended that Sidor be left at his post until the Government was firmly in the saddle, since he had a considerable following in the Hlinka Guard and might make some trouble. Killinger supported this recommendation. (371/208081)

⁴ See document No. 248 and footnote 7.

⁵ Record of these discussions has not been found.

⁶ Not found.

No. 264

B15/B002619-20

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 2598 of July 31

MADRID, July 31, 1940.

Received July 31—6:25 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The confidential emissary of the Minister of the Interior returned this morning from Lisbon. He reports as follows:

The Duke and Duchess were strongly impressed by the reports of English intrigues being carried out against them and of danger to their personal safety. They no longer feel secure. They say they cannot take a step without surveillance. Yet the Duke declared he wanted to proceed to the Bahamas. No prospect of peace existed at the moment. Further statements of the Duke indicate that he has nevertheless already given consideration to the possibility that the role of an intermediary might fall to him. He declared that the situation in England at the moment was still by no means hopeless. Therefore he should not now, by negotiations carried on contrary to the orders of his Government, let loose against himself the propaganda of his English opponents, which might deprive him of all prestige at the period when he might possibly take action. He could, if the occasion arose, take action even from the Bahamas.

The Duke stated to the confidential emissary that he likely would leave at the end of this week or beginning of next week. However, aside from tomorrow, August 1, there is no immediate possibility of departure. Thus it may be assumed that the Duke made this statement in order to conceal the true date. The Minister of the Interior is ready to make a last effort to prevent the Duke and Duchess from leaving in case there is still time for it, and in spite of his previous objections to sending the same confidential emissary a second time, he is now ready to dispatch again this afternoon by plane to Lisbon the first confidential emissary, who is especially close to the Duke (the district leader of the Falange here, Primo de Rivera), for the purpose of acquainting the Duke personally with two of his lines of thought.

(1) According to reports available to the Minister the decision will very quickly go against England and the English Government and the King will soon be forced to leave the country.

(2) From the Bahamas, where the Duke would be in the power of the English Government (even if it should settle in Canada), he would not be free to intervene. This would be possible only from a neutral country. Accordingly a return to Spain is advisable. In order not to create the impression of flight the Duke should suddenly postpone his journey as now planned and then after 8 or 10 days travel to Spain.

Schellenberg has been informed from here. Please inform the Chief of the Security Police.

STOHRER

No. 265

B15/B002617-18

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Special Train, FUSCHL, July 31, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received Berlin, July 31—6:30 p. m.

No. 19 of July 31 from Fuschl

No. 442 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent July 31—6:30 p. m.

In connection with the report that the Duke of Windsor will depart for America tomorrow¹ I request that you inform your Portuguese friend, with whom the Duke lives, for strictly confidential transmittal to the Duke the following:

Basically Germany wants peace with the English people. The Churchill clique stands in the way of this peace. Following the rejection of the Führer's last appeal to reason Germany is now determined to force England to make peace by every means of power. It would be a good thing if the Duke were to keep himself prepared for further developments. In such case Germany would be willing to cooperate most closely with the Duke and to clear the way for any desire expressed by the Duke and Duchess. The direction in which these wishes tend is quite obvious and meets with our complete understanding. Should the Duke and Duchess have other intentions, but be ready to collaborate in the establishment of a good relationship between Germany and England for the future, Germany is likewise prepared to cooperate with the Duke and to arrange the future of the Ducal couple in accordance with their wishes. The Portuguese confidant, with whom the Duke is living, should make the most earnest effort to prevent his departure tomorrow, since reliable reports are in our possession to the effect that Churchill intends to get the Duke into his power in the Bahamas in order to keep him there permanently and also because establishment of contact at an appropriate moment with the Duke on the Bahama Islands would present the greatest difficulties for us. We are convinced that the Duke will be so under surveillance there that he will never again have the chance to come to Europe, even by airplane, as he mentioned to the Portuguese confidant.

Should the Duke in spite of everything be determined to depart, there is still the possibility that the Portuguese confidant might remain in touch with him and arrange some other way to transmit communications verbally, whereby we can continue beyond this present contact and, if occasion arises, negotiate. You may inform the Portuguese confidant that the proposed overture comes from an authoritative German source. I assume that your Portuguese friend is discreet and can be relied upon to transmit such a confidential communication. I request that it be made to him, of course, only privately

¹ Huene had telegraphed this information on July 28 (B15/B002602).

and orally, and in case, contrary to all expectation, an indiscretion should take place, you must naturally deny entirely any such statement or any connection with the matter whatsoever.

Please keep this telegram confidential and under your personal charge.

RIBBENTROP

No. 266

91/100311-13

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 437 of July 31

DUBLIN, July 31, 1940.

Received July 31—7:03 p. m.

For Under State Secretary Woermann.

In connection with my telegram No. 434¹ regarding latest developments in the political situation here I would request that the following points be taken into account:

(1) Possible British intentions to attack Ireland are being discouraged principally by respect for public opinion in the United States, which consideration is particularly in the foreground with the British Government at present. The possible reelection of Roosevelt, who is not in favor with the Government here, would increase the danger for Ireland, since that consideration would then be of less consequence. This would certainly be the case if the United States should enter the war, but also even if that step were not taken. Ireland, however, in my opinion would benefit by the collapse of the Roosevelt candidacy. In the United States at present the Irish element, and now even the radical opposition, is reported to be largely backing de Valera, inasmuch as he has steadily clung even recently to neutrality in spite of all British allurements. The Irish Minister of External Affairs has, as already reported, instructed the Irish Minister in Washington to make contacts with Senators of Irish origin who are friendly to Germany, in order to take steps against the agitation against Irish neutrality, which is bound up with the suspicions originating from England regarding Germany's intentions to attack Irish neutrality. Also contact with our Embassy in Washington is clearly desired. Walshe indicated to me further that closer cooperation between the Irish element in the United States and the German element there, and also with the Italians, might be in the general interest, and he had also stated something like that to the Italian Minister. The Irish Government apparently believes that if the Irish element in the United

¹ Not printed (91/100309-10).

States is properly used, it could constitute a powerful influence in our favor, likewise the Irish-American press. By other channels I heard that perhaps something could be accomplished along this line also in the Hearst press. The difficulty is, as Walshe, too, pointed out, that if any German participation became known outside, it could easily lead to an undesirable effect in the opposite direction. I assume that the Irish Government because of well-justified anxiety about a possible unfavorable British reaction against Ireland must also avoid the appearance of cooperation with us. I would be grateful for advice as to whether and how far such discreet cooperation with the Irish element in the United States is considered either possible or productive by the Embassy there and to what extent it has been initiated, and also how far I may go in conversations with the Government here on the subject in view of the caution requisite for the reasons mentioned for fear of producing a compromising position with respect to England. The Italian Minister here intends to report to Rome on the same subject.

(2) From various indications in talks with Walshe and Boland I assume that the Irish Government may be placing hope in future German interest in the maintenance and completion of an entirely independent United Irish state. They express this rather in a negative fashion by saying that they hope that in a future peace settlement we will not sacrifice Ireland to England, or they speak of negotiations which the Irish Government will have to carry on with us then. Their particular anxiety is that England immediately following a defeat might be inclined to reduce Ireland to her old position of dependence since Irish neutrality is regarded as a severe blow to the prestige of the British Empire. This might be done with the support of the United States within the outlines of a future, more extensive, framework of Anglo-American cooperation. Irish interest in a closer dependence on us would be encouraged if I could today indicate in conversation where the opportunity occurs our intention at least not to abandon Ireland. Such an intimation might easily emerge from the telegraphic instruction (group garbled) of July 15.² On the contrary the appearance must be avoided of any intention on our part to put Ireland into a position contradictory to England to an extent not hitherto expressed. This was what the Entente attempted to do with Czechoslovakia, etc., against us after the World War with the well-known unfortunate consequences. I would suggest that an instruction be sent.³ Basically I have always given expression to a friendly and understanding attitude on the part of Germany toward Ireland.

HEMPEL.

² Not found.

No. 267

1242/337091-96

*Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
No. 22BERLIN, July 31, 1940.
W. H. A. 468.MEETING OF THE COMMERCIAL POLICY COMMITTEE, JULY 31, 1940¹

FRANCE

Herr Hemmen gave a review of the present status of the economic negotiations with the French Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden. Discussions of the following points followed his statements:

1) *Alsace-Lorraine*

The question was raised as to whether, in view of the advancement of the Alsace-Lorraine customs border to the old Reich frontier,² the special position of Alsace-Lorraine may in future be referred to the French. The Commercial Policy Committee considers it proper not to do this for the present.

With regard to the question of the collection of customs at the new border of Alsace-Lorraine, the view is generally taken that in order to avoid an increase in the price of imports, it does not appear advisable to levy duties on articles destined for consumption in Alsace-Lorraine. The frontier fulfills its purpose as a currency frontier and as a protection against illegal imports and exports. The representative of the Ministry of Finance reserves the position of the Minister of Finance.

2) *Coal deliveries to France*

The question as to whether negotiations should take place in Wiesbaden or Paris with regard to coal deliveries to France, was decided in accordance with the first alternative. Coal deliveries must be utilized as an important bargaining item at the negotiations in Wiesbaden, for example in return for the delivery of raw materials of military importance desired by us, as well as in return for certain political demands (for example, uniforms for the German border inspectors in France). It also has the advantage that the coal deliveries can be handled through the German-French clearing arrangement provided for.

¹ Present were representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, the OKW, the High Command of the Navy, the Ministries of Economics, Food, Finance, and Transport, the Forestry Office, and the Reichsbank.

² See Document No. 354.

According to the principle of "economic sovereignty follows military sovereignty" the coal from the two departments of Northern France, Nord and Pas-de-Calais, can be offered as coal of German origin.

Lieutenant General Thomas is undertaking to inform the Chief of the OKW with regard to this view of the Commercial Policy Committee.

3) *Line of Demarcation*

Goods and Foreign Exchange Control

There was agreement over the fact that it is important and necessary to put into effect as soon as possible the border control provided for on the outer borders of metropolitan France, the more so since the French, under the slogan of "unity of territory" desire the elimination of the line of demarcation. For reasons of the personal safety of our officials, a uniform is to be requested for the German border inspectors. With regard to the establishment of the control on the Mediterranean coast and the Italo-French border, the position of the Italian Government, requested by our Embassy in Rome, is to be awaited.

There was agreement over the fact that beyond the borders of metropolitan France a goods export control is to be envisaged for the French colonies also, at first in the French North African territories, and, according to the need, also in other French overseas possessions.

With regard to the question as to whether the commissioners assigned to the French Ministry of Finance and the Bank of France are to be given the right to issue directives or veto powers, it is agreed that we can confine ourselves to a veto right, provided that we are assured unlimited opportunity for influencing foreign exchange legislation and the control of imports and exports.³

4) *Occupation costs*

Payments on account of occupation costs, amounting to at least 20 million reichsmarks per day are to be required of the French Government.⁴ These payments may be made in the form of *Reichskreditkassenscheine*,⁵ French francs, or other assets to be agreed upon.

The French Government shall be given no accounting as to the amount of the occupation costs. Since the daily payment is termed a payment on account, we may, moreover, at any time demand additional payments.

³ An unnumbered draft telegram by Wiehl to Rome dealing with the problems contained in section 3) is in the files (1242/337077-79). For the Italo-German negotiations on this problem see documents Nos. 337 and 338.

⁴ See document No. 309.

⁵ Notes issued by the *Reichskreditkasse*, which was established in occupied territories as a credit institution. It had head offices in Berlin and was affiliated with the Reichsbank. The *Reichskreditkassenscheine* served as occupation currency.

The computation of the amount of the occupation costs for internal use must be made through the OKW. In this connection all costs incurred in reichsmarks, particularly, therefore, all deliveries from Reich territory are also to be included. Since a portion of the occupation costs, therefore, is incurred not in French francs but in reichsmarks, a certain franc amount will probably remain from the payments made by the French Government in French francs, which are, indeed, to be based on the total amount of the occupation costs. It is agreed that this amount is to be used as much as possible by the military government under central direction or through the intermediary of the competent German authorities for purchases in unoccupied territory, since it is in the German interest to limit supplies from Reich territory for the army of occupation so far as practicable. All purchases in unoccupied territory must, however, be paid for in cash. So far as the available franc amounts do not suffice, the credit to be made available anyway by the Bank of France for purchases of merchandise is to be resorted to. In no event may purchases possible in themselves be neglected for lack of means of payment.

The *Reichskreditkassen* in occupied territory are to remain in existence until further notice.

The draft of the German note regarding occupation costs⁶ should be amended in accordance with the foregoing decisions.

These decisions were adopted unanimously. The representative of the OKW will obtain the approval of Field Marshal Keitel as soon as possible.

5) *Shipping*

The French delegation stated that a certain amount of sea traffic under Italian control between southern France and North Africa has been authorized.⁷ It was agreed that the full utilization of this shipping was important for German economic needs, particularly for the importation of French colonial products. First it must be determined to what extent Italy is exercising a control over this shipping and to what extent this shipping may be protected. The promised telegraphic report of our Embassy in Rome is to be awaited.⁸ A German-Italian conversation regarding mutual interests with respect to the procuring of goods from metropolitan France and the colonies is contemplated.

⁶ This had been transmitted to the Foreign Ministry by telegram No. 84 of July 24 from the Special Commission on Economic Questions with the German Armistice Commission (1001/306013-14).

⁷ An inquiry whether the Italian Armistice Commission had in fact authorized the resumption of sea traffic between France and North Africa was addressed to Rome by telegram No. 976 of July 21 (1242/337029) and answered in the affirmative by Mackensen in telegram No. 1423 of July 30 (1242/337088).

⁸ Rome telegram No. 1434 of July 31 (1001/305973), elaborating the information contained in telegram No. 1423 (see footnote 7) was received in Berlin at 10:10 p. m. on the same day.

With regard to the French Danubian ships, negotiations between German and French interests are scheduled to take place in Wiesbaden the beginning of next week. With regard to the change of flags of the ships in Istanbul, the French have stated that this was attributable neither to instructions of the French Government nor of the Director General of the French company. The Commercial Policy Committee agrees to the conduct of negotiations dealing with the provisional chartering of the French ships for the purpose of returning them to the Danube, it being assumed that the German flag will be hoisted.⁹

6) *Petroleum supply*

Herr Hemmen has already given the French delegation the assurance that newly imported quantities of petroleum will serve France's own requirements only. He asks that the condition laid down for this assurance, namely, to sell to Germany the quantities of petroleum on hand in unoccupied territory, be dropped because General von Stülpnagel thought that this demand, which went beyond the demand provided for in the Armistice Treaty to safeguard gasoline stocks, was indefensible. Herr Hemmen wants, however, to demand the sale to us of the available petroleum by way of negotiations, and hopes in this way to arrive at the same goal. The Commercial Policy Committee agreed to this.¹⁰

7) *The imposition of customs duties on the exchange of goods between Germany and France*

It is agreed that in the case of the importation of French goods into Germany, on the basis of an autonomous ruling, without assuming any obligation at all toward the French Government, in future only the duties are to be levied that were to be levied on the basis of the former German-French Commercial Treaty and the most-favored-nation

⁹ By an agreement of June 22, 1940, the French Danube ships had been transferred to the British flag, and were at this time in Istanbul. By a note of July 23 France had been asked to rescind the agreement of June 22 and to arrange for the return of these ships under the French flag to the Danube. On Aug. 8 General Huntziger informed Hemmen that the French Government would comply with the German demands (telegram No. 62 of Aug. 8 from Hemmen at Wiesbaden: 365/206492-94).

See *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 98 and 101.

¹⁰ By telegram No. Del 12 of July 12 (1242/336981-82) Hemmen had transmitted a French request to resume the import of petroleum. In order to achieve this the French asked for a German assurance that supplies of imported petroleum would not be subject to confiscation. Hemmen suggested that this request be granted. In a memorandum of July 25 (1242/337061-62) Wiehl sought the Foreign Minister's approval for this proposal with the proviso that the needs of both unoccupied and occupied zones were met by these imports, and existing petroleum stocks in France were sold to Germany. By a telegram of Aug. 5 (1242/337138) Hemmen was informed that on the Foreign Minister's decision the sought for assurance could be given, on condition that France kept Germany fully informed of her negotiations with Britain on this point. Hemmen was further instructed to negotiate with France the sale to Germany of petroleum stocks in the unoccupied zone.

clause. Regarding the question as to whether the French Government is to be requested likewise to restore autonomously the condition of the prewar period, no decision was reached. The representative of the Four Year Plan took the stand that we may leave it to the French to decide what duties to levy, since in the present situation it is entirely a matter of indifference from the German standpoint whether the French Government renders more difficult or more expensive the importation of German goods into France. On the other hand, the view was taken by various other officials that it was right to tell the French that we naturally expected that they would see to it independently that German goods likewise fared no worse upon importation into France than before the war. No such communication is to be made until a decision is reached on this point.

WIEHL

No. 268

247/164160-68

Minute by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, August 3, 1940.¹

MY CONFERENCES IN COPENHAGEN ON JULY 30 AND 31, 1940

I first had a conference with Foreign Minister Scavenius in the presence of MM. Renthe-Fink and Mohr. The conversation lasted about an hour and a half.

To begin with I made reference to the well-known statement of the Danish Government and the communication of July 17, 1940, addressed to the Foreign Minister.² It was stated therein that "in Europe a new era has begun, which would bring a new political and economic order under the leadership of Germany. It would be the task of Denmark to find her place in a necessary mutual and active cooperation with Greater Germany." Minister Mohr had during his visit to Germany conveyed the Danish Government's wish to enter into early negotiations with Germany on the economic aspect.³

Pursuant thereto I had been instructed to signify now that the Reich Government was prepared for such negotiations. The only arrangement consonant with the present and future situation was an agreement for an economic union. In connection therewith I made some statements on the general economic position of Denmark in order to explain that an economic union was not only the proper arrangement within the framework of the New Order in Europe, but that it was also to the advantage of Denmark herself.

¹ This document is printed at the date of the last conferences for the convenience of the reader.

² Document No. 181.

³ See document No. 189.

After M. Scavenius had asked some questions on the significance and scope of an economic union, he also asked what the intentions were in the economic field with respect to the other Scandinavian countries. He gave as the reason for this question that for centuries there had been a certain uniformity among the Scandinavian countries in their political and economic development and that it therefore had a bearing on the position Denmark took whether an agreement on an economic union would for the future place Denmark outside this uniformity of development or not. I replied to him that with regard to Sweden we had not as yet had any occasion to consider this question. If Sweden should approach us with the question whether she could enter into closer economic relations with Greater Germany, the question would presumably be studied with positive interest. As for Norway, the situation was different. The political and military developments of recent months of course gave the Reich Government occasion to concern itself with this problem. The Reich Government had not made any final decision on this problem in all its details. But it could be safely assumed that the present political and military situation would have definite consequences. I made these statements only for the personal and confidential information of M. Scavenius.

M. Scavenius then expressed extremely serious concern about the Danish smallholders, who did not raise enough fodder on their own soil to produce finished agricultural products (bacon, milk, butter, eggs). If no provision was made for these small farmers, they would be uprooted and forced to go to the cities as laborers. In reply I pointed to the German farm policy. Denmark had no reason to fear that in this matter Germany would deliberately follow another policy in Denmark than in Germany herself. To what extent Greater Germany would be able during and after the war to supply these Danish smallholders with fodder was another matter. Whether and to what extent this was possible now during the war was a question on which I had no figures available for him. That would have to be clarified in subsequent negotiations.

I emphasized in the course of the conversation that the initiative taken by the Danish Government through the well-known oral and written statement was especially appreciated by the Reich Government. Scavenius then asked somewhat anxiously whether his statement had directly inspired the German proposal for an economic union. Apparently he was worried lest he be reproached in domestic politics for having personally created the situation in which Denmark was now faced with this question.

After a number of individual questions had been discussed, I emphasized in conclusion that the Reich Government had no desire for negotiations that would drag out for weeks. The Danish Govern-

ment would have to decide in principle during my stay in Copenhagen whether it wished to enter into negotiations on the establishment of an economic union and to conclude the negotiations in a very short time. It was agreed that the discussion should be continued the same evening after the Danish Foreign Minister had informed his ministerial colleagues. In a following discussion with M. Mohr alone I asked what the Danish Government itself had had in mind with the declaration in question and what it had expected of us. Mohr told me that it had had in mind a customs union or something similar. The conclusion of a currency union at the same time came to it as a surprise, however.

The discussion was continued the same evening in a larger group. Besides Scavenius and Mohr, President Bramsnaes of the National Bank and MM. Sthyr, Wassard, and Svenningsen⁴ were present. M. Bramsnaes raised strong objections to a currency union. A stable exchange rate between the mark and the crown was sufficient. He made reference to the former Scandinavian and Latin currency unions. I tried in a long discussion to dispel his objections. He persisted in his chief objection that under the arrangement proposed by us the Danish Government or the Danish National Bank would lose all control over Denmark's credit policy and consequently also her economic policy. He and the others urgently requested that the rate between the mark and the crown be fixed in some other way. The rate of conversion was already unjust under the previous and present conditions (customs protection, import and export prohibitions) and did not correspond to the purchasing power of the crown in Denmark. The resultant losses incurred by Denmark were, however, kept within certain bounds under the present commercial arrangement between the two countries. But if Denmark were to be completely incorporated into the German economy, this incorrect conversion rate would throw all of the social and economic relations of Denmark into the greatest disorder.

The Danish Foreign Minister then informed me that his ministerial colleagues had likewise agreed to the opening of negotiations on a customs and currency union and also to having such negotiations conducted quickly. His ministerial colleagues, however, had various reservations to make or questions to ask. In that connection he handed me a document informally. After examining this document I discussed it briefly and superficially. I told the Foreign Minister that I would study the document and on the following day state my position on individual points.

⁴ M. A. Wassard and Nils Svenningsen were officials of the Danish Foreign Ministry.

On July 31 a number of conferences took place, including one with Minister President Stauning, the Finance Minister, Minister of Public Works Gunnar Larsen, and President Bramsnaes of the National Bank. In this conference these men expressed their great concern, first over the rate of conversion between the mark and the crown and secondly over my demand that the reichsmark be made legal tender in Denmark. In the third place they asked for assurances that Danish industry and agriculture would not be ruined. On the third point I was able to make reassuring promises. The first two points remained open.

This conference with the Minister was followed by individual conferences with MM. Mohr, Sthyr, and Wassard. At this conference the document handed to me the evening before was also discussed. The Finance Minister and the President of the National Bank insisted on being permitted to set forth their view on the above-mentioned first two points in this document. The document was then handed to me officially in the form of the attached memorandum.

It was agreed that the first meeting with the Danish delegation should be held on Monday, August 5, at 5 p. m. At the time I was in Copenhagen it was intended that the delegation should be constituted approximately as follows: Director Sthyr, chairman; in addition MM. Wassard, Svenningsen, Bramsnaes, and a man from the Danish Ministry of Finance who is familiar with customs duties, excise taxes, and sales taxes. Whether M. Mohr was to accompany them was still undecided. In the meantime it has been reported from Copenhagen that the chairman of the delegation will not be Sthyr but Minister Gunnar Larsen. For the negotiations it is provisionally proposed that 2 or 3 days be spent discussing the details with the Danes. If they should then desire to get in touch orally with the Danish Government, they could return to Copenhagen for 1 or 2 days, and then return immediately to Berlin for the purpose of concluding the treaty in another 2 or 3 days.⁵

ITTER

⁵ The ensuing negotiations took place in Berlin Aug. 4-8, when the draft of a general economic treaty (3355/E000207-25) was handed to the Danes. There is also the draft of a customs and currency union treaty in the files (8861/-E218131-46). After this first round of negotiations, the Danish delegation returned to Copenhagen.

Before the delegation returned to Berlin, Renthe-Fink informed Ritter by telephone on Aug. 14 that the Danes did not regard this forthcoming second round of negotiations as final and did not wish to conclude a treaty which would have to be presented to the Danish Rigsdag for ratification, because so many problems on which questions might be asked were still unresolved. The Danes preferred a protocol which would have to be submitted only to the Foreign Affairs Committee and which would involve less publicity. (Ritter minute of Aug. 14: 247/164178-79). These negotiations took place in Berlin Aug. 15-17.

The third series of Berlin negotiations began on Aug. 23; see document No. 382.

[Enclosure]

COPENHAGEN, July 31, 1940.

MEMORANDUM

The Danish Government declares that it is willing in principle to enter into negotiations immediately with the German Government about the conclusion of an agreement on an economic community under which the political independence of Denmark would be fully maintained. With regard to the currency question the Danish Government is proceeding on the assumption that the Danish crown will continue to be the only circulating medium in Denmark and that a stable ratio between the mark and the crown conforming to the price level in the two countries will be agreed upon.

Moreover there is agreement on the following:

That the German Government will, when the administrative measures are to be agreed upon, see to it that the various branches of Danish economic life, including small farming, will not be placed under worse conditions after the war than before the war, and that particularly Danish industry, which supports one-third of the Danish population, will be able to maintain its level of activity. For this purpose agreements on production or sales quotas or similar measures will be considered.

That for the implementation of the agreement each individual branch of Danish industry will be carefully studied for the purpose of giving it every possible consideration.

That it will be made possible for Denmark—which presumably will have to obtain the main outlet for her products in Germany—to use a reasonable proportion of her income from her exports to Germany for the purchase in third countries of the raw materials, etc., required for Danish agriculture and industrial production as well as of other goods from third countries (such as tobacco, coffee, etc.), and as far as possible for other necessary payments.

That the present restrictions on Danish exports to third countries made necessary for military reasons will be abolished after the war.

That, in order to avoid sudden changes in Denmark's position with respect to capital and level of business activity, transitional provisions will be agreed upon in order that the conversion of the economy made necessary by the agreement may take place quietly.

No. 269

121/119776

*The Office of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the
Military Commander in France to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 308 of August 1

PARIS, August 1, 1940.

Received August 1—7:55 p. m.

A 2-hour visit yesterday from Georges Bonnet. Subject: protestations of his good will. Enumeration of services and essentially in agreement with the known facts. Stressed in a reserved manner his personal readiness for future collaboration.

Report by letter follows.¹

SCHLEIER

¹ Not found.

No. 270

8589/E602757-58

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, August 1, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFA/L Nr. 33 210/40 g. Kdos. Chefs
By officer only

DIRECTIVE NO. 17 FOR THE CONDUCT OF AIR AND NAVAL WARFARE
AGAINST ENGLAND

In order to establish the conditions necessary for the final conquest of England, I intend to continue the air and naval war against the English homeland more intensively than heretofore.

To this end I issue the following orders:

1. The German air arm is to overcome the English Air Force with all means at its disposal and in the shortest possible time. The attacks are to be directed primarily against the planes themselves, their ground organization, and their supply installations, also against the aircraft industry, including plants producing anti-aircraft material.
2. After gaining temporary or local air superiority, the air war is to be carried on against harbors, especially against establishments connected with food supply, and also against similar establishments in the interior of the country.

Attacks on the harbors of the south coast are to be undertaken on the smallest scale possible, in view of our own intended operations.

3. On the other hand, air attacks on warships and merchantmen of the enemy may be diminished, unless particularly advantageous targets of opportunity offer themselves, unless additional effect would be achieved in connection with actions described in paragraph 2, and unless such attacks are necessary to train crews for future operations.

4. The intensified air war is to be carried out in such a manner that the Luftwaffe can be called upon at any time to support naval operations against advantageous targets of opportunity in sufficient strength. Also, it is to stand by in force for operation *Seelöwe*.

5. I reserve for myself the decision on terror attacks as a means of reprisal.

6. The intensified air war may commence on or after August 5. The exact time is to be selected by the Luftwaffe itself according to the weather, after preparations have been completed.

The Navy is authorized to begin the projected intensified naval warfare at the same time.

[ADOLF HITLER]

No. 271

174/186376-78

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 609

BERLIN, August 1, 1940.

The Japanese Ambassador, with whom I settled some current matters today, brought the conversation finally to the role which the new Japanese Cabinet will have to play in the field of world politics. Kurusu explained right from the start that he has not as yet received any instructions from his Government but he believes that one will not have to wait very long for a determination of the broad lines of the new Japanese foreign policy. Regarding his own—Kurusu's—work, there were two possibilities: Either he may wait until his Government gives him instructions, or he may take a position in terms of the outlook from here in order to advise his Government before it decides on a definite course of action. In both cases a frank discussion with the Foreign Minister or with myself would be necessary.

The Ambassador did not go into details but gave some views of his own which probably represent his personal evaluation of the situation. He believed that Japanese policy will now have to be oriented on a long-term basis. Apparently Kurusu does not believe in a speedy termination of the war and counts on a period of tension which will

last for several years; during this time the relations of Japan with the United States of America and Russia are for him naturally the most important. The Ambassador told me that he realizes that the Foreign Minister has repeatedly enjoined Japan to come to an understanding with Russia. Such a course of action as well as the Japanese attitude toward the United States should, however, be coordinated with German and Italian intentions. The Ambassador recalled that the Foreign Minister had, at the visit of Minister Sato, put great emphasis on German-Japanese friendship and cooperation.¹ In spite of this, he, Kurusu, did not know exactly what in detail we had in mind by this cooperation, and especially whether and at what time we would like to see Japanese power thrown into the balance in the present conflict. If, for example, Japan were to drive toward war and enter into the conflict against America, while Germany, on the other hand, in expectation of a quick victory believes a termination of the war to be imminent, Japan apparently would act contrary to German wishes. If Japan were not to intervene now, however, Japan as a factor, and especially its fleet, would constitute in the future in any case an important potential in the triangle, Berlin-Rome-Tokyo.

I had the feeling that Kurusu expects from the new course in Tokyo an inclination toward intervention in the war, but wanted to hear from me that this, according to the German view, would not be entirely expedient at the moment.

The Ambassador would certainly be grateful if he could get a hint in the near future from either the Foreign Minister personally or from me, as to what advice he should give to his Government. That this must be entirely within the framework of the German-Japanese policy of friendship is clear to him. He is, however, not quite certain perhaps if we still value the Japanese-Russian settlement as much as we did previously; also, if the new Japanese Cabinet should continue its anti-Anglo-Saxon course in an intensified or perhaps for the present in a more moderate tempo.

In general I accepted the remarks of the Ambassador without attempting to anticipate the answer to be given. I contradicted his view that the war might last for a long time and that it will be followed by an even longer period of tension.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 137.

² In a supplementary memorandum for the Foreign Minister of Aug. 2 (174/-136386) Weizsäcker noted: "Kurusu's words conveyed the hope that Japan might be heard in the new ordering after the war and would not be forgotten in the new division of the world."

No. 272

124/122557-58

Ambassador Papen to State Secretary Weizsäcker

CONFIDENTIAL

At present at SALZBURG, August 1, 1940.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: The second detailed discussion with the Foreign Minister and today with the Führer did not result in any essential change in my instructions. The desire is to keep the situation between Russia and Turkey fluid—at least to conduct our policy in such a way that Turkey could not in any event become the connecting link between England and Russia.

As for my view, that it might become necessary for the Axis to be more receptive to Russian desires for a change in the Straits statute so as to prevent the English from constructing the projected triangle in this way, it was decided that in this question, too, we should first await the outcome of the coming weeks in regard to England.

I have been authorized, however, to call on the President and once more point out to him—cum grano salis—the advantages of an alignment with the Axis. I will try to do this in a cautious way, therefore, without thereby giving Moscow cause for concern.¹

Moreover, the outcome of our pacification action in the Balkans will also have a very important influence on further developments in Turkey.

At any rate I am very glad that I have had the opportunity to discuss orally the very complex problems once again and to hear the opinions held on these matters by the highest authority.

Tomorrow morning I shall fly home with Richthofen.

Cordial greetings for the present and

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

PAPEN

¹ See document No. 349.

No. 273

174/186380-82

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOKYO, August 2, 1940—1:20 p. m.

No. 765 of August 2

Received August 3—8:40 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka yesterday invited me for the first political discussion and informed me that the first three requests from

the currently accumulated work of the Embassy, which I had transmitted to him through a confidential agent, were being carried out following conversations with the Ministers concerned :

1. *Transit shipments.* The Foreign Minister stated that he had regretted to hear that the former Government had shown a lack of cooperation toward Germany in transit matters. He had immediately arranged with the appropriate Ministry for very extensive consideration of German wishes.

2. *China damages.* The Foreign Minister promised to take energetic action finally to bring about a satisfactory and complete settlement of the matter.¹

3. *The press.* The Foreign Minister admitted that the constant anti-German propaganda in certain local newspapers printed in English was intolerable,² and he promised closer supervision by the Ministry of the Interior.

The Foreign Minister further assured me that the difficulties created recently by Japanese functionaries abroad in regard to the repatriation of German nationals from American countries would be eliminated.

The Foreign Minister then of his own accord brought up the soy bean question and declared that he was prepared to lend active support to our wishes.³ I have asked the Legation at Hsinking for information regarding the present status of the matter.

Following this the Foreign Minister, who carried on the conversation in an extremely friendly tone, turned to general questions of German-Japanese relations and asked in particular what attitude Germany could be expected to take in regard to Japan's well-known economic plans for a greater East Asia. I listened to his statements noncommittally and declared that it would not be possible for Germany to take a position until Japan presented a concrete plan, which would have to guarantee Germany tangible and valuable advantages.

In this connection the Foreign Minister explained the lack of content of yesterday's declaration by the Government, and his own mediation proposal⁴ (cf. DNB Tokyo 199 to 204), by the impossibility of

¹ Cf. vol. iv, document No. 536. After prolonged negotiations, the Japanese Government in July, 1940, declared itself willing to pay for damages to German property in China for which the Japanese Army was proved to be responsible. A Japanese commission was set up in Shanghai to investigate German claims. (letter from Knoll to Kopp of the Ministry of Economics, July 23: 8746/-E610519-20)

² In a memorandum of Aug. 1 (174/136372) Welzsäcker noted that he had spoken to Kurusu about false reports and rumors carried by the Domei News Agency. He had given him a list of those showing a strong anti-German bias (174/136373-74).

³ Cf. vol. ix, document No. 484.

⁴ For the statement by the Japanese Government of Aug. 1, 1940, and that by Matsuoka of the same date, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 108-111.

disclosing the real intentions of the Government at the present time. Meanwhile the severe action taken against the British propaganda organization in Japan had, of course, already proved by deeds what course Japan was following.⁵ Matsuoka asked me to inform the Reich Foreign Minister that ever since Japan withdrew from the League of Nations he had advocated the view that permanent isolation on the part of Japan was impossible, and consequently alignment with Germany was the only way open; he was therefore glad that as Foreign Minister he could now carry out this idea. He expressed the wish to keep constantly in very close touch with me.

I left the Foreign Minister in no doubt that Japan had much to make up for in order even to bring about a state of really benevolent neutrality toward Germany.

At the end of the conversation the Foreign Minister told me that he had received the French Ambassador a short while ago and requested him to obtain the consent of the French Government for Japanese troops to march through Northern Indochina and for the establishment of two air fields, since this was the only way in which an attack on the Yunnan railroad and Kunming could be made possible. He had assured the French Ambassador that Japan had no territorial aspirations in Indochina and would later evacuate the territory. The Foreign Minister hoped that the French Government would meet this request with understanding in order not to make it necessary for the Japanese Army to force its way through by violence. The French Ambassador had promised to pass the matter on, calling attention to the fact that according to the armistice negotiations France could not make a decision alone, and therefore the matter would have to be presented to the Armistice Commission for decision. The Foreign Minister said that he would appreciate it if the Reich Government raised no objections to the Japanese wishes and also used its influence along that line with the French Government. Without taking any position myself, I promised to forward his request.⁶

Ott

⁵ A representative of Reuters, Cox, had been arrested on charges of espionage and had committed suicide in prison. Numerous other arrests of persons alleged to be connected with British intelligence and propaganda had likewise occurred. Ott had reported on these matters in telegram No. 746 of July 30 (174/136369-70) and in telegram No. 751 of July 31 (174/136371).

⁶ Matsuoka's memorandum of this conversation is in the mimeographed collection of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, exhibit No. 545.

No. 274

136/74250

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

No. 7 of August 2 from Fuschl RAM FUSCHL, August 2, 1940.
Received Berlin, August 2—3:30 p. m.

No. 1208 of August 2
from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 2—4:20 p. m.

In case the Windsor matter does not require your presence in Madrid, please come to Berlin to report, preferably by the end of this week.¹

For your personal and strictly confidential information. What we want to achieve now is Spain's early entry into the war. I intend, circumstances permitting, to visit the Spanish Government at an early date in order, if opportunity presents itself, to make final arrangements. With reference to your telegram No. 1971 of June 19,² after your report on the present situation and the attitude of the Spanish Government, I should like to discuss further procedure with you personally.

Please do not mention anywhere our intentions or the possibility of my visit.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Stohrer replied that unless otherwise instructed he would plan to arrive in Berlin Aug. 6 or 7 (telegram No. 2646 of Aug. 2: 136/74251). See document No. 313.

² Not printed (490/232215). See vol. ix, document No. 488, and footnote 1.

No. 275

1379/357760

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 1339 of August 2 BERLIN, August 2, 1940—4:24 p. m.
Received August 2—8:45 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1363 of July 13.¹

You are requested to inform M. Molotov that the Reich Government has taken cognizance of the wish of the Soviet Government that Germany leave to the Soviet Union that part of Lithuania allocated to Germany by the Moscow agreements. This would represent a rather considerable change in the Moscow Treaty to the disadvantage of Germany. Before the Reich Government can consider the matter in

¹ Document No. 162.

detail, therefore, I should be interested in hearing what quid pro quo the Soviet Government would propose.²

RIBBENTROP

² See document No. 302.

No. 276

B15/B002632-33

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

LISBON, August 2, 1940—3:46 p. m.

SECRET

Received August 2—8:55 p. m.

No. 800 of August 1

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 442 of July 31.¹

(1) In accordance with the telegraphic instruction which arrived shortly before midnight,² I immediately got in touch with our confidant the Duke's host, the banker Ricardo do Espirito Santo Silva, who happened to be at the Ducal couple's farewell reception at a hotel here. After the end of this affair he visited me at my residence, where we discussed thoroughly possible further courses of action. I would note at this point that the person concerned is an unobjectionable individual, who has never denied his friendly attitude toward Germany and whose discretion is beyond question. The confidant promised to give the message to the Duke in the course of the morning.

(2) Every effort to detain the Duke and Duchess in Europe (in which connection I refer particularly to Schellenberg's reports³) was in vain. Their departure took place this evening.⁴ The decision of the Duke was influenced during the last few days especially by his close friend, Sir Walter Monckton, who had come to Lisbon expressly for the purpose of indicating to the Duke the serious objections which existed to a further postponement of his departure. Monckton told the confidant verbally that while the Duke was no doubt the most popular man in England, the whole of England today still stood behind Churchill.

(3) On the other hand the message which was conveyed to the Duke made the deepest impression on him and he felt appreciative of the considerate way in which his personal interests were being

¹ Document No. 265.

² I. e., on July 31.

³ Reports from Schellenberg had been transmitted via Madrid as telegrams Nos. 2547 of July 27 (B15/B002601), 2550(?) of July 28 (3680/E035156-57), and 2588 of July 31 (B15/B002614-15).

⁴ I. e., Aug. 1. The Ambassador in Spain reported in telegram No. 2632 of Aug. 2, received at 1:25 p. m., Aug. 2, that Schellenberg had just telephoned from Lisbon that the Duke and Duchess had sailed the previous evening on the American steamship *Escaibur* (B15/B002629).

taken into account. In his reply, which was given orally to the confidant, the Duke paid tribute to the Führer's desire for peace, which was in complete agreement with his own point of view. He was firmly convinced that if he had been King it would never have come to war. To the appeal made to him to cooperate at a suitable time in the establishment of peace, he agreed gladly. However, he requested that it be understood that at the present time he must follow the official orders of his Government. Disobedience would disclose his intentions prematurely, bring about a scandal, and deprive him of his prestige in England. He was also convinced that the present moment was too early for him to come forward, since there was as yet no inclination in England for an approach to Germany. However, as soon as this frame of mind changed, he would be ready to return immediately. To bring this about there were two possibilities. Either England would yet call upon him, which he considered to be entirely possible, or Germany would express the desire to negotiate with him. In both cases he was prepared for any personal sacrifice and would make himself available without the slightest personal ambition. He would remain in continuing communication with his previous host and had agreed with him upon a code word, upon receiving which he would immediately come back over.⁵ He insisted that this would be possible at any time, since he had foreseen all eventualities and had already initiated the necessary arrangements. The statements of the Duke were, as the confidant stressed, supported by firmness of will and the deepest sincerity, and had included an expression of admiration and sympathy for the Führer.

HUENE

⁵ In telegram No. 884 of Aug. 15 (B15/B002635), the Minister in Portugal reported: "The confidant has just received a telegram from the Duke from Bermuda, asking him to send a communication as soon as action was advisable. Should any answer be made?" No answer to this telegram from Lisbon has been found.

No. 277

B15/B002635-38

*The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 808 of August 2

LISBON, August 2, 1940—10:00 p. m.

Received August 3—6:35 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

At the time of . . .² to Madrid I had to assume that the Duke of Windsor, as a result of the mediation of the Ambassador and the

¹ Although his name does not appear on it, this document seems to be from Schellenberg. See documents Nos. 235 and 257.

² A notation on the original states that one word is missing at this point.

most influential Spanish confidential agent, had given up the intention to travel to the Bahamas and was trying instead to return to Spain. (I refer to taking advantage of the hunting excursion on the frontier.)

The principal tasks in Lisbon :

(1) Creation and organization of a personal protective service for the Duke and Duchess.

(2) Preparation of security for the automobile journey of the Duke and Duchess from Lisbon by way of Guarda to Villa Formosa (320 kilometers).

(3) Security for hunting excursion.

(4) Security for border crossing.

(5) Security in Spain.

Good connections were soon established with the main confidential agent responsible on the Portuguese side (the director of counter-espionage in Portugal) and with the Portuguese collaborator made available by him. The superior of the principal Portuguese confidential agent works very closely with the I[n]telligence S[ervice] and Scotland Yard through the British Embassy. Nevertheless it was possible to secure compliance with almost all of our requests.

After only 2 days there was established a protective service of 18 agents working for us. One to three agents were constantly active in the immediate vicinity of the Duke. In connection with the preparation for the journey, security at the frontier, etc., the reports which came in soon made it evident (and this was confirmed from the beginning by the Minister here) that the Duke was giving up the return to Spain and had even expressed himself unfavorably about it within his intimate circle. After the appearance of Monckton accompanied by members of the I. S. and Scotland Yard, a change in tactics seemed advisable, since the Duke fell completely under their influence.

Through the efforts of a high Portuguese police official who visited the Duke and Duchess personally, it was possible to interfere with the plans of the Duke and Duchess to move to a hotel under I. S. surveillance. The hints dropped on the occasion of this visit about the impending danger to the Duke and Duchess from I. S. activities, Jews, and emigrés, produced a very strong effect.

From July 29 on the principal object was to prevent the departure of the Duke and Duchess by making use of all the means available suitable to the nature of the mission.

(1) Since the Spanish plan collapsed completely, the Portuguese host of the Duke and Duchess here was employed in closest cooperation with the Minister at this post, in a manner which is evident from the personal reports of the Minister on the subject.

Attention is called particularly to the Minister's last report of August 1,³ where it is noted how every effort was made, even in a political way, to influence the Duke in our direction. The result expresses entirely the Duke's mentality and is strikingly characteristic of the situation I found here.

(2) In order to increase the weight of anxiety and to determine the Duke and Duchess to remain in Europe, they were kept constantly aware—through the influence of the various personal connections of the principal Portuguese confidential agent—of the danger of a surprise attack by Churchill and of I. S. activity. It is certain that the Duke and Duchess really had feelings of anxiety. However, Monckton was clearly able to dissipate the anxiety as it arose. As the preparations for departure became more active, the strongest methods were brought into use by us. In detail these were:

(a) Complete uncovering through police machinations of the known I. S. members here (thus, for example, the Scotland Yard official Holder and the operatives Evelyne Forth and Catherine Fox did not receive their firearms before departure of the ship because of uncertainty in interpretation of customs regulations).

(b) Since the Duke was especially impressed by the Jewish peril, the principal private secretary to the Duke, Philipps, was furnished with a list of Jews and emigrés sailing on the same ship and it was stressed that the counterespionage police could make no guarantees.

(c) Call on the Duchess by the wife of a Portuguese official. (Reason for the visit: anxiety about her husband's position, since if anything happened, he would lose his post. Reaction: Deepest thanks to the Portuguese lady and the request to remain firm, since the Duke must make the journey).

(d) Anonymous gift of flowers with a greeting card containing a warning.

(e) Anonymous letter to the Duchess also emphasizing the gravity of the danger in psychologically suitable form.

(f) Bribing of the second (English) driver who remarked about the danger and refused to go along to the Bahamas. The chauffeur could not go along and will for the time being be taken care of by the principal Portuguese confidential agent.

(g) On the day of departure a paid agent was arrested on the ship for lacking a passport and at his hearing he stated he had seen suspicious persons on the ship and actually led the Portuguese authorities to a spot where traces of an infernal machine and tools for building such a machine were found. The affair was bruited about in the company of the Duke and Duchess as a most serious sort of warning, yet without result, since the Duke stressed that because of political prestige he had to make the journey.

(h) Sabotage against the automobile which was driving to the ship with luggage. The luggage only reached the ship after an hour's delay.

³ Document No. 276.

To sum up :

A firing of shots (harmless breaking of the bedroom window) scheduled for the night of July 30 was omitted, since the psychological effect on the Duchess would only have been to increase her desire to depart. Because of the opposition of the aforementioned (group garbled) Portuguese alien police no trouble would have been made for the I. S.

Through steady undermining of the sense of security of the Duke and Duchess and open and concealed references to the activity of the I. S. the Duke and Duchess were, however, strongly influenced and this led, according to the admission of the principal private secretary, Philipps, to personal steps on the part of the Duke which resulted in the establishment of a protective service by proved and devoted friends of the Duke.

(3) In order to exhaust completely all the possibilities, the so-called Spanish plan was out of necessity once more taken up on July 29 and 31, and August 1. As has been already reported the Spanish Minister of the Interior dispatched the district leader of the Falange in Madrid, Primo de Rivera, to the Duke. His intervention was also without success. On August 1, 5 hours before the departure of the ship, at the advice of the principal Portuguese confidential agent the attempt was made, with the aid of the Minister here, to send the Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon (brother of the Caudillo) to the Portuguese Premier Salazar, who at the farewell call of the Duke and Duchess would try to persuade them to remain, at least in Portugal. Ambassador Nicolas Franco and Salazar spoke of official Spanish and Portuguese wishes, etc. Even this last maneuver could not prevent the departure of the Duke. I am leaving with my party for Madrid on August 3 and shall attempt from there (in case no other instructions are at hand) to arrive in Berlin by the quickest possible route, where I could give a complete report orally. I would be particularly grateful to have the Head of the Security Police informed.

HUENE

No. 278

1242/337132-38

The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan to the Reich Commissar for the Netherlands, the Reich Commissar for Norway, and the Military Commander in Belgium

SECRET

BERLIN, August 2, 1940.

V.P. 11964/5 g.

One goal of German economic policy is the increase of German influence in foreign enterprises. Whether and to what extent the peace

treaty will bring a transfer of interests, etc., cannot yet be foreseen. It is necessary, however, even now to take advantage of every opportunity in order to enable the German economy, while the war is still on, to obtain entry into interesting business enterprises and to prevent illicit transfers that may render more difficult the attainment of the above-mentioned goal. In this connection I would note that:

1. The transfer of capital from Germany to the occupied territories is being made easy so that even now controlled purchases of business concerns in the occupied areas by German groups are being made possible. I shall give you further details in the very near future. I particularly reserve my approval of the purchase of enterprises, interests, etc., lying in the occupied territories, within the framework of the directives which are to be issued by me.

2. I assume that the foreign exchange regulations which prevail in the occupied areas prevent an effective embargo on the transfer of ownership in foreign business establishments to third countries (it is a question mainly of the United States of America and Switzerland). Please study the law concerning foreign exchange from this angle and, if necessary, supplement it, so that the granting of consent for such permits, which is reserved by Germany, will be handled in the sense indicated above.

3. It seems expedient, however, to provide that until further notice ownership rights in business concerns that have their corporate location in one of the occupied countries, shall not be sold to other than German interests, such as to citizens of another occupied territory or of a third country. Please put through the necessary legal regulations.

4. As matters stand, such measures will not suffice, however, to reserve for ourselves the enterprises that are important to us, because in many cases the interests are already sold before the entry of the German troops, or the titles, shares, etc., have been transferred abroad. It is desirable that such illicit transfers of ownership to domestic or foreign companies as have already taken place be made retroactively illegal, or, if need be, that the legality of the purchase of such assets be made so uncertain through the issuance of a suitable order, that the transactions become unattractive to the buyers. Please consider, therefore, to what extent our aim can be promoted through the introduction of obligatory licensing with retroactive effect for sales of ownership in domestic or foreign enterprises. The commencement of hostilities between the country concerned and the German Reich should be established as the key date.

In this connection it may be pointed out that the Foreign Ministry has already informed the Governments of the Balkan countries that we will not recognize as legal transfers which have been made since

the beginning of the war of rights in Balkan enterprises out of Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian, English, and French hands.¹ The Balkan Governments have been asked to revise their own laws accordingly; that is, to put the transfer of interests in domestic enterprises or in domestic plants of foreign enterprises under compulsory licensing. The reference to the fact that in the occupied areas retroactive compulsory licensing has been introduced, will be a useful argument in later negotiations even if the validity of such a licensing procedure should be called in question in certain countries because of its belated introduction. At least in this way a delay can be obtained, which gives opportunity for negotiations.

Please let me have a report² on the result of your investigation of the questions raised.

GÖRING

[Typewritten postscript:] I am sending a copy for your information. Please inform the Economic Commission with the Armistice Commission accordingly in order that the viewpoints mentioned may also be considered in their negotiations.³ GÖRING.

¹ Instructions to this effect had been contained in circular telegram Multex No. 128 of June 27 (5873/E411643-43/1).

² Not found.

³ The copy of the document as printed here is from the files of Minister Clodius.

No. 279

205/142493-94

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 612

BERLIN, August 2, 1940.

Upon his return after 2 weeks' leave in his own country, the Swedish Minister last evening made a special urgent communication to me on behalf of his Government;¹ today he visited me for a general discussion. He had three subjects: 1) direct German-Swedish relations, 2) the fate of Finland, 3) the future of Norway.

Concerning 1), direct German-Swedish relations, the Minister mentioned as always the German orientation of the policy of Minister Günther. He stressed again the cooperation shown us on the question of the transit of war material and military personnel. He was satisfied, moreover, with the progress of Herr Schnurre's last mission in

¹ Neither this communication nor a definite indication of its subject has been found. In *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. I, p. 845, reference is made to telegrams sent by the King of Sweden on Aug. 2, 1940, to King George VI and to Hitler "offering his good offices toward examining the possibilities of making peace."

Stockholm.² We agreed that aside from the objections I had made to fabrications of the Swedish press, there were at present no problems in the direct relations between Germany and Sweden. M. Richert evidently desired from me an affirmation that our relations could be described as entirely settled and friendly. I was, however, sparing of such phrases. The desire of Minister Günther to make a trip to Berlin was not mentioned in the conversation this time.³

Concerning 2). The Minister appeared worried about Russian policy toward Finland. His anxiety was due to the fact that Russia was always finding new issues with respect to Finland, and bringing up new problems, which had previously been considered settled. Richert then tried to sound me out as to the attitude we would take in the event of a new Russo-Finnish conflict. He intimated that in such an event certain hopes were placed on Germany in Finland, and he mentioned also that the instability of German-Russian relations was a matter of common gossip in Berlin.

In the latter respect, I indicated to Richert that those who claimed that there was something the matter in German-Russian policy were mistaken. As to Russo-Finnish relations, I referred M. Richert to Molotov's latest speech,⁴ according to which Sweden's anxieties with regard to Finland were unfounded.

On 3). M. Richert tried to show that sentiment in Sweden toward Germany was naturally also connected with the much-discussed future fate of Norway. In Norway they wanted to hear nothing of the former Nygaardsvold Government, and just as little of the Hambro people, but the Norwegian seemed to cling much more strongly to his Monarchy and to the royal house than was thought. Naturally, the fact that the Norwegian Crown Princess is Swedish had something to do with these observations of the Swedish Minister. M. Richert thought he must attribute to British pressure the sojourn of the King and the Crown Princess of Norway in England and their behavior there.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.⁵

WEIZSÄCKER

² See documents Nos. 131, 132, and 133.

³ Richert had indicated to Weizsäcker in an interview on May 18 that Günther was willing to come to Germany to discuss with Ribbentrop the transit question and other questions at issue between Germany and Sweden. See vol. ix, document No. 268. In a report to Günther on June 16 Richert stated that Ribbentrop again brought up the subject of a visit by Günther to Germany which he had suggested to Richert in an interview at Godesberg on May 15. See *Transiteringsfrågan Juni-December 1940*, pp. 9-11.

⁴ Speech before the seventh session of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow on Aug. 1. Text in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 461-469.

⁵ Sent by teletype.

No. 280

124/122366-68

Minister Blücher to State Secretary Weizsäcker

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

HELSINKI, August 2, 1940.

DEAR BARON WEIZSÄCKER: As I may write a private letter to you in your capacity as State Secretary, I am making use of this privilege in an exceptional case.

Finland is again moving into the spotlight of general interest. Germany has in these last weeks secured for herself in Petsamo 60 percent of the output of the second largest nickel deposit in the world. We can thus for the entire area of Greater Germany become completely independent of the world nickel market for at least 20 years. England has lodged a sharp protest against this in Helsinki, is now harassing Finnish shipping between Petsamo and the United States in an intolerable manner, and has proposed establishment of a regular Vice Consul in Petsamo. The third party, Russia, the one most vitally interested in Finnish affairs, on the other hand, is organizing communistic incidents in Finnish cities, and is pursuing an obscure policy.

You know my view that Finland, with the Åland Islands, commands the key position in the Baltic area and that occupation of Finland and the Åland Islands by a major power, like Russia, renders Germany's military-political position in the North untenable. But Finland has in addition to this strategic significance also great importance for our industry, and especially our war industry, as a source of raw materials, such as molybdenum, copper, and wood; and once production of nickel has begun, this importance will increase in a measure that I could not have foreseen in the past.

These considerations should be potent enough to justify Germany in taking a vital interest in future developments in Finland.

The Finnish Government, as I indicated at the start, now finds itself in a position where it is put under pressure from the Russian side, and subjected to harassment from the English side. It is afraid, moreover, that these two countries might come to an understanding and take joint action against Finland on the Narvik-Petsamo-Murmansk route.

The behavior of the English is caused by the acquiescence of Finland in meeting Germany's wishes in the Petsamo question. The behavior of the Russians has other reasons, but probably has also been affected adversely for Finland by the German successes in the Petsamo question.

In this dilemma, in the causation of which the role of Germany cannot be entirely discounted, the eyes of leading Finnish statesmen are turning to Berlin.

The Führer's intervention in the Balkan question has left a very deep impression here and given rise to the wish that Germany might similarly take up also the readjustment of the status of the Baltic region.

In a conversation with me today, in which, as he put it, he wanted for once to "philosophize" freely, the Foreign Minister threw out the idea whether it would not be possible to receive Finnish and Swedish Ministers in Berlin on a basis similar to that on which Rumanian and Bulgarian Ministers were received.

The objections to such a plan are quite obvious and I stated all of them in our talk. M. Witting, however, persisted in his "philosophical" proposition that he and Minister President Ryti would like to be received by the Führer or the Foreign Minister, linking this with the idea that the corresponding Swedish Ministers should do likewise.

I have not yet heard from M. Witting, in his own words, what the two Ministers proposed to say in Berlin. But I have learned from another source that they would be willing to submit to an arrangement in the Baltic region, especially with respect to their own territory, that would mean a considerable curtailment of the sovereignty of their country in favor of Germany.

Given the great strategic and economic interests at stake for us here, and given the fact that this is an historic opportunity that may offer itself but once, it would be inexcusable in my opinion if we offhandedly rejected the Finnish proposal, if it should be presented.

If this should happen, I think that the next development would be for Minister Kivimäki to come to sound you out first as to whether the Führer or the Foreign Minister would be willing to receive the two Finnish Cabinet members. Naturally, Kivimäki would in that case have to supply specific information on what the Finns propose to say.

Should M. Kivimäki, however, make no démarche with you, please consider this letter as not having been written.

I am enclosing a carbon copy for Herr von Grundherr.

With Heil Hitler, etc.

BLÜCHER

No. 281

141/128656

The German Embassy in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

SECRET

No. 260 of August 3

BRUSSELS, August 3, 1940—9:40 a. m.

Received August 3—11:35 a. m.

The Rexist leader Degrelle,¹ who for the time being does not wish

¹ Cf. vol. ix, document No. 317, and footnote 3.

to be politically active, has expressed an intention of taking a dominant part in the management of the Belgian press. He has received permission to re-issue the newspaper *Le Pays Réel*, possibly under another name, and he would like to make it an organ of the intellectual elite. Next he wishes to gain control of *Le Soir* and of *Het Laatste Nieuws*, the largest Flemish newspaper, by placing in them trusted men of his, in order to start a propaganda campaign on social questions. He has not yet communicated this plan to the military authorities, but merely submitted it for information to the representatives of the Foreign Ministry. No position was taken by anybody.

LIEBE
BRAND

No. 282

2148/468487-38

The Foreign Minister to the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

Temporarily at FUSCHL, August 3, 1940.

With reference to the inquiry of the Quartermaster General of July 23, 1940, No. 10.883/40, directed to the High Command of the Wehrmacht and forwarded by it by telephone to the Foreign Ministry.¹

The Führer has named the former Minister Abetz as Ambassador and at my suggestion has directed as follows:

I. Ambassador Abetz shall have the following functions in France:

1. Advising the military authorities on political questions.
2. Continuous liaison with the Vichy Government and its representatives in the occupied area.
3. Exercise of influence in the direction desired by us on the influential political personalities of the occupied and unoccupied areas.
4. Political guidance of the press, radio, and propaganda in the occupied area and exercise of influence on such factors in formation of public opinion in the unoccupied area as can be reached.
5. Assistance to Reich Germans, and French and Belgian nationals returning from internment camps.
6. Advising the Secret Military Police [*Geheime Feldpolizei*] and the Gestapo in the seizure of politically important documents.
7. Seizure and securing of public artistic properties, also private and especially Jewish artistic properties in accordance with special directives issued on that subject.

II. The Führer has expressly directed in this connection that Ambassador Abetz be solely responsible for dealing with all political questions in occupied and unoccupied France. Insofar as his functions

¹ No record found.

affect military interests, Ambassador Abetz will act only in conjunction with the Military Commander in France.

III. Ambassador Abetz will be assigned to the Military Commander in France as his representative. His post remains in Paris as previously. He will receive his directions for carrying out his duties from me and will be solely responsible to me in that respect.

I would be grateful if the High Command of the Wehrmacht would issue the necessary orders to the military authorities concerned as soon as possible.

RIBBENTROP

No. 283

3065/611834-35

*Circular of Ambassador Ritter*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, August 3, 1940.
e. o. W VI 1855.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Rüter.

Effective August 1, the British Government has expanded the long-distance blockade and export embargo against Germany and Italy in that:

(1) For all shipments to and from all neutral countries of Europe, as well as Spanish North Africa and the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic islands navicerts and certificates of origin and interest are made obligatory with the effect that ships on voyage to and from these countries without navicerts will be dealt with as prizes.

(2) Blockade and embargo are extended to occupied countries as well as to unoccupied France and French North Africa.

(3) It is apparently intended to force neutral shipping lines, by threat of continuing exclusion from British bunker coal and repair facilities, to pledge themselves to Great Britain to submit to the navicert system in respect to all their shipments. Please determine in a suitable way whether and in what form the British Government has notified the Government there of the new measures. Please make an immediate telegraphic report both regarding the probable effect on the foreign trade of that country, and in addition, if possible, also in regard to the attitude of the Government there and the shipping companies.

For your information there only: We regard submission to British demands as active support of British measures in the economic war at sea. Our countermeasures will depend on the attitude taken there.

RITTER

¹ This circular telegram was sent to Missions in Europe, and the United States, Panama, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Japan.

No. 284

73/52648

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 618

BERLIN, August 3, 1940.

When the Hungarian Minister called on Under State Secretary Woermann today,¹ I asked him to come also to my office for a brief talk. In accordance with instructions I told him the following: I had recently been informed by Sztójay that Count Csáky proposed to open the negotiations with the Rumanians by demanding a security, e. g., Oradea, as a token of Rumania's good will.² In our view this would be the worst conceivable opening move for negotiations. Nor are we interested at this time in any further information on Hungarian intentions toward Rumania. The matter was already upon the road of direct Rumanian-Hungarian negotiations, as decided upon at Munich.³

When M. Sztójay replied that Hungary just now had absolutely no confidence in Rumania's good will and expected nothing to come from the impending negotiations, I rejected these remarks of the Minister. Not one direct word had been spoken as yet. All that M. Sztójay had tried to do now in two or three visits with me was to distort and undermine the foundation laid at Munich, an undertaking to which I could be no party.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Woermann's memorandum of this conversation is not printed (73/52638-39).

² In telegram No. 700 to Fuschl on July 30, Weizsäcker had told Ribbentrop of the Hungarian intention, of which Weizsäcker had been that day informed by Sztójay, to demand Oradea as a pledge (73/52622-23).

³ See document No. 146.

No. 285

B15/B002641-42

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 2663 of August 3

MADRID, August 3, 1940.

Received August 4—12:25 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The Spanish Minister of the Interior just informed me that his confidential emissary had just telephoned to him from Lisbon, using phraseology which had been agreed upon, that on the day of their departure he had spent a considerable time with the Duke and Duchess. The Duke had hesitated even up to the last moment. The ship had

had to delay its departure on that account. The influence of the legal adviser of the Duke, Sir Walter Turner Monckton, was again successful, however, in bringing him around to leave. The confidential emissary added that the Duke had clearly perceived that it would have been better to have remained here so as to be able to step in at the decisive moment. The Duke believed, however, that it might be possible for him to do this from the Bahamas. For this purpose an arrangement was reached concerning which the confidential agent did not wish to say anything over the telephone.

Schellenberg, who has just returned from Lisbon, is reporting about all his numerous and extremely circumspect measures taken to prevent the departure. His account in respect to the influence of Sir Walter is in accord with the reports of the Spanish confidential agent. Schellenberg also made certain arrangements which ought to make possible resumption of relations with the Duke.

STOHRER

No. 286

585/242670-71

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 299 of August 4

SOFIA, August 4, 1940—7:45 p. m.

Received August 5—1:20 a. m.

The King summoned me to Castle Vrana this morning. He asked me at the beginning and again at the end of the hour-and-a-quarter's conversation to convey to the Führer his warmest thanks for his attitude on the Dobruja question. This was the first ray of light for Bulgaria after the many difficult years that the country had had to go through. He was also especially grateful for the appreciation for Bulgarian policy which the Führer had expressed.

Like the Foreign Minister yesterday after his conversation with Cadere,¹ I found that the King also entertained a certain skepticism as to whether the Rumanians were now really inclined to square accounts with Bulgaria. He expressed himself fully on the problem of Silistria, the seriousness and gravity of which he had, as a 19-year-old, already experienced between the Balkan wars. He had himself been sent at the time to the mutinying 31st Infantry Regiment, which came from Silistria, and whose soldiers had shaken their fists at him and cursed him, saying: "What are we still fighting for? Your father has sold us!" His father had, despite all warnings that it might cost him his throne, agreed to the cession of Silistria because he was at the time

¹ In telegram No. 297 of Aug. 3, Richthofen had reported that Cadere, the Rumanian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, was in Sofia on an official mission and was being received by Foreign Minister Popov (585/242665-66).

still dreaming of marching into Constantinople, in return for which the cession of a city that had for centuries been considered as Bulgarian seemed to him a tolerable sacrifice. The experience of the Second Balkan War immediately following had then shown the King what a grave mistake he had made. For, with the cession of Silistria, the dissatisfaction in the officers' corps and the founding of the (group garbled) League had begun. These circumstances had later been forgotten, since the Rumanians had by no means contented themselves with Silistria, but had occupied the whole of southern Dobruja and would finally have marched even further if the aging King Carol had not checked his own people. After these past events, it was impossible for him as the son to face the Bulgarian people and renounce that area; the more so since propaganda was increasing every day with a view to persuading the people that Bulgaria could get the whole of the Dobruja from Russia. The Russian Minister had recently also made a remark to this effect. He hoped, however, that the Rumanians would realize how advantageous it would be for them to have a contented and friendly Bulgaria as their southern neighbor.

As for the remainder of the conversation, it is perhaps also worth mentioning that the King—who said he did not express this so openly to Ambassador von Papen yesterday²—considered it out of the question, from his knowledge of the personalities involved, that the Turks would again move into the German camp.

RICHTHOFEN

² Passing through Sofia on returning to his post, Papen had conversations with King Boris, the Minister President, and the Foreign Minister on which he reported in a telegram sent from Therapia on Aug. 4 (271/176609-10).

No. 287

19/12556-58

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1636 of August 5

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1940—9:12 p. m.

Received August 6—9:00 a. m.

The American press, headed by the *New York Herald Tribune*, has in the last few days in lengthy news stories and editorials dealt in a sensational manner with the person of Handelsrat Westrick.¹ On the assertion that Westrick, as an agent of the fifth column, is inimical to American national interests, vicious attacks have been launched not only against him but also against all persons with whom he has had dealings here. Some trivial matters, which indicate that he is

¹ See document No. 40, *ante*, and vol. ix, document No. 475.

being systematically spied upon, are presented to the public in totally distorted and exaggerated form, thus, for example, that Westrick, in order to shield himself and his family from insults and threats, registered at a New York hotel under an assumed name, or that in the early part of his stay he had a car belonging to an American oil company at his disposal for his personal use, or that in applying for a driver's license, he made alleged misrepresentations regarding his physical disability, "artificial leg." Because of this latter incident he has now had his driver's license and car registration taken away from him. The fact that he gave the office of the Texas Oil Company as his business address in his application for a driver's license is now construed as concealment of his true activity. It is superfluous to explain that all these attacks represent malicious distortions of actual facts. As former business partner of Dr. Heinrich Albert, who is in bad repute here from World War days, Westrick is branded as a most dangerous secret agent, who is not conforming with diplomatic usages and therefore must be expelled as *persona non grata*. The federal secret police [*Bundesgeheimpolizei*] and other public authorities have subjected Westrick and all persons with whom he comes in contact here to an annoying surveillance, and his present residence in a suburb is guarded by the police to protect him from molestation by the many curiosity-seekers attracted by the publicity. The State Department, according to reports in the press, is following this development with interest. State Department officials are said to have stated privately that Westrick's activity is being closely watched by the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and that a detailed file is being prepared on him.

That this smear campaign against Westrick has been staged to serve as a curtain raiser for the new fifth column campaign, which Roosevelt opened today with his appeal to the Governors and Congressmen of the various states, is evident from the statements made by Attorney General Jackson at a conference regarding these new measures by the individual states against the fifth column. Alluding unmistakably to Westrick, the Attorney General said, among other things, that the Axis Powers were trying to soften the United States by promises of advantageous business deals and so create a fifth column among American business leaders; and that it would be well to assume that these intrigues would not be confined to acts of violence, as was the case at the time of the Black Tom affair.²

When Political Adviser Dunn of the State Department asked me to see him last Saturday in connection with the request for the recall

² The Black Tom dock, Jersey City, was blown up and set on fire July 30, 1916. Two persons were killed and the damage was estimated at 22 million dollars. See vol. iv, document No. 504.

of Consul Ried,³ I brought up the matter of this undignified and tactless campaign against Westrick. This situation, however, cannot be expected to change until Westrick leaves for home.

The deplorable part is that as a result of this vicious publicity, which was in no wise provoked by Westrick, Americans who have still maintained business connections with Germany and social relations with the Embassy and Consular staffs, are so compromised before the public that they have found themselves compelled to sever these relations. Even more deplorable is the fact that in consequence of this situation, the personnel of the Embassy and the Consulates, who have already been working under most difficult conditions as it is, find themselves subject to even greater suspicion than before, which makes their work harder yet.

Westrick will leave San Francisco on August 19 for home.

His departure, naturally, will now be interpreted as being under compulsion and the press will celebrate a triumph at its success of putting an end to Westrick's usefulness.⁴

THOMSEN

³ Friedrich Ried who had served as a German Consul in Brazil had been withdrawn from there because of objections of the Brazilian Government to his activities and in April 1940 he had been assigned as Consul at New York City. Protests were raised against his presence in the United States and on July 24, 1940, Under Secretary of State Welles announced that the Department of State was considering the case. On Aug. 19 it was announced that Ried was being transferred to the Consulate at Kobe, Japan. Thomsen reported on his interview with Dunn in telegram No. 1622 of Aug. 3 (19/12545-46).

⁴ The last word appears in English in the original.

No. 288

19/12559-61

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1940—3:38 p. m.

SECRET

Received August 7—3:10 a. m.

No. 1649 of August 6

For OKW, Foreign Department [*Ausland*]; OKH, Attaché Branch, Chief of the General Staff; Air Ministry, Attaché Group, Chief of the General Staff.

The background of Lindbergh's re-emergence in public and the campaign against him.

The Jewish element now controls key positions in the American armed forces, after having in the last weeks filled the posts of Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary of War, and Secretary of the Navy with subservient individuals and attached a leading and very influential Jew, "Colonel" Julius Ochs-Adler, as secretary to the Secretary of War.

The forces opposing the Jewish element and the present policy of the United States have been mentioned over and over in my reports, taking account also of the importance of the General Staff. The greatly gifted Lindbergh, whose connections reach very far, is much the most important of them all. The Jewish element and Roosevelt fear the spiritual and, particularly, the moral superiority and purity of this man. On Sunday, Lindbergh delivered a blow¹ that will hurt the Jews by declaring that America was not threatened, provided she made due preparations for her own protection; that it was unworthy of the American nation to look to England for its defense, and that the people had been influenced by the idea that England's defeat would destroy America's security. He also exposed the propaganda of misrepresentation in the American press, and stressed that America should strive for sincere collaboration with Germany, with a view to peace and the preservation of Western culture. Several hours later, the aged General Pershing, who now has long been a puppet in the hands of Roosevelt, which means of the Jews, read over the radio a declaration, foisted upon him by the wirepullers, to the effect that America would be imperiled by England's defeat; for that reason 50 destroyers should be transferred immediately.²

Pershing later on in the broadcast also advocated universal military training, but he did that on behalf of the General Staff, because the poor results of the voluntary enlistment system and the reluctance of young Americans to enter military service seem to make universal military training necessary. The tragedy of the situation is that the demand for universal military training is at the same time vigorously pushed by the Jewish element, which is now making a show of patriotism, because it feels for one thing that arming to the greatest possible extent is essential to its purposes, and then also because it hopes that in a militarized state headed by Roosevelt as dictator, it will be able to exercise the actual dictatorship and make use of universal military training for Jewish objectives.

The demand for transfer of 50 old destroyers to England, which has still a long way to go and is not possible without a change in the existing law, is like the famous promise of delivering to England 3,000 aircraft a month.³ England's will to fight is to be strengthened at any cost. The uncertainty prevailing in the British High Command, reported in telegram No. 1618 of August 3 (with Pol. I g),⁴ is causing

¹ For text of Lindbergh's speech of Aug. 4, see the *New York Times*, Aug. 5, 1940, p. 4.

² For the text of Pershing's speech, see the *New York Times*, Aug. 5, 1940, p. 1.

³ In a speech broadcast on July 24, Lord Beaverbrook, British Minister for Aircraft Production, had said he was authorized to state that the United States Government would sponsor a plan to begin immediate production of airplanes for the British account to the total of 3,000 per month. This was confirmed by Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau in a statement of July 25. For texts see the *New York Times*, July 25 and 26, 1940, pp. 1 and 9, respectively.

⁴ Not found.

anxiety here, the more so as new reports from England indicate the spreading of a certain nervous fatigue as a result of the German measures and the chronic uncertainty of the immediate future. Confronted with the impossibility of making any effective deliveries of arms to England because of the country's own armament requirements, the idea now is to promise the destroyers which the British Ambassador already requested once before. The purposes of the Jewish element were plainly confirmed by Senator Lucas, who spoke against Lindbergh over the radio on Monday night at Roosevelt's behest.⁵ He rejected Lindbergh's peace plans, disputed Lindbergh's statement that no threat to America is possible from the direction of Greenland, and sharply attacked Lindbergh's wish for collaboration with Germany as well as his friendly sentiments for the Führer. Conversely, he praised Roosevelt as the man of peace. He might as well have said that Roosevelt and the Jewish element wanted England to go on fighting and that the hysterical fear on the part of the American people of an attack on the Western Hemisphere must be still further increased.

The chorus of the Jewish element casting suspicion on Lindbergh in the press, and his denunciation by a Senator as a "fifth columnist", that is, a traitor, merely serve to underline the fear of the spiritual power of this man, about whose progress I have reported since the beginning of the war and in whose great importance for future German-American relations I believe.⁶

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

⁵ Aug. 5. For the text of Lucas' speech see the *New York Times*, Aug. 6, 1940, p. 6.

⁶ A further report from Thomsen gave an account of a confidential conversation between Lindbergh and several American General Staff officers. Lindbergh gave it as his opinion that England would soon collapse before German air attacks. The General Staff officers, however, held that Germany's air strength was not sufficient to force a decision. (Washington telegram No. 1987 of Sept. 18: 35/22869-70)

No. 289

71/50689-90

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 602 of August 6

THERAPIA, August 6, 1940—7:00 p. m.

Received August 7—1:05 a. m.

Today the secretary of the Grand Mufti of Bagdad [sic] visited me, requesting a visa for Berlin and Rome.¹ He told the following:

The Italian-Arab negotiations with Bagdad have brought forth a written promise by Italy that all Arab countries under mandate or

¹ See document No. 200.

protectorate had Italy's positive assurance of their independence. The Iraq Government would like to restore relations with Germany on the same basis. It would then immediately dissociate itself from Foreign Minister Nuri Said. Furthermore, it wished to assist the Axis Powers everywhere in their war against England, especially by a new revolt in Palestine. This required that the Mandate Government of Syria be informed, because the uprising would in the main have to be organized from there. The tension between the Iraq Government and England was increasing ever since Iraq categorically refused to let Indian troops pass through. The Iraq Army is master of the situation after nearly all English forces had been transported to Egypt (one group missing: "by" or the like) Turkish planes. An understanding has been reached with Saudi Arabia on the establishment of independence, the removal of Abdullah,² and annexation of Transjordan to Palestine. Nothing has been said yet about oil interests.

The entire complex of questions is to be discussed by the Grand Mufti's secretary in Berlin and Rome. The secretary is known in Berlin under the name of Osman Kemal Haddad, and he last was in Berlin on September 3, 1939, at Pension Sydow. His Iraq passport No. 593 is made out to Tewfik Ali al-Shakir. He has a visa for Hungary and requests that our Minister be instructed to issue to him a visa for Berlin.

Request telegraphic instruction right away.³

PAPEN

² Abdullah Ibn al Husayn, Emir of Transjordan, 1921-1951.

³ On Aug. 12 Papen again urgently requested such instructions, "as the personage in question will not escape the attention of the Secret Service here much longer." (3562/E023433)

On Aug. 15, Woermann informed Papen that the Mufti's secretary would be received at the Foreign Ministry by Minister Grobba; simultaneously the Legation in Hungary was instructed to issue a German visa to the Arab emissary (71/50691).

No. 290

B14/B002139-42

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, August 6, 1940—7: 40 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received August 6—8: 00 p. m.

No. 1461 of August 6

Ciano sent for me today to tell me, for the information of my Government, first of developments in Italian-Russian relations since the two Ambassadors had returned to their posts¹ and second of the

¹ See vol. ix, document No. 381.

further intentions of the Italian Government. As guide for the conversation he was using a brief memorandum which he had drafted for the Duce and which, he said, was fully approved by him.

I. Development of relations:

June 16. Rosso-Molotov conversation from which the Ambassador gains the impression that Molotov desires a positive development in Russo-Italian relations.²

June 16. Ciano wires Rosso that the fascist Government was glad and willing to meet such wishes of the Russian Government.³

June 21. Rosso has a long and friendly talk with Molotov; Rosso sets forth the lines of Italian policy in the Danube Basin and the Balkans, which might be summed up as friendly cooperation with all interested parties.⁴

June 25. Molotov, in a talk with Rosso, describes Russian policies in the Danube-Balkan area:⁵

Hungary: Relations normal. Russia is of the opinion that the Hungarian claims against Rumania "have a basis" [*"eine Basis haben"*].

Bulgaria: Cordial relations, good neighborliness which is capable of development. Russia considers the Bulgarian claims against Rumania and Greece as justified.

Rumania: Bessarabia (the question was still open at the time) is strictly Russia's concern. In general, in her relations with Rumania Russia will give consideration to Italy's and Germany's interests and is prepared to come to an understanding with regard to them.

Turkey: Distrust of Turkish policies, based in the first place on Turkey's unfriendly attitude as documented in the conclusion of the treaty with England and France,⁶ and secondly, on Turkey's efforts to dictate her will to Russia in the Black Sea, as well as Turkey's claim to be sole master of the Straits.

Thirdly, Turkey's menacing attitude in the area south and south-east of Batum.

Mediterranean and Black Sea:

Mediterranean: Russia recognizes as perfectly reasonable Italy's holding of a preponderant position there. (Ciano added to me that by the Mediterranean he meant in this connection the areas adjoining the Mediterranean Sea.)

Black Sea: Russia hopes that Italy in her turn recognizes Russia's preponderance in the Black Sea.

Molotov concluded by expressing hope that the Italian Government would inform him of its point of view on these questions. He had

² Cf. Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, pp. 24-26.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

⁴ See vol. IX, document No. 520.

⁵ See document No. 21. Cf. Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, pp. 41-43.

⁶ Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ankara, Oct. 19, 1939; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 60, p. 167.

spoken with perfect honesty and clarity, "which had also been governing his relations with Germany during the past year, which continued to be of the best. He hoped for the same regarding relations with Italy."

June 28. Ciano-Gorelkin conversation. Ciano touches mainly on the questions discussed in the Molotov-Rosso talks, but without defining them more precisely in detail.

July 18. Gorelkin informs Giannini that Russia was prepared to resume trade relations with Italy, but desired such negotiations to take place in Moscow. Also, any new agreements would have to be on a different basis from those that expired on December 31.

July 27. People's Commissar for Foreign Trade Mikoyan tells Rosso that the possibility of fresh negotiations depended on prior complete clarification of the political relations between the two countries. In his report on this conversation Rosso adds that Mikoyan is a very influential personage and a member of the Politburo and that in his (Rosso's) opinion his declarations are not merely those of a department head, but reflect the attitude of the whole Government.⁷

July 30. Telegram from Rosso.⁸ Russia quite obviously wishes to participate in the consultations and decisions concerning the problems of the Danube-Balkan area. Count Schulenburg is of the opinion that it would be good policy to meet halfway the Russian suggestion for cooperation between the three southeast European countries, for then it would be easier to control the Russians and exert a moderating influence than if their aspirations were ignored or rejected. Rosso shares this opinion, especially as far as the Straits are concerned, which is a question for whose solution the Russians will press at the next opportunity, in Rosso's opinion.

August 2 [sic]. Molotov's speech. Ciano interprets the passage referring to Italy as a further hint to promote Russo-Italian relations.⁹

To this account of the developments of the last few weeks Ciano added the observation that the Duce and he were of the opinion that now something had to be done about Italy's relations with Russia.¹⁰

But before anything was done they intended to inform the Führer and the Foreign Minister about the developments to date and about the next step that was contemplated.

⁷ Rosso's account of this conversation is printed in Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, pp. 50-51.

⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

⁹ Molotov's speech of Aug. 1, 1940 (Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 461-469), contained the following passage referring to Italy:

"It should also be noted that our relations with Italy have lately improved. An exchange of views with Italy has revealed that there is every possibility for our countries to ensure mutual understanding in the sphere of foreign policy. There is also every reason to expect an extension of our trade relations."

¹⁰ Cf. Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, pp. 53-54.

For the further course he, Ciano, thought he would send for Gorelkin and express to him, in the matter of trade negotiations, the willingness of Italy to send a delegation to Moscow. As far as the political relations were concerned, he would tell him more or less the following:

In the Bessarabian question Italy and Germany had not only demonstrated their full understanding of the Russians and raised no objections but, in addition, had talked moderation to the Rumanians. That in itself was evidence of beneficial results for Russia from the contacts that had been established. Molotov's statements about Russia's relations with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania were basically in accord with the Axis position. As for Turkey, he wanted to say that Italy had no aggressive intentions regarding Turkey at all. But here, too, Turkish policies were regarded with anything but confidence while Russia's resentment and suspicion were well understood. Nor were there any objections to Molotov's statements regarding the Mediterranean and Black Sea questions, and he would declare that Italy was conscious [*bewusst*] of Russia's special position in the Black Sea. On that point, however, some further clarification of the meaning of the Russian aspirations might be requested. In the question of the Straits, if the Russians, as seems probable, should press it and insist on demilitarization, one might encourage them to continue in that direction. Furthermore it might be interesting to clarify the question, neither broached by Molotov nor touched on by Rosso, of Russo-Yugoslav relations. Ciano concluded his statements with the request that he be in due course informed of the Foreign Minister's point of view.¹¹

MACKENSEN

¹¹ See document No. 348.

No. 291

51/84882-88

*Circular of the Foreign Minister*¹

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, August 6, 1940.

[Multex No. 195]²

R 810 g. Ang. I.

For the Chief of the Mission or his representative personally. Special security handling. To be deciphered personally.

¹ The addressees were the German Missions at Ankara, Buenos Aires, Shanghai, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Athens, Bangkok, Belgrade, Bern, Bogotá, Bucharest, Budapest, Caracas, Ciudad Trujillo, Havana, Helsinki, Guatemala, Hsinking, Lima, Lisbon, Mexico, Montevideo, Panama, Port au Prince, Quito, Sofia, Stockholm, and Tehran. Cf. vol. ix, document No. 396.

² The telegram number is obtained from Multex No. 208 of Aug. 16 (document No. 350).

Following receipt of further final instructions, the Government there is to be notified as follows:

"Owing to the course the war has taken in recent weeks England has become the center of the fighting at sea and in the air. In the sea area around England, therefore, hostilities can now be expected at any time, so that it is impossible for merchant ships to sail without danger in this area. Thus the entire sea area around England has become a zone of operations. Any ship that sails this area exposes itself to destruction not only by mines but also by other means of combat. The German Government therefore issues a renewed and urgent warning against traversing the endangered area. It should be suggested to the (insert the name of the country) Government that it also take on its own initiative such measures as it feels to be appropriate so that its citizens and ships (insert the name of the country) will no longer enter the endangered area. To be considered dangerous is the sea area bounded by a line connecting the following points: From the French Atlantic coast at 47° 30' North 2° 40' West to a point 45° North 5° West to a point 45° North 20° West to a point 58° North 20° West to a point 62° North 3° East, from here south to the Belgian coast, then following the Belgian and French coasts to the initial point.

"The German Government assumes no responsibility for damage which may be incurred by ships and persons in this area."

End of notification.

A further telegraphic instruction relating to the time to carry out the above telegraphic instruction will follow.*

RIBBENTROP

* See document No. 350 and footnote 1 thereto.

No. 292

51/84333-35

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Eire

[Telegram]

No. 238

[BERLIN, August 6, 1940.]

R 810 g. Ang. II.

[Here follows the same text as Multex No. 195 of August 6 (document No. 291) to the end of the quoted notification.]

This notification is being transmitted simultaneously to the Governments of all the other neutral states involved in ocean commerce.

Please add the following in transmitting this to the Irish Government:

"The German Government, which is transmitting the above warning to the neutral Governments involved in ocean commerce, in spite of the fact that the waters around England are endangered by combat ac-

tivities, desires to make it possible for Ireland to obtain the goods necessary to her existence. The German Government is therefore willing to give special consideration to Irish ships. The German forces will not attack ships under the Irish flag which are specially marked and reported by the Government of Ireland, if these ships and their cargoes are promptly reported by telegraph, if they obey the instructions of the German forces, and have on board only goods which the Irish Government guarantees will remain in Ireland. Arrangement of the details of the procedure may be reserved for a special agreement."

End of the notification.

A further telegraphic instruction relating to the time to carry out the above telegraphic instruction will follow.¹ You are authorized thereafter to enter immediately into negotiations with the Irish Government for the conclusion of such a special agreement.

Telegraphic instructions on details of this agreement will follow.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 350 and footnote 1.

² These instructions were communicated in telegram No. 267 of Aug. 16 from Ambassador Ritter (2186/472342-43). In telegram No. 506 of Aug. 25 (91/100346-49) Hempel reported that the German proposals had been studied in Dublin and that he had discussed them with Walshe, the Secretary General of the Ministry for External Affairs. Walshe had pointed out the peculiar nature of Irish overseas trade which was principally with England and in British ships, and had indicated concern lest a special agreement with Germany provide the British with grounds for accusing Ireland of unneutral behavior. He mentioned his intention to transfer the negotiations on the German proposals to Berlin. Hempel agreed to this transfer. A memorandum by Leitner of Sept. 2 (91/100370-72) recorded a conversation with the Irish Chargé d'Affaires. Warnock was not yet able to present a reply by his Government but reiterated the arguments of Walshe. A further memorandum by Leitner of Nov. 1 (9960/E696288) recorded that the topic was again mentioned by the Irish Chargé d'Affaires but he had had no response from Dublin to the German proposals. No records of further conversations on this subject have been found.

No. 293

51/34835-37

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in the Soviet Union,
Spain, and Japan*

Telegram

To Moscow No. 1368

[BERLIN, August 6, 1940.]

To Madrid No. 1245

R 810 g. Ang. III.

To Tokyo No. 639

[Here follows the same text as Multex No. 195 of August 6 (document No. 291) to the end of the quoted notification.]

This notification is being transmitted simultaneously to the Governments of all the other neutral states involved in ocean commerce.

Please add the following in transmitting this to the Government there:

"The German Government, which is transmitting the above warning to the Governments of the neutral states involved in ocean commerce, would like to express the hope, in consideration of the special relations between our two countries, that the

- in 1) ships of the USSR
- in 2) Spanish ships
- in 3) Japanese ships

will also avoid the endangered ocean area, since with the present development of the war situation it is no longer technically possible for the German forces to undertake special measures to except the

- in 1) ships of the USSR
- in 2) Spanish ships
- in 3) Japanese ships

from the danger."

End of the notification.

A further telegraphic instruction relating to the time to carry out the above telegraphic instruction will follow.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 350 and footnote 1.

No. 294

51/34887-89

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

TOP SECRET
No. 865

[BERLIN, August 6, 1940.]
R 810 g. Ang. IV.

For the Chief of the Mission or his representative personally. Special security handling. To be deciphered personally.

I. The Reich Government is having the following notification transmitted to the Governments of the states involved in ocean commerce:

[Here follows the text of the notification quoted in Multex No. 195 of August 6 (document No. 291).]

II. Following receipt of further final instructions the text of this notification is to be brought to the knowledge of the American Government, with the remark that the Reich Government can limit itself to informing the Government of the United States that this note has been sent to the other neutral countries, since the Government of the United States has already prohibited its citizens and ships by its own legislation from entering or traversing the ocean area in question.

III. Please add orally in transmitting the note that promises with regard to safe conduct of individual ships given at the time of this transmittal remain valid. However, in so far as the Reich Government is aware, none of the guaranteed ships is in the ocean area in question at the present time. End.

A further telegraphic instruction relating to the time to carry out the above instruction will follow.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 350 and footnote 1.

No. 295

51/84839-41

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

TOP SECRET

[BERLIN, August 6, 1940.]

No. 1059

R 810 g. Ang. V.

I. The German Government is having the German Missions transmit the following communication to the Governments of the neutral countries which carry on ocean commerce.

[Here follows the text of the notification quoted in Multex No. 195 of August 6 (document No. 291) and quotation of the additions made in the telegrams of August 6 to the Legation in Eire (document No. 292) and the Embassies in the Soviet Union, Spain, and Japan (document No. 293).]

The German Embassy in Washington was instructed ¹ only to bring the text of the notification to the knowledge of the American Government with the remark that the Reich Government could limit itself to informing the Government of the United States that this note had been sent to the other neutral countries, since the Government of the United States had already prohibited its citizens and ships by its own legislation from entering or traversing the ocean area in question.

II. Following receipt of further final instructions the above is to be brought to the knowledge of the Italian Government. A further telegraphic instruction relating to the time to carry out the above instruction will follow.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 294.

² See document No. 350 and footnote 1 thereto.

No. 296

19/12574

*The Director of the News Service and Press Department to the
Embassy in the United States*

Telegram

No. 863

BERLIN, August 6, 1940.
zu P 13462.

According to a report of the Minister in Havana,¹ Sell gave him a memorandum which, among other things, contained the proposal of Fulton Lewis, that the Führer should direct an appeal to Roosevelt with a view to his mediation with Churchill. Although execution of this proposal is out of the question, it would nevertheless be of interest to obtain your views, in particular concerning the importance of Fulton Lewis.²

SCHMIDT

¹ See document No. 230.

² See document No. 306.

No. 297

124/122369-70

State Secretary Weizsäcker to Minister Blücher

BERLIN, August 6, 1940.

DEAR HERR VON BLÜCHER: In reply to your letter of August 2,¹ which I received today, I should like to inform you that so far Minister Kivimäki has not brought up the idea of a visit here by the two Finnish Ministers. I rather believe that for the time being he will not do so, either. Doubtless he has close contact with the Swedish Minister here, who has been urging a trip to Berlin by the Swedish Foreign Minister for quite a while now, without so far having found any great response here.² In point of fact I believe it was thought that the time for such a trip here has not yet arrived. I have therefore also refrained from informing the Foreign Minister of the idea. For the time being we have plenty to do with the Balkan problem, for which I hope a peaceful solution can be found.

It is recognized here, too, that the Finnish question is beginning to become somewhat more important than it seemed this summer. I personally have the feeling that since the day the English left Narvik the Russians have regretted having released the Finns from the war relatively cheaply.

¹ Document No. 280.

² See document No. 279, footnote 3.

In conclusion I must still explain a misunderstanding. Herr von Ribbentrop does not want any private letters exchanged by the Missions and the Foreign Ministry on official matters. What he has permitted and considers proper is only the use of the report form with my personal address instead of that of the Foreign Ministry. This being so, I did not send your letter through channels.

Cordial greetings and best regards.

Heil Hitler!

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 298

F18/099

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*¹

BERLIN, August 6, 1940.

RM 21.

RECEPTION OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, M. SHKVARTSEV, ON AUGUST 6, 1940

I received the Soviet Ambassador, M. Shkvartsev, today and strongly remonstrated with him regarding the article, published in Riga in the newspaper *Jauņakas Zinas* on August 5, entitled "German Communists Against Dictate at Compiègne." I strongly emphasized that this was an outright inflammatory article against Germany. The attacks on the German Government contained in that article were not calculated to further good German-Russian relations, which after all were desired by both sides. The contents and implications of this article did not correspond to the letter or the spirit of the Moscow agreements. The article was also in diametrical opposition to the desire, recently expressed by the Führer and the day before yesterday [sic] by Molotov in Moscow,² of further strengthening friendly German-Russian relations. I requested the Ambassador to inform his Government immediately of this talk and to notify it that the Reich Government considered it appropriate to suppress such articles in the future.

¹ Marginal note: "Shown to the Führer. Si[egfried] Aug. 11, 1940."

² Apparently a reference to Molotov's speech of August 1; see document No. 249, footnote 4. Molotov had said: "Our relations with Germany, which were radically changed nearly a year ago, remain entirely as laid down in the Soviet-German agreement. This agreement, strictly observed by our Government, removed the possibility of friction in Soviet-German relations when Soviet measures were carried out along our western frontier, and at the same time it gave Germany a calm feeling of security in the East. Far from reducing the significance of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, events in Europe have, on the contrary, emphasized the importance of its existence and further development."

M. Shkvartsev did not make any comment on the article itself, but promised to report the matter immediately to M. Molotov. As basis for his report a copy of the DNB dispatch of August 6 covering the article was handed to him.

R[IBBENTROP]

No. 299

1053/312226

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 774 of August 6 RIO DE JANEIRO, August 7, 1940—12: 27 a. m.
Received August 7—8: 35 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 748 of July 31.¹

Our comprehensive offer in accordance with telegraphic instruction No. 595 of July 10² was communicated to the Finance Minister 2 weeks ago. The offer made a strong impression on the Government and was very favorably received, and this has also been confirmed by confidential informants. If, nevertheless, negotiations so far have not yet eventuated and the Finance Minister puts off conversations, the following grounds appear responsible for it:

1) The Federal President and Government at the time had obviously counted on a quicker decisive blow against England. Meanwhile the view of that part of the Cabinet which reckoned on a longer duration of the war won more ground; the Finance Minister counts among this number.

2) The attitude of the Government to the North American cartel project³ was negative; our offer and our intensive counterpropaganda contributed to this. The Government expects, however, further steps by the United States. Influential circles in the Government are therefore trying to see to it that the Government is not bound by definite agreements with Germany which could limit its freedom of movement in case of a longer duration of the war. The Federal President left yesterday for a journey of 10 to 14 days in the interior of the country, without my being able to speak to him about the negotiations. After his return I will immediately bring up⁴ again with him the question of negotiations.⁵

PRÜFER

¹ Not printed (188/137630).

² Document No. 145.

³ See documents Nos. 127 and 178.

⁴ The German word here is "entscheiden." It would appear to have been garbled in transmission.

⁵ In telegram No. 826 of Aug. 14 (1053/312213) Prüfer reported: "Finance Minister stated orally that the Government agrees in principle to our comprehensive offer. The Foreign Minister also wishes to come to a general conclusion with us." In a further telegram, No. 924 of Sept. 9, however, Prüfer noted that Brazilian views about economic agreements with Germany were dependent upon the war and the outlook for its end; meanwhile the need to export put the country "necessarily and exclusively" under American economic influence (1053/312203).

No. 300

19/12563-4

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1661 of August 6

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1940—8:18 a. m.

Received August 7—7:25 p. m.

For Information Department.

The American book trade published in the last few weeks the following books attacking Roosevelt and seeking to forward American neutrality, in the production of some of which the Embassy has had a share and the distribution of which it is at present promoting to the greatest possible extent.

1. *Country Squire in the White House*, a vitriolic attack on President Roosevelt and his administration, by the renowned and widely read journalist John T. Flynn. This 131-page book is based on convincing factual material, and brilliantly supported by quotations from Roosevelt's earlier speeches and statements, and has, as even the *New York Times* admits, already been more harmful to Roosevelt's reputation than any pamphlet, brochure or book published to date.

2. *The Dynamics of War and Revolution*, by the well-known writer and former American diplomat Lawrence Dennis. It is a searching historical-philosophical treatise which predicts an anti-democratic revolution in the United States, presents the dynamics of historical evolution and the problem of our times to the American reader in an entirely new light, and proposes German-American collaboration.

3. *Common Sense Neutrality*, by Paul Comly French, a skillful compilation of the views on neutrality of well-known American personalities, including Borah, Hoover, Lindbergh, etc. The book is a plea for neutrality on general pacifistic, humanitarian, and practical grounds.

4. *America Wake Up*, by An Beneken, written for the most elementary level. It takes also a very positive attitude toward National-Socialist ideology, attacks the Roosevelt administration, and advocates a realistic collaboration between American and the totalitarian countries.

5. *War, War, War—Veritas Vincit*, by Cincinnatus, a very sharp indictment of the American Jews, unsparingly scourging the behind-the-scenes connections between them and their strawman Roosevelt. The pseudonym conceals a patriotic American. The book was printed privately and is not to be had in the regular book trade.

Each of these books is addressed to a different audience, but all of them pursue the same tendency. The Embassy has already bought a limited number of books 2, 3, and 4, and sent them to interested persons.

This required the outlay of \$2,500. During this propaganda operation it has become apparent that No. 1 had the heaviest impact of all on American readers. There is a plan to have 50,000 copies of this book distributed during the election campaign by trusted intermediaries, who must be carefully camouflaged in order to conceal the German hand. This will probably require about \$25,000. Before the delicate negotiations with these intermediaries can be started, please instruct by telegraph whether funds are available and the plan is approved.¹

THOMSEN

¹ No reply to this telegram has been found.

No. 301

B19/B008700-01

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 1372

BERLIN, August 6, 1940.
Sent August 7—2: 15 p. m.
zu W V 2950.¹

With reference to my telegram No. 1310 of July 30² the Legation at Helsinki telegraphs as follows:

"The Foreign Minister, when I informed him that we would confine ourselves to the fulfillment of the agreement concluded between I. G. Farben and the nickel company, pointed out that the Soviet Government had stated to the Finnish Government that it consented to the delivery of 60 percent of the nickel production to Germany *for the year 1940 only*, while the agreement applied to a longer period." End of telegram from Helsinki.³

The initialed German-Finnish government agreements⁴ do not contemplate any limitation in time with respect to the Finnish obligation to deliver to us a fixed percentage of the nickel ore production from Petsamo. Accordingly also the commercial agreement between I. G. and the Petsamo Nickel Company for deliveries was also concluded for an unlimited period, even though the Finns, with possible Soviet demands in mind, reserved the right to give notice of termination of the contract at the end of the year 1940. (On this point see written instruction W V 2909/II of August 2.⁵) In view of the substantial investments which would have to be made on the German side, a [con-

¹ W V 2950: Not found.

² Document No. 259.

³ The telegram was No. 469 of Aug. 1, 4: 10 p. m., from Helsinki, of which the passage quoted here was the first paragraph (4416/E083876).

⁴ See document No. 221.

⁵ W V 2909/II: Not found.

tract containing a] limitation of the right to delivery of the production of nickel ore to the year 1940 would be of no value. We have therefore assumed both in our negotiations with the Finnish Government and in your discussions with the Soviet Government that a limitation in point of time was not at issue. If in the negotiations with Finland we originally only dealt with the years 1940 and 1941, we did this only because we wished to obtain the concession itself by the end of 1941 at the latest.

Molotov's statements, which you reported in your telegram No. 1399 of July 17,⁶ we interpreted in accordance with our viewpoint also with respect to the period of time involved. In case you consider it necessary please in a suitable way make this again entirely clear to Molotov.

WEIZSÄCKER

⁶ Document No. 182.

No. 302

104/112868

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, August 7, 1940—6:33 p.m.

No. 1590 of August 7

Received August 7—8:05 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1339 of August 2.¹

Carried out instructions today with Molotov regarding strip of Lithuanian territory. Molotov appeared satisfied and declared that since the German Government had declared its willingness to examine the matter more closely, the Soviet Government too is ready to discuss suitable compensation. In any event the Soviet Government will await notification of the German wishes.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 275.

No. 303

B14/B002150-52

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 1068

BERLIN, August 7, 1940.

e. o. W XII 498140.

Please inform Count Ciano orally as follows:

The International Danube Commission which, after the disappearance of Austria and Czechoslovakia and Germany's withdrawal in

1936,¹ consists at present of Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Italy, France, and England, and whose principal function it is to supervise the Yugoslav-Rumanian administration at the Iron Gate and thus guarantee a smooth flow of traffic on the stretch of the Danube that is most difficult for shipping, met at the end of June under French chairmanship for a lengthy plenary session. A committee of the Commission will go to Orșova, again under French chairmanship, on September 10. On November 1 the chairmanship of the Commission is to go for half a year to the British member, who only recently summoned a former naval officer to assist him. The German Legation at Belgrade reports that the French Secretary General of the Commission, Baule, who was inducted into the French military service 8 months ago and was employed as Naval Attaché of the French Legation at Belgrade, has been demobilized in the meantime and now intends to resume his activity in the Commission.² Also other members of the Commission's secretariat who are nationals of the enemy powers are on temporary leave only during the war.

The German Government considers the time ripe for putting an end once and for all to the activity of this Commission. It is probably known to the Italian Government that it has taken very exhaustive efforts on the part of the German Diplomatic Missions in Belgrade and Bucharest to get the Yugoslav and Rumanian Governments to take effective measures for the protection of Danube traffic against the often quite obvious attempts, reported time and again, to cut off Germany's imports via the Danube by acts of sabotage. Through the well-known facts published in the sixth German White Book³ it has been made plain that the former French Minister in Bucharest himself instigated such acts of sabotage. Reports about the participation of British agents in such acts have repeatedly reached the German Government.

It is indefensible from the standpoint of an effective prosecution of the war that English and French influence upon the Danubian countries through the International Commission be tolerated any longer. This is contrary both to the existing power relations and the vital interests of Germany and Italy.

The German Government therefore intends to make the demand in Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, and Sofia that the International Danube Commission, which is based on [the Treaty of] Versailles and which has legally long been incapable of making decisions, be

¹ The text of the German note of Nov. 14, 1936, announcing withdrawal from the International Commissions for the control of the Rhine, Elbe, Oder, and Danube, is published in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, December 1936, pp. 354-355.

² The Belgrade report referred to here has not been found.

³ See Editors' Note, p. 124.

finally rendered inactive; that there be no further session of the Commission and its committees; and that any French or English influence whatever in questions heretofore dealt with in the International Danube Commission should cease.⁴

Until the final settlement after conclusion of the peace, the suspension of the present Commission and a technical supervision, as simple as possible, of the Yugoslav-Rumanian administration should be agreed upon between Germany, Italy, the four riparian Governments heretofore represented on the International Danube Commission, and Slovakia. The German Government would like to reserve more detailed proposals on provisional regulations for a conference of the experts concerned.

We hope that the Italian Government will agree to our plans just described. We intend to start the necessary action as soon as possible and to call a conference of experts to Vienna for the beginning of September.

Please send a telegraphic report on the carrying out of these instructions and the reply of the Italian Government.

For your information only:

As for the European Danube Commission (at present consisting of Italy, Rumania, England, France, and Germany, which joined again in 1939), we likewise consider English and French membership as not acceptable in the long run. The conditions are different here, however, from those in the International Danube Commission. In the case of the latter our efforts are for its elimination; as a state with a paramount interest in the Danube, but not belonging to the Commission, we want to manage this *on our own* with the other riparian countries belonging to the Commission, after Italian consent has been obtained in accordance with the above instructions. In the case of the European Danube Commission we as a member state are striving for the exclusion of England and France while the Commission is to continue in existence, for which purpose we shall at the proper time induce first Italy, and then *jointly* with her Rumania to send three identical notes to the present Rumanian chairman of the Executive Committee, to the effect that the three powers do not consider it feasible that England and France continue as members. In order to avoid the possibility of Italy's proposing a joint procedure for the International Danube Commission as well, we wish to postpone temporarily the action with regard to the European Danube Commission. Therefore, please do not mention the latter Commis-

⁴ In telegrams dated Aug. 14, the four Legations referred to were given instructions to see the respective Foreign Ministers on Aug. 19 and state the German position. The four countries were to be invited to be represented at a conference of experts in Vienna on Sept. 5 to arrange with Germany, Italy, and Slovakia the details about the shutting down of the Commission. (2141/-468244-47)

sion. Should it be mentioned by the Italians, please state simply that you have had no instructions in the matter.⁵

WEIZSÄCKER

⁵ In telegram No. 1496 of Aug. 12, Mackensen reported that Ciano expressed complete agreement with Germany's ideas on the subject of the International Danube Commission; Ciano was sure that Mussolini would approve also (2141/468243).

No. 304

174/136396-97

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*¹

St.S. No. 634

BERLIN, August 7, 1940.

On August 1 (St. S. No. 609²) the Japanese Ambassador had suggested an exchange of views with the Reich Foreign Minister regarding the entire political orientation of the new Japanese Cabinet. His two questions at that time were whether we still considered the Japanese-Russian settlement as important as ever and whether we wished an intensified or perhaps a moderate tempo in regard to the anti-Anglo-Saxon policy of the new Japanese Cabinet.

Today the Ambassador brought up the conversation between Foreign Minister Matsuoka and Ambassador Ott (telegraphic report from Tokyo No. 765³). In this conversation Ambassador Ott, according to Kurusu's information, again stated very plainly that in the future, too, no conflict between Soviet Russia and Germany was to be expected. Japan, too, should—if necessary with Germany's help—come to an understanding with Russia.

The point, however, upon which Kurusu dwelt at considerable length on the occasion of today's visit was not Japan's relations with Russia, America, or England, but the new order which was being considered by Japan in the area of so-called Great Asia. Ambassador Ott also touches upon this subject in his telegraphic report, but Kurusu gave more details regarding Matsuoka's statements; these were as follows: Japan desires to organize Greater East Asia, including the South Pacific, on a broad basis. Matsuoka had told Ott that in this great area Japan wishes to bring about a condition in which there would be no conquest, no oppression, and no exploitation. Everyone would be given just treatment. Japan for her part would observe these three fundamental rules, but would also expect European and American countries not to violate these principles. These were ideals which, rightly understood, were in the interest of all. Kurusu named

¹ The memorandum is unsigned, but is evidently by Weizsäcker.

² Document No. 271.

³ Document No. 273.

Japan, Manchuria, and China as the nucleus of this Greater East Asia and applied the designation of East Asiatic Axis to them.

Kurusu continued by saying that since Minister Sato had taken away with him from here the impression of an unchanged friendly German attitude toward Japan but had not been entirely clear as to how this friendship was to be developed,⁴ it was now high time to find out Germany's view of these Japanese plans for Greater East Asia.

The Ambassador went so far as to say that for the administration of their entire foreign policy and for the pertinent Cabinet discussions in Tokyo Matsuoka and Konoye, to begin with, needed to understand clearly how we stood in regard to this matter. Kurusu did not mention the statement of our disinterestedness regarding these overseas problems, which we had made to the Japanese in May of this year,⁵ but it was plain to see what he was aiming at, and he was obviously acting upon instructions from Tokyo in this matter.

According to Kurusu's account, Ott did not permit himself to be drawn into a discussion on this subject any more than I did today.

Finally, Kurusu again expressed the hope that he would shortly be able to discuss these far-reaching problems with the Reich Foreign Minister.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

⁴ See document No. 137.

⁵ See vol. ix, document No. 230.

No. 305

73/52654-55

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 635

BERLIN, August 7, 1940.

The Hungarian Minister informed me today orally and in writing (cf. annex 1¹) that his Government, complying with Germany's suggestion, will not insist at the opening of the negotiations on demanding the cession of a border town as pledge of Rumania's good will.

The Minister next called my attention, also both orally and in writing (cf. annex 2), to an intransigent address by M. Strat, the Rumanian State Secretary for the National Economy.

The Minister furthermore referred orally and in writing (cf. annex 3) to a parallel action of the former Rumanian Minister President

¹ The three annexes cited in this document are not printed (73/52656-59).

Maniu. Sztójay claimed that Maniu sought backing in Russia, and asserted again that Gafencu and the King of Rumania were flirting with Moscow.²

I asked the Minister if he was seriously trying to make me believe that a crowned head would throw himself into Stalin's arms.

Finally the Minister announced a memorandum on Transylvania by Count Teleki,³ which would supplement Count Teleki's earlier written statements on Transylvania.⁴

I thereupon told the Hungarian Minister first of all that the financial reparations which Hungary was intending to demand of Rumania were, in the opinion of the Foreign Minister, excessive and unenforceable.⁵ Next I gave him an outline of the Hungarian intrigues in Bucharest, as described by Herr Fabricius in his telegraphic report No. 1299,⁶ for which we had no use. I finally told the Minister that what he was trying out on me today was nothing but a repetition of what I had asked him to stop doing the last time,⁷ namely, to try, even before the opening of the Hungarian-Rumanian negotiations, to twist the understanding reached at Munich. The Hungarian statesmen at Munich had indeed had every opportunity, which they surely used, to lay everything that was on their minds before the Führer and the Foreign Minister.⁸ Their present attempt to nullify the Munich understandings would get nowhere with us. I would, as a friend, urgently advise him against acting with such a lack of psychology and trying to propagandize the German Government by such a paper bombardment at this stage of the game, instead of negotiating with the Rumanians.

Upon this the Hungarian took back a document which he had brought with him, the content of which he had not yet divulged to me.

WEIZSÄCKER

² In telegram No. 499 of July 30 Erdmannsdorff reported a statement of the Hungarian Foreign Minister that he knew from an absolutely reliable source "that King Carol, shortly before the negotiations in Salzburg, had the Rumanian Minister in Moscow offer the Soviet Union a mutual defense pact." (73/52629-30)

³ A Hungarian memorandum on Transylvania was handed to Woermann on Aug. 28 and transmitted by telegraph to Fuschl (73/52715-17).

⁴ Not found.

⁵ A memorandum by Schmidt of Aug. 6 indicates that Ribbentrop instructed Weizsäcker to convey this view to the Hungarian Minister (73/52624); Weizsäcker had sent to the Foreign Minister on July 30 a Hungarian note claiming 3 billion marks as reparation for damages suffered during the Rumanian occupation in 1919 (73/52625-28).

⁶ Of Aug. 4, not printed (172/135337). In his comments on the facts reported in this telegram, Weizsäcker again closely followed Ribbentrop's instructions, recorded in a memorandum by Schmidt of Aug. 6 (172/135336).

⁷ See document No. 284.

⁸ See document No. 146.

No. 306

19/12575-76

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram

WASHINGTON, August 8 [7?], 1940—9:51 p. m.
No. 1669 of August 7 Received August 8—8:50 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 863 of August 6.¹

1) The following may be said concerning the importance of Fulton Lewis, Jr.:

L. is one of the younger news announcers of the well known radio company, the Mutual Broadcasting Company, has enjoyed a particular success of late, and is a close personal friend of Sell. He attempts to support the isolationist line in his commentary on foreign affairs. He takes an attitude toward Germany which is factual and unprejudiced, so that the proposal in question was certainly well meant. On the other hand, in contrast to some leading American commentators, no political importance is to be attached to L. The proposal in question, therefore, probably arises mostly from a desire on the part of the personalities involved to gain attention. Similar proposals are frequently made to the Embassy by well meaning but uninfluential persons.

2) On the question of an appeal by the Führer² to Roosevelt for mediation with Churchill the following may be said: Since the Havana Conference, attacks by Roosevelt and his administration against all Germans and against alleged German plans of conquest, also in the Western Hemisphere, have continually increased; the aim is to promote Roosevelt's re-election, to prepare public opinion for the introduction of at least limited compulsory military service, and to divert the attention of American voters during the political campaign to the international situation. In view of the internal political situation and the atmosphere of hatred against us a mediation appeal to Roosevelt at this time would be exploited primarily as a sign of German weakness and of a fear to undertake a military assault against England. Moreover, Roosevelt would be made to appear in the eyes of the American voters as the best qualified international mediator, recognized even by the Führer himself, and this would likewise strengthen his chances for election.

THOMSEN

¹ Document No. 296.

² Marginal note: "Herr Schmidt: What is this? W[eizsäcker], Aug. 9."

No. 307

9324/E660944

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, August 7, 1940—11:27 p. m.

No. 1592 of August 7

Received August 8—3:10 a. m.

W IV 4397.

With reference to my telegram No. 1522 of July 31,¹ your telegram No. 1344 (W IV 4266) of August 3,² and your instruction W IV 4071 of July 25.²

Molotov gave me today a lengthy memorandum proposing the formation of a mixed German-Soviet commission for the purpose of settling German property interests in Estonia and Latvia and the date of payment, as well as of a second mixed commission for the purpose of negotiations about the resettlement of Germans from Lithuania and the determination of German property interests in Lithuania and the date of payment. The commissions should also settle Soviet counterdemands. The text of the memorandum is being sent tomorrow by courier.³

SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 251, footnote 3.

² Not found.

³ Not printed (9324/E660951-54). The German Government replied with the proposal, contained in a memorandum sent from Berlin on Aug. 16 (9324/E660962-64), that while there should be two mixed commissions, one should deal with German property interests in all these Baltic countries, the other with the resettlement of Germans from Latvia and Estonia as well as from Lithuania. Upon being informed of these proposals Molotov expressed surprise that any appreciable number of Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche still remained in Latvia and Estonia. He said he would later inform Schulenburg of the Soviet position (telegram No. 1737 of Aug. 23 from Schulenburg to the Foreign Ministry: 9324/E660980). See document No. 398.

No. 308

2361/488105-06

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

THERAPIA, August 7, 1940.

A 3961

Subject: Italy and the signing of the German-Turkish commercial agreement.

The signing of the German-Turkish commercial agreement¹ was evidently received by my Italian colleague with somewhat mixed feel-

¹ See document No. 213 and footnote 1.

ings. To be sure, Signor de Peppo had breathed an audible sigh of relief when I informed him 2 days after Italy's entry into the war that the preliminary German-Turkish agreement had been put through. For during that period of high political tension, when our Italian friends here were expecting at least a rupture in the diplomatic relations between Turkey and Italy and had already sent their women and children home, he quite correctly recognized this to be the first concrete indication that Turkey would probably continue to stay out of the war. In the meantime, however, they have fallen into the habit of regarding matters from a somewhat more sober viewpoint once more. I was therefore not surprised that the day after the signing of the agreement M. de Peppo remarked somewhat reproachfully to Herr Kroll that it might have been better to have kept the Turks in suspense a little longer. He said that precisely at this time, when they are so entirely dependent economically on the Axis Powers, one ought to make them realize very clearly the significance of the German and Italian markets for the Turkish economy. Herr Kroll and I explained to Signor de Peppo in large outline the reasons why we considered it right to sign at the present moment, in which connection it was natural that we reminded him of the political significance of the signing of the preliminary agreement at the time.

The displeasure of my Italian colleague hides, of course, the very real fear that we will succeed in winning the leading place in Turkish foreign trade as we did before the outbreak of the war, and thus render precarious Italian efforts in the same direction. It should not be forgotten, after all, that in the past, before the clearing system was introduced in German-Turkish trade, Italy had first place for many years ahead of all the other countries in Turkish imports as well as exports. The conversion of German-Turkish trade to the clearing system, together with the difficulties arising from Turkish participation in the League of Nations sanctions during the Italian-Ethiopian war, then had resulted in Italy's trade with Turkey shrinking to a minimum. In spite of persistent Italian attempts to overcome the German competition, it was only after the German-Turkish trade agreement failed to be extended last fall ² that Italy succeeded in gaining a firm foothold once more and in exploiting the suspension of deliveries of German weapons in the interest of Italy in order to squeeze us out of the Turkish trade.

In my opinion there is no reason why we should give up the economic position we have won during decades of laborious work just because we have naturally accorded our ally a privileged political position in the Mediterranean area.

PAPEN

² See vol. VIII, document No. 391.

No. 309

365/206488-89

*The Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions
With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram en clair

No. 58 of August 8

WIESBADEN, August 8, 1940—12:10 p. m.

Received August 8—12:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 70 (W Frie 197) of August 7.¹

The note on occupation costs was delivered today. There follows the final text of the note with the changes in figure 3 and in the next to the last paragraph which were arranged with Senior Counselor Dumont by telephone:²

Note for the Chairman of the French delegation to the German Armistice Commission, General Huntziger. General: By order of my Government I have the honor to inform you of the following:

1. In accordance with article 18 of the German-French Armistice Agreement of June 22, 1940, the costs of the maintenance of the German occupation troops on French soil are to be borne by the French Government. An immediate arrangement is necessary for the implementation of this provision.

2. In consideration of the impossibility of calculating the costs exactly at this time, payments on account of at least 20 million reichsmarks a day will be required until further notice. These payments on account may be made in French francs, *Reichskreditkassenscheine*,³ or other means of payment to be agreed upon. An exchange rate of 1:20 is to be used as a basis for conversion into French francs, with the right to a later change in the conversion rate reserved.

The billeting of the German occupation forces on French soil is not included in the arrangement for payments on account. The persons providing billets will be reimbursed by the French Government for their expenses, independent of the arrangement for payments on account.

3. The arrangement for payments on account applies to the period starting June 25, 1940. The installments are to be paid in each case in advance for a period of 10 days. The installments that have accumulated in the meantime are due immediately.

¹ Telegram No. 70 has not been found, but a notation on instruction W Frie 197, which communicated the text of a note on costs of occupation to be delivered to the chairman of the French delegation to the German Armistice Commission, stated that the text was being sent to Hemmen by teletype also (1001/-305959-61).

² The changes were recorded in an unsigned minute of Aug. 8 (1242/337153).

³ Notes issued by the *Reichskreditkasse*, which was established in occupied territories as a credit institution. It had head offices in Berlin and was affiliated with the Reichsbank. The *Reichskreditkassenscheine* served as occupation currency.

The payments are to be made to an account "Occupation Costs" at the Bank of France, Paris, for the free disposition of the Chief of the Military Administration in France.

4. Requisition certificates for contributions in kind, except for billeting, which were issued by the German occupation forces may, if they were made out after the entry into force of the arrangement for payments on account, likewise be given in payment of the occupation costs by the French Government. On the other hand, the requisition certificates issued by the German occupation in the period before the entry into force of the arrangement for payments on account must be redeemed by the French Government without applying them to the occupation costs.

I request that you confirm the receipt of this note, M. General, and inform me of the measures taken by the French Government for the implementation of the above arrangement.

Accept, M. General, the assurance of my highest consideration.
Signed: Hemmen. Conclusion of the note.⁴

HEMMEN

⁴ The French reply and further exchanges on this subject are in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. 1, pp. 158-174. See also document No. 378.

No. 310

1004/307223-24

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the German Armistice Commission to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

SECRET

No. 114

WIESBADEN, August 8, 1940—5:30 p. m.

Received August 8—5:45 p. m.

With reference to point one of today's telephone conversation with Secretary of Legation Grote.¹ I am quoting below strictly confidentially the text of General Stülpnagel's report to the OKW regarding his conversation with General Huntziger on the Japanese demand for the right to march through Indochina:

"On the evening of August 7, after his return from Vichy, General Huntziger gave the following information orally to General von Stülpnagel: On August 1 or 2 the Japanese Government had sent a note to the Governor General of French Indochina in which the demand was made that the French Government grant the Japanese in Tonkin all necessary facilities for waging war against China. The Japanese desired most of all to have the Haiphong-Yunnan railroad placed at their disposal for the transportation of troops to southwestern China, in order to be able to effect the encirclement of Chungking in this manner from the southwest. The Japanese demand was

¹ Recorded in a memorandum by Grote, dated Aug. 8, on news from the Armistice Commission, not printed (1004/307225).

in the form of an ultimatum but without time limit. In case of refusal, Japan reserved the right to take further measures.

On August 3 the French Government authorized the Governor-General of Indochina to reply to the Japanese that their demand was a violation of French sovereignty. The French Government had given no cause for this, since it had discontinued the practice of permitting the transit of arms to China via Tonkin as much as 8 or 9 months ago. Consequently, the French Government could in no wise comply with the Japanese demand in this respect. Any possible concessions could be made only on the basis of voluntary agreement with Japan. The sovereignty of the French colonial empire could not thereby be violated in any way.

General Huntziger stated that the French Government had informed the U. S. A. of these proceedings.² He had furthermore been instructed to request that the Reich Government inform the Japanese Embassy of the French viewpoint, since neither the French Government nor the Japanese Embassy in Vichy had any safe and dependable means of communicating with Tokyo. The French Government was of the opinion that the Reich Government must be interested, as a result of the armistice agreement, in not having any further armed conflicts break out in the French colonial empire. Such would however be unavoidable in case Japan resorted to force against French Tonkin. General Huntziger added that it would be in the general European interest to prevent any further setback in the influence of the white race in East Asia.

General von Stülpnagel did not take any stand with regard to these explanations. He promised, however, to transmit them to the Reich Government."³

HENCKE

² The French Embassy in Washington had sent to Mr. Hull an aide-mémoire dated Aug. 6 on this subject (Department of State, file No. 751 g. 94/80).

³ A copy of Stülpnagel's report was also sent to Ribbentrop from the OKW on Aug. 8 with a cover letter by Keitel saying he had informed Hitler of his intention to transmit the report to the Foreign Ministry. Keitel further informed Ribbentrop that Hitler wanted to discuss the matter with him (4443/E086229-31). To brief Ribbentrop for this discussion, Woermann sent to him on Aug. 23 a comprehensive memorandum (4443/E086223-28) on the development of the situation in Indochina.

No. 311

B14/B002154

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 1080

BERLIN, August 8, 1940.
zu W III b 4326.¹

I. The Italian Ambassador asked to see the Foreign Minister in order to be informed in connection with Funk's speech of German intentions regarding the economic reorganization of Europe.² He

¹ W III b 4326: Not found.

² See document No. 261.

mentioned that there was some uneasiness in Italy, based on reports by Italian industrialists who had visited Germany lately, as to whether Italian economic interests and especially the interests of Italian industry would be taken into account in German planning.³ The Foreign Minister explained to the Ambassador that Funk's address at the present juncture, during the Havana Conference, was aimed primarily at America. We would carry out the economic realignment of Europe cautiously and step by step, and of course only in closest cooperation with Italy. Italy had no reason at all for apprehension.

II. Ricciardi had a first conversation with Clodius⁴ in which he spoke along the same lines as the Ambassador did to the Foreign Minister. Since Giannini's presence will offer an opportunity for direct talks between the Chairmen of the Government committees, further talks with Ricciardi have been postponed for the time being.⁵

III. Please speak there as the Foreign Minister did to the Ambassador and otherwise refer to the impending conversations with Giannini⁶ in Berlin, about the course and outcome of which the Embassy will be informed.

WEIZSÄCKER

³ In a letter of Aug. 7 to German Economics Minister Funk, the Italian Minister of Foreign Trade, Raffaello Ricciardi, had referred to Funk's speech and had set forth his own ideas on the future economic development of Europe (2032/444893-900). Funk replied on Aug. 29 that he was in basic agreement with Ricciardi's ideas and hoped they would soon be able to discuss these matters in Berlin (2032/444905-06).

⁴ Clodius' memorandum of Aug. 6 on this conversation is not printed (B14/B002135-36). Adelchi Ricciardi, former Commercial Counselor in the Italian Embassy in Berlin, was Director-General of the Ministry of Trade and International Payments.

⁵ In a memorandum of Aug. 3 (2032/444809-12) Weizsäcker had recommended that Giannini be invited to Berlin, as he himself had suggested to Clodius.

⁶ Cf. document No. 361.

No. 312

19/12571-72

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

No. 877

BERLIN, August 8, 1940.
e. o. Pol. IX 1531.

According to press reports, Pershing in his radio address of August 4,¹ advocated the transfer of 50 United States destroyers to England. Sumner Welles, in a statement to the press on August 5,²

¹ See document No. 288, footnote 2.

² On Welles' statement to the press on Aug. 5, see the *New York Times*, Aug. 6, 1940, p. 6.

underlined Pershing's remarks and referred to them as worthy of the most serious consideration.

The interpretative remark of the American Under Secretary of State suggests the thought that the American Government is really intending to sell these naval vessels to England, and that it has put forward Pershing to influence public opinion and Congress in favor of the plans of the Administration.

We have, as is known, so far accepted without opposition the numerous violations of neutrality by the American Government. But if the American Government should now take serious steps to place naval vessels at the disposal of England, this would bring up the question of whether the American Government should not be officially warned against an action which is plainly contrary to the recognized principles of neutrality, as laid down in The Hague Convention on Neutrality at Sea of October 18, 1907.

But before a decision is taken here on the subject, we would like you, together with the armed forces Attachés to state your position on the whole problem, giving particular consideration to the question whether the opposition of public opinion and in legislative bodies might not be so strong that the Administration would have no prospects of carrying out its plan.

For the time being, however, you are requested to refrain from extending any feelers to American official circles.^a

WEIZSÄCKER

^a See document No. 322.

No. 313

FS/0183-0188

Memorandum by the Ambassador to Spain

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, August 8, 1940.

G. A. on Operation Gibraltar

CONDITIONS FOR SPAIN'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

According to a memorandum presented in June of this year by the Spanish Embassy, the Spanish Government declares itself ready, under certain conditions, to give up its position as a "nonbelligerent" state and to enter the war on the side of Germany and Italy.¹ The Spanish Foreign Minister, and also the Minister of the Interior, have up until the last few days repeatedly pointed out this Spanish offer to

¹ See vol. IX, document No. 488.

me, so that it may be assumed that Spain even today will keep its promise made in June.

As conditions for entry into the war, the Spanish Government cites the following:

1. Fulfillment of a number of national territorial demands: Gibraltar, French Morocco, that part of Algeria colonized and predominantly inhabited by Spaniards (Oran), and further the enlargement of Rio de Oro and of the colonies in the Gulf of Guinea;

2. Making available military and other assistance required for carrying on the war.

The memorandum of Admiral Canaris enclosed here ² gives detailed information regarding the extent of military assistance apparently necessary.

Besides this military assistance, however, economic support of Spain will also be necessary. To this belong, above all else, the delivery of gasoline and, from the beginning of next year, delivery of grain for bread. According to a recent utterance of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs (of the third of this month) Spain, due to its shortage of gasoline, can wage war without our help 1½ months at the most. As concerns the grain for bread, the Minister believes that Spain has sufficient supplies until about March of next year. I consider this latter supposition as too optimistic, unless a strict rationing is carried out.

Besides this necessary assistance, however, Spain, upon entry into the war, will be exclusively dependent on the resources of German and Italian aid with respect to a number of other commodities as well.

Advantages of the Operation.

1. The effect of the declaration of war on England by a new country will be very strong in England and on the entire world; England's prestige and her prospects for victory will receive a new severe blow, while—upon success of the operation—our prestige will be greatly increased.

2. England will no longer be able to carry on trade with Spain, thus will receive from there no more ores and above all no more pyrite.

3. Nullification of English property rights in ore and copper mines, etc.

4. A victorious execution of the operation will mean the control of the Straits.

Dangers of the Operation for Spain.

1. It would be possible that England, after becoming aware of Spain's war preparations, would beat Spain to the draw and begin war operations.

² Not found.

2. For this purpose she could attempt to extend the territory of Gibraltar in order thereby to make the attack upon Gibraltar more difficult. England could further occupy the Canary Islands, Tangier, and the Spanish colonies, operations which without doubt will take place at least in part after the outbreak of war. Spain even considers the Balearic Islands as being threatened.

3. A break between Spain and England can have consequences for Portugal. The English could occupy Lisbon and Lagos or other places in Portugal so that Spain would have a land front. In case of an occupation of Portuguese harbors Salazar, to be sure, is said to have held out to the Spaniards the prospect of military counter-measures, and to have declared himself agreed to a Spanish entry for rendering assistance against England.

4. Outbreak of the war between Spain and England can bring events to a head in North Africa, especially Morocco, where the situation is very tense. Spain distrusts the Resident General Noguès who is said to be ogling with the English. Therefore a cooperative English-French-Moroccan operation against the Spanish zone and Tangier would be possible.

5. Because of debilitation resulting from the Civil War, Spain is economically unfit to carry through to the end a war lasting more than a few months if she does not receive economic aid from German and Italian quarters. Aside from gasoline, this, as mentioned above, is especially true of grain for bread as well.

6. As a result of an intensification of the grave economic situation and eventual starvation and as a result of political and military setbacks (loss of islands, of the colonies) domestic riots could result. This danger I do not consider as very grave at first, since the Army is intact. Should the war be of longer duration, however, the situation could become serious.

Difficulties and Dangers for Us.

1. For transporting the necessary war material to Spain, only the railroad line Bordeaux-Hendaye-(border)-Irún-San Sebastián-Burgos and so forth and the road running parallel are available. Within the border area occupied by our troops there is only one other passageway over the Pyrenees, namely, at St. Jean Pied de Port. According to information from General of Infantry von Both in Biarritz, only passenger cars and light trucks can travel on this pass-road because of its narrow curves. The transporting of all war material must therefore go along the coast where for long stretches, between Bayonne and San Sebastián, the railroad and the road can be observed and fired upon from the sea. A further difficulty exists in the fact

that the Spanish railroad has a different gauge from the French so that reloadings are necessary and such equipment as railway guns cannot be transported further. Heavy artillery and some other things are therefore confined exclusively to the roads.

2. The claims upon Germany to deliver weapons and supply special troops should meet with no objections. On the other hand, should the war be of longer duration, the economic assistance requested of us could represent a great burden (especially with respect to nutrition).

If the operation is undertaken, it is in any case necessary :

1. To have the preparations go forward in as camouflaged a manner as possible, to make available in Spain supplies of gasoline and war material (ammunition, bombs) which can be unobtrusively transported by railroad and truck, and, not until the last moment, to bring the heavy guns collected in the south of France across the border by fast transit and into the prepared emplacements, while the air arm is absolutely not to make its appearance until the operation begins in earnest.

2. The moment for initiating the preparations and the operation itself must be adjusted to the expected development of things in England itself, in order to avoid a too early entry of Spain into the war, that is to say, a period of war unendurable for Spain, and thus in certain circumstances the beginning of a source of danger for us.

STOHRER

No. 314

183/86211

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 641

BERLIN, August 8, 1940.

The Swiss Minister mentioned in my office today that Germany seemed to object to the slow demobilization of the Swiss Army and spoke in this connection of a proclamation by General Guisan on Mt. Rütli.

I replied that whether the Swiss demobilized quickly or slowly was their own affair. General Guisan's address, however, which M. Frölicher mentioned, I did not consider a matter of indifference. Without going into the matter, I wanted to tell him that these remarks of Guisan's had also impressed me unfavorably and would probably still have a sequel.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 335.

No. 315

5626/E405582-86

German-Rumanian Agreement

AUGUST 8, 1940.

**GERMAN-RUMANIAN AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 8, 1940, CONCERNING THE
EXPORT OF RUMANIAN GRAIN TO GERMANY, WITH THE SUPPLE-
MENTARY PROTOCOL OF THE SAME DAY**

PROTOCOL

The German Government, represented by the Special Deputy for Economic Questions with the German Legation in Bucharest, Minister Dr. Neubacher, and the Royal Rumanian Government, represented by the Minister of Economics, Professor Leon, have agreed on the following, in the desire to secure the delivery of Rumanian grain to Germany by setting amounts and prices on a long-term and large-scale basis, and therewith to guarantee the recovery and further development of Rumanian agriculture:

ARTICLE I

The German Government is willing to take over the grain surplus of Rumania at fixed prices. The Royal Rumanian Government is willing to export the grain surplus of Rumania to Germany at fixed prices.

ARTICLE II

Amounts:

The Royal Rumanian Government promises the following specific quantities from the 1940 harvest:

1. Barley: 450,000 tons and, in case the harvest exceeds 700,000 tons, the additional amount, it being agreed that the entire export surplus shall be delivered to Germany.

2. Oats: 50,000 tons and, in case the harvest exceeds 500,000 tons, the additional amount, it being agreed that the entire export surplus shall be delivered to Germany.

3. Rye: 30,000 tons and, in case the harvest exceeds 200,000 tons, the additional amount. If the domestic consumption should be less than 200,000 tons the amount thus released shall also be exported to Germany. This amount shall be determined in the period from February 1 to February 15, 1941.

4. Corn: 500,000 tons and, in case the harvest exceeds 4,000,000 tons, 50 percent of the additional amount, but in any case at least 80 percent of the export surplus, not including the above-mentioned basic amount of 500,000 tons.

5. Wheat In case the harvest exceeds 1,900,000 tons the entire additional amount shall be delivered to Germany.

ARTICLE III

Prices:

For the deliveries from this year's harvest the following basic prices per 10,000 kg fob have been established:

- | | | |
|------------------|--|-------------|
| 1. Barley, basis | 61 kg 3 percent foreign matter | 35,000.—lei |
| 2. Oats, " " | 44 kg 5 percent " " | 37,000.—" |
| 3. Rye, " " | 68 kg 3 percent " " | 46,000.—" |
| 4. Corn, faq " | 14 percent moisture content | 43,000.—" |

To these prices there is added, in consideration of the especially high production costs now prevailing, a compensatory payment of 5,000 lei for barley and oats and 6,000 lei for rye and corn.

ARTICLE IV

Payment:

As to payment, the provisions of the German-Rumanian Clearing Agreement shall apply, in the version of the Protocol of the Government Committees of December 21, 1939,¹ with the regulation that settlement of all purchases effected after August 1, 1940, shall take place via the new special reichsmark account of the Rumanian National Bank with the German Clearing Office.

So that the payments made to German creditors from the old special reichsmark account are not reduced by this arrangement, the Royal Rumanian Finance Ministry shall make available the difference which is needed for obtaining the reichsmarks necessary for payment of the Rumanian Government obligations, if in accordance with the above agreement they are to be paid into the new account rather than the old one.

At the end of each month the German Legation shall inform the Royal Rumanian Finance Ministry as to the differences resulting from the above arrangement. The Royal Rumanian Finance Ministry shall then immediately transfer to the National Bank the lei necessary for the purchase of the reichsmarks on the new special account.

ARTICLE V

Delivery:

The deliveries shall be effected in the course of the grain year (August 1 [1940]–July 31, 1941).

The additional amounts to be established under article II shall be established by September 30, 1940, and for corn by December 15, 1940, if no other arrangement is made in article II, and shall be delivered by July 31, 1941, following the above-mentioned basic amounts. The amounts and other stipulations for wheat shall be arranged by October 31, 1940, at the latest.

¹ See vol. VIII, document No. 502, footnote 2.

The Royal Rumanian Government shall make possible the export to Germany at fixed prices of the amounts promised in article II, by not making applicable to them taxes and levies which might be imposed during the delivery period, and by not permitting an increase in the existing freight rates, tariffs and fees.

Signed at Bucharest, in duplicate, in both the German and the Rumanian languages, on August 8, 1940.

NEUBACHER

LEON

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL

The Royal Rumanian Government guarantees the opportunity to purchase the amounts of grain arranged for in today's agreement at the prices and on the conditions there set forth, providing these amounts are available at all.

The Reich Office for Grain, charged by the German Government with the task of purchasing, may begin with its purchases at once.

BUCHAREST, August 8, 1940.

NEUBACHER

LEON

No. 316

143/129088-92

*Draft Circular of the State Secretary*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, August 8, 1940.

Sent August 9—11:35 p. m.

e. o. Pol. IX 1538.

For information.

I. The most important decisions taken at the Havana Conference² are:

1. The Havana Declaration, which states that a provisional administration of European colonies in the Western Hemisphere by American nations is permissible under certain conditions.

2. The resolution relating to defense against fifth-column intrigues endangering national security.

3. The resolution relating to supervision of the political activities of foreign diplomats and consuls in host countries.

4. The resolution relating to "inter-American economic and financial cooperation." Its aim is, in view of the present situation, to establish a close and sincere cooperation in order that the American Republics

¹ To all Missions.

² See Editors' Note, p. 258.

might protect their economic and financial structure and maintain their fiscal equilibrium. In this resolution the American States declare their adherence to the liberal principles of international trade but emphasize their readiness to resume trade with the entire world. The Inter-American Financial and Economic [Advisory] Committee in Washington is to continue dealing with economic problems.

5. The resolution on the neutrality question. In this resolution the Inter-American Neutrality Committee in Rio is instructed to draw up a draft convention for the purpose of ensuring respect for the American Security Zone.

The internment of German ships was not discussed.

II. The North American Government achieved certain successes at the conference, but it did not succeed in maneuvering the Ibero-American States into an anti-German line.

The Havana Declaration has given it a legal basis for occupying endangered European colonies of the Western Hemisphere even without Pan-American consultation. Our interests are not affected thereby, because we have no aspirations for American colonies of European Powers.

With respect to the question of a fifth column, the U.S.A. was unable to win entire acceptance for its proposals, although it may score as a success the taking up of its cries of alarm by the Ibero-American States and the branding of the fifth column as a common danger.

The economic results of the conference are slight. The U.S.A. observed restraint in the prosecution of its plans of economic imperialism, since it knew the opposition that exists in the Latin States. It may be expected, however, that the United States will make every effort at the approaching negotiations in Washington to draw the Ibero-American States still further into the orbit of its economic policy.

Supplement for the Missions listed under 2: ³

Regarding the attitude of the Ibero-American States at the conference the following reports have been received:

The Argentine delegation dropped for the time being the general opposition it allegedly intended to offer to the U.S.A. plans, in order to avoid wrecking the Conference, but put through a number of important modifications and remained firm on the question of the Falkland Islands. Brazil gave Argentina moderate support without submitting proposals of her own and tried to eliminate the thrusts aimed at the European countries. Chile was interested only in economic matters. The Peruvian delegation played the part of a listener, but also put through some modifications. It was successful in its attempt to avoid a discussion of its own dispute with Ecuador. Mexico tried, in conformity with the general line of her policy, to maintain her

³ These were the Missions in Rome and Madrid and those in the Western Hemisphere.

independence with respect to the U.S.A. without thereby disturbing Pan-American cooperation. She supported the resolution against a fifth column with great alacrity. Her attempt to have the problem of European refugees discussed failed. Venezuela kept in the background, as did also Bolivia and Paraguay. Uruguay submitted a project for the extension of the Neutrality Zone, which is to be studied by the Neutrality Committee in Rio. In economic questions she kept aloof. Ecuador tried to have her dispute with Peru settled and was otherwise interested only in economic matters. Cuba strove to exert a conciliatory influence and succeeded in preventing a discussion of German merchant vessels. The speech of the Foreign Minister, however, contained unfriendly statements against the totalitarian states, allegedly owing to pressure from North America. Colombia cooperated fully with the United States, without coming into the foreground to any extent. The small Caribbean and Central American States acted merely as satellites of the U.S.A.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 317

1379/857784

*The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union and
the Legation in Lithuania*

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, August 9, 1940.
W XII 5228.

For personal information only.

The incorporation of Lithuania into the territory of the Soviet Union creates a completely new situation for the Memel Free Port Zone. The Free Port Zone represented an international obligation, made to facilitate the return by little Lithuania of her most important port to Germany. For Russia, which has expanded and has at her disposal a great number of Baltic Sea ports, it has lost its real significance; its continued existence would lead to politically dangerous Russian privileges on German territory. If Russia should demand the continuance of the Free Port Zone in Memel, the position taken here will be that the promises given in the German-Lithuanian Treaty of March 22, 1939,¹ are no longer applicable to a Lithuania which has been incorporated into the Soviet Union. The competent offices will initiate the necessary steps for terminating the present state of affairs.

The question of handling Russian traffic via the German port of Memel will especially be kept in mind.

By order:
MARTIUS

¹ See vol. v, document No. 405.

No. 318

4050/E065227-29

*The Chairman of the German Economic Delegation to the Chairman of the Swiss Economic Delegation*¹

BERLIN, August 9, 1940.

W II 5155.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I. In the negotiations on the conclusion of the German-Swiss Clearing Agreement of today's date the German Government stated that, for the purpose of preventing countries other than Italy from being supplied with strategic goods, it will take steps within its own jurisdiction to the effect that the goods listed in annex 1² may be transported through Germany and exported across the Swiss-French border—whether France or a third country is the destination—only if the shipments are accompanied by a permit which is issued by an authority to be designated by the German Government. The right to amend annex 1 is reserved. The German Government will request the Italian Government to issue corresponding orders for transit through Italy.

As soon as the French transit prohibitions have been issued and thereby the goods listed in annex 1 have come under these transit prohibitions also in France, it is the intention to stop issuing permits for transit through France.

II. On this occasion agreement was achieved on the following points:

1. The goods listed in annex 2³ can be exported without restriction from Switzerland to all countries. The right to amend this annex is reserved.

2. Subject to special agreement, Switzerland will limit the export of such goods as are listed neither in annex 1 nor in annex 2 to all countries with the exception of Germany and Italy, up to the end of 1940, to such amounts as correspond to the biannual export in 1938 or, if the export in 1937 was higher, to the biannual export in 1937. The same limit applies to exports in the first 6 months of 1941.

The German purchase possibilities are not to be impaired by this export to third countries.

3. Up to the time when the necessary arrangements for issuing the permits and for the control of the German, Italian, and French borders have been made, Switzerland will not issue export licenses for the goods listed in annex 1, in so far as these are not destined for Ger-

¹ This letter addressed to Director Hotz of the Swiss delegation is part of a series of documents on the conclusion of the German-Swiss Clearing Agreement of Aug. 9, 1940 (4050/E065220-391). These consist of texts of the Clearing Agreement proper with annexed lists and exchanges of letters and of subsidiary agreements with their annexes on payments, transfers, tourist traffic, etc.

² Not printed (4050/E065230-31).

³ Not printed (4050/E065232).

many or Italy. The same applies to the export of war material across the Italian and French borders, in so far as the destination of the war material is not Italy.

Accept, Mr. Chairman, the assurance of my highest consideration.⁴

SEYBOTH

⁴ A similarly worded letter to Seyboth from the chairman of the Swiss Economic delegation, also dated Aug. 9, is in the files (4050/E065233, E065226).

No. 319

216/147570-71

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 649

BERLIN, August 9, 1940.

The Chinese Ambassador came to see me today to discuss Indochina. Reading from the instructions of his Government, he said the following:

Japan is demanding the passage of troops through Indochina in order to attack China. France is preparing to oppose this, but is afraid of Germany's opposition. The provisions of the armistice between Germany and France not only do not prevent France from opposing attacks of third states against her colonies, but it was explicitly agreed that France should retain part of her Navy to protect her colonies.¹ Japan wants not only to utilize the favorable opportunity in order to occupy Indochina, but wants to attack China by way of Indochina. This undertaking is surely contradictory to the desires of Germany. If Japan should reach its goal of dominating China and the South Seas Germany will no longer have the opportunity to take part in the trade markets of the Far East. Economic cooperation between China and Germany would likewise be prevented. China hopes therefore that Germany will use its influence to deter Japan from its course of action and thus strengthen France's will to resist.

The Ambassador added that he had news to the effect that 18 Japanese warships were en route from Formosa in the direction of Indochina. According to his knowledge there are already about 20 Japanese active as control officers in Indochina. This control not only extends to war material but also to the prevention of the transit of other goods which could not be considered war material. I answered the Ambassador, who wanted to learn the facts of the case and the German view, as follows:

I also have heard about the Japanese plans. The Japanese Embassy here has, however, not yet informed the Foreign Ministry about the matter. (I did not make any mention of the telegraphic report

¹ For the text of the Armistice Treaty, signed on June 22, 1940, see vol. ix, document No. 523.

of Ambassador Ott about the matter,² nor of today's message from Herr Hencke in Wiesbaden³). The German Government has therefore not as yet concerned itself with this affair. Without anticipating what the Foreign Minister might say on the subject, I would like to point out to the Ambassador the fact that we had no diplomatic relations whatever with the French Government; our relationship with France is based rather on the armistice convention. In this convention the pertinent article is article 10 which states that France must not take a hostile attitude toward the German Reich. The article does not say anything about the relationship of the French Government to third states. In reality, therefore, the influence of the German Government on French policy is much less than the Ambassador seems to suppose. In this matter the Chinese Government must therefore turn first of all, in my opinion, to Vichy.

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 273.

³ Cf. document No. 310 and footnote 1.

No. 320

2032/444825-26;
2032/444828-29

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 23

BERLIN, August 9, 1940.

W. H. A. 769.

MEETING OF THE COMMERCIAL POLICY COMMITTEE, AUGUST 9, 1940¹

I. Switzerland.

The questions still remaining open in the negotiations now completed with Switzerland² are to be discussed in Bern after the middle of August. The whole German Government Committee need not be there, but only those members in charge of the particular questions.

II. Slovakia.

Herr Wiehl communicates the Führer's decision that treatment of the question of economic federation with Slovakia be postponed until later.³

III. Italy.

Herr Clodius reports on the various items of the enclosed agenda⁴ of the Government Committee negotiations with Italy beginning August 12 in Berlin.⁵

¹ Present were representatives of the Foreign Ministry, of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, the OKW, the Reichsbank, and the Ministries of Economics, Food, and Finance.

² See document No. 318.

³ See document No. 246.

⁴ Not printed (2032/444827).

⁵ These negotiations led to the signing of the sixth Secret Protocol (document No. 361). Records of other matters discussed in the course of the negotiations are filmed on serial 2074.

The Commercial Policy Committee is of the opinion that another vigorous attempt must be made to induce the Italian Government to continue the Czechoslovakian and to reinstate the French treaty rates of customs duties for the importation of German merchandise into Italy.

In a full discussion of the question of control over French foreign-exchange practices, French exports, and the French frontiers themselves, there is general agreement that we ought to strive to keep control in German hands as far as possible, but that no request should be made to the Italian Government for the Franco-Italian frontier also to be staffed with German officials.

The Ministries concerned, and the Minister of Economics in particular, are agreed that the questions of Europe's economic reorganization should also be discussed with Signor Giannini. Minister Funk has also agreed to receive Signor Giannini personally.

IV. Economic Reorganization of Europe.

There is agreement on the desirability of action to limit where possible public discussions about German plans for the economic reorganization of Europe. The Society for European Economic Planning and the Greater Economic Sphere, which was founded by Minister Daitz,⁶ is again to be directed to restrict itself to scientific research and to refrain from any public propaganda as well as from making contacts abroad.

V. Greece.

Herr Moraht reports on the latest intelligence regarding Greek deliveries of military equipment for England. It is agreed that the Greek Government is to be told in vigorous terms that these deliveries must cease at once and that we would not deem it proper to let the government committee negotiations with Greece, contemplated for late August in Berlin, take place unless the Greek Government immediately complied with our wishes. It is further agreed that if required such economic pressure as we can exert should be brought to bear on Greece, with the details to be decided on in due course.⁷

VI. Luxembourg.

Herr Wucher⁸ informs the meeting that the incorporation of Luxembourg into the German customs area is to take place within the next few days.⁹

⁶ The Gesellschaft für europäische Wirtschaftsplanung und Grossraumwirtschaft e. v., headed by Werner Daitz, was founded at the beginning of the war. In the files there are two memoranda by Daitz of May 28 and May 31, dealing with the economic integration of the occupied territories and proposing the establishment of a Reich Commissariat for the Greater European economic sphere, together with a printed prospectus of the society (1263/339398-412).

⁷ See document No. 375.

⁸ Ministry of Finance.

⁹ This occurred on Aug. 15.

VII. Servicing of the Tribute Loans.

The Reichsbank management will submit this question to the Commercial Policy Committee in good time before the next payments are due.

WIEHL

No. 321

174/186401

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 806 of August 10

Tokyo, August 10, 1940—2:00 a. m.

Received August 10—1:30 p. m.

The British Embassy informed the Japanese Government that it was withdrawing all British troops from Peiping, Tientsin, and Shanghai in order to utilize them elsewhere. In so doing the British Government reserved for itself all the rights to which it was entitled by virtue of the Peking Protocol of 1901.¹

Official circles and the press endeavor to explain the English step which has roused great excitement here as a measure long overdue, taken only now under the pressure of the European situation as a cheap gesture of friendship to Japan. England is thereby seeking to relieve the tension in the Far East at the last minute and if possible to prevent further rapprochement between Japan and the Axis Powers. The newspapers unanimously emphasize the fact that any real improvement in Japanese-English relations would have to be preceded by a complete reversal of English policy in East Asia. The withdrawal of the troops is also variously commented upon as a sign of the great military weakness of England, who could not dispense even with such meager armed forces in the defense of her world empire. Several newspapers link this English concession to the most recent arrests of Englishmen² and the wave of anti-British sentiment in Japan and call it the first victory of the new Foreign Minister. With all due allowance, the press welcomes the English decision as evidence of further progress in driving British influence out of East Asia.

OTT

¹ For text, see *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901, Appendix (Affairs in China)* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 306.

² See document No. 273, footnote 5.

No. 322

35/22658/5-22661

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1940—4:15 p. m.

No. 1685 of August 10

Received August 11—3:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 877 of August 8,¹ received after a delay because of serious garbling.

In concurrence with the armed forces Attachés.

1. The radio address of the aged Pershing, who spoke merely as a tool of President Roosevelt and those close to him, particularly the Jewish pro-British circles, springs from the urgent desire of inducing England to stay in the war. The address and its underlining by Under Secretary of State Welles has the same object as the recent much heralded announcement by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau that the United States would send to England 3,000 aircraft a month—namely, the object of strengthening England's will to fight by promises of abundant arms deliveries. It should be borne in mind in this connection that the British Ambassador here recently stated that of all the things needed by England, destroyers were the most important.

2. The limited possibilities for implementing such declarations made for political purposes are evidenced by the fact that Roosevelt has not been able even to keep his past promises to the Allies, and by the fact that war material has not been shipped in any greater quantities than those specified in detail in the telegraphic reports of the Military Attaché.

3. The sale of destroyers to England, even according to American official opinion, would require a legislative act of Congress. Such a sale is blocked by sections 3 and 6 of the Act of June 15, 1917,² which absolutely and unequivocally prohibits the sale of naval vessels, and also by section 14 of the Act of June 28, 1940,³ which requires for any sale of naval vessels the certification by the Chief of Naval Operations that the destroyers are not needed for defense of the country. This Act, passed only a few weeks ago, expressly retains the rigorous prohibitory provisions of the Act of June 15, 1917, from which it may be inferred that Congress is at present in no mood for amending

¹ Document No. 312.

² 40 Stat. 217, 222.

³ 54 Stat. 676.

the Act of 1917 and for transferring destroyers to England. That Government circles are beginning to realize this is indicated by the statement of Secretary of the Navy Knox who, when asked about his position on the sale of destroyers to England at a press conference on August 7, said briefly that this was entirely up to Congress and was not a matter for the Secretary of Navy to decide.

4. Any sale would also be obstructed by the statement of the American naval command that the present destroyer force was inadequate for the defense of the country, as also by the request of Chief of Naval Operations Stark for 81 additional destroyers to meet immediate requirements. In a recent widely noted article of the well-known Major Eliot, which was also inserted in the *Congressional Record*, the author concludes on the basis of a factual analysis of the current American needs for naval vessels that at the utmost all old destroyers would be dispensable, and this moreover only if the procurements within the fleet which are actually necessary should not be forthcoming [sic].⁴ Given this attitude of the American Navy, any request of President Roosevelt for legislative approval of the sale is apt to encounter serious difficulties in Congress.

5. The American Government has therefore announced just today in a formal statement given to the press by Senator Mead that it did not at this time contemplate the sale or transfer of naval vessels to England or any other power.

6. Regarding the question of a countermove on our part at the present time, I would suggest in agreement with the armed forces Attachés consideration of the fact that we undertook nothing against the announced and completed delivery to England of hundreds of field artillery pieces and over half a million infantry rifles from American Army stocks, and that we also did not make the delivery of combat aircraft from Army and Navy stocks the subject of a warning or protest. If Germany were to deliver a warning against the sale of destroyers which has been endorsed by Pershing and indirectly also by Welles, it would have to be expected that the President and also the influential Jewish hatemongering clique would take advantage of that warning and by distorting the German viewpoint and launching an unbridled press campaign whip up Congress, in which case they might succeed in obtaining from Congress legislative approval for the sale of destroyers to England.

THOMSEN

⁴ A notation by the telegraph section indicates that the foregoing sentence of this message was garbled.

No. 323

172/135380

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, August 10, 1940—7:00 p. m.

No. 1341 of August 10

Received August 10—10:20 p. m.

Foreign Minister Manoilescu, to whom it is now clear that nothing can be changed in the Führer's attitude with regard to Silistria and Balcic,¹ today instructed the Rumanian Minister in Sofia to invite the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov to meet on a Danube steamer between Giurgiu and Ruse for a preliminary discussion of the Craiova conference.² He is hoping that they will be able to meet Sunday or Monday.

FABRICIUS

¹ In telegram No. 1308, sent on Aug. 7, Fabricius had reported that Manollescu was planning to send a personal letter to the Foreign Minister as a last effort in the defense of the Rumanian viewpoint (172/135345).

² See document No. 347.

No. 324

449/222754-58

The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Greece

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, August 10, 1940.

IMMEDIATE

zu W 3797 g.¹

URGENT

No. 375

With reference to your telegram No. 358.²

1. At the outbreak of the war, it will be recalled, we took the position that, except when the conduct of naval operations was affected, neutral countries might continue their trade with our enemies on the prewar scale, provided that this would not interfere with a satisfactory development of trade with Germany.³ Excluded, however, were deliveries of war material; we took it for granted that European

¹ W 3797 g.: Not found.

² Not printed (9921/E694648). This telegram, dated Aug. 6, reported that the Greek Bodosakis plant had recently delivered a quantity of ammunition for the use of infantry, allegedly with German permission, to Turkey. Whether this shipment had then been sent on to Great Britain was not known; but it was known that the British had closed a deal on Aug. 3 for a consignment of heavy ammunition from the Bodosakis plant.

³ See vol. VII, documents Nos. 402, 545, 552, and 568, and vol. VIII, documents Nos. 17, 18, 20, 42, 66, 83, and 136.

countries which had close economic ties with us would abstain from exporting any war material to the powers at war with us, or from making any deliveries at all which would directly benefit the hostile military forces, particularly if, as in the case of Greece, they were receiving war material from us. The fact that Greece has not drawn this—as I said—obvious conclusion from her political and economic relations with Germany has been resented here all the more because Greece on her part, by facilitating the English nuisance purchases of chromium ore, has even injured Germany in a commodity area that benefits the prosecution of the war only indirectly.

2. Moreover, through Italy's entrance into the war, the defeat of France, and England's effort to blockade the whole of Europe, there has come about a fundamental alteration of the situation.⁴ We have accordingly already demanded and obtained the declaration from other southeastern countries that they will cease the direct and indirect export of raw materials and agricultural products to the countries at war with Germany, and also stop supplying such industrial products as might strengthen the military or economic potential of the enemy countries.⁵ Owing to the exposed situation of Greece we have so far refrained from demanding such a declaration of her, but we shall be compelled to abandon such restraint in the face of Greek deliveries of war material to enemy countries.

3. You are requested to call upon the Minister President immediately and with greatest seriousness and emphasis demand that in the first place the delivery of war material of any description be stopped at once, after which you are to leave a pro memoria outlining the evidence of ammunition deliveries to England ascertained by you, and containing a verbatim reproduction of the statements under 1 and 2 above.⁶ Assurance must be obtained in particular that all 20 mm. and 37 mm. ammunition manufactured with machine tools supplied by Rheinmetall-Borsig will remain in Greece. If the Military Attaché deems such an arrangement practicable, please demand the admission of a German control organization, which would be designated by Herr v. Clemm,⁷ to keep a watch over it. Please also emphasize particularly that the favoritism is obviously being shown

⁴ See vol. ix, document No. 435.

⁵ See vol. ix, document No. 442, for German demands on Yugoslavia. Documents of a similar nature with respect to Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria have not been found.

⁶ In telegram No. 374 of Aug. 12 (9924/E694666) Erbach reported that he had that day seen Minister President Metaxas and had left with him a pro memoria, as instructed. "Metaxas promised to do everything to hinder the export from Greece of munitions destined for England. Metaxas stated that to the best of his knowledge no actual shipment of munitions for England had yet occurred." A fuller account of the conversation, as well as the text of the pro memoria, was sent by Erbach as report W J 3 Nr. 9 of Aug. 13 (9924/E694669-74).

⁷ Maj. Clemm von Hohenberg, German Military Attaché.

to the English with the knowledge of Government authorities, since the operation of the Bodosakis plant is under supervision of the Greek Government. The business relations of German firms with Bodosakis will be stopped at once for the duration of the war. As long as Greece fails to comply with our demand we hold that negotiations between the Government Committees would be out of place. The consequence would be, as I am adding for your information only, that beginning September 1 imports from Greece would for the time being be held to the amounts laid down in the annex to article 4 of the Commodity Agreement of September 24, 1937.⁸ But we shall, of course, reserve to ourselves all further steps.

4. That Germany agreed to the delivery of small-caliber ammunition to Turkey is a complete fabrication. Whether the Turks have passed it on to England will be investigated by the Embassy in Ankara; but that is immaterial in the last analysis because the Turks are adhering to their alliance with England, and any strengthening of their armament would consequently be of indirect benefit also to the English. However that may be, the central issue of our complaint is the delivery of heavy ammunition to the English themselves.⁹

CLODIUS

⁸ *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1937, p. 567.

⁹ See document No. 375.

No. 325

B19/B003695

Memorandum by the State Secretary

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 10, 1940.

St.S. No. 650

By order of Field Marshal Keitel, Captain (Navy) Bürkner just paid me a visit in order to point out the danger of a new Russo-Finnish war. He said the reports on Russian troop movements indicate such a danger. The OKW would regret a disturbance of the peace in the north and of the regular deliveries of raw materials from Finland to Germany. Field Marshal Keitel therefore suggests that a word of restraint be spoken in Moscow, with stress laid on our economic interests in Finland.

I promised to pass on Herr Keitel's wish to the Foreign Minister. I gave as my personal opinion that one could hardly do more—assuming one can do anything at all—than have Count Schulenburg at a convenient opportunity put the question as to whether anything new was developing against Finland.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 326

F6/0092-0096

Note of the High Command of the Army

TOP SECRET MILITARY

August 10, 1940.

Gen St d H. Abt. Fremde Heere West/IVNr. 606/40 g. Kdos.THE SPANISH ARMY AT PRESENT ¹1) *Strength of Spanish Army:*

At the end of the Spanish Civil War approximately 1.2 million men (about 100 divisions) were under arms on the Nationalist and Red sides.*

Since the end of the Spanish Civil War the Army is gradually being realigned as a peacetime army.

Present strength	340,000 men
Eventual peacetime strength	290,000 men
Potential wartime strength	500,000 men

Military service is compulsory. The term of service has not yet been fixed.

2) *Organization of the Spanish Army:*

The Spanish Army consists of 27 divisions, including 9 mountain divisions, 1 motorized division, and 1 cavalry division. They are supplemented by troops of the caliphate (under the Caliph, but available to Spain) 20,000 (Moroccans) strong.

Twenty divisions are stationed in the Peninsula, 5 in Morocco, and forces amounting to 1 division each are in the Balearic and the Canary Islands.

The infantry divisions are now 9,000 strong; the wartime strength is 12,000 men.

The divisions are allocated to 10 military districts (see enclosure ²). District commanders have the prerogatives of a general officer commanding.

3) The officer corps is markedly superannuated in the higher ranks. It includes few regular officers, mostly reserve officers retained in service. The officer situation is poor. Owing to the losses of the Civil War a great many of the scheduled positions are unfilled. Only the

¹ Marginal note: "Foreign Ministry: I believe that this presentation will be of interest to the Foreign Minister. C[anaris], Aug. 13."

* Footnote in the original: "Spain has at present about 22 million inhabitants."

² Not found.

posts of colonels and lieutenant colonels are filled according to the budget. There is a shortage of

majors, 50 percent of budgeted positions
captains, 90 percent of budgeted positions
first and second lieutenants, almost 100 percent
of budgeted positions.

Platoons are commanded practically throughout by reserve officers. They are released only after completing the 18-month training courses for officers on active duty. About 4,000 officers are now attending these courses. In case of war they would immediately rejoin their units and even today they are capable, well-disciplined, and dedicated officers. For the creation of an officer corps numerically sufficient for all grades and services (regular engineer officers, e. g., were almost completely wiped out at the beginning of the Civil War) Spain needs, in the opinion of General Martínez Campos, Chief of the Spanish General Staff, 8 years.

4) *Armament and Equipment:*

Infantry arms and pieces of equipment are available in sufficient quantities. This material is fit for war use.

With respect to artillery there are great deficiencies in guns, laying gear, and spare parts. Available guns are mostly worn out. At present it might not be possible to equip a wartime army with sufficient artillery.

Armor:

There are about 200, mostly light, tanks still fit for war use. Spare parts are lacking. The relatively numerous antitank armament is in good condition and fit for war use.

The ammunition situation is bad. Spain may at present have ammunition for only a few days. Capacity of arms and ammunition factories is small, only slowly starting up and as yet far below wartime requirements.

5) *Fortifications:*

So far little work has been done to complete the planned fortifications.

On the Pyrenees frontier there are in the west several groups of field fortifications capable of being defended, in the central sector there are few fortifications of slight defensive capacity and in the eastern sector there are no fortifications as yet.

On the frontier with Portugal there are no fortifications at all.

Installations built around Gibraltar are of little value and essentially represent a waste of material.

Coastal fortifications existing from earlier times seem to have not yet been modernized and to have sufficient defensive power only in part.

Only in Morocco have proper field fortifications been built on the frontiers. Since the troops stationed there are too weak, however, construction work has been suspended.

6) *Estimate of the Spanish Army:*

The soldier, depending on the region from which he comes, is generally willing, obedient, tough, and courageous. He is sometimes likely to be affected by panic and tends to be somewhat indifferent regarding his profession and fate. Too much individualism often leads to lack of discipline.

The officer has the same fighting and moral qualities as the soldier. The officer, especially if older, often lacks enterprise, tenacity, and sufficient interest in his profession. The young officer promises to become a better one, since the recent war experience and the German example furnished in the Civil War are deeper rooted and more alive in him.

The command is usually sluggish and doctrinaire. The lessons of colonial wars are often applied to European conditions in an exaggerated fashion. Under the conditions of the Iberian Peninsula and the colonies, its performance is adequate. It will be the task of peacetime training to educate according to new points of view a sufficient number of commanders who are able to fulfill the requirements of modern *European* war. A certain haughtiness and vanity that often dims the sense of reality will exert a retarding influence on such education.

Since in creating a corps of leaders one must resort chiefly to the younger generation it might take years to make perceptible progress.

Summing it up, it can be said that the Spanish Army has still a certain amount of war experience and is fit for limited employment in war. Many of the existing deficiencies, especially in command and armament, are compensated for by the fighting spirit of officers and men. The army will be fully able to meet the task of defending its homeland and external possessions. Yet because of the deficiencies in armament and ammunition and because of the small capacity of her armament industry, as well as because of many internal difficulties of the country now under reconstruction, Spain can *without foreign help wage a war of only very short duration.*

7) *Spain's present military attitude:*

Although in many groups and especially in the leadership pro-German sentiments prevail and there is a will for a complete break with England and to extend Spanish rule (Gibraltar, North Africa), a feeling of internal weakness and of present military impotence still predominates.

Hence "nonbelligerent" Spain's entry into the war can be expected only if German-Italian successes should permit the expectation of a

quick, certain, and riskless attainment of Spanish aims. Internal and external dependence, particularly the former, forces Spain to a reserved attitude.

It could be regarded as certain, however, that if her own or Portuguese territory, or her vital interests, were violated, Spain would defend her Iberian, North African, and Mediterranean interests.

By order:
MAYER-RINK [?]

No. 327

85/22668-70

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1695 of August 11 WASHINGTON, August 11, 1940—8: 14 p. m.
Received August 12—7: 35 a. m.

With reference to my telegrams No. 1577 of July 30, paragraph 2,¹ and No. 1656 of August 6.²

The shift in America's foreign policy, which since the announcement of the new Japanese Greater East Asia policy has shown considerable stiffening toward Japan and a conciliatory attitude toward Russia, is highlighted by several developments in the past few days:

1. The Soviet Government, as I have learned from talks with the Russian Ambassador, has through its Ambassador here and through the American Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow emphatically protested against the American export embargo, especially on machine tools, on the ground that this would reflect adversely on the negotiations for the renewal of the Russo-American trade agreement. The exchange of notes renewing the trade agreement for another year, published on August 6,³ would indicate, however, that in accord with English foreign policy and probably under the direct influence of England, the American Government is receding from its former rather inflexible attitude. The new trade agreement shows by its recognition of the Russian reservation⁴ (cf. telegraphic report No. 1656 of August 6) a quite remarkable consideration for Russian interests. Actually, Russia's intent professed in the agreement, to purchase goods in the amount of not less than 40 million dollars from America within the next 12 months, carries no binding force whatever, while America's

¹ Not printed (57/38801-03); paragraph 2 referred to the chartering of an American tanker to a Soviet company for transport of oil from California to Vladivostok.

² Not printed (9918/E694605). This telegram noted the renewal of the United States-Soviet trade agreement for one year and the exchange of notes between the two Governments.

³ For the texts see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. III, p. 105.

⁴ The Soviet reservation referred to possible Soviet inability to fulfill the terms of the agreement due to American export restrictions.

extension of most-favored-nation treatment to Russia is of a binding character. This is clear evidence that the American side was anxious for the negotiations not to fail on any account and that additional negotiations with a view to satisfying the Soviet wishes for the delivery of machine tools are being contemplated on the basis of the newly established *modus vivendi*.

The statement of Acting Secretary of State Welles on the new Russo-American trade agreement, made public in a special State Department press release,⁵ in which Welles expresses the "profound satisfaction" of the American Government over the renewal of the agreement, admits no doubt as to the new trend of America's foreign policy.

2. I reported previously in connection with the negotiations leading to the renewal of the trade agreement that the Federal Maritime Commission had approved the charter of an American tanker to a Russian agency while at the same time denying charter of four American tankers and two cargo vessels to Japan. In connection with the development outlined above it is particularly interesting to note that the Maritime Commission, in a session on August 8, approved the charter of two American tankers to the Soviet Government to carry engine gasoline from California to Vladivostok, while at the same time declining the application for charter to Japanese parties of a cargo vessel for the shipment of needed steel and of a tanker for the shipment of fuel and diesel oil to Japan.

3. Welles and the Soviet Ambassador had two unusually long talks within the past week. As Welles told the press on August 8, the talks dealt in detail with the problems of American-Russian relations and were, as he added, conducted on both sides in a friendly and constructive spirit with a view to settling all outstanding differences in the most equitable manner possible.

This development is the more noteworthy as American-Russian relations had so deteriorated since the German-Russian rapprochement that 2 weeks ago in connection with Welles' statement on the incorporation of the Baltic States in Russia,⁶ the *New York Times* saw fit to make the following statement: "Through the recall under protest of the American Ministers to the Baltic States, American-Russian relations have struck such a low point as has not been registered since 1933."⁷ Not only did Welles, who spoke on behalf of the President, in dealing with the incorporation, draw up a sharp indictment against Soviet Russia's action but Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau also froze the assets of the Baltic countries in the United States making them unavailable to Soviet Russia. In addition to that, the "moral embargo" on strategic materials had been explicitly applied to Soviet Russia since December last year.

It remains to be seen whether this erratic turn in American foreign policy will be lasting.

THOMSEN

⁵ Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. III, p. 105.

⁶ For the text of Welles' statement of July 23, see *ibid.*, p. 48.

⁷ The passage appearing in quotations in Thomsen's telegram is a condensation of several sentences in a news story by Bertram D. Hulen, which appeared in the *New York Times*, July 24, 1940, p. 1.

No. 328

407/214756

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 12, 1940—2:33 p. m.

No. 1628 of August 12

Received August 12—5:00 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1284 of July 25 (Pers. H 11163).¹

Foreign Commissar Molotov communicated the following by a note of August 11:

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have by decision of the Supreme Soviet been incorporated in the territory of the Soviet Union and therewith have become a part of the Soviet Union. The direct diplomatic relations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are terminated. The Soviet Union accordingly expects that the German Legations in Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn will be liquidated on or before August 25. Consulates must likewise be liquidated on or before September 1. A portion of the staff of the German Legation in Kaunas may exercise consular functions during the resettlement. The Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Diplomatic and Consular Missions will cease their activities and transfer their functions, archives, and property to the proper Soviet Mission.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Not found.

No. 329

F8/0189

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, August 12, 1940.

SECRET

e. o. Pol. III 2345 g.

[No. 1287]¹

For the Chargé d'Affaires personally.

The Foreign Minister requests you to find out the following, if possible promptly, but without attracting attention, perhaps during an interview on other matters, from the Minister of Trade or some other competent office:

(1) In case of a complete British blockade, and if the circulation of private cars were resolutely curtailed (as now in Germany), how

¹ The number is taken from the reply, document No. 355.

much gasoline would be absolutely required by Spain monthly (including essential bus routes, truck traffic essential for the food supply of cities, etc., civil aviation and normal military requirements)?

(2) How much additional grain must Spain absolutely import if grain is [one word illegible] rationed until the next crop?

(3) What and how many other vital goods does Spain need from abroad?

It would also be interesting to learn Spain's normal monthly gasoline consumption, that is, during the last few months before the price increase.

STOHRER
HAIDLEN

No. 330

B19/B003699

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, August 12, 1940.

St.S. No. 653

Field Marshal Keitel spoke to me today on the telephone about an old arms transaction now in progress (between the Danish firm Madsen and the Finnish Government);¹ last week the Führer gave his consent to its being carried out, at the same time remarking that he intended to speak about it to the Foreign Minister in the same sense. Concerning the further steps to be taken I have informed Herr Clodius.

Field Marshal Keitel also said that yesterday the Führer had called his attention to the Finnish problem again in the same sense. Herr Keitel explained this remark to me to the effect that the Führer seemed to be considering indirect and inconspicuous encouragement and support of the Finns (e. g., through Sweden).²

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The transaction involved delivery of machine guns (4416/E083874).

² The Halder Diary contains the following entry at Aug. 12: "Kinzel: Question by the Führer concerning Finland's military strength. Russian readiness for operations against Finland is said to be set for Aug. 15."

In a memorandum of Aug. 14, concerning a conference with Göring on that day (introduced at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals as document No. 1456-PS, but not included in the published collection), General Thomas of OKW recorded:

"With Herr Veltjens present, deliveries to Finland were discussed. The Reich Marshal explained that the Führer wished speedy and extensive deliveries to Finland, since he did not want to give the Finns over to the Russians. Veltjens was instructed to inform Mannerheim and, after clarification of the situation, to communicate the wishes of the Finns to the Armaments Office. Transportation would be mainly on the ships carrying Swedish ore. Veltjens was also to request from Mannerheim that we be permitted to transport flak units through Finland on the highway from Petsamo to Kirkenes. At the desire of the Führer there should be made available to the Finns as a first priority antitank mines in large quantity for antitank defense."

No. 331

F2/0463-0466

The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the German Armistice Commission and the High Command of the Army

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, August 12, 1940.

No. 00 611/40 g.Kdos.WFA/L(III)

Pol. I 934 g. Ra.

Subject: The demarcation line in France.

The Führer has given his consent to the following principles for the future treatment of the demarcation line and the measures resulting from it:

1. The treatment of the demarcation line between the occupied and unoccupied parts of France must correspond to the requirements of Germany's conduct of the war. The security of military operations takes first place. For this purpose the leakage of information, which might injure the German war effort, from the occupied area to enemy and neutral countries must be prevented above all.

At the same time the flow of assets and goods of strategic importance from the occupied to the unoccupied area and to foreign countries should be prevented (article 17 of the Armistice Agreement).

The French administrative and economic interests must be subordinated to these requirements.

2. Accordingly, any relaxation in the blockade along the line of demarcation can be permitted only if the French Government undertakes in return to carry out additional German demands going beyond the Armistice Agreement.

Primarily the following may be considered as demands of this kind:

a. supervision of every kind of traffic of persons, goods, and communications along the outer borders of France (Franco-Spanish border, the Mediterranean harbors, and Franco-Swiss border);

b. exertion of German influence on the administration and economy of the unoccupied area and the colonies.

The results of these demands can be so important, if properly developed, that they will in the long run permit a greater relaxation in the blockade at the line of demarcation for commercial traffic. For passenger traffic and communications the limits of a possible relaxation are more restricted, since in these the military security purpose of the occupation is observed to a greater extent.

3. In particular the following principles obtain for the implementation of the supervision:

a. Passenger traffic: In spite of strict supervision of passenger traffic along the outer borders of France, passenger control at the line of demarcation cannot be dispensed with for military and intelli-

gence reasons. Since, however, supervision at the line of demarcation between the Swiss border and the Loire is difficult, the control of persons can be carried out along the line extending from the Loire estuary to Nantes to Bléré and from there to the Swiss border either along the demarcation line or along river courses parallel to it. The requirement of a military pass for crossing this control line should be instituted.

In the occupied area south of the Loire the corresponding supervision of the demarcation line can be limited to the crossing points, and the supervision of passenger traffic can be withdrawn to sectors that can be kept under surveillance. The military occupation centers, especially the coastal bases, are to be secured by the introduction of local restricted areas.

b. Traffic in foreign exchange and goods: The supervision of payments can in principle be shifted to the outer borders of France. The line of demarcation can therewith be given up as a borderline for payments.

For traffic in goods some alleviation can be permitted if the outer borders are closed off. However, supervision along the line of demarcation in the sense of the requirement in article 17 of the Armistice Agreement cannot be dispensed with.

c. Communications: Communications (by telephone, teletype and telegraph) are likewise to be supervised at the outer borders of France. For this it must be required that communications from the unoccupied area to Spain and Switzerland be routed via the occupied area. Direct connections from the unoccupied area to Spain and Switzerland should be suspended. Communications via the sea cables running through the Mediterranean are to be supervised in Marseilles.

When this supervision at the outer borders is ensured, control of communications across the line of demarcation can be relaxed.

d. Postal communications: Mail from the unoccupied area to foreign countries is to be routed via German or Italian postal inspection points. For mail to Spain and Switzerland these inspection points are to be located in the occupied area (perhaps Bordeaux and Bézançon). Mail for foreign countries via the Mediterranean will be routed by way of a postal inspection point in Marseilles.

Depending on how this supervision functions, postal communication between the occupied and unoccupied areas can be freed.

4. It must be a basic principle for the supervision at the outer borders of France that it also extends to traffic of all kinds between metropolitan France and the French overseas possessions, especially North Africa. Traffic to Corsica is to be included in the supervision to the extent that there is a possibility that information will be sent on from there.

5. German and Italian control authorities are to be set up for implementing the supervision along the outer borders of unoccupied France. Details of the arrangements for delimiting the control areas are to be arrived at by the German Armistice Commission and the Italian Armistice Commission.

6. In the German control areas along the outer borders, it will be necessary to employ personnel of the customs, counterintelligence, and

ensorship services. Details will be regulated by the Armistice Commission in cooperation with the High Command of the Army and the highest Reich authorities concerned. In so far as the outer French borders are located in the occupied area, the employment of the supervisory organs is the function of the High Command of the Army.

The implementation of the military control of persons at the control line (line of demarcation) in accordance with figure 4a [2a] is the function of the High Command of the Army.

7. The Armistice Commission is to conduct the negotiations with the French Delegation with regard to the institution of supervision at the outer borders of the unoccupied area in accordance with the above principles. In so far as payments and commercial traffic are affected, the Special Commission on Economic Questions will conduct the negotiations.

The prohibition on traffic at the line of demarcation will be maintained until the German and Italian supervision at the outer borders is functioning satisfactorily. The High Command of the Army in agreement with the Armistice Commission will regulate the gradual relaxation of the prohibition in the course of the negotiations.

*The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht*
KEITEL

No. 332

104/112386

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, August 13, 1940—12:25 a. m.

SECRET

Received August 13—4:25 a. m.

No. 1638 of August 12

With reference to my telegram No. 1590 of August 7.¹

Concerning the Lithuanian strip of territory Molotov today handed me a long memorandum stating that territorial compensation was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, but declaring readiness to pay 3,860,000 gold dollars within 2 years (i. e., half of the sum the U. S. A. paid to Russia for the cession of Alaska), either in gold or goods, as Germany may prefer, for the retention of the strip of territory by the Soviet Union.

The text of the memorandum² will be sent Wednesday via courier by plane.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 302.

² The memorandum and Schulenburg's letter of transmittal are not printed (1379/357775-78).

No. 333

449/222758-59

The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

ATHENS, August 13, 1940—2:40 p. m.

No. 376 of August 13

Received August 13—8:45 p. m.

In a prolonged conversation yesterday with the Minister President, which quickly shifted from practical issues of German-Greek relations to the general political field, I found Metaxas completely under the influence of the surprising Italian press attacks in connection with the assassination of the Albanian irredentist leader Naggia [Daout Hodja]. The Greek morning papers printed in a prominent position the communiqué of the Stefani Agency from Tirana which contains Italian charges regarding alleged Greek responsibility for the crime and accusations asserting that Greece was following a systematic policy of oppression in the disputed border zone on the coast of southern Epirus. The communiqués of the official Greek news agency, published in the press at the same time by way of reply, reject both accusations.¹

Metaxas expressed to me his concern over Italian intervention, which he regards as being imminent. If Italy expects an easy time in making good her territorial claims against Greece, similar to Soviet Russia in the Bessarabian question, she is deceiving herself mightily. Greece would fight back against any aggression and would refuse to be humiliated by Italy, even if there were danger of her own destruction.

I took advantage of the opportunity offered by this frank exchange to urge upon the Minister President a complete reorientation of Greek foreign policy. I pointed out to him in this connection in what grave danger Greece would be placed in a general reorganization of the European power relations, if she came in too late because of irresolution and continued political vacillation between the two hostile camps. Metaxas replied to this in a firm tone that he could not depart from the present Greek foreign policy because in Greek experience England was today still in a dominant position in the eastern Mediterranean. He added that even if I were right, Greece would then run the risk of being 5 minutes too late for everything.

It is my impression that there prevails a real will to resist any Italian intervention, if it should materialize, and that this finds strong sup-

¹ The Stefani Agency's statement on this incident and the communiqué of the Greek Agence d'Athènes are printed in the publication of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Documents: Italy's Aggression Against Greece* (Athens, 1940), pp. 81-84.

port in the general popular sentiment against Italy. As I gather from what he said about Germany's policy of peace in the Balkans, Metaxas hopes that Germany will continue to exercise a moderating influence on the Axis partner. The concern aroused by reports reaching here that the German press has now also taken up the Italian attacks on Greece is therefore all the greater.

The trend of the conversation conveys to me the impression of deep personal disappointment on the part of Metaxas; he views Germany's alignment with Italy's policy as the breakdown of his own policy, and particularly so because he is convinced that the neutrality policy which Greece has followed in the past lies not least of all in Germany's interest, too.

ERBACH

No. 334

B14/B002164-65

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 657

BERLIN, August 13, 1940.

The Greek Minister called on me today in order to present to me a denial of the DNB report of the assassination of an Albanian patriot by Greek agents. He handed me the translation of an account by the Agence d'Athènes, enclosed herewith,¹ which in fact completely contradicts all important points of the DNB report No. 224, page 20. The Minister said the situation was aggravated by the fact that this story, after having become known in Rome as much as 20 days ago, was now being spread by Stefani in this form and with such virulence. The Minister stated that his Government had been painfully surprised by this. It was the desire of the Minister that the German press should give consideration to the semi-official Greek account, as well.

Continuing, the Minister said that one could not resist the thought that Italy wanted a war with Greece. If such a war should break out, it would set the whole Balkans aflame, which would surely be contrary to the policy of the Axis hitherto. The Minister then mentioned also that his Government had really done everything possible to maintain neutrality, but was now repeatedly faced with Italian misunderstandings and unfounded accusations. This referred especially to the accusation of assistance to British naval and air forces in viola-

¹ Not reprinted (449/222762-63). See document No. 333, footnote 1.

tion of neutrality. Conversely, the Italian Air Force had already bombed Greek naval units on three occasions, which had necessitated protests by Athens in Rome.

I told the Minister that for our information on what was going on in the Mediterranean we relied on the reports of our Italian ally. Therefore he need not entertain any hope that we would publish in our press the Greek version of the incident under discussion. I did not believe that Italy was seeking any quarrel with Greece. It would be wiser if the Minister did not use the word "war" too hastily. If he spoke of a Balkan conflagration that would result from an Italian-Greek conflict, I could, if anything, merely envisage one that would end to the detriment of Greece. The reliance on English aid, formerly so popular in the Balkans, and with Greece's ally, Turkey, had meanwhile generally proved to be ill-founded.

The Minister finally restricted his request to the wish that in the interest of truth we would take cognizance of the report in the Agence Havas, which he had brought me.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 335

183/86217

The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 703 of August 13

BERN, August 13, 1940—10:49 p. m.

Received August 14—2:55 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 690 of August 9. (Wrong: correct number presumably 655: Pol. II 2800¹).

Démarche as ordered in the telegram cited was accomplished today before Federal Councilor Etter, acting for the Foreign Minister who is away. He will present our remonstrances to the Federal Council, which will deal with them at the end of this week after the return of the Federal President.² As his personal opinion, Federal Councilor Etter stated that he believed that our interpretation of the proclamation was not intended by the General. After my interview my Italian colleague made the same démarche. Federal Councilor Etter's reply was substantially the same as his reply to me.

KÖCHER

¹The correction appears on the original. Telegram No. 655, not printed (3918/E051052). See document No. 256.

²See document No. 397.

No. 336

585/242682

*The State Secretary to the Legations in Hungary, Rumania,
and Bulgaria*

Telegram

No. 671 to Budapest
No. 963 to Bucharest
No. 487 to Sofia

BERLIN, August 13, 1940.
e. o. Pol. IV 2305 g.

For Chief of Mission.

A recurrent tendency of the Rumanians and Hungarians is observable to draw us into conversations about Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionist demands, with a view to getting us at this stage to commit ourselves to their viewpoints and to cause our intervention, if the occasion should arise. This is not in accord with our wishes stated to the parties, which, it is known, stipulate that they should now seek a direct settlement. Please continue to maintain an attitude in accordance with this.

Same text to Bucharest, Budapest, and Sofia.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 337

2074/450072-73

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, August 13, 1940.

The negotiations with Ambassador Giannini on the question of the control of the French economy and the French borders ¹ have so far not led to an agreement. The High Command of the Wehrmacht and the Ministry of Economics consider it most important that both the central control at the ministries in Paris and the control at all the borders, including the Italian-French land border, be exclusively in German hands. The last Italian proposal is to the effect that the central control in Paris be exercised jointly by a German and an Italian commissioner at each of the various French ministries. For the border control the Italians propose that the Italian-French land border and the entire Mediterranean coast be controlled by Italy. Germany would retain control at the line of demarcation and would take over control at the Pyrenees border and at the short sector of the Franco-Swiss border that is not yet subject to control.

¹ An Italian delegation headed by Giannini had arrived in Berlin to negotiate about these matters.

In the face of these conflicting points of view, I consider the following solution to be correct:

The central control in Paris should remain exclusively in German hands. The Italians should merely delegate a liaison official to the German representative at each of the ministries. The control at the Italian-French land border should remain with Italy.² The control on the Mediterranean coast should remain with Italy. The Italian Government should obligate itself to see that the Italian control authorities at the border follow the unified directives and instructions that are put out from Paris. Admiral Canaris will, moreover, on behalf of the Abwehr, try to arrange with the Italian intelligence authorities for closer cooperation and participation of German authorities in the Mediterranean ports and ³ along the Italian-French land border.

The question of the division of control in the African colonies has not yet been sufficiently clarified for it to be possible to make definitive proposals at this time.

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister herewith, with the request that the solution proposed above be approved. I shall try to proceed in such a way that we can avoid the high-level conference [*Chefbesprechung*] at first considered necessary by the representatives of the OKW and the Ministry of Economics, and also the necessity for a decision by the Führer.

CLODIUS

² Marginal note: "Yes R[ibbentrop]." This note appears in the margin at the bottom of the first page of the memorandum. It is therefore not apparent whether it was intended to apply to the text opposite or to the memorandum as a whole.

³ The words "in the Mediterranean ports and" were inserted in Ribbentrop's handwriting.

No. 338

2074/450074

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

URGENT

BERLIN, August 13, 1940.

The following should be added to today's memorandum on the question of the control of the French economy and the French borders:¹

1. The High Command of the Wehrmacht has stated that the chairman of the Armistice Commission, General von Stülpnagel, is of the opinion that the elimination or even relaxation of the line of demarcation between the occupied and unoccupied areas of France is out of the question if the control at the outer French border, that is, both along the Mediterranean coast and at the Franco-Italian border, is not carried out exclusively under German responsibility and by German of-

¹ Document No. 337.

ficials. Otherwise the purpose of the entire measure would be largely defeated. He requests that this be taken into account in the decision.

2. State Secretary Landfried, as deputy for Minister of Economics Funk, who is absent, stated that he is in agreement with the solution I sketched in this morning's memorandum if for political reasons we could not insist on a more far-reaching arrangement with Italy. We should try, however, also at the same time to include at least a few higher German officials as liaison people at the most important control points on the Italian-French land border.

To be submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.²

CLODIUS

² See document No. 360.

No. 339

216/147575-26

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 815 of August 14

TOKYO, August 14, 1940—10:20 a. m.

Received August 14—7:45 p. m.

For the State Secretary.

With reference to my telegram No. 765 of August 2.¹

The Foreign Minister, who asked me to come to see him yesterday to inform me of questions of Japanese foreign policy of interest to Germany, said that the French Government had accepted in principle the three Japanese demands on Indochina reported in my previous telegram. Details will be negotiated in Hanoi. From the unexpectedly quick compliance of the French Government, he believes he can conclude that the Reich Government had also taken a very gratifying attitude on this question.²

On the question of Indochina the American Ambassador recently asked him, on instructions from Washington, whether press reports of alleged Japanese plans for passage of troops through Indochina are true.³ If so, the American Government could not declare itself in agreement, since it must demand maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific area in accordance with the Four Power Pacific Pact of 1922. The Foreign Minister limited himself to opposing arguments.

¹ Document No. 273.

² In telegram No. 823 of Aug. 15 (216/147577) Ott reported that he had just been informed that the French had now made their acceptance in principle of the Japanese demands concerning Indochina conditional upon a Japanese guarantee of renunciation of territorial claims. While not excluding the possibility of such a guarantee, Matsuoka requested that the German Government support the Japanese demands by influencing the French Government.

³ For Ambassador Grew's memorandum of this conversation, dated Aug. 7, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 290-291.

The Japanese Government will reject the American position on the grounds that the Treaty named had to do solely with the insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean of the signatory powers.

In this connection the Foreign Minister mentioned that since the battle in Flanders America has been trying by means of increased threats and enticements to keep Japan away from a rapprochement with the Axis Powers. Thus America on the one side announces the embargo on oil and scrap iron, which in first line is directed against Japan,⁴ and on the other indicates readiness to guarantee a larger loan. In principle Japan would not reject the loan, but in no case would she accept thereby any sort of obligations which could hinder her rapprochement with the Axis Powers. The likelihood that the loan will materialize is therefore extremely slight.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister emphasized once more his own and Prince Konoye's determination to work closely together with the Axis Powers.

OTT

⁴ President Roosevelt's proclamation that exports of petroleum and iron and steel scrap would be subject to license was dated July 26, 1940. The text is printed in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. III, p. 49.

No. 340

F18/100-101

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

RM 22

BERLIN, August 14, 1940.

Subject: Conversation with the Russian Ambassador.¹

The Russian Ambassador made an appointment with me for today in order to give me the answer of the Russian Government to the complaint concerning the article in the Latvian newspaper *Janaukas Zinas*.² He said that he had instructions from his Government to inform me that the appearance of the article was due to a misunderstanding. His Government had given instructions to Latvia, which now belonged to the Soviet Union, that in the future such articles were to be suppressed.

I answered the Russian that I took note of that. Such articles were not advantageous for the development of the good German-Russian relations which we desired. In the German press in turn we would not tolerate articles against Russian conditions either.

I then asked the Ambassador what truth there was to press reports of a stiffening in Russo-Finnish relations; whether they had reached a final understanding on the Åland problem or whether there were

¹ Marginal note: "Shown to the Führer. Si[egfried] Aug. 15."

² See document No. 298.

otherwise any reasons for this stiffening. M. Shkvartsev stated that he had no information on that point.

The Ambassador and his interpreter made a somewhat dejected impression during the talk.

R[IBBENTROP]

No. 341

B19/B003703-04

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 14, 1940.

The Finnish Minister called on me today to take up once more the subjects he had already broached to me on July 29 and to the State Secretary on August 3.¹

In the course of the conversation the Minister repeatedly brought up the question of whether we would not support Finland at least diplomatically in case of a renewed advance on the part of the Soviet Union. Since I evaded this repeated question, the Minister finally said he could see very well that this would not be the case.

Then M. Kivimäki again turned the conversation to the attitude of Sweden. The feeling there with regard to Finland was considerably more reserved than during the last war. The Minister wanted to attribute this to German influence exerted on Sweden. I said in this regard that we had not had any conversations with the Swedish Government on this theme, but that at any rate we would not do anything that could encourage any country to enter a war against the Soviet Union. M. Kivimäki thought that it would be sufficient if in case of a Russian-Finnish conflict Germany would leave Sweden a free hand. I turned aside further discussion of this subject with the remark that I could not make any statements for the German Government on these questions, but took it as certain that our attitude in a new Finnish-Soviet conflict would not be different than in the last one.

M. Kivimäki said, incidentally, that he did not have any special new indications of an imminent Soviet action from Finland itself,

¹ On the occasion of his visit to Woermann on July 29 the Finnish Minister had referred to rumors of Soviet intentions against Finland and had endeavored without success to elicit a statement as to whether Finland was regarded as being in the Soviet sphere of influence (B19/B003670).

At his call on the State Secretary on Aug. 3 the Finnish Minister had referred to Communist activity in Finland and to the desirability of having Sweden take a clearer stand in favor of Finland than during the Soviet-Finnish War, when Sweden had been restrained by Germany. Weizsäcker denied that this had been the case and evaded making any statement concerning Germany's position in case of a new Soviet-Finnish conflict. (104/112356)

but that the passage in Molotov's recent speech regarding Finland was interpreted there as a kind of threat.² The Soviet Union criticized in particular the attitude of Finland toward the Society of the Friends of the Soviet Union. But this society was in reality an institution of the prohibited Communist party. Thus the Soviet Union was demanding of Finland that she promote communism in her own country. Finland could not be a party to this. Moreover, in the case of a renewed conflict she would fight again. Of course the strategic prospects in such a case had worsened considerably owing to the new frontiers and the occupation of Hangö, whereas Finland's armament had somewhat improved. But in the further course of history it was at any rate better to have fought for one's freedom.

WOERMANN

² See document No. 279, footnote 4.

No. 342

85/22687-89

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1715 of August 14 WASHINGTON, August 14, 1940—5:34 p. m.
Received August 15—8:10 a. m.

For OKW Foreign Department [*Ausland*], for OKH, Attaché Branch, for the Air Ministry, Attaché Group.

SECURITY AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

1) In the West the United States is preparing the defense of Alaska. (See reports Nos. 1542 of July 26,¹ and 1701 of August 13.²)

The importance of French Oceania, especially of the Marquesas Islands, which was discussed in the papers long before the war, as well as of the Galapagos Islands, which belong to Ecuador, is being mentioned occasionally in the press and discussed in deliberations of the State Department and of the armed forces.

On the Atlantic front the attention of the United States is turning to the French possessions in the Caribbean Sea, of which Martinique has now acquired importance because of the planes which are stored there and the French naval forces stationed there, especially the aircraft carrier *Béarn*.

2) While the Americans are preparing, on the basis of the Havana Agreement, to bring under their influence the French possessions,

¹ Not printed (19/12485-86).

² Not printed (85/22675-76).

which lie off the western and eastern coasts of the American Continent, they seem, on the other hand, to be making an effort to spare the English possessions, which are no less important strategically for the protection of the United States, and actually to guarantee them for England, so long as England proves to be the obedient vassal of the United States. There is talk here of the possibility that the appointment of the Duke of Windsor as Governor of the Bahama Islands might be the first step in the establishment of a new British Dominion, which would include the entire portion of the West Indies now dependent on England, and perhaps even the Bermuda Islands.

Previously I reported that on these Islands the English were being relieved by Canadian troops, and I pointed out the possible effects of this fact from the standpoint of constitutional law (see my telegram No. 1593 of August 3rd).

3) While on the Pacific front, the 3rd and 7th Divisions have been equipped and trained for immediate shipment to threatened points, and in San Diego Marines about one brigade strong are ready for the same purpose, they have immediately available on the eastern coast for such an enterprise the 1st Division (New York) and the 1st Marine Brigade, that is, a brigade of especially equipped and trained Marines—some 2,900 officers and men, who have until now been quartered in Quantico (Virginia). They are now being shifted to the American base of Guantanamo, situated at the eastern end of Cuba. Special destroyers and transport ships are being equipped for the rapid transfer of the Marine Brigade. There can hardly be a doubt that the Americans are preparing the necessary forces in order to intervene militarily, as soon as developments provide the pretext, namely, that it is necessary to prevent possessions belonging to one European power from passing under the influence of another European power.

4) Within the scope of this American power politics is the establishment of Consulates, which has just been ordered, not only at St. Pierre Miquelon, but also at Dakar. Recently it was noticeable that it was occasionally reported over the radio from an undetermined source that German planes had arrived in Dakar. These were the familiar American tactics of craftily mixing in the poison. Now the cat is out of the bag and it is stated that the shortest route from Africa to America is by way of Dakar, and that Dakar is of extreme importance for air routes from Europe via Africa to South America.

It might just as well be said that the American Consulate in Dakar is being established by order of Pan-American Airways and American imperialism, which today requires control of the air of the South At-

* This telegram has not been found. The date is in error. The journal entry indicates that this telegram was sent on Aug. 1.

lantic Ocean and communications from Puerto Rico and Natal, Brazil, to the West African coast, and along the latter to Capetown.

The picture is quite clear: American Consulates in Iceland, Greenland, St. Pierre Miquelon, Martinique, Dakar, established in the period from April to August 1940—suit the purposes of American imperialism in the Atlantic Ocean.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

No. 343

F2/0456-0458

*The Foreign Intelligence Department of the Wehrmacht to the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht*¹

91/40 g. Kdos. Chefsache Ausl III Org.

AUGUST 14, 1940.

Submitted herewith is a copy of the report by the Military Attaché at Rome of August 9 regarding a conversation with General Roatta on the subject of preparations for attack on Yugoslavia.

[Enclosure]

CHEFSACHE

AUGUST 9, 1940.

g.K.No.123/40

By officer only

For General Staff of the Army (Attaché Branch) and OKW.

General Roatta invited me to see him today and asked me to transmit the following wishes of the Italian General Staff:²

¹ This document is unsigned. It was sent to the Foreign Ministry's representative with the Army for transmission to the Foreign Minister. It bears a number of handwritten notations in the Foreign Minister's handwriting which, however, were crossed out.

² The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, Aug. 1, 1940–Nov. 30, 1940 (typescript, MS C-065), of the Historical Division, European Command), contains this passage at Aug. 14:

"Finally the Chief of the National Defense Branch hands a memorandum to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff concerning Yugoslav fortifications at the German frontier, including the OKH papers on which it is based, for report to the Führer.

"Those papers have been called in by the OKH in consequence of a request by General Roatta transmitted on July 23 by the Military Attaché at Rome to let him have particulars of the Yugoslav fortifications at the German frontier in view of a possible German-Italian operation against Yugoslavia or a possible march of Italian forces through German territory.

"The Chief of the National Defense Branch proposes handing this material to the Italians, omitting the appended OKH evaluation, which says that the fortifications erected at the German frontier would be no serious obstacle for an opponent with modern equipment and would at most delay an advance if combined with road demolitions."

The report of July 23 from the Military Attaché in Rome, referred to above, has not been found.

The General Staff of the Italian Army received from the political leadership the order to prepare a plan for an attack on Yugoslavia, predicated on the commitment of Italian forces against the northern border of Yugoslavia, through Carinthia and Styria. He assumed that this question had already been agreed upon with the Reich on the political side. The initiation of these preparations did not mean that Italy intended to attack in shortest order, but only meant preparation by the General Staff for a contingency that might arise in 2 months, in 1 year, or perhaps not at all.

An Italian attack solely across the Italian border (Julian [Alps] front) would strike at the enemy frontally on difficult terrain. It was the intention, therefore, to bring into action two armies on the Julian front and one army of 8-10 divisions from Carinthia or Styria. For this there would have to be prepared :

a) The transports: Into consideration would come the railroads via Tarvisio, San Candido, and perhaps also via Brenner-Wörgl. The previous preparations of the two transport divisions would greatly facilitate execution.

b) Supplies: To be brought from Italy or, in the first days, local provisioning.

c) Medical and veterinary service, through making available hospitals with German or Italian personnel.

d) Use of airports.

The Italian armed forces also required for the carrying out of the offensive a rather large number of motor vehicles, since they did not have enough themselves particularly after sending numerous motor vehicles to Libya.

These motor vehicles would not only be needed for the armies that would be brought into action from Carinthia and Styria, but for the entire front. Request is made for 5,000 motor vehicles as closed formations (with personnel).³

General Roatta requests a conference as soon as possible (in about 8 days) at a place in southern Germany or northern Italy, to be attended primarily by :

a) representatives of the [Army] Operations Division (for information only)

b) representatives of the [Army] Chief of Transport.

c) representatives of the Quartermaster General (supplies).

³ A supplementary message by Rintelen from Rome on Aug. 14 (F2/0461-0462) stated: "On instructions from Badoglio, Roatta says that the inquiry from the Italian General Staff was based on the assumption of nonparticipation by Germany. Badoglio put up for consideration an attack from Styria and Carinthia with German troops as a second alternative. In case of the second alternative the participation of Hungary would be arranged by us, in case of the first alternative by Italy."

I called the attention of General Roatta to the fact that we continued to take the position that at present peace in the Balkans was in our common interest. R. agreed and again stressed the fact that at present it was only a matter of preparations by the General Staff for an operation that might become necessary, which he had been directed by the political leaders to make.

Please send me instructions.⁴

VON RINTELEN

¹ The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff contains the following passage at Aug. 15:

"The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff transmits to the Chief of the National Defense Branch the following decisions made today by the Führer: . . .

"2. The Führer is completely uninterested in the Italian wishes regarding an attack on Yugoslavia (see 14 Aug.). He wishes peace at the southern frontier of Germany and warns against giving the English an opportunity to establish their Air Force in Yugoslavia. German-Italian General Staff discussions are therefore superfluous. Moreover, the reports handed in by the OKH on the Yugoslavian fortifications at the German frontier are not to be passed on to the Italians."

On Aug. 15 (F2/459-460) the Attaché branch of the Army was directed to instruct the Military Attaché in Rome as follows: "No assurances of any kind concerning Yugoslavia have been made to the Italians by the Reich Foreign Minister: The work planned by the Italian General Staff must be merely a study.

"With respect to what has been said, General Roatta is to be answered that the OKW cannot discuss his suggestion until the political aspect has been clarified."

See also document No. 353 and enclosure 2.

No. 344

104/112388

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1432

BERLIN, August 15, 1940.

zu Pers. H 11859.¹

11865.²

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 1628³ and 1633.⁴

You are requested to call on Molotov and convey to him the following:

In response to the note of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of August 11, 1940,⁵ the Reich Government converted the German Legations in Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn, effective at once, to permanent Consular Missions. In view of the continued special economic inter-

¹ Pers. H 11859: Not found.

² Pers. H 11865: Not found.

³ Document No. 328.

⁴ Not printed (104/112384).

⁵ See document No. 328.

tests of Germany in the Baltic territories incorporated in the Soviet Union, we assume that the Soviet Government will signify its agreement to this arrangement.

Report by telegraph.*

WOERMANN

* Schulenburg reported in telegram No. 1717 of Aug. 21 (104/112406-07) that he had received a reply from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs as follows:

"(a) The Soviet Government notes that the German Legations in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have ceased their activities. The Soviet Government consents that the former German Legations in Riga and Tallinn should exercise Consular functions until September 15, 1940.

"(b) The Soviet Government reaffirms its previous assent by virtue of which the German Legation in Kaunas may exercise Consular functions up to the completion of the resettlement of the Germans from Lithuania.

"(c) The Soviet Government is at present not in a position to permit the functioning of foreign Consular Missions in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia beyond the time limits indicated above."

As a result of further negotiations the activity of the German Missions was in fact continued somewhat beyond the limit mentioned (104/112431, 112408, 112473).

No. 345

1512/872049

Memorandum by the Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, August 15, 1940.

D III 2298.

Communication for Secretary of Legation Rademacher.

1. On the occasion of a conference with Ambassador Abetz in Paris, he informed me that when he reported to the Führer on France about 2 weeks ago, the Führer told him that he intended to evacuate all Jews from Europe after the war.

2. Ambassador Abetz further told me that they have confiscated the complete card index of the Freemasons in France and have them safeguarded in an annex of the Embassy.

Department for German

Internal Affairs:

LUTHER

No. 346

F8/0197-0199;
F8/0227-0229

Francisco Franco to Benito Mussolini

MADRID, August 15, 1940.

MY DEAR DUCE: Ever since the beginning of the present struggle it has been our intention to make every effort to prepare ourselves to

intervene in the foreign war whenever a favorable occasion presented itself, to the extent permitted by our resources, although the scarcity of goods vitally essential to us and the interruption of communications with Italy and France have prevented any action up to this time.

The swift and crushing victories in Flanders have brought a change in the situation; the French defeat has freed our borders, lessening the grave tension which, with the Moroccans, we had endured since our campaign.

From that moment, our horizon cleared; action by us has been made possible, and it can become very effective once the difficulties of supply are overcome.

In accordance with this course of action, upon your country's entering the war we took a clearer position, passing from a status of alertness to one of nonbelligerency, which inevitably had strong repercussions abroad; however, this position, by reviving suspicions and reactions, caused the unleashing of an Anglo-American offensive against our sources of supply, aggravated recently by the new measures taken by the United States against exports, and by the English blockade, thus creating a situation of serious tension in our relations with those countries.

The consequences which the French defeat will inevitably have on the disposition of the North African territories prompted me to instruct my Ambassador in Rome, when that time came, to voice to you the aspirations and claims of Spain, traditionally maintained throughout our history in Spain's foreign policy, which are today more alive than ever in our minds; those are territories whose present subjugation is the result of that Franco-English policy of predominance and spoliation which has inflicted on Italy also so many wounds. Spain's legitimate aspirations are in this case combined with the compelling security need for the elimination of an extended and weak boundary line and the protection of our lines of communication with the Canary Islands.

Thus, to what she has already done for the establishment of the new order by years of hard struggle, Spain adds one more contribution by preparing herself to take her place in the strife against our common enemies.

In this connection, we have requested from Germany those things which are indispensable for our action, and have given impetus to our preparations by making every effort to improve the supply situation as much as possible.

In view of all this, you will understand the urgency of my writing to you to request your support of these aspirations for the attainment

of our security and greatness, in exchange for which you can count absolutely on our support of your expansion and your future.

With assurances of my greatest admiration for the brave Italian comrades who are fighting so gloriously, I send you most cordial greetings.

F. FRANCO

No. 347

172/185415

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, August 16, 1940—1:45 a. m.

No. 1367 of August 15

Received August 16—5:55 a. m.

I. The Rumanian-Hungarian negotiations will start on August 16 in Turnu-Severin. The Rumanian delegate is Valer Pop; the Hungarian delegate, De Hory. Hungarian Minister de Bárdossy will be only an observer. The [Rumanian] Foreign Minister will go to Turnu-Severin for the opening session.

II. The Rumanian-Bulgarian negotiations are supposed to begin in Craiova on August 19. The Rumanian delegate is Cretianu, Under State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry. As was to be expected, the Bulgarian Government has turned down the request by the Rumanian Government that it abandon its demand for cession of a coastal strip extending to Caliacra (without Balcic).

FABRICIUS

No. 348

B14/B002183-84

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, August 16, 1940.¹

No. 1113

With reference to your telegrams No. 1461 of August 6² and No. 1497 of August 12.³

Please call on Count Ciano and convey to him the following:

It is not quite clear from Count Ciano's remarks in what direction he would like to reshape Italy's relationship to Russia. We infer from

¹The Rome Embassy copy of this telegram indicates that it was sent from Berlin at 6:50 p. m. and received in Rome at 7: p. m. on Aug. 16 (9866/-E692889-91).

²Document No. 290.

³Not printed (9863/E692875).

Ciano's remarks that what he has in mind is merely a diplomatic exchange of views aiming at a closer friendly relationship between the two countries, and not any concrete agreements. On the points brought up by Count Ciano I would say the following:

1. Any additional improvement in the relations between Italy and Russia would naturally be welcomed by us from the standpoint of our general policy.

2. Balkans. Now that the Axis has intervened here to the extent of getting Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania to start on the path of negotiations, it seems to me not in our interest at present to bring the Russians into this question in any form whatsoever. If there were any assurance that Russia's participation would lead to a further easing of the situation in these areas, there would perhaps be no objection to it. But it seems to us that the course of events (Bessarabia, Dobruja) and the actual state of affairs (Communist agitation in Bulgaria) do not indicate that this is so. Rather, it seems evident that any further Russian participation not only would not make agreement easier among these three countries, but on the contrary would make it more difficult because these countries would try to pit one great power against another. Such an intervention would tend to inject into the question of a purely territorial revision the factor of ideology, with obvious consequences.

3. As regards the question of Turkey and the Straits, during Ambassador von Papen's recent visit, upon mature consideration we reached the conclusion that at this time it would be to the interest of the Axis to keep matters there in as fluid a state as possible.⁴ In any event, we have no interest at this time—and this may be even more true for Italy—in getting the Turks and the Russians together. I would in this connection recall M. Saracoglu's diligent efforts in Moscow some time ago⁵ and later in Ankara to have Turkey mediate between Russia and England. I should therefore recommend that this question not be pursued too far in the forthcoming conversations with the Russians.

4. As regards the question Russia-Yugoslavia, I believe that in the course of the conversations it would be of interest to ascertain something definite about the real state of their relations.

In conclusion I would say with respect to Ciano's remarks about the political questions in the last paragraph of your telegram No. 1461, that save for the qualifications outlined above they are in full accord with my own views.

RIBBENTROP

⁴ See document No. 272.

⁵ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 105, 116, and 268.

No. 349

265/172386-88

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 636 of August 16

BEYOGLU, August 16, 1940—7:00 p. m.

Received August 16—11:30 p. m.

Today's conference with the President, which was preceded by a long conference with the Foreign Minister, was awaited with tense expectancy, according to high Turkish officials. It was widely hoped, apparently, that I would give foreign policy, which is in a deadlock, a chance. And so the upshot of the conversation with the Foreign Minister was that all decisions were reserved for the President.

The President entrusted me with expressing to the Führer his sincerest thanks for having been so kind as to inform him through me of his intentions relative to the new order in the Balkans.

The President stressed that the whole world could only be grateful to the Führer for the attempt to create a balance in a peaceful way between the Balkan countries, settle the dispute of many years' standing, and bring about a new order for a lasting peace. He supported with all his heart every attempt in that direction, for Turkey's interest could only be in a peaceful Balkan area with a flourishing economy. The question whether Bulgaria's demands with regard to Thrace had also been discussed seemed to interest him particularly. He took cognizance with relief of the remark that that remained to be settled in the future. The present Italian-Greek conflict evidently alarms the Turks. Surely Italy would take our attack on England as an opportunity to strengthen the Italian position in the Greek Archipelago. I do not have the impression that if this should be the case Turkey would be inclined to provide Greece with armed assistance. I gave an account of the Balkan situation as instructed, which was followed by a detailed conversation about the general situation. I did not neglect to impress upon the President the strength of Germany's position as the only military power in Europe, as well as our sure expectation of England's early defeat. In the face of this, I said that the attitude of Turkey, which was still playing the English game, was entirely incomprehensible.

Reverting to the publication of the documents, with sarcastic criticism of the double-faced policy of his Foreign Minister, who was present, I rejected the President's reproaches that by demanding the Foreign Minister's dismissal we had interfered in domestic policy;¹ I told him that it was well known in Germany that the President

¹ See document No. 179.

was the sole person responsible for the direction of the present foreign policy and that it therefore did not matter in the least what Foreign Minister he chose for these transactions. But he must be clear about the fact that the censure of world history was very incisive and might not even pause at the fate of Turkey. Therefore no one could exonerate himself from the responsibility of having rejected the repeated efforts of Germany to improve relations.

To his question how we evaluate the Russo-Turkish situation I replied: "Exactly as you do, Mr. State President, who have mobilized the entire Turkish Army in Thrace and on the Bosphorus." The economic agreement, I told him, would not be extended in spite of extensive desires on the part of Turkey, unless Turkey's political attitude changed and unless the press was permitted to make a more objective presentation of our arguments, too. From the long discussion the already familiar fact emerged that there is still considerable resentment over the publication of the documents, and the demand for dismissal of the Foreign Minister, and the suspicion that we wanted to incite Russia against Turkey. However the President assured me that he had never wanted to carry on a policy of (group missing) against Germany, and that he would be happy if the situation created by the publication of the documents could be cleared by an improvement in the atmosphere. He commissioned me to tell the Führer that on the basis of our conversation he would do everything to achieve this improvement. I may therefore assume that consideration will now be given to my very detailed complaints about the attitude of the Turkish press. It also appears to me worth mentioning that the President asked me whether I did not see some possibility of a peaceful compromise with England. He said he had the feeling that England desires this, but that the Führer's appeal had not offered sufficient basis for it. A few days ago the Dutch Minister² asked a neutral Chief of Mission the same question, telling him he had the feeling the British Ambassador would be happy if a possibility of an understanding could be found. When I asked the State President whether he had any substantial bases for his view he answered evasively, but added that owing to her relations with England Turkey would at any time be in a position to put out the necessary feelers if the Reich so desired.

I ended this observation by pointing out that England had wanted war, so the only thing that remained was a decision by force of arms.

Turkish circles in Iran report that alarm has been caused by Russian demands relative to military transit. There is no substantiating evidence.

PAPEN

² Phillips C. Visser.

No. 350

51/34842-48

*Circular of the Foreign Minister*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, August 16, 1940.

SECRET

R 986 g.

Multex No. 208

With reference to my telegram of August 6, Multex 195.²

(1) Please carry out the instructions at once, if possible on August 17. The communication you have been directed to make should be delivered in the form of a note.

(2) If the opportunity is afforded for oral explanation, please make it clear that the present German action is a necessary consequence of the constantly more severe English measures. Responsibility for this development lies therefore with England alone.

(3) In the morning newspapers of August 18 a lengthy communiqué will be released by DNB. The text of the communiqué follows, with a phrase book. If possible, please deliver the text of the communiqué as a press release for purposes of information at the same time as you make the démarche directed in paragraph (1). No delay must be made with the démarche for that reason, however. Should the communiqué not be on hand in time, you should make provision for delivery of it later for the purpose of information.

(4) With regard to the treatment of the matter by the press you should use all means available there through influence of the government or official press agencies to see that English responsibility is placed foremost and that the German action is represented only as a necessary consequence.

(5) Please reply by telegraph.

Acknowledge receipt.³

RIBBENTROP

¹ The telegram was addressed to the German Missions at Ankara, Buenos Aires, Shanghai, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Athens, Bangkok, Belgrade, Bern, Bogotá, Bucharest, Budapest, Caracas, Ciudad Trujillo, Havana, Helsinki, Hsinking, Lima, Lisbon, Mexico, Montevideo, Panama, Port au Prince, Quito, Sofia, Stockholm, Tehran, Dublin, Madrid, Moscow, Tokyo, Rome, and Guatemala.

A notation indicates that in the instruction to the Legation in Dublin paragraph (3) was not applicable and was to be omitted.

In telegram No. 906 of Aug. 16, the text of which was similar to that of the circular telegram, the Embassy in Washington was instructed to make the communication orally as directed in the instruction of Aug. 6 (document No. 294).

² Document No. 291.

³ Replies from the Brazilian, Japanese, Argentine, and Chilean Governments are printed in the German naval manual *Urkunden zum Seekriegsrecht 1. September 1939 bis 31. August 1940 zusammengestellt vom Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine 1. Abt. Seekriegsleitung* (Berlin, 1941), pp. 260-261.

No. 351

121/119810

*The Foreign Minister to Ambassador Abetz*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT
No. 480

BERLIN, August 16, 1940.
Büro RAM No. 260.

With reference to your telegram No. 356 of August 10, 1940.²

Please continue to treat the question of the transfer of the French Government or individual ministries in a dilatory way. Such a transfer is out of the question at this time, since Paris and northern France are a theater of operations against England.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Abetz was addressed in this telegram as "Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the Military Commander in France."

² Not printed (121/119795-96). Abetz had reported that Laval discussed with him on Aug. 10 the question of removing the seat of the French Government to Paris.

In a Pol. I M memorandum of Aug. 9 on reports received on the actions of the Armistice Commission it was recorded:

"At his conference with General von Stülpnagel day before yesterday, General Huntziger asked by direction of Marshal Pétain whether Marshal Pétain could announce over the radio that the German Government was in agreement in principle with the return of the French Government to Paris. A date for this was not yet provided for, however.

"After a report was made to the Führer, the query was answered in the affirmative." (365/206501-03)

No. 352

4469/E087690-94

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

BERLIN, September 4, 1940.²

**RECORD FROM MEMORY OF THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND
 MINISTER QUISLING ON AUGUST 16, 1940**

Attended by: 1. The Führer, 2. Minister Quisling, 3. Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, 4. Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, 5. Reichsamtsleiter Scheidt.

The memorandum was written later, without notes having been taken during the conference. The contents are to be understood accordingly.

The Führer asked Minister Quisling to make his report.

Quisling began by explaining the situation into which he had come as a result of the events of April 9, 1940. He mentioned that he had

¹ The initials "Sch/M" appear at the end of this memorandum. Presumably it was prepared by Scheidt.

² This document is printed here for the convenience of the reader.

actually been prepared for such a development, but found himself in a critical position, since the old government had been able to escape. Since after the German troops had entered he was the only leader of a legal party in Oslo who had not left the country, he took over the power to avoid anything worse. He had also had the consideration in mind that by taking over the government, he would maintain Norway's independence, which had been recklessly placed at stake through the conduct of the King and his government.

At first he had been successful in accomplishing his purposes. The will to resist of the army mobilized against Germany was not uniform, since a very large part of the nationally-minded soldiers, on account of the slogans of the Quisling Government, began to doubt the cause represented by the liberal parties and consequently by the Western Powers. All parliamentary parties, from the Marxist to the Conservative party, had disintegrated. The trade unions declared they were ready to enter into negotiations, the press adopted the policy ordered by the Quisling Government.

This healthy and necessary development was later interrupted through measures taken by the German authorities. These, not knowing the situation and circumstances, have become victims of the scheming efforts of the old party clique.

Quisling himself had warned against the consequences of the intended measures. All the same, he had been asked to resign on April 15, 1940, and an allegedly constitutional substitute government was put in his place. Through this, not only the position of his party, but also the German position in Norway deteriorated. The constitutionality of the Administrative Council now set up is only fictitious, the prerequisites for its convocation have not been complied with. It can be proved that it does not work in loyal cooperation with Germany, and particularly because of the uncertain and obscure situation in Norway public opinion toward Germany has deteriorated. In this respect nothing has changed since Reichskommissar Terboven arrived in Norway. Although he negotiated with Quisling, he also maintained active contact with representatives of the old system and even intends to recall the Storting in order to have the old party representatives confirm a new Norwegian government and depose the King. It is unnecessary to recall the Storting for the purpose of forming a new government or to depose the King, as well as to undertake all necessary steps according to constitutional law. This institution is in any case not a legal one, and therefore the constitutionality of all decisions made by the Storting since the autumn of 1939, and from now on, is extremely doubtful.

Whoever knows the Norwegian people and their mentality, will acknowledge that they dislike nothing more than lack of clarity and

inconsistency. All great changes in Norway have been achieved by means of two sorts of impetus—first, by reasoning with the Norwegians, and second, if this should bear no result, by energetically forcing through what had to be accomplished. This happened in the case of the political unification of Norway, the introduction of Christianity, and the achievement of the Reformation. Quisling advised to aim straight for the goal without any diversions and to refrain from all subterfuges. Political subterfuges were unworthy in the face of history, of the Norwegian people, but particularly of the Greater German Reich.

Reichskommissar Terboven has always pursued the policy of supporting the Nasjonal Samling only secretly. He is afraid that it would be compromised by German aid. He compares this case with the occupation of the Ruhr. This is incorrect!

To the question of the Führer, as to what Quisling proposed now, he answered: Formation of a Norwegian government with the Nasjonal Samling forming a majority. Whether this would be under Quisling's leadership or not was at the moment of no importance. Dissolution of the Storting and then clear-cut and effective work for a future collaboration with Germany.

The Führer then began to speak and stated about the following:

The whole Norwegian undertaking had been prepared on short notice. In December, after Quisling had drawn attention to the menacing danger, he had considered the entire development in the north with greater care.³ After the Finnish peace, it had at first looked as if, from a practical point of view, it would be impossible for the Allies to extend the war to Scandinavia. In the course of March, however, the indications of danger increased more and more and in the beginning of April the Führer decided to step in, since otherwise there would have been the definite danger that the Allies would arrive in Norway before the German troops. That had to be avoided at any cost. On the other hand, if he had found the English already in Norway, he would have been able to drive them out, but only by using resources which would have been incomparably greater than those actually used on the part of Germany in the Norwegian undertaking.

After the occupation, it was unfortunately not possible to persuade the King of Norway to adopt a reasonable attitude similar to that of the King of Denmark. The old system in Norway chose war and, of course, got it.

The German political representatives had always wanted to do the best they could but they had not been sufficiently well acquainted with conditions and it was quite clear that Herr Bräuer and the other representative also (the name Habicht was not mentioned) had been de-

³ See vol. VIII, document No. 443.

ceived by the Norwegian jurists. "You have heard perhaps what occurred in these rooms." "The careers of these gentlemen are definitively terminated."⁴

The Führer himself had given specific instructions that Quisling be included in a so-called constitutional government. But later on he suddenly found that there had been created not a government for Norway, but an Administrative Council [*Verwaltungsausschuss*] for the areas which were occupied by German troops. He, the Führer, did not need any Administrative Council [*Administrationsrat*] in the areas occupied by his troops. What he had wanted was a Norwegian Government.

Since what had once happened could not be changed, Terboven had been sent to Norway. Quisling should not think that Terboven did not wish him well. Terboven had always explained to the Führer that the Nasjonal Samling was the only movement which was of any use with regard to collaboration. On the other hand, Quisling must understand that it was difficult for these gentlemen to adapt themselves in circumstances so completely foreign to them. A comparison between the best organized party in the world, namely, the NSDAP, and national movements abroad was of course impossible. One could not judge a movement such as Quisling's by the existence and completeness of a central membership file. He also shared Quisling's opinion that the policy should be followed which was clearly directed toward a goal. In the next few days he would send for Terboven and would discuss this with him. It was not correct to say that aid by Germany for the Nasjonal Samling would compromise this movement. A Great Germanic movement could never be compromised through aid extended by the Greater German Reich.

He, the Führer, wished to bring about orderly conditions in the north. After having for a long time and repeatedly submitted suggestions to the English with regard to a reorganization of Europe, he found himself forced, against his will, to wage war against the English. He was now in the same position as Martin Luther, who did not want to go against Rome, but had the fight forced upon him. In the present struggle he would destroy the old England and proceed alone to create a new order in Europe. He was interested only in northern Europe, in the south of Europe not at all. The Mediterranean countries had always been the racial death of the Germanic peoples.

He was indebted to Quisling for drawing his attention to developments which might easily have proved to be fatal for Germany in this war. How acute this danger had been he had realized only when the

⁴ The two sentences enclosed in quotation marks were added later in the margin.

secret documents of the Allied High Command had been found in France. He knew that Quisling had acted for the sake of a great cause. A new, young Norway would learn to appreciate this and he could only conceive of a young Norway under the leadership of the Nasjonal Samling and indissolubly linked with Quisling's person.

Quisling could rely on him.

No. 353

F18/102-107

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*¹

RM 23

BERLIN, August 17, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE ITALIAN
AMBASSADOR, ALFIERI, AUGUST 16, 1940²

The Foreign Minister first read to Alfieri the instruction which was sent to Ambassador von Mackensen for his conversation with Count Ciano concerning the Italian negotiations with Russia.³ He summarized it to the effect that the Axis had no positive interest in encouraging Russia in a rapprochement with Turkey, but on the contrary must view the continuance of a state of flux as being in its interest. It must be borne in mind that Turkey and its Foreign Minister Saracoglu had tried in the past to play the role of mediator between Russia and England. If an accord should be reached between Turkey and Russia, these attempts at mediation would undoubtedly be revived in

¹ Marginal note: "Has been submitted to the Führer. H[ewell] Aug. 21."

² Enno von Rintelen in his postwar reminiscences, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse* (Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1951) p. 107, briefly refers to this meeting as having taken place on Aug. 17.

Likewise the diary notation by Michele Lanza, an official of the Italian Embassy in Berlin, dates the conversation as Saturday, Aug. 17, and describes it in detail in his book, Leonardo Simoni (pseud.), *Berlino, Ambasciata d'Italia 1939-1943* (Rome, 1946) pp. 161-163.

Nevertheless the date Aug. 16 as recorded here appears to be correct. Internal evidence in the account by Lanza, and its chronological discrepancies with Ciano's diary notations, prompted Mario Toscano to suggest that the correct date was Aug. 16; see *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, p. 57, note 89.

Toscano points out that the meeting took place in the evening, and first of all Ribbentrop read the text of the telegram which had just been sent to von Mackensen. This is document No. 348, telegram No. 1113, which was sent from Berlin at 6:50 p. m. and received in Rome at 7:00 p. m. on Aug. 16.

Toscano further points out that Alfieri's account of his discussion with Ribbentrop had been telegraphed to the Italian Foreign Ministry and was the subject of a discussion between Ciano and Mussolini on Aug. 17; see *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Aug. 17, 1940. It appears unlikely that the discussion in Berlin and the comment about it in Rome were on the same evening.

Enclosure 1, the note which was presented by Alfieri, may be either incorrectly dated as Aug. 17, or what we have may be a modified version which was substituted next day by the Italian Embassy.

³ Document No. 348.

Turkey. It would therefore be more advantageous to face a Turkey which possessed only a worthless guarantee from England and was otherwise in sharp opposition to Russia.

The Foreign Minister next spoke about the conversations of General Roatta with the German Military Attaché von Rintelen regarding preparations for action against Yugoslavia. He informed the Italian Ambassador approximately in the sense of the attached note.⁴

Ambassador Alfieri, in turn, then spoke about the problem of Greece. He was instructed to obtain a statement on what position the Reich Foreign Minister was taking in the Greek-Italian question. But the German reply was already evident from the statement which he had just received on Yugoslavia. He assumed that the position taken in this problem was the same as in the Yugoslav question.

The Foreign Minister affirmed this.

Ambassador Alfieri then presented the written instruction annexed hereto,⁵ which states precisely Italy's position with respect to Greece. He added orally that Count Ciano was now engaged in the preparation of a note to Greece, and had first wanted to know Germany's position. He stressed that the measures to be taken with respect to Greece were of purely precautionary nature.

SCHMIDT

[Enclosure 1] *

SECRET

BERLIN, August 17, 1940/XVIII.

The Italian Government is in accord with the German Government in the conviction that the war against England is one of fundamental significance, also in respect of all objectives of political systematization.

With regard to Russia, Italy will conclude no treaties but will endeavor to improve her relations, also with a view to preventing Moscow from putting in order her position with respect to London.

No action of any sort is intended against Yugoslavia, and the statements regarding Italy's program which Count Ciano had the opportunity to convey to the Führer are herewith confirmed.⁷

The proposed ties between the General Staffs were only in the nature of an effort to be prepared for any contingency.

The attempt is now being made to transfer the controversy with Greece to a diplomatic plane, and nothing more will be done than to reinforce the six divisions presently in Albania by an additional three divisions.

⁴ Enclosure 2.

⁵ Enclosure 1.

⁶ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's hand: "Presented by Alfieri."

⁷ Another marginal note reads: "Has been submitted to the Führer. H[ewel] Aug. 21."

⁸ Cf. document No. 129.

[Enclosure 2]

BERLIN, August 16, 1940.

NOTE CONCERNING THE PROBLEM OF YUGOSLAVIA

General Roatta of the Italian General Staff recently approached the Military Attaché on instructions of the Italian General Staff with the request that a plan for a possible conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia be discussed jointly with the German Wehrmacht.⁸ In this connection we were apprised of certain plans and wishes of the Italian General Staff. The Military Attaché was meanwhile directed by the High Command of the Wehrmacht to reply to General Roatta that before there was further discussion of these matters in military terms the political side had first to be clarified.⁹

1) In principle it should be said that the Axis is at present engaged in a life and death struggle with England and that it would therefore doubtless be inadvisable to tackle any new problem at all that did not absolutely have to be tackled in connection with this effort to crush England. While we are today subduing the British Isles, Italy is about to throw the English out of North Africa. Both, in our opinion, are problems that tax to the full the armed forces of both countries, as well as, and above all, the General Staffs.

2) The Yugoslav problem is also not to be taken too lightly from the purely military angle. The Serbs are not bad soldiers and it would still require considerable effort on Italy's part to crush them. There is the additional fact that English bomber wings would undoubtedly come to the aid of Yugoslavia. The German Luftwaffe in the air and on the ground would therefore also have to be committed. This in turn would mean, however, a dispersal [of effort] since the German Luftwaffe, as it is, already has to protect a large area of Europe with its antiaircraft guns, indeed from Kirkenes to Biarritz, and is at present engaged in the main attack against England in the air. We would wish to avoid such a dispersal.

3) From the purely political standpoint, such a new seat of conflict in the Balkans would in certain circumstances start a general conflagration. How would it affect Hungary? How would Greece react, etc.? Above all, however, it should be remembered that Yugoslavia has close relations with Russia. Moscow, ever mistrustful, would then in certain circumstances be brought into the picture even though only diplomatically, and in the end Germany would be forced again to shift its troops to the east. This she does not consider advisable.

⁸ See document No. 343.

⁹ See document No. 343, footnote 4.

For all these reasons, we would like to postpone a more detailed study of this problem until such time as the general situation is further clarified, especially with reference to the German-English military situation.

No. 354

1001/305934-35

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, August 16, 1940.

In Alsace and Lorraine the German civil administration was introduced as early as the middle of July, for the time being without publicity and without any particular legal documentation. By decrees of the Führer on August 2, chiefs of the civil administration were appointed for Alsace and Lorraine, and an official announcement was made to that effect on August 7. On July 24 Alsace and Lorraine were included in the German customs area. Moreover, immediately after the occupation the railroad network was placed under German administration. Regarding the last two measures no special legal documentation was issued, either, nor was any announcement made. No official communications have been made to the French so far concerning these measures.¹

On August 5 the French Armistice Commission sent the German armistice delegation for economic questions two notes² requesting authorization to reinstate French customs control agencies along all the French borders, and to restore the railroads in Alsace and Lorraine to the technical direction of the French railroad authorities. Minister Hemmen has asked for instructions in answering the notes.

The fact that the measures for extending the German customs and transportation administration to Alsace and Lorraine have been undertaken without announcement and without special legal documentation is based on an order by the Führer, according to information from the Ministry of the Interior. Minister Hemmen has accordingly been instructed heretofore not to discuss these measures with the French in Wiesbaden.

The question is whether this instruction should be continued in effect even after the French have made the two official inquiries. There is no need on the German side to inform the French officially of the

¹ The inclusion of Alsace and Lorraine in the German customs area had come up in the course of conversations between Minister Hemmen and M. Arnal of the French delegation at Wiesbaden on Aug. 3 and 4. See *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, p. 97, footnote 2.

² Not found. They were discussed by General Huntziger and Minister Hemmen on Aug. 7. See *ibid.*, p. 105.

actual state of affairs in response to their notes. On the contrary, this could lead to superfluous discussions which would also be undesirable if they should be made public. Furthermore, the reasons that led to the Führer's order to carry out the measures without publicity doubtless continue to be valid. It will therefore be advisable to treat the two French notes in a dilatory way and to leave them unanswered until further notice.

To be submitted herewith through the Under State Secretary for the Political Department to the Foreign Minister, with the request for instructions.³

WIEHL

³ Such instructions have not been found.

No. 355

F8/0206-0207

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, August 16, 1940.

SECRET

Received August 17—1:20 a. m.

No. 2800 of August 16

With reference to my telegram No. 2784 of August 15² and your telegram No. 1287 of August 12.³

To 1). The Minister of Trade says that the present Spanish gasoline consumption of 400,000 tons per year, with a normal annual consumption of 600,000 tons before the price increase, could hardly be reduced any further. This quantity will barely suffice for bus routes, truck traffic needed for food, civil aviation, and normal military requirements.⁴ More resolute curtailment of private car traffic would, since curtailment is already great and the number of cars is small, not help a great deal.

To 2). With the present already strict rationing, bread grain (wheat) requirements will be 600 to 700,000 tons, if the 300,000 bought in Argentina cannot be imported.⁵ In view of the high extrac-

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

² Not printed (F8/0208). Heberlein reported that the Ministry of Trade had promised to furnish on Aug. 16 the data requested in telegram No. 1287, and that the wheat situation had been discussed.

³ Document No. 329. The numbers in the telegram printed here refer to the questions listed in telegram No. 1287.

⁴ This sentence, garbled in transmission, has been corrected from another copy (F18/483-484).

⁵ On Sept. 4 Stohrer wired the following addendum to this telegram: "Of the 300,000 tons of wheat bought in Argentina to make up the shortage, only 25-30,000 tons have been received. Contracts covering the rest of the 300-400,000 tons are reportedly not yet closed." (telegram No. 2993: F18/484)

tion rate already ordered, the existing shortage of blending agents for flour, and the existing meat shortage, further rationing is possible only on a small scale.

To 3). Further requirements are about 200,000 tons of coal and at least 100,000 tons of Diesel oil and 200,000 tons of fuel oil and other mineral fuels.

Besides there are urgently needed (with industry at full capacity and agriculture at full utilization) :

Lubricating oil 40,000, petroleum 20,000, manganese ores 35,000, scrap 100 to 150,000, paper pulp 100,000, raw rubber 25,000, cotton 100,000, wood pulp 48,000, manila hemp and jute 55,000, peanut seed 30,000, nitrogen fertilizer 625,000 (all in tons).

As the computation had to be made in great haste, the Ministry of Trade has reserved the right to correct it.

HEBERLEIN

No. 356

B15/B002660

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT
Multex 211

BERLIN, August 17, 1940—1:30 p. m.
e. o. P 14621.

The early German newspapers for Sunday will contain the official German announcement of the beginning of the total blockade of England.

In the course of Saturday afternoon at about 4 p. m., German summer time, the text of the announcement will be sent out by DNB, Transocean, Infa service, and Morse service.

The trend of the comment and argumentation thereon should be directed toward making it clear to the world that it is folly now to send ships to England. England has by her measures of provocation called forth this counteraction.

Confirm receipt.

[unsigned]

¹ The list of addressees does not accompany the text.

No. 357

B14/B002185-87

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1526 of August 17

ROME, August 17, 1940—6:00 p. m.

Received August 17—6:45 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

When I informed Ciano today that I was now able to present to him the Foreign Minister's view of his [Ciano's] ideas about Italian-Russian relations, which he had outlined to me on August 6,¹ he told me that he had already been told about this by Alfieri, who sent him a telegram about his conversation on the subject with the Foreign Minister.² However, he listened calmly to what I had to say to him in accordance with telegram No. 1113,³ and repeatedly affirmed that he understood perfectly the Foreign Minister's point of view. At the moment everything had to be deferred as having only secondary importance to the supreme goal of Axis Powers, namely, the defeat of England, and it was necessary to bring the policies of the Axis Powers into closest alignment.

With respect to specific points he remarked:

1. *Russia*: He had in mind only an improvement of relations on a very general basis, without envisioning any concrete agreements. He unreservedly concurred in the views as to the consequences of any active Russian participation in Balkan questions.

2. *Turkey*: He too shared our conviction that it would be to the best interests of the Axis Powers at the present time to keep matters down there as fluid as possible.

3. *Yugoslavia*: He noted that the Reich Foreign Minister was equally of the opinion that it would be interesting in the course of further Italian-Russian conversations to obtain some definite information on the real state of the Russian-Yugoslav relations.

Ciano then went on to say that he had just had a lengthy conversation with the Duce on the basis of Alfieri's telegram and was about to send Alfieri a telegram that, as he added, was largely inspired or, one could say, dictated by the Duce, and ran along the same lines as his remarks to me. The Duce, too, had stressed the need for subordinating all issues to the one great goal and treating them in the closest concert. The telegram further contained the statement that Italy was not planning any action against Yugoslavia at this time, and that the controversy with Greece would be dealt with by diplomatic means.

¹ See document No. 290.² See document No. 311.³ Document No. 348.

Ciano added that Italy would not undertake anything in this respect without previously consulting us.

Neither was the fact that Italy was reinforcing her 6 divisions in Albania by 3 new divisions to be construed as a prelude to military action.⁴

Finally Ciano expressed his gratification over the decisive progress made in Somaliland, which however was connected with heavy casualties (1,500 of a total force of 20,000). He expected the fall of Berbera within 2 or 3 days.

With respect to the opening of Graziani's campaign against Egypt he remarked that the delay was due not only to the truly infernal heat but also to the fact that Graziani was obliged to bring certain measures taken by Balbo into line with his own plans; this was understandable because every responsible general had to follow his own plan and could not take over that of his predecessor.

MACKENSEN

⁴ Cf. document No. 353, enclosure 1.

No. 358

585/242694

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 334 of August 17

SOFIA, August 17, 1940—8:30 p. m.

Received August 17—11:20 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 331 of August 17.¹

The Bulgarian Government intends, in order to make it perhaps easier for the Rumanian Government to cede the territory, to revert to the plan of offering it a nonaggression pact, of which I was informed by Kiosseivanov² as far back as last February (telegram No. 51 of February 8³). At the time I did not express any opinion on this to Kiosseivanov and the present Foreign Minister has thus far never mentioned this subject to me. I have just heard from the Italian Minister, however, that Popov spoke to him of the possibility of such a proposal, and that he, Magistrati, had called it good.

Since the Foreign Minister will probably speak to me about the matter within the next few days, I should be glad to know your attitude.⁴

RICHTHOFEN

¹ Not printed (585/242692).

² Minister President and Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, 1935–February 1940.

³ Not printed (585/242543–44).

⁴ See document No. 365.

No. 359

83/61501-02

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 17, 1940.

Counselor of Embassy Zamboni informed me under instructions as follows:

The Iraq Minister President Gailani ¹ has made to the Italian Minister an emphatic declaration of his sympathies for the Axis Powers. He stated that this policy is shared by the great majority of the Moslem population, the Army, and the Air Force, which are anti-British. The Minister President wanted again a closer rapprochement of Iraq with Germany. The Minister President asked the Italian Minister that the Italian Government should make itself the spokesman of these intentions with the German Government.

The Italian Minister then had added on his own that the major portion of the Cabinet shared the Minister President's view; in addition to the latter, the foremost supporters of that view are the Minister of Finance Suwaydi and the Minister of War Hashimi (Hashimed), and also the former Minister President Djamil Madfai.

The Italian Embassy has been instructed to discuss the matter with the Foreign Ministry in an appropriate manner and report the results.

The same matter, from an Italian source, has already been reported by the Legation in Tehran, in telegram No. 397.² Contrary to Minister Ettel's report, Zamboni's communication did not speak explicitly of a resumption of diplomatic relations, but referred only generally to a rapprochement. I briefly mentioned to M. Zamboni that we had already heard something in that matter from Tehran, without saying anything else about the contacts that had been established. I promised M. Zamboni a reply. I added that a rapprochement with Iraq was of course entirely in line with our policy.

WOERMANN

¹ Rashid Ali al-Gailani became Minister President of Iraq Mar. 31, 1940, after Nuri as-Said had resigned as head of the Cabinet, keeping only the post of Foreign Minister.

² Not printed (83/61499).

No. 360

1004/307208-10

Confidential Protocol

The German and Italian Governments have agreed ¹ to issue instructions to the German-French and Italian-French Armistice Com-

¹ See documents Nos. 337 and 338.

missions by which the following agreements will be brought into effect:

1. The Italian Government will send one representative each to the German commissioners with the French National Bank and the French Ministry of Finance. The duty of these representatives is to assure cooperation between the German and Italian authorities in all questions having to do with the control of France in regard to foreign exchange, imports and exports, and transit, both in metropolitan France and in the colonies. Moreover, the Italian representatives in agreement with the German commissioners will assure that in implementing the regulations that have been issued the supervision of the French border authorities will be carried out in a uniform and equitable manner by the German and Italian authorities at all parts of the border of metropolitan France and the colonies.

2. The border control in the special fields listed in paragraph 1 above, as well as that of persons and communications, will be carried out in the zones listed below by the German or Italian authorities in the name of the two Governments in accordance with the instructions issued by the central control authority.

The control of the French borders at the Pyrenees, along the Atlantic, along the Channel, along the old French border with Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany, and along the Swiss border up to the point where the Italian control begins is reserved for the German authorities.

The control is reserved for the Italian authorities beginning at the point on the Swiss border which corresponds to the end line of the Italian military control on the French border, which is established in the Italian-French Armistice Agreement, and it follows the French Mediterranean coast as far as Port Bou.

At the border crossing point at Port Bou, the Italian Government will appoint one customs official and one railroad official with the German control agency in order to supervise transit traffic from the Iberian Peninsula to Italy via France.

For the rest, it is agreed that the German authorities will exercise the control in Morocco exclusive of the Moroccan Mediterranean coast and over French West Africa, whereas the Italian authorities will exercise this control in Corsica, Algeria, Tunisia, and Syria as well as on the coast of French Somaliland.

Signed at Berlin, in duplicate, in the German and Italian languages, on August 17, 1940.

CARL CLODIUS

A. GIANNINI

No. 361

5591/E401173-76

*German-Italian Commercial Agreement, Signed at Berlin,
August 17, 1940*

W 3975 g.

SIXTH SECRET PROTOCOL ¹

Pursuant to instructions from their Governments, the chairman of the German Government Committee and the chairman of the Italian Government Committee for the regulation of economic relations between the German Reich and Italy, with the participation of technical experts, have reviewed the question as to the extent to which the deliveries of strategic materials by both parties could be increased over the quantities agreed upon in the Fifth Secret Protocol of June 18, 1940.

These discussions have led to the following result:

1. The German deliveries to Italy agreed upon in the Fifth Secret Protocol of June 18, 1940, shall be enlarged with respect to the commodities as specified below, the quantities named including those already set forth in the said Secret Protocol:

Abrasives	100 tons a month
Refractory materials and kaolin, total	4,000 tons "
Magnesite	600 tons "
Pitch coke	1,000 tons " *
Ceramic insulating materials	3.5 tons "

2. Germany shall make one delivery of 50,000 kg. phthalic anhydride, as well as a total of 5,000 tons caustic soda in monthly shipments of 1,000 tons upward to 2,000 tons, if possible.

3. The Italian Government Committee points out that it has been impossible to utilize in sufficient measure the Italian import quotas for the Italian tariff classifications 278-348, cast iron, iron and steel, provided for under (3) in the Confidential Protocol of February 24, 1940,² because the German suppliers either did not make deliveries contracted for or refused acceptance of new orders.

¹ The original Secret Protocol was signed May 14, 1937 (7199/E529736-41). For text of the Second Secret Protocol, signed Dec. 18, 1937, see vol. i, document No. 84; for the Third, signed Feb. 13, 1939, see vol. iv, document No. 451; for the Fourth, signed Feb. 24, 1940, see vol. viii, document No. 634; for the Fifth, signed June 18, 1940, see vol. ix, document No. 480.

*The increase of 400 tons a month over the quantity previously agreed upon in the Fifth Secret Protocol is contingent upon the receipt by Germany of corresponding deliveries from other countries. [Footnote in the original.]

² See vol. viii, document No. 634, footnote 1. This particular reference is on 8339/E590003.

The German Government Committee promises that it will make possible the delivery of arrears of this kind up to a total quantity of about 60,000 tons of iron within the next months. Allocation of deliveries under this head shall be governed primarily by a list presented by the Royal Italian Embassy in Berlin, together with any amended and supplementary lists which may be transmitted by the Royal Italian Embassy. Deliveries already performed on contracts contained in the list presented shall be charged against the total of 60,000 tons.

4. The Italian Government Committee calls attention to the particular urgency of an order for 2,000 tons of rails, 2,000 tons of standard steel, and 2,000 wheel-and-axle sets for the Italian State Railways.

The German Government Committee promises to see to it that the orders are placed and filled within the shortest possible time.

It is agreed that these deliveries shall be subject to deduction from the delivery commitments accepted by Germany.

5. Germany shall supply 100 tons of buna a month. Moreover, the German-owned rubber warehouses in Italian ports shall be placed at Italy's disposal.

Furthermore, Germany will release to Italy the tires not needed by herself from the stocks captured in the territories occupied by German forces. The details shall be arranged directly between the High Command of the Wehrmacht and the Under State Secretariat for War Materials Production.

If the Italian rubber industry should find itself able to use a larger quantity of buna, the German side will examine the possibility of supplying additional quantities of buna.

Germany is prepared to make skill and technical assistance available to the Italian rubber industry for the processing of buna.

The Government Committees shall appoint a German-Italian technical commission for the day-to-day handling and clarification of specific questions arising from the cooperative effort in administering the joint rubber supply program.

6. Germany will deliver copper, of Bor Mine grade, in monthly consignments of 500 tons, each. These quantities will be increased as soon as this is made possible by the expansion of production at the copper mines of Bor, which is now being vigorously pursued by the German authorities.

In lieu of these, the installments for the first 4 months, totaling 2,000 tons, will immediately be shipped from German stocks.

Furthermore, a single shipment will be made of 2,000 tons of brass, with a copper content of 63 to 67 percent.

7. The German Government Committee promises the release of 175 tons of nickel purchased in Norway by Italy, and of the 500 tons of tin, owned by Italy and last stored in Antwerp.

Done at Berlin, in duplicate, in the German and the Italian languages, on August 17, 1940.³

The Chairman of the
German Government
Committee
CARL CLODIUS

The Chairman of the
Italian Government
Committee
A. GIANNINI

³ In the files are additional agreements, protocols, and exchanges of letters under the same date, which deal with specific questions in German-Italian economic relations (2032/444835-84, 444889-904).

No. 362

85/22718-15

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1940—4:50 p. m.

No. 1746 of August 18

Received August 19—4:15 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1727 of August 16.¹

1) A relation similar to an alliance, between the United States, England, and Canada, is becoming more and more clearly distinguishable with today's meeting between Roosevelt and Mackenzie King. Similar importance is attributed in the press to this meeting as to the Brenner meeting. In fact, the United States as a "non-belligerent" occupies in relation to England the same position as Italy once did to Germany.

2) Public opinion is being systematically whipped into a state of panic. America did not desire a war, but war was being foisted on America by Germany. All the measures of the past few days are being justified by the necessity of defending America.

a) Naval and air bases: the American Government is trying, with all the means at its command, to strengthen England's will to resist, and is therefore prepared for assistance with the destroyers, which Congress does not yet wish to approve. The English offer is so attractive, however, that the price of 50 old destroyers seems slight and the opposition of Congress may fade. England may also be trying with her generous offer to obtain repeal of the Johnson Law,² so that

¹ Not printed (85/22697).

² The Johnson Act of Apr. 13, 1934 (48 Stat. 574), prohibited loans to countries which were in default on their war-debt payments to the United States.

after crediting the ceded island bases against old war debts, she may obtain a clear credit position in the United States. The legal justification for the delivery of the destroyers to England—possibly via Canada—is in preparation. The opposition of the Chief of Naval Operations, formally considered as binding, is being overridden by Roosevelt as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. Although the transfer of the destroyers to England would hardly have the importance of an act indicating a decision for war, as is imputed to it here for propagandistic reasons, it would finally eliminate the United States from the status of a neutral power in relation to Germany.

The criticism of thoughtful patriots directed at the inconsistency of the Government in weakening its own armaments through transfer of the destroyers is of considerable volume, but it can prevail only if the victory over England is soon secured.

b) Canada: Conversations are being conducted on the basis of Roosevelt's Kingston Declaration (August 18, 1938);^{*} they may assume the form of a defensive alliance. First of all, negotiations on protection in the Atlantic, to be exercised jointly, and to include Greenland and Iceland; also on provisions for the reception of the British Fleet in the event of a British defeat. In this event continuance of the war by England from Canada will force the American Government—under Roosevelt—to show its hand further. America can either not suffer a part of the Western Hemisphere to wage war against Europe, or must join it.

3) Well-informed politicians consider an American declaration of war on Germany unlikely, since war cannot be waged actively because of the fleet being tied down in the Pacific Ocean and also opposition in Congress and among the people cannot be overcome. On the other hand, America—under Roosevelt—will do everything to strengthen England's powers of resistance, to injure us, to arm herself, and to leave it to us to draw the conclusions from her behavior.

4) All Roosevelt's foreign policy measures are connected with his ambitions for re-election. Through the danger that he has conjured up he wants to commend himself to the American people as the indispensable savior of the country from the peril threatening it. In view of his previous success in producing a mass psychosis, his election prospects must be considered to have improved considerably.

THOMSEN

^{*} For the text of President Roosevelt's address at Kingston, Ontario, on Aug. 18, 1938, see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. VII, pp. 491-494.

No. 363

B14/B002188

The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 389 of August 18

ATHENS, August 18, 1940—10:00 p. m.

Received August 19—2:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 389 of August 15.¹

It is apparent from another conversation with State Secretary Mavroudis and with the Italian Minister that the Greeks are still in the dark as to Italy's real plans and when she will try to carry them into effect. The Government is endeavoring to exhibit good will toward Italy. Thus, contrary to Ciano's assertion (end of your telegram No. 381, Pol. IV 2666²) it has, upon Grazzi's representation, immediately recalled the Greek Consul General at Trieste. In opposition to popular sentiment, the Government has scrupulously avoided any anti-German or anti-Italian emphasis in its treatment of the sinking of the warship *Helle*,³ regarding which the Military Attaché has reported.⁴ The Government is convinced, however, that the development cannot be checked. Mavroudis is undecided whether Italy really wants the cession of territory or rather the overthrow of Metaxas. Grazzi has thus far made no demands (cf. Ciano's statement in telegram No. 389⁵), and moreover claims that he does not know what they are, although he thinks that for the present they would not aim at the cession of territory but rather the surrender of bases in Crete and the southern Peloponnesus for the attack on Egypt.

ERBACH

¹ Not printed (449/222767-68). This telegram stated that in spite of the Italian press campaign to liberate Albanians living under Greek rule, a direct military move by Italy, in the view of the Embassy in Rome, as transmitted in a message on Aug. 14, did not appear imminent.

² Not found.

³ The Greek light cruiser *Helle*, while at anchor off the harbor of Tinos, had been torpedoed by an unidentified submarine and sunk on Aug. 15 with loss of one life and injury to 29 persons. For the Greek communiqué on the sinking, the report of the Greek naval investigating commission, and other documents on the incident, see *Diplomatic Documents: Italy's Aggression Against Greece*, pp. 88-89, 92-97.

⁴ The Military Attaché's report has not been found.

⁵ This telegram (see footnote 1) contained the following passage relating to Ciano: "At a social gathering yesterday evening Ciano told Bismarck that Italy hoped by means of sufficient diplomatic pressure to be able to secure fulfillment of her demands on Greece."

No. 364

35/22721

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1754 of August 19

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1940—6:54 p. m.

Received August 20—5:15 a. m.

1) Dispatch of American military and naval commission to London took place, as I hear on good authority, without Kennedy being consulted in advance.

The latter, in indignation, asked to be recalled when he was informed by Churchill about the arrival of American officers. It required a personal telephone conversation on the part of Roosevelt to dissuade Kennedy from his intention to resign. Kennedy stated in this connection that the dispatching of missions was pointless if it was their duty to negotiate with English staffs regarding American aid; all help would be too late.

2) In another telegraphic report, according to my informant, Kennedy describes the devastating effect of German air attacks on England's ports, fields and armaments industry.

THOMSEN

No. 365

585/242695

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

No. 503

BERLIN, August 19, 1940.

zu Pol. IV 2427 g.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 334 of August 17.²

Should the Foreign Minister revert to the matter, you may inform him that we have no objection to the contemplated offer of a nonaggression pact. Please state at the same time, however, that in this question, too, we do not wish to appear as mediator, and therefore ask that your communication not be interpreted as advice from Germany.

WOERMANN

¹ Pol. IV 2427 g.: Not found.

² Document No. 358.

No. 366

F18/108-110

*Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department*¹

SECRET

BERLIN, August 19, 1940.

RM 24

W 3983 g.

Today the Foreign Minister received the Finnish Minister and at this opportunity he had Minister von Fieandt (retired), Chairman of the Finnish Government Committee for German-Finnish economic relations, who is now in Berlin for discussions, presented to him. The conversation first turned to the question which was the direct cause of Fieandt's trip to Berlin: delivery of machines and mining equipment to Petsamo in the value of 10 million reichsmarks and granting of a Reich guarantee to the I. G. Farben-Industrie, which is carrying out these deliveries. It is necessary to make the deliveries quickly so as to set in motion the extraction of nickel ore and carry out the recently concluded contract for delivery of 60 percent of the nickel ore production obtained at Petsamo. The German deliveries will be paid for later by counterdeliveries of Finnish nickel ore. For the intervening period the I. G. Farben-Industrie has applied for a Reich guarantee so as to reduce the risk to private enterprise. The Foreign Minister recognized the necessity of a Reich guarantee for these orders, and commissioned Minister Schnurre with taking up the matter in this sense with the Reich Minister of Finance.

The Finnish gentlemen then stated that the Finnish Government regarded the recently concluded German-Finnish commercial treaty of June 29² as a great and effective help, and they thanked the Foreign Minister for the cooperation in the economic field shown by this treaty. The conversation then turned to the two questions that had remained unsettled at the last negotiations:

1. The ships detained in Norwegian ports with their cargoes consisting in part of arms for the Finnish Government,
2. the Finnish wishes for delivery of arms as advanced at the recent negotiations by the Finnish side.

The Foreign Minister stated that today after the end of the French campaign the situation with regard to war material was different and that in evaluating the Finnish desires for arms and in the question of the release of the confiscated arms shipments in Norwegian harbors we could therefore use a somewhat different criterion. It would be determined what was still on hand *in natura* of the ship cargoes belonging to Finnish owners. This could be delivered to the Finnish Government. In case a return *in natura* should no longer be possible or in case the investigations of the circumstances should

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."² See document No. 74.

come upon special difficulties, other war material could be delivered instead of this and the wishes expressed by the Finnish side could thereby be taken into account. The Foreign Minister commissioned Minister Schnurre with contacting the OKW so as to approach the matter in accordance with these guidelines.³

The two Finnish gentlemen appeared to be much impressed by this conversation, which was held in a friendly atmosphere.

SCHNURRE

³ The following entries in the Halder diary further document the increased German interest in Finland during August:

Aug. 22: "Rössing (Attaché Helsinki): Report on Finnish 16-division Army. Reversal of attitude of the Führer with respect to Finland. Support with arms and munitions. Negotiations for transit of 2 mountain divisions by the Arctic Ocean Road to Kirkenes . . ."

Aug. 26: . . . "The Commander in Chief of the Army returns. Was with the Führer today to report. Results: . . . Finland is to receive arms and airplanes from us. If the Russians attack the Finns, we want to occupy Petsamo . . ."

Aug. 31: . . . "The Führer after lunch talks with several Attachés.

Russia: The Russians should understand

(a) . . .

(b) That the transports at present going to Finland are only shipments of arms which were withheld during the war and which can now be made (instead of guns of large caliber which can be used by Germany, these are of medium caliber).

(c) Reinforcement of Kirkenes. For this purpose transit through Finland. This is directed against England.

Finland. The Führer wants to equip Finland with supplies richly and generously. Speedily!

In this instance also directions governing statements on the subject of arms deliveries, as in the case of Russia . . ."

In a memorandum of Aug. 24, concerning a conference with Göring on that day (introduced at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals as document No. 1456-PS, but not included in the published collection), General Thomas of OKW recorded:

"Information on the Finland business. The Reich Marshal said to me that he had directed the Air Ministry to make deliveries as liberally as possible. Speedy assistance to Finland is essential, especially because Finland is ready to make concessions in every respect. The business should be completed quickly in close cooperation with Veltjens."

In a further memorandum concerning a meeting attended by Thomas on Aug. 30 it was recorded:

"Situation in the East. Any further political or military advance of the Russians in the European area would be displeasing to the Führer. He has given a directive that support of Finland be carried out immediately on a very extensive scale. The fact that Germany is giving assistance to Finland is to be made known to the Russians, since the Führer believes that then the Russians will shrink from further steps."

No. 367

2281/481468

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, August 19, 1940.

I

As I have been told by Count Ciano, the Italians are about to increase the 6 divisions in Albania by 3 more, to a total of 9.

Reinforcement of the Italian forces in Albania is *not* a signal for imminent military actions, but is designed to lend emphasis at the right moment to the impending settling up of matters with Greece which for the time being is being pushed only by diplomatic means.

II

In the same conversation Count Ciano assured me once more that no military action against Yugoslavia is planned at the present. The proposal to us about certain consultations (Roatta-Rintelen)¹ implied only a "studio." Count Ciano showed me a telegram to Alfieri (formulated by the Duce but sent out over Ciano's name), instructing him to convey this to the Reich Foreign Minister.

III

The launching of Graziani's offensive, according to Count Ciano's statements in the same conversation, depends not so much on the truly infernal heat in Cyrenaica, but mainly on Marshal Graziani's readaptation to his own plans of certain preparations previously made by Balbo and adapted to Balbo's plan of action.

M[ACKENSEN]

¹ See document No. 343.

No. 368

121/119818

*The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Military
Commander in France to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 413 of August 20

PARIS, August 20, 1940.

Received August 20—8:10 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Please approve immediate anti-Semitic measures which might serve as a basis for later removal of Jews from unoccupied France as well.

1. Prohibition on return of Jews across the line of demarcation to occupied France.

2. Registration requirements for Jews domiciled in the occupied area.

3. Labeling of Jewish stores in occupied France.

4. Appointment of trustees for Jewish stores, businesses, stocks of goods, and department stores whose owners have fled. The measures mentioned can be justified as in the interest of the security of the German occupying power and can be carried out by French authorities.¹

ABETZ

¹ A reply from Sonnleithner of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat on Aug. 21, reads: "With regard to the proposal in your telegram No. 413 of Aug. 20, which is regarded favorably here, a decision will be made by higher authority." (121/119817)

No. 369

F8/0204-0205

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, August 20, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received August 20—11:30 p. m.

No. 2830 of August 20

Immediately after my return ¹ I had a thorough discussion with the Spanish Foreign Minister on the general situation.

With respect to England the Minister stated that he will have the dispatches of the Spanish Ambassador in London during the last 2 weeks assembled for me; but they were rather lacking in content since the Duke of Alba was confining himself merely to forwarding statements by English governmental departments. A confidential observer who, for this reason was dispatched to London, has not yet begun to report. But from private news from England and from the dejection at the English Embassy in Madrid the Minister concludes that in England the conviction that the war is lost is gaining the upper hand. From the English Army the Minister expects no great resistance, as soon as the cadres of the original English Army, already much knocked about in Flanders, and a certain number of sports flyers, etc., have been killed or wounded. The mood prevailing in Portugal and Morocco is an excellent thermometer for England's dangerous position. In Lisbon there appears more and more inclination to draw closer to Spain, and in Morocco the danger of cooperation with the English has also diminished in the last few days.

The Foreign Minister then spontaneously reverted to an earlier Spanish offer to enter the war on our side under certain conditions.² I had the distinct impression that the Foreign Minister considers Spain's participation in the war as practically certain. The question of the military assistance that Spain needs from us is being handled by General Vigón, who expects Admiral Canaris here again in the next few days. The preparation of public opinion is in the hands of the Minister of the Interior; strong attacks on England in the Spanish press, against which the English Embassy is constantly protesting, clearly show this tendency. The economic consequences of Spain's entry into the war leave the Minister strangely unworried, since he expects England soon to be defeated. Regarding Spain's requirements of gasoline, grain, coal, rubber, etc., in the event of war, my deputy has reported the data officially furnished him in telegrams Nos. 2784 of August 15³

¹ See document No. 274.

² See vol. ix, document No. 488.

³ See document No. 355 and footnote 2.

and 2800 of August 16.⁴ How much the Spanish Government expects to participate in the war is also evident from the strictly confidential communication the Foreign Minister conveyed to me today, that at the conclusion of the Spanish-Portuguese supplementary agreement to the Non-Aggression Pact a secret oral agreement was made that Portugal would give Spain an entirely free hand for an attack on Gibraltar.⁵

Although the Minister no longer considers the danger threatening from Morocco quite as acute as before, he still requests us to recommend to the Italians that they demand through the Armistice Commission the delivery of a considerable number of "400" tanks and "500" aircraft. The Minister admits that earlier statements about 1,400 planes located in French North Africa had been exaggerated.

The Minister of the Interior returns tonight from an official trip. I shall speak with him tomorrow and report further.⁶

STOHRER

⁴ Document No. 355.

⁵ See documents Nos. 95 and 176.

⁶ See document No. 373.

No. 370

285/181842-43

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*¹

BERLIN, August 20, 1940.

Pol. VII 2025 g.

Leading Arab personalities have in recent times repeatedly approached our foreign Missions with the request to bring about a policy statement by the Reich Government on the independence movement of the Arab countries and to promote support for their aspirations. This affords occasion to state the following fundamental considerations about the coming reorganization of the Arab region:

Germany pursues no political interests in the Mediterranean area, whose southern and eastern part is formed by the Arab world. Germany will therefore let Italy take the lead in the political reorganization of the Arab area. This consequently rules out any German claim to political leadership, or the sharing of leadership with Italy in the Arab territories, which consist of the Arabian peninsula, Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria-Lebanon, and Iraq.

¹ This circular was sent to the Embassies in Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the Soviet Union; to the Legations in Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Iran, Rumania, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia; and to the Consulates at Geneva, Izmir, Tabriz, Tetuan, and Trebizond.

This political *désintéressement*, however, does not at all mean that in these areas Germany renounces the pursuit of interests in matters of economy, transportation, and cultural policy. First and foremost, Germany will assert, and settle in concert with Italy, her claims with respect to participation in the exploitation of oil resources, the securing of her air routes, and the continuation of her archaeological activities.

These directives, however, must be treated confidentially. They are not of a nature to be divulged to representatives of foreign powers. Especially, they must not be made known to Arab personalities. It is desirable, nevertheless, on every occasion to stress to them the common German and Arab interest in England's defeat, and assure them of Germany's full sympathy in their people's fight for liberation. Please avoid entering into any discussion, however, of the question of the future political organization of the Arab region, and if necessary observe a noncommittal attitude; on no account are you to say anything to Arab representatives about a *désintéressement* on the part of Germany.

By direction :
WOERMANN

No. 371

1001/395901-04

The Chairman of the French Delegation to the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions With the German Armistice Commission

[Translation] ¹

WIESBADEN, August 20, 1940.

MR. MINISTER: In reply to note No. 80 of July 19, 1940,² I have the honor to present to you the information requested:

1. What was the total as of June 22, 1940, of the holdings of the Bank of France for its own account of:

- A—Gold (bullion and coins), stated in French francs and in gold weight;
 - B—balances abroad;
 - C—bills of exchange, checks, and other claims on foreign countries;
 - D—foreign securities (face value and market value);
 - E—foreign currency (specie);
- For B through C separately according to currencies.

¹ In the course of the German translation appear several notations indicating minor discrepancies between the text of the original German note and corresponding passages of the French reply. These notations have been omitted. The original French text has not been found.

² See *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 72-73, footnote 1.

Reply:

A—The gold holdings of the Bank of France, on June 22, 1940, amounted to 84,616,343,928.02 francs, for a total gold weight of 1,777,450.900 kg., on the basis of 1 franc equaling 0.02334 gm. gold, 0.900 fine.

No change in the composition of the gold holdings has occurred since June 22.

B—The following tabulation reflects the status of the balances abroad of the Bank of France on June 22 and July 25:

	June 22	July 25
£	88, 991. 18. 8	104, 018. 17. 9
\$ (USA)	480, 465. 95	510, 878. 42
\$ (Canada)	16, 848. 14	16, 778. 74
\$ Hungarian National Bank . .	648, 295. 34	648, 295. 34
Norwegian crowns	19, 857. 38	19, 857. 38
Swedish crowns	52, 917. 21	92, 465. 03
Swiss francs	55, 909. 17	75, 104. 30
Belgas	2, 668. 71	2, 668. 71
Netherlands guilders	1, 191. 80	1, 696. 93
Italian lire	66, 668. 64	66, 668. 64
Reichsmarks	2, 008. 97	2, 008. 97
Lei	23, 638. 00	23, 638. 00
Pesetas	34, 347. 16	34, 347. 16
Rubles	42, 627, 382. 66	42, 627, 382. 66

C—Bills of exchange, checks, and other claims on foreign countries totaled approximately 20 million French francs.

D—No foreign securities represented the countervalue of foreign currency operations either on June 22 or on July 25. This statement naturally does not refer to the investment of the basic capital of the Bank.

E—The Bank possessed no foreign currencies (specie) as its property on either of the mentioned dates.

2. What was the total of the holdings, as of June 22, of the types mentioned under 1 A through 1 C held for their own accounts by:

A—the Currency Stabilization Fund (Fonds de Stabilisation des Devises);

B—other official French agencies in occupied and unoccupied France in France and abroad.

Reply:

A—The Currency Stabilization Fund

a) Gold

June 22, 1940: 271,835.7736 kg. valued at 12,940,863,240.99 francs on the basis of 47,605.446 francs per kilogram of pure gold;

July 25, 1940: 260,015.0650 kg. valued at 12,378,133,136.04 francs on the aforesaid basis.

b) Accounts abroad (the underlined amounts indicate debits) :

	<i>June 22</i>	<i>July 25</i>
£.	6, 258, 492. 17. 8	5, 895, 927. 5. 7
\$ (USA)	254, 247, 938. 93	243, 921, 977. 95
\$ (Canada)	1, 197, 034. 208	1, 176, 209. 51
Guilders	1, 313, 025. 16	1, 363, 405. 16
Swiss francs	4, 658, 926. 16	5, 754, 724. 27
Belgas	<u>40, 891, 675. 73</u>	<u>15, 453, 272. 27</u>
Swedish crowns	41, 354. 00	41, 354. 00
Danish crowns	64, 822. 61	64, 822. 61
Norwegian crowns	<u>44, 925. 55</u>	<u>41, 589. 52</u>
£ (Egypt)	32, 628. 54	37, 632. 04
Escudos	595, 852. 08	152, 591. 42
Italian lire	66, 052. 77	48, 052. 11
Pesos	386, 031. 77	313, 814. 16
£ (Turkey)	885, 981. 536	885, 981. 536
Banknotes and coins:		
Luxembourg francs	6, 582, 836. 65	7, 188, 896. 20
Belgian francs	1, 042, 585. 25	2, 689, 349. 00
£ (coins)	21, 876. 8. 5	22, 463. 18. 0

c) Bills of exchange, checks, and other claims

<i>June 22</i>	<i>July 25</i>
None	None

B—Accounts of official French agencies in the occupied and unoccupied zone and in foreign countries, administered by the Bank

a) Gold: none

b) Accounts in foreign countries:

	<i>June 22</i>	<i>July 25</i>
"Special account of the Bank of France" in New York	\$ 14, 994, 303. 54	16, 867, 471. 22
Administration of the Mint	£ 2, 794. 10. 5	2, 794. 10. 5
Clearing Offices:		
Iran	£ 28, 018. 19. 8	28, 018. 19. 8
Turkey	£ 8, 186. 13. 4	8, 186. 19. 8
Tourist Office	\$ 21, 461. 17	21, 461. 17
	£ 202. 0. 5	202. 0. 5
Swiss francs	20, 100. 00	20, 100. 00
Danube-Sava-Adriatic Railway	\$ 2, 915, 306. 41	2, 915, 306. 41
	£ 16, 885. 0. 4	16, 885. 0. 4
Blocked Italian lire	2, 816, 024. 10	2, 816, 024. 10

c) Bills of exchange, checks, and other claims on foreign countries: None.

3. What was the total of the holdings, as of June 22, of the types mentioned under 1 A through 1 C held in France and abroad for other accounts by the Bank of France, the Currency Stabilization Fund, or other official French agencies in occupied and unoccupied France in France and abroad ?

Reply:

A—Credits held by the Bank of France for other accounts:

a) In gold:

- 1) Deposited with the Bank of France: 420,778,372.18 frs.
- 2) Deposited with the Federal Reserve Bank, New York, [for] Bank of Poland: Pure gold 64,177,212.00. This deposit was withdrawn by the Bank of Poland on July 25.

b) Foreign currency credits for other accounts administered by the Bank of France:

Bank of Poland: \$676,318.82

This deposit was withdrawn by the Bank of Poland on July 25.

c) Bills of exchange, checks, and other claims: None.

B—Credits held by the Currency Stabilization Fund for other accounts: None.

C—Credits held by other official French agencies:

Information has been requested. However, any figures will be low in comparison with those shown in the present note.

4. Where are the deposits of the gold held for their own accounts by the Bank of France, etc., and what are the amounts of the holdings in each deposit?

Reply:

	June 22	July 25	
London	10, 801, 000, 000. 00	Frs.	} Unchanged
New York	30, 657, 000, 000. 00	"	
Fort de France	12, 099, 000, 000. 00	"	
Dakar	31, 056, 000, 000. 00	"	
Casablanca	3, 000, 000. 00	"	
	844, 616, 000, 000. 00 [sic] Francs		

5. Where are the deposits of any gold held for the account of the central banks of issue or official agencies of Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and the former Czechoslovakia, separated according to the countries mentioned, and what are the amounts in each deposit?

Reply:

Bank of Poland (Dakar)	33 million francs
Belgian National Bank	None
Luxembourg	None
The Netherlands	None
Norway	None
Czechoslovakia	None

As a memorandum:

4,944 packing cases, contents unknown to the Bank, deposited by the Belgian National Bank, and stored in Dakar.

700 packing cases (approximately), contents unknown to the Bank, deposited by the Bank of Poland, stored in Dakar.

6. What changes have occurred in figures 1 through 5 since June 22, 1940?

Reply:

The changes were indicated above under the respective headings.

Accept, etc.

HUNTZIGER

No. 372

449/222778

The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 359 of August 21

ATHENS, August 21, 1940—3:00 p. m.

Received August 22—2:20 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 389 of August 18¹ and the telegram of the Military Attaché of August 20.²

The inquiry of the Chief of the General Staff³ and my conversation yesterday with the influential, pro-German Minister of Justice confirms the view that notwithstanding the rebuff administered to them, the Greeks still place their hopes in Germany, which could not permit Italy to play the same game with the Greeks that the Allies played in 1916. Italian thrusts, especially the numerous attacks on ships and the exploitation of the assassination of Daout Hodja⁴ are, despite the pacifying influence of the Government, regarded by popular sentiment as cynical provocations. The resulting indignation against Italy makes it difficult for the Greek Government to obtain domestic acceptance of the Italian demands and consequently also to reach a decision to yield.

I would suggest that this point be brought to the attention of Rome.⁵

ERBACH

¹ Document No. 363.

² Not found.

³ Gen. A. Papagos.

⁴ See document No. 333.

⁵ Nothing further found.

No. 373

186/74294-95

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

MADRID, August 21, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received August 21—5:00 p. m.

No. 2838 of August 21

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 2830 of August 20.¹

Admiral Canaris just informed me about his latest conversation with General Vigón. He will hand Canaris by the end of this week a detailed list of military (material and personnel) assistance that Spain believes she needs to enter the war, not only for the Gibraltar enterprise, but in general. Vigón also promised a list concerning the economic aid required by Spain in the case of a longer duration of the war.² It might well be compared with the data procured by my deputy (telegram No. 2784 of August 15³).

Vigón stated that Franco, who is in Coruña at present, said that he would consider an early entry into the war as useful, since through Britain's economic measures Spain already had one foot in the war. Franco was said to have added that he would reconcile himself even to a war of longer duration.

The Minister of the Interior is still out of town, so that I shall not see him until tomorrow.

STOHRER

¹ Document No. 369.² The detailed lists referred to have not been found.³ See document No. 355 and footnote 2.

No. 374

F8/0203

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 2837 of August 21

MADRID, August 21, 1940.

Received August 21—6:45 p. m.

The Spanish Foreign Minister gave the new Spanish Ambassador in Berlin,¹ who has just left, a memorandum² to take along for the information of the German Foreign Ministry, which was drafted by Franco in person and deals with the development of Spanish-

¹ Gen. Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteiros.² Not found.

Portuguese relations since the outbreak of the war. The Minister handed me another copy, from which the fact emerges that Portugal, in growing ideological affinity with Spain, is moving away from England. After her neutrality declaration independently issued at the beginning of the war, Portugal had been silent with regard to any rapprochement and had treated England coldly, since Oliveira^a knows that England is working against him. In order to get out of her traditional dependence on England, Portugal had at first concluded the Friendship Treaty. Spain reminded Portugal at every opportunity of the encumbrance of her policy by her relationship with England. Spanish pressure brought to bear on Portugal at Italy's entry into the war, in pointing out that a landing of English forces in Portugal would be considered as an attack on Spain, is countered by Portugal with the remark that she did not feel herself threatened by England, and with the conclusion of an amplification of the Non-Aggression Pact. The Supplementary Protocol gave maximum security to Spain with simultaneous strengthening of Portugal's position with respect to England. Portugal was undertaking a departure from English policy and an entrance into the Spanish sphere of influence.

It might perhaps be advisable not to let the Spanish Ambassador know, when he conveys this communication, that the contents of this memorandum by the Generalissimo are in my hands, too, and in substance have been transmitted by me.

STOHRER

^a i. e., Salazar.

No. 375

449/222779-81

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, August 21, 1940.

I had a conversation yesterday with the acting Chief of the Commercial Policy Department in the Greek Foreign Ministry, M. Kyrou, regarding the difficulties which have arisen between Germany and Greece.¹ I told M. Kyrou very emphatically that we were very much surprised at the conduct of Greece. I could only advise the Greek

¹ Kyrou had come to Berlin for preliminary talks respecting the negotiations of the German-Greek Government Committee scheduled to begin Aug. 28. Kyrou had been charged by Minister President Metaxas to discuss the outstanding questions affecting German-Greek economic relations. On Aug. 16 he had met with Minister Moraht, the head of the section of the Economic Policy Department dealing with southeastern Europe, and Moraht had stated the main German complaints against the Greek Government. Moraht's memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (9924/E694686-88)

Government in the interest of Greece herself to see to its prompt correction. I referred him at the same time to the communication which Minister Moraht already conveyed to him a few days ago.

M. Kyrou made the following statements respecting the individual complaints:

1. *Deliveries of chromium ore*

The Greek Government would make a statement in this matter entirely satisfactory to us at the impending negotiations of the Government Committees.

2. *Delivery of war material to England*

M. Kyrou gave the assurance that these deliveries would be completely stopped, and referred to corresponding statements on the subject conveyed to our Minister in Athens.*

3. *Trade relations with England*

I told M. Kyrou that we had already received formal declarations from nearly all European governments that in view of England's attempt to impose a blockade on Europe, they would stop all exports to the countries at war with Germany. Owing to Greece's unusual geographic situation we had not yet demanded such a declaration from Greece. The attitude of the Greek Government, unsatisfactory to us in a number of questions in which we had an interest, would now impel us to do so, however; and this all the more because we were constantly receiving reports that the English Mediterranean Fleet was being supplied from Greece.

On this point M. Kyrou confined himself to taking cognizance of my statement.

4. *Voyages of Greek ships for England*

I told M. Kyrou that the fact that the greatest part of the Greek merchant fleet was still in the service of England was perhaps the gravest charge we had to make against Greece. We were unable to accept any of the Greek legal counterarguments. It was furthermore really incomprehensible to us that Greece was now even forcing Greek sailors on the basis of legal regulations to sail to England. We expected without fail that Greece would at once not only stop this legal coercion but also prohibit any further sailings of Greek flagships to England. The announcement by the German Government of the blockade of England offered the best pretext for that.

Referring to the Greek memorandum given to Minister Prince Erbach in Athens,³ M. Kyrou kept on trying to explain the extraor-

* With report W J 3 Nr. 9 of Aug. 20 (9924/E694683-85) Erbach had sent a copy of a pro memoria dated Aug. 17 from the Greek Government; he noted that, according to the pro memoria, "the Greek Government has now banned all export of war material and munitions. Orders already placed with Greek firms are also included in the ban."

³ Not found.

dinarily difficult situation of Greece. The conversation closed with my repeating to him that we regarded all arguments advanced by Greece as invalid. Even the risk of seizure of the ships by England could not be decisive, particularly since he had admitted to me himself that nearly all the Greek owners of the ships were living in London. If the Greek Government persisted in its present attitude, the dangers ensuing for the over-all Greek interests might be graver than any temporary seizure of ships belonging to Greeks living abroad.

M. Kyrrou was rather discouraged as he left me and said that he would talk immediately with the [Greek] Minister and then report to his Government.

This morning I informed M. Kyrrou by telephone with reference to our conversation that according to a report received from Bucharest today, the Rumanian *Official Gazette* of August 20 has published a decree prohibiting the sailing of Rumanian ships in English waters.⁴

M. Kyrrou told me that he had already been in touch with his Government in Athens after conferring with the Minister, and thought that he would be able to tell me before the close of the day that a corresponding or similar decree would be published in Athens within a few days.

It was my impression that this last statement perhaps anticipates the actual situation somewhat, but I believe that a sufficient show of determination on our part will force the Greeks to enact such a decree.⁵

CLODIUS

⁴ The Bucharest report has not been found.

⁵ The documentation on the subsequent phase of the problem is fragmentary, but the question of the sailing of Greek ships to Great Britain continued to be discussed. Relevant documents are filmed on serial 9924.

No. 376

172/135447

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 21, 1940.

The Rumanian Minister presented to me today a copy of an atlas just published in Bucharest, which contains a collection of reproductions of German, Italian, and Hungarian ethnic maps of Rumania and especially Transylvania, dating from 1857 to 1930. In so doing he referred to the copy presented yesterday to the Reich Foreign Minister by the Chief of Protocol. He requested me to explain to the Reich Foreign Minister on the basis of these maps how unacceptable the demands now being made by Hungary are. Their acceptance would result in the cession of 2.4 million Rumanians to Hungary, while only 180,000 Hungarians would remain on Rumanian territory. In view

of the Hungarian attitude the only possible course, after all, would be for the Führer to arbitrate.

I declined going into the details of Hungary's wishes and referred once more to our well-known position in the question of arbitration.

The Minister persisted in his view that the question could not be resolved without German intervention. The alternative to arbitration might be "advice," such as had been given Rumania in respect to Bulgaria.

I persisted in my negative attitude toward suggestions of this sort.

M. Romalo took a very favorable view of the negotiations with Bulgaria, now that Rumania has accepted all of Bulgaria's territorial demands.

WOERMANN

No. 377

449/222782

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Greece

Telegram

No. 400

BERLIN, August 22, 1940.

Pol. IV 2477 g.

The Greek Minister informed us by instruction on August 20 that the Greek Government had received alarming reports of the transfer to Albania of Italian troops, including motorized forces and tanks, and concentration of these troops on the Greek border. It expected an Italian invasion any day, and asked the German Government for advice. Upon the reply that we could not quite see what sort of advice was wanted, the Minister stated more concretely that he wanted information on Italian intentions. I told the Minister, as my purely personal opinion, that an Italian action did not seem to me to be imminent. The Minister asked that the request be conveyed to the Foreign Minister and that he be given an answer. By decision of the Foreign Minister this matter will be given dilatory treatment.¹ No further reply is intended.

WOERMANN

¹ In reporting to the Foreign Minister on his interview with the Greek Minister, Woermann had suggested in a memorandum of Aug. 20 (449/222776-77) that the Minister might be told that there was no evidence at hand of an Italian intention to attack Greece unless Greece gave provocation.

No. 378

1001/305914-15

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, August 22, 1940.

Minister Hemmen telephoned the following report from Wiesbaden, which he also intends to repeat by teletype:

The French were called upon by a note of August 8¹ to deposit daily into an account with the Bank of France the equivalent of 20 million RM as part payment toward the occupation costs, with retro-active effect to June 25, 1940, the amounts in arrears as soon as possible, and the future amounts in advance, by 10-day periods. The payments in arrears due on August 21 would therefore have been 1,140 million RM and those for the 10-day period ending the last of August, 220 million RM, totaling 1,360 million RM.

General Huntziger, by notes of August 12 and 19,² raised objections to these demands, claiming that they were far too high and that they also included expenditures incurred for troops stationed in France not for occupation purposes but for carrying on the war with England. These objections were rejected, the latter by recalling that the French had been expressly told at Compiègne before the signing of the Armistice Agreement that "the strength of the German occupation forces would be governed by the requirement of future German strategy."

Payment of the amount due has not been made so far. General Huntziger made additional oral representations, with General von Stülpnagel on August 20, and with Minister Hemmen on August 21,³ asserting that Germany's action was in violation of the Armistice. Concerning the occupation costs he repeated the earlier arguments, which Minister Hemmen had rejected on the grounds stated earlier. He also brought up the subject of Germany's demand for establishment of a control commission for French goods and foreign currency movements, which was incompatible with France's sovereignty. Minister Hemmen also maintained this demand. General Huntziger finally described Germany's steps for the incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine also as a breach of the Armistice Agreement, but Minister Hemmen would not go into this matter since it was primarily a political one.

¹ See document No. 309.

² A German translation of General Huntziger's note of Aug. 12 was transmitted to the Foreign Ministry in an unnumbered Wiesbaden telegram of Aug. 17 (365/206530-32) and that of Aug. 19 in Wiesbaden telegram No. 76 of Aug. 20 (365/206544-47). The French text of both notes is in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 159-160, and 162.

³ The minutes of General Huntziger's conversation with Minister Hemmen on Aug. 21 are in *ibid.*, pp. 164-171. Hemmen had reported this conversation in telegram No. 80 of Aug. 22 (365/206569-70).

After these two conversations General Huntziger flew to Vichy to make his report. Minister Hemmen has the impression that with this the armistice negotiations have entered the anticipated critical stage. He thinks it not at all impossible that Marshal Pétain will write another letter to the Führer.

Minister Hemmen discussed the situation with General von Stülpnagel, who will in turn report to the OKW.

It now remains to be seen whether the French are going to persist in their refusal to pay, which is not likely to be the case with respect to the entire sum. The means available to exert pressure are the following: an embargo on all imports, especially of foodstuffs and coal, and an extension of the military occupation. A refusal to relax the demarcation line would be scarcely effective as a means of pressure because the French apparently have already realized that a relaxation of the order such as they are trying to secure cannot be considered.

I shall continue to study the matter in cooperation with the OKW and the other departments concerned.

Herewith to be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the Under State Secretary, Political Department.⁴

WIEHL

⁴ In a further memorandum of Aug. 23 Wiehl recorded that Hemmen had reported as follows from Wiesbaden:

"General Huntziger returned from Vichy and informed Minister Hemmen orally that the French Government would make the part payment toward the occupation costs to the Bank of France, as demanded by us. Today payment of 220 million RM will be made for the last 10-day period in August, and on Monday, Aug. 26, the payment covering the period since June 25, 1940, in the amount of 1,140 million RM. The French Government intends however to restate in a written note its position that these payments are too high." (1001/305911)

The French note of Aug. 26 is in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, pp. 171-174.

No. 379

85/22789-40

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1940—1:00 a. m.

No. 1796 of August 22

Received August 23—12:50 p. m.

In a conversation today, the Russian Ambassador anticipated a question regarding the course and result of his conversation with Sumner Welles on Russo-American trade relations and spontaneously declared his dissatisfaction with the dilatory progress that was being made. For lack of good will on the part of the Americans, the conversations remained superficial and always revolved around the same arguments. Russia wants to normalize trade relations with the United States but feels the lack of all American cooperation in the

matter, since the Americans are apparently not ready to deliver those finished products which are important to Russia. To be sure, Russia was suddenly being offered as much tonnage as she wanted, but this was of no use to Russia. For, in the first place, she herself had no scarcity of tonnage—there were four Russian steamers at present in American ports—and second, the ships could not be loaded for lack of goods.

Oumansky expressed himself very bitterly regarding official American criticism of the annexation of the Baltic countries, confiscation of the assets of these states, and the artificial arousing of fears of a Russian attack on Alaska—all measures in crass contradiction to the attempts being made today toward conciliation of Russia. Russia did not forget so quickly, he said. Future relations between the USSR and the United States would for a long time to come be affected by such psychological errors on the part of the Americans.

With regard to this statement of Oumansky's, it must be borne in mind that the Soviet Government has doubtless been badly hit by America's curtailment of exports in recent months, and that Oumansky therefore regards as inadequate the results thus far achieved in the negotiations with the American Government, particularly since Soviet Russia is extremely dependent upon the import of certain American products. Actually, however, as I have repeatedly had occasion to report in the last few weeks, America has, *from her point of view*, showed notable cooperativeness with Soviet Russia, and it is also unmistakable that she is trying to improve her relations with Soviet Russia within the scope of her present foreign policy.¹

At the beginning of the conversation, in words that had the ring of sincerity, Oumansky mentioned the anniversary, today, of the German-Russian Treaty of Friendship.

THOMSEN

¹ In telegram No. 2094 of Sept. 30 (35/22925) Thomsen reported that Oumansky had stated that his conversations with Hull and Welles had made no progress, in fact had not even been resumed.

No. 380

121/119828

Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 442 of August 23

PARIS, August 23, 1940—7:00 p. m.

Received August 23—8:30 p. m.

Georges Bonnet, who is obviously seeking to divest himself of responsibility for the political events of 1939, made the following statement to me, which is of interest for the assessment of French war guilt. A year ago today a conference took place between leading officials of

the Quai d'Orsay and the French generals' corps. At that conference on August 23, 1939, he, Bonnet, counseled that the Poles should be induced to take a conciliatory attitude toward Germany, and suggested as a basis for negotiations with Germany the cession of Danzig, the Corridor, and Eastern Upper Silesia. General Gamelin and the other leading military figures took the position, which contrasts with their position during the crisis in September, 1938, that one should not shy from allowing matters to develop toward a war, since the military and international situation of the Reich did not warrant the favorable assessment accorded to it by Bonnet.

Related to this, was the report from a reliable source that General Georges, who is usually regarded as sober-minded, gave credence to an agent's report received on August 30, 1939, according to which in connection with the military preparations against Poland a "revolt" in the "Prussian (!) officer corps" had been observed.

ABETZ

No. 381

320/192884-86

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Missions in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, August 23, 1940.
e. o. W 3824 g. I.

1. Buenos Aires (No. 711)¹
2. Santiago (No. 238)²
3. Montevideo
4. La Paz

To 1 and 2.

With reference to your reports regarding arms deliveries.³

To 3.

With reference to your telegram No. 143 of July 3, paragraph 5.⁴

To 4.

With reference to your telegram No. 113 of July 13.⁵

To 1-4.

1. We are very anxious to participate extensively in the future rearmament of the South American countries. We shall be able to

¹ Supplied from Buenos Aires telegram No. 978 of Aug. 28 (299/185648).

² Supplied from Santiago telegram No. 204 of Aug. 27 (5577/E412089).

³ For Buenos Aires reports on arms deliveries see footnotes 6 and 7. Schoen had reported a Chilean request for Germany to supply armaments to the Chilean Army and Navy in his telegrams No. 145 of June 28 (5577/E412097), No. 161 of July 10 (1054/312344-45), No. 184 of July 31 (5577/E412092) and No. 189 of Aug. 7 (5577/E412091).

⁴ Not printed (64/44322).

⁵ Not printed (1018/308936).

make virtually unlimited deliveries as soon as the war is over and to meet all requests for arms of German manufacture. We are prepared to negotiate immediately about such deliveries. We hope thereby to be able to prefinance our large immediate needs of products from there after the end of the war most easily by advance drafts on later payments. Possibilities for delivery of individual types, delivery dates, and prices would have to be settled in separate negotiations.

2. If the question of delivery should be brought up before the end of the war, I request that you do not reject this in principle but point out the special difficulties (possibilities of transportation, delivery dates) that exist during the war.

3. Captured arms. After the conclusion of peace our armament industry can presumably be only partly occupied with supplying the needs of our own Wehrmacht and will consequently be dependent on exports. The delivery of captured arms would, however, restrict export possibilities perceptibly, since the receiving countries would be dependent on Belgian and French supply firms for spare parts and would continue to make their future purchases from these firms. For that reason deliveries of captured matériel will for the time being be limited to exceptional emergency cases, and could be considered for individual South American states only for special political reasons in order to ensure imports of important raw materials or to fight the competition of the United States. Up to this point for information only.

You are therefore asked not to reject requests for captured arms in principle, but to avoid negotiations about details and point out that the booty captured in the west cannot be sorted and fully inspected for several months, so that at the moment it cannot be foreseen to what extent the particular wishes of the authorities there can be fulfilled.

Supplement for Buenos Aires:

With reference to your No. 766 of July 10.*

Pursuant to a voluntary arrangement between Siemens and Krupp and with the approval of the Reich Government, Krupp is taking over the direction of the delivery syndicate. The Embassy will remain in charge of the negotiations with the Government there.

With reference to your No. 795 of July 17.¹

We are prepared to negotiate about details of armament deliveries in case the information given to the agent of Siemens should be confirmed and the Government there should approach the Embassy or

* Not printed (299/185615-16). In this Thermann had reported the Argentine Finance Minister's suggestion that German arms deliveries should be handled by a consortium headed by the Siemens firm.

¹ Not printed (299/185635-37). In this Thermann had passed on details of the Argentine armaments program as given to Siemens' representative.

the syndicate. We consider it better to let Argentina take the first step so that we may exploit the pressure of the need for an outlet for Argentine products as a lever for the letting of an armament contract to Germany. I therefore request that you advise the syndicate to observe restraint.

With reference to your No. 753 of July 5.^a

The question of prefinancing is thereby decided for the time being in the sense of section 1.

WIEHL

^a Not printed (341/199486-87).

No. 382

247/164183-87

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, August 23, 1940.
zu WV 3188.¹

Subject: Conference on the problem of an economic community between the Greater German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark.

Minister Gunnar Larsen, Director Sthyr, and Department Director [*Ministerialdirektor*] Wassard, the Danes who arrived from Copenhagen this morning, called on Ambassador Ritter. The Germans present were: Minister Eisenlohr, Ministerialrat Ebner (Ministry for Food and Agriculture), Ministerialrat Imhoff (Ministry of Economics), Consul General Krüger,² and Counselor van Scherpenberg.

Minister Gunnar Larsen made the following statement on the basis of a document which he did not hand over:

After making as thorough a study as the short time available permitted, the Danish Government had come to the conclusion that it was still impossible for it to obtain a clear picture of the consequences of the establishment of a customs and currency union for the Danish economy. It had been necessary to consult leaders in the Danish economy and thereby the Danish economic organizations had been made acquainted with the problem. They had advised against the establishment of a customs and currency union. The reason given was that it would be impossible to put an economic community into effect during the war, because the Danish restrictions on imports and exports must be maintained for the duration of the war. Moreover, an adjustment of the Danish to the German tariff rates could do nothing to relieve the present shortage of goods. Therefore, since no significant

¹ WV 3188: Not found.

² Consul General Ernst Krüger was Commercial Attaché at the German Legation in Copenhagen.

practical consequences could be expected for the present from the conclusion of such an arrangement, there was no point in forcing the question. In view of this position of the Danish economic organizations the Danish Government could not at the present time conclude the basic agreement [*Rahmenvertrag*] under discussion. The Danish Government would, however, continue the investigation of general economic problems. It hoped that the German side would assist it in this study of the problem. In conclusion M. Gunnar Larsen expressed the gratitude of the Danish Government for the friendly reception which had been accorded the Danish delegation in Germany.

Ambassador Ritter replied as follows:

The Danish Government had at the beginning of July, on its own initiative, decided upon and published a declaration in which it was stated that Denmark was willing as far as necessary to collaborate reciprocally and actively with Greater Germany, in order that Denmark might find its place in the economic reorganization of Europe under the leadership of Germany. The Danish Government had, likewise on its own initiative, notified the Reich Government of this declaration in an especially emphatic *démarche* and in that connection expressed the wish that early negotiations might be inaugurated.³ In reply the Reich Government had stated that it was willing to conduct such negotiations and that it considered an economic community to be the only possible form of such collaboration and such a place for Denmark. Thereupon the Danish Government had declared in a jointly signed memorandum of July 31⁴ that it was prepared to begin negotiations immediately for the conclusion of an agreement for an economic community under certain conditions. None of these conditions had proved impossible to fulfill in the negotiations conducted thus far. In the important question of the rate of conversion the Danish Government had not as yet made any definite proposal. Today's statement therefore represented a withdrawal of the general assent already expressed. He took cognizance thereof and found that the negotiations were thereby concluded negatively.

Ambassador Ritter added to this formal counterstatement that he had foreseen that the participation of interested parties would have the result that these interested parties, without bearing any responsibility, would only bring up objections and negative viewpoints. Therefore he had from the outset warned against protracting the negotiations and had pressed for an immediate decision. Developments had, unfortunately, proved that he was right. He was convinced that Danish business would later regret the decision that had been communicated today.

³ See document No. 181.

⁴ Enclosure to document No. 268.

M. Wassard remarked after this statement by Ambassador Ritter that the negotiations were, to be sure, broken off. If, however, the Danish Government should later have a sure basis for determining what could be done, there was still the possibility that it might approach Berlin again. The question was open as to whether, on the basis which Denmark would then propose, new negotiations could be taken up.

Director Sthyr added that this eventually might occur in a few weeks. It would be useful if the Danish side, without carrying on negotiations, could in the meantime obtain information and further clarification of problems in Berlin.

Ambassador Ritter stated in reply that a decision on whether negotiations should be resumed could be made only after the Danes approached the German side with a new proposal. Then the question could be discussed as to whether these proposals formed a suitable basis. However, he wished even now to express his view that anything which differed substantially from our proposals could not be considered by the German side as a suitable basis for the resumption of negotiations in connection with the economic reorganization of Europe. He did not wish to reject the idea of having M. Sthyr or M. Wassard exchange views informally on individual questions with specialists in the German ministries. But this would be permitted only under the direction of the Foreign Ministry, excluding any direct contact of interested circles in Denmark with interested circles in Germany. Such discussions with specialists in the ministries should also preferably be independent of any negotiations that might be conducted on the current exchange of goods. The Danish side agreed.

In the course of the conference the German side emphasized that Denmark would now naturally continue to be treated as a foreign country and could not count on the advantages, such as possibly more abundant provision of raw materials, domestic prices, etc., which she would have enjoyed if an economic community had come into existence.

In conclusion it was agreed that nothing should appear in the press about the fact that these discussions had been held or about their outcome.

In reply to a question by M. Wassard as to what answer should be given to the American Chargé d'Affaires in Copenhagen in case he should on his own initiative ask questions of the Danish Ministry, Ambassador Ritter said that it would be best to answer the American that presumably he too had heard at the time about the declaration made public by the Danish Foreign Minister. It was natural that information had been exchanged in talks with the German Government.

about the content of this declaration. The American should not be told any details, however.

RITTER

No. 383

F2/0455

The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Minister

Amt Ausl/Abw

BERLIN, August 23, 1940.

Received August 26.

[1] ¹ 97/40 g. K. Chef-Sache Ausl III Org

RM 30 g. Rs.

For personal information only.

With reference to the oral report by the Military Attaché of the German Embassy in Rome on August 18, 1940, to the Foreign Minister we wish to bring the following to your notice.

Lieutenant General von Rintelen telegraphed on August 22 that Marshal Badoglio and the Deputy Chief of the Italian General Staff, General Roatta, have concurred with the German view conveyed to them.²

So far only some cavalry had been shipped to Albania. Transport of three divisions had been prepared but not yet ordered. The Military Attaché also reports in the same telegram that the Italian offensive in Libya will be launched at the same time as the German offensive.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
By order:
BÜCKNER

¹ The preceding portion of the file number is illegible.

² See document No. 353 and enclosure 2.

No. 384

73/52698

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, August 24, 1940—4:45 p. m.

No. 547 of August 24

Received August 24—8:12 p.m.

The Deputy Foreign Minister has informed me that according to a telegraphic report just received from Hory, the Rumanians in Turnu-Severin ¹ today persisted in maintaining their old standpoint, where-

¹ See document No. 347.

upon the negotiations were broken off and the Hungarian delegation returned to Budapest.

It is my impression, shared by my Italian colleague, that in all probability Hungary will start military operations about the middle of next week, unless the Axis Powers intervene first. Whether the direct talk between the Hungarian and Rumanian Foreign Ministers envisaged as a possibility might still come off, will depend on the circumstances, as yet not made known, in which the negotiations were broken off.

ERDMANNSDORFF

No. 385

540/240615

The Consul at Lourenço Marques to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT LOURENÇO MARQUES, August 24, 1940—5:35 p. m.
No. 225 of August 24 Received August 24—10:10 p.m.

The wife of General Maritz called and on behalf of her husband asked whether Germany intended to uphold the agreement [*Vertrag*] concluded in 1914 between Maritz and the Governor of German South-West Africa.¹ If that were the case Maritz requested that a statement to that effect be made over the radio, which would have a tremendous influence on the Boers and would hasten their unification for an active fight for freedom.

¹ The reference is to an agreement between Gen. S. G. Maritz, a Boer leader of opposition to the Union of South Africa Government during the early months of World War I, and the Governor of German South-West Africa. A copy of the agreement, in a German translation, is in the files (578/241906). The text is as follows:

"Agreement concluded and entered into force between the Imperial Governor of German South-West Africa, representing His Majesty the German Emperor, on the one hand, and General S. G. Maritz, acting in the name and on behalf of a group of officers and men who are prepared to declare the independence of South Africa, on the other hand, to wit:

"1) The said General S. G. Maritz has proclaimed the independence of South Africa and is in a state of war with England.

"2) The Governor of German South-West Africa recognizes as belligerent all African fighting forces which take the field against England and will support these, following further consultation, in the conflict with England.

"3) Should British South Africa partially or as a whole be declared independent, the Imperial Governor of German South-West Africa will secure as quickly as possible the recognition as such of the State or States in question by the German Empire and their inclusion in general peace negotiations.

"4) In view of the assistance granted, the newly-formed State (or States) will raise no objection should the German Empire take possession of Walvis Bay and the islands off German South-West Africa.

"5) The middle of the Orange River will in future form the boundary between German South-West Africa and the Cape Colony.

"6) The German Empire will raise no objection in case the above-mentioned States wish to take possession of Delagoa Bay.

"7) Should the uprising fail, such members of the revolutionary movement as cross over to German territory will be regarded as German citizens and treated as such.

"Drawn up and signed at on"

Maritz is reported to be taking a leading role in Ossewa-Brandwag² and to be prepared for every sort of activity leading to freedom from England.

I request instructions. Mrs. Maritz will await here the German reply.

In the event of a statement being made which could appropriately come only some time after the departure of Mrs. Maritz from Lourenço Marques, I would like to point out certain reservations as probably being necessary with regard to article 6 (Delagoa Bay). Mrs. Maritz, on behalf of Frau Denk who is living comfortably with her son at Windhoek, asked for news about Denk.³

TROMPKE

² Ossewa-Brandwag was a South African Nationalist organization set up along military lines.

The Consul at Lourenço Marques had reported in his telegram No. 214 of Aug. 6 that he had received a request for military assistance and proposals for military cooperation on the part of Ossewa-Brandwag, and he asked for instructions as to what sort of a reply should be made (540/240611-12). No reply from the Foreign Ministry has been found.

³ See vol. VIII, document No. 577 and vol. IX, document No. 25.

No. 386

B14/B002206

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Greece

Telegram

SECRET

No. 405

BERLIN, August 24, 1940.

zu Pol. IV 2511 g.¹

The Greek Minister during the night informed us upon instruction of Metaxas that the threat to Greece posed by the Italian concentration on the Albanian-Greek border made it necessary to mobilize at once. The Minister added that he had prevailed on Metaxas to defer a decision until he had spoken to the Foreign Minister. The Minister asked me to tell him what we knew about Italian intentions. The Foreign Minister, who is presently traveling in southern Germany, could not be reached. With respect to the Greek Minister we shall continue to treat this matter in a dilatory manner.² Please report by telegraph whether mobilization measures have been ordered.³

WOERMANN

¹ Pol. IV 2511 g.: Not found.

² In a memorandum of Aug. 24 recounting the efforts of the Greek Minister to get in touch with the Reich Foreign Minister, Woermann recorded that he had called the Foreign Minister's Special Train at Hof at 2:08 a. m., with the Greek Minister's message, but had stated that Ribbentrop need not be awakened, but could be informed of the matter early in the morning (449/222787-88). In a memorandum of Aug. 25 Woermann noted that he had informed the Greek Minister that the Foreign Minister wished to speak to him at Fuschl on the following day (449/222790). See document No. 394.

³ See document No. 391.

No. 387

B14/B002209-10

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 24, 1940.

I had already briefly informed the Italian Counselor of Embassy Zamboni this forenoon of the steps undertaken last night by the Greek Minister and of our dilatory procedure.¹ In accordance with the instructions telephoned to me by the Foreign Minister, I further told Zamboni the following this afternoon:

The Foreign Minister thought there was something peculiar about this habit of the Greeks of always calling upon us so importunately in this connection; the Greeks would do better if they took their wishes in this respect to Rome. I had, as a matter of fact, already made such a suggestion to the Greek Minister last night, but he had shrugged his shoulders at this.

For the rest, the Foreign Minister had instructed me to remind Zamboni, for transmittal to Ambassador Alfieri, of the conversation which the Foreign Minister had had with the Ambassador on August 16.² He had told him on that occasion that his attitude in the Greek question was similar to that in the Yugoslav question which had been discussed first in that conversation. It was generally desirable that the situation there should remain quiet. As his personal opinion the Foreign Minister had added that Italy ought to consider whether certain gains might not be canceled out if England were to acquire a foothold in Greece under one pretext or another and, for instance, established bases there for air attacks. Signor Zamboni interrupted me at this point and indicated that he was accurately informed of the substance of that conversation. He added on his own that the Foreign Minister had also said that there might perhaps be some remote parts of Greece where the disadvantages attending Italian action might be less marked. Signor Zamboni believed that no Italian action was imminent, but that Italy, having once embarked upon the press campaign and military pressure, could not now simply abandon this action publicly.

I made a point of stressing repeatedly that my instructions were confined to recalling the conversation of the Foreign Minister with the Italian Ambassador in connection with the new Greek démarches. Our tactics with regard to the Greeks would continue to consist in not in-

¹ See document No. 386.

² See document No. 353.

terfering in the Italian orbit and treating Greek wishes presented here in a dilatory manner.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

No. 388

F10/084-086

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

ROME, August 24, 1940/XVIII.

FÜHRER: We have not had an opportunity for an exchange of ideas since our discussion of June 18.²

I consider it opportune to tell you what I think of the situation at this moment.

To begin with, as regards the Danube Basin and the Balkans, there has been no change in the policy agreed upon, which is to keep that zone outside the conflict. The measures of a military character at the Greek and Yugoslav borders are simply of a precautionary character, prompted by the fact that both countries are deeply hostile to the Axis and ready to stab it in the back if a favorable occasion should offer itself. The Italian police have discovered in the environs of Trieste no less than five large arms caches, hidden by Serbian partisans.³ It is not unknown to you, furthermore, that both Greece and Yugoslavia have almost completely mobilized their armed forces, and there can be no doubt concerning the effective, continuous, and verified complicity of Greece with Great Britain. All Greek ports are bases against us. But for all of that, and barring unforeseen developments, it is not in this direction but toward Egypt that I intend to direct the Italian military effort within the near future. The preparations are now completed and we are approaching a season more favorable for combat and for the march across the desert. Marshal Graziani has already received the order to attack on the same day when your Army attacks Great Britain. Despite the difficulties of terrain and climate, I believe we will defeat the English forces as well as the Egyptian forces if—as seems likely—they should join the English.

And now permit me a *tour d'horizon*.

France. I feel sure that you cannot have failed to note the extraordinary psychological phenomenon, so typical for the indomitable pride

¹ Translated from the Italian text. The German translation is found on F10/028-030.

² See vol. IX, document No. 479.

³ The official German translation reads "Freischärlern."

of the French, that *France does not consider herself conquered*. Vichy France is counting on English resistance and American intervention. What is happening in North Africa indicates the intentions of the French Government. It is therefore necessary to remain watchful and impose such peace terms as will render it *innocuous* for several generations at least.

United States. Barring a complete reversal—always possible in a country of such genuine hysterics as are the American politicians [*politicians*]¹—the possibility of American intervention ought to be calculated as a reality of tomorrow, especially if Roosevelt is reelected, as seems probable. Roosevelt will be unable to make a contribution in men, but he will give greater material assistance, especially aircraft. This is happening already, and so even that possibility cannot prevent Great Britain's defeat.

Japan. I have not yet seen the results of the new "course" of Japanese policy. The Japanese, although they are most clear in their aims, are very slow and mysterious in their methods. I think that the policy of the Axis in Tokyo ought to be to "ease tension" in Russo-Japanese relations and on the other hand to "increase tension" to the maximum between the United States and Japan.

Returning again to military matters, it is superfluous for me to tell you with what joy Italian sailors and aviators are preparing themselves to act, alongside their German comrades, against Great Britain.

Accept, Führer, my always cordial and comradely greetings.

MUSSOLINI

P. S. As regards the harvest in Italy: The harvest has yielded 700,000 tons less bread grain, but was extraordinarily good in regard to corn, rice, potatoes, beans, sugar beets, fruit, and green fodder. We are therefore not unduly concerned about our food supply. Mus.

No. 389

271/176491

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry

BERLIN, August 25, 1940.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE OF AUGUST 25 FROM THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ IN BUCHAREST TO OKW, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT [*Abteilung Ausland*]

During the night of August 24–25 there was shooting along the border north and northeast of Rădăuți, no real attack. General activity along and beyond the line in northern Bucovina more lively than in Bessarabia.

Sizeable Russian troop units ascertained to be on the way from the interior of the country via Hotin and Śniatyn to the south. A Russian parachute regiment identified with certainty at Chişinău, two new divisions identified in the region northeast and east of Lipzsan; one of these divisions is a cavalry division, the other an infantry division (the latter supposedly is No. 100).

The Rumanian General Staff supposes that the main Russian attack will come in the Cernăuţi-Seret-Hotin area in order to roll up the Prut front.

The Rumanian General Staff shows itself, as compared with yesterday,¹ still more alarmed; a further state of alert has been ordered for the Operations Department from today until tomorrow.

The foregoing text was telephoned to Under State Secretary Woermann, to the Adjutant of the Foreign Minister at Fuschl, as well as to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff (Captain Gregor).

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, Under State Secretary Woermann, and Minister v. Rintelen.

OVERBECK

¹ In telegram No. 1435, sent Aug. 24, at 11:50 p. m., the Military Attaché had reported the alarm of the Rumanian General Staff about the intelligence being received from Bucovina and Bessarabia. A state of alert had been ordered for the night of Aug. 23-24. (172/135480-81)

See also document No. 396 and footnote 5.

No. 390

78/52701

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 25, 1940.

Ambassador Alfieri telephoned the following to me today:

Count Ciano talked to him this morning about the reports received from Hungary. Persistent rumors as well as other reports indicate that Hungary is taking too unyielding an attitude. Count Ciano has already discussed this question with the Duce. He is wondering if Hungary is not preparing to make a too belligerent gesture, and whether a *démarche* by Germany and Italy is not indicated in order to state again their attitude. This *démarche* by the two Powers would be designed to remind Hungary in the spirit of the Salzburg conversations¹ that the responsibility for and consequences of such an attitude on the part of Hungary would have to be borne by Hungary alone.

The Ambassador added as his personal opinion that he thought it possible that all that Hungary intended by her military threats was to exert sharp pressure on Rumania.

¹ Apparently the reference here is actually to the Munich conversations on July 10. See document No. 146.

At 11:15 a. m., M. Alfieri telephoned once more in this matter to say that he would be glad if he could have a reply before noon, if possible, because Count Ciano was going to call him up again at that time.

I answered that I doubted that a decision could be had that quickly.

To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, requesting immediate transmittal to Fuschl.

Addendum: I refer to telegram No. 547 of August 24,² from Budapest, indicating that Erdmannsdorff and his Italian colleague have the impression that Hungary will in all probability start military operations about the middle of next week, unless the Axis Powers intervene first.

WOERMANN

² Document No. 384.

No. 391

449/222791

The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ATHENS, August 25, 1940—3:30 p. m.

No. 402 of August 25

Received August 25—6:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 405 of August 24.¹

There has been no mobilization so far. Metaxas told the Italian Minister day before yesterday, as I have now learned, that he had informed the British Minister, when the latter remarked that the British guarantee remained in force as before, that he had no need for this guarantee because he did not believe there would be Italian military aggression. Grazzi reported this to Rome; he believes that the Italian denial of demands on Greece in the nature of an ultimatum was the result of it. The communication of [Metaxas?] to Grazzi² is prompted by the desire not to give Italy any pretext for undertaking anything with a view to getting in ahead of English aid. It is certain, however, that Metaxas has no doubts about the critical deterioration of the situation.

ERBACH

¹ Document No. 386.

² The German text here reads "Mitteilung Massaker an Grazzi . . ." "Massaker" would appear to be a garbling of "Metaxas". The files of the Legation in Athens are not available for this period; consequently the draft of this telegram before encoding could not be checked.

No. 392

F8/0192-0193

*Benito Mussolini to Francisco Franco*¹

ROME, August 25, 1940/XVIII.

DEAR FRANCO: I thank you for the letter which you have sent me in which you outline the position of Spain in the present stage of the war.²

I should like to make it clear to you at once that your letter has not surprised me.

Ever since the outbreak of the war I have been constantly of the opinion that "your" Spain, the Spain of the Falangist Revolution, could not remain neutral to the end but at the right moment would change to nonbelligerency and finally to intervention.

Should that not happen, Spain would alienate herself from European history, especially the history of the future, which the two victorious Axis Powers will determine.

Furthermore, she would have no moral justification for the solution of her African questions, and, let me say to you, a victorious revolution must set itself external goals of an international character, such goals, therefore, as can, at a given moment require the complete attention and total effort of a people.

I should like to say to you, dear Franco, that I, with these my objective considerations, do not wish to hasten you in the least in the decisions³ that you have to make, for I am sure that in your decisions you will, as always, be inspired by the defense of the fundamental interests of your people and I am just as certain that you will not let this opportunity go by of giving Spain her African vital space.⁴

There is no doubt that, after France, Great Britain will be beaten. The British régime exists only on one single element: the lie.

I certainly do not need to tell you that you, in your aspirations, can count on the full solidarity of fascist Italy.

I beg you, dear Franco, to accept my most cordial and comradely greetings.

MUSSOLINI

¹ Translated from the Italian. A German translation is found on F8/0190-0191.

² Document No. 346.

³ "Decision" in the German translation.

⁴ "Lebensraum" in the German translation.

No. 393

73/52705-06

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, August 26, 1940—6:58 p. m.

No. 555 of August 26

Received August 26—11:45 p. m.

The Foreign Minister, talking with agitation, outlined to me his difficult position.

He was being reproached by the Regent and the military for putting up with the dilatory tactics of the Rumanians whereby they were able to move additional troops to Transylvania, as a result of which the casualties would be higher in the event of a Hungarian offensive. He could not maintain himself much longer against the urgings from these quarters to strike soon, the more so as the Rumanian reply received today was unsatisfactory again. Also the reports about the growing agitation of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania caused by the brutal requisitions and the drafting of Hungarians for the labor divisions, were more and more alarming.

Csáky intends to instruct the Hungarian Minister in Berlin to ascertain:

1. Whether the Reich Government, in the event of a Hungarian-Rumanian conflict, would observe strict or benevolent neutrality (delivery of war material to both sides).

2. Whether Berlin's views were in agreement with:

a) The alleged statement of the German Minister to the Hungarian Minister in Bucharest, that he was endorsing the Rumanian proposal presented at Turnu-Severin and that he held this to be the only solution of the dispute.

b) The statement of Reich Minister Darré to the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, reported by the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, that any attempt on the part of Hungary to solve the Transylvanian question by an armed conflict would destroy for generations the friendly relationship between Germany and Hungary, and entail unforeseeable consequences. The Hungarian Minister had interpreted this statement to mean that Hungary in such a case would have to reckon with armed intervention by Germany, which might feel that her military potential in her struggle for survival was threatened by Hungary's military action against Rumania.

Since the Hungarian Ministers, on the strength of alleged statements of the Führer at the meeting in Munich,¹ had been of the opinion up to this time that he had warned the Hungarian Government against armed action only on account of Rumania's good arma-

¹ See document No. 146.

ments but not with a view to the German interests, and that while he would deny any aid to Hungary in such an event, he would allegedly leave them a free hand if Rumania remained intransigent, Csáky now wished to clarify the situation, because matters would otherwise run their course. He confidentially mentioned again that, for instance, a message from the Führer to the Regent would surely still have the power of restraining him and the Army from taking any rash action; he [Csáky] was no longer in a position to do this by himself because of the lack of a conciliatory attitude on the part of Rumania.

Please send telegraphic instructions² for guidance of my conversation.

ERDMANNSDORFF

² Not found.

No. 394

2281/480660-61

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

FUSCHL, August 27, 1940.

Pol. IV 2699 g.

RECEPTION OF THE GREEK MINISTER RIZO RANGABÉ BY THE REICH
FOREIGN MINISTER IN FUSCHL ON AUGUST 26, 1940¹

The Foreign Minister told the Greek Minister that we classified countries as those which had aligned themselves with the Axis, and those which had aligned themselves with England. We considered Greece as a country which had gone over to England, for the Greeks had accepted the English guarantee, were supplying war material to the English and sailed their ships into the blockade zone around England. We had other evidence, besides, which proved to us the pro-English attitude of Greece. Such an attitude appeared unwise to the Foreign Minister. For the coming centuries Europe would be controlled by the Axis Powers, and the attitude of the Axis toward the European states would be guided by the attitude which these states maintained toward England during the fight which Germany and Italy were waging for their existence.

The Foreign Minister could give the Greeks only one piece of advice; first, to adjust their general policy to this situation, and, second, in consequence of that attitude, to establish friendly relations

¹ Copies of this memorandum were sent on Sept. 5 to the Ambassador in Italy and the Minister in Greece (2281/480659).

and come to an agreement with the Italians. The Foreign Minister emphasized to the Greek Minister that the Mediterranean was the sphere of interest of our Italian ally, and that consequently we had no direct interest in it. Since the Greek Government had asked for the advice of the German Government, however, the Foreign Minister could only urgently advise the Greek Minister, with a view to both the immediate and the more distant future, to remedy the Italian grievances as quickly as possible and accommodate any wishes the Italians might have.

The Greek Minister was apparently seriously disturbed by the fact that we should have proof of unneutral actions by the Greeks, and wanted to ascertain details, which the Foreign Minister refused. The Minister gave the positive assurance that his country was supplying no war material and that Greek ships were now refusing to go to England.

Apart from this he complained about the Italian attitude, which the Foreign Minister rejected on the grounds of Greece's favoring of British maritime interests, which was known to us. The Foreign Minister further pointed out to the Minister that Athens and Greece were presently the headquarters of the entire espionage and propaganda activities of the English Secret Service.

The Minister endeavored to win us as mediators in the controversy with Italy. This the Foreign Minister declined, pointing to the direct route and stressing that an agreement was not at all impossible if Greece took the proper attitude.

The Foreign Minister made a point of stressing that he had spoken to the Minister so openly only because the latter had taken the initiative in asking to be received for a discussion about the Greek-Italian question. He had no detailed information, however, about the issues in dispute between Greece and Italy, nor any intention of intervening in any manner whatsoever.

When the Foreign Minister told the Minister in conclusion that the German victories ought indeed to have opened the eyes of the Greeks, and referred to the example of Rumania, which had also long relied on English protection, the Greek Minister asserted that he was fully and completely convinced that Germany would triumph over England and would do everything for his part to influence his Government to put its policy on the right track.

During the course of the conversation the Foreign Minister also warned the Minister especially against any mobilization; a mobilization had started the Czechoslovak crisis and had led to the total annihilation of Czechoslovakia.

SONNLEITHNER

No. 395

280/152801-08

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 628 of August 26

BELGRADE, August 26, 1940—9:00 p. m.

Received August 27—1:45 a. m.

The Prince Regent, whom I called on at Castle Brdo in order to request him to assume the sponsorship of the Architectural Exposition, stated that he would be glad to sponsor it.

In a 1-hour conversation that followed, the Prince Regent presented his views of the political situation.

There was no doubt in his mind that Germany was invincible militarily. But there were two foes he feared for Europe—hunger, and in its wake, communism. Germany, to be sure, because of her internal consolidation, was not subject to these dangers, but other countries in Europe were. He could place no confidence in the policy of Soviet Russia. The treaty with Russia had certainly been a brilliant and politically inevitable move on the part of the Führer. The prestige that Soviet Russia had thereby gained and her expansion to the west will still give Europe many an uneasy hour, however. In the future the Balkans would have only the choice between alignment with Germany and alignment with Russia. Italy would not count, nor would the Western Powers. She would never be in a position to play a dominant role in the Balkans. He considered it self-evident that facing this choice Yugoslavia had to opt for Germany, for the material and cultural interests of Yugoslavia pointed to Germany, which was to him also the embodiment of order. This realization of the need for closest alignment with Germany, to be sure, did not yet prevail everywhere in the population. This was due not only to the well-known Francophile and pan-Slavist tendencies in some political and military circles, but today perhaps even more to the mistrust to which Italy, Germany's ally, repeatedly gave rise. When claims were recently again advanced in Italian books and newspaper articles to Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Montenegro, nay, even to the shrine of the Serbian people in Serbia, Kossovo and Skoplje, although a pact of friendship existed between Yugoslavia and Italy which recognized the common frontiers, this mistrust was indeed understandable. Yugoslavia had always shown good faith toward Italy. She had not given practical support to the policy of [League of Nations] sanctions and had, at the time, tacitly accepted the occupation of Albania, which violated the pact of friendship. This had, to be sure, not been out of friendship for Italy but only from common sense and confidence in Germany's interest in a Yugoslavia that was

intact. The attitude of Germany toward this aggressive policy of Italy's would be of the greatest significance for the sentiment toward Germany. Germany was respected, but Italy was despised by the populace.

Here I remarked that the Italy of Mussolini must not be confused with the Italy of former times. Also one ought to have an understanding of the fact that the Russophile tendencies of very influential Yugoslav circles were making the Italians uneasy. Italy would never permit its neighbor on the Adriatic to become a vassal of the great Russian Power.

The Prince Regent, much agitated, replied that he knew, indeed, of the existence of such Russophile tendencies, but that Yugoslav policy was not being influenced by them. He had evidence, moreover, to show that Communist agents had come here precisely from Italy in order to make trouble.

The Prince Regent then spoke of the fight against the Freemasons, of which he entirely approved. These groups had always opposed Yugoslav foreign policy of recent years. Their elimination was necessary in the interest of Yugoslavia and he would strive for it with all his vigor.

The Prince Regent remarked in conclusion that he was already making plans for his private life after the King¹ attained his majority. He wished then to spend the summer at his Brdo castle, but the winter, if at all possible, in Munich. He planned to purchase a house on the Nymphenburger Schloss Circle.

I also informed the Prince Regent of the willingness of the Foreign Ministry (telegram No. 567, Prot. A 16235 VI 14, of August 16²), to arrange for telephone conversations between Princess Olga³ and Countess Törring, for which he expressed his thanks.

HEEREN

¹ King Peter II, born in 1923, had ascended to the throne after the assassination of his father, King Alexander, in 1934.

² Not found.

³ Wife of Prince Paul.

No. 396

172/185491-93

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1449 of August 26

BUCHAREST, August 26, 1940.

It can be put down as a result of Turnu-Severin¹ that the Rumanian Government is now prepared to submit a map in which it will mark

¹ On Aug. 24, Fabricius had reported that the Rumanian-Hungarian negotiations had just broken down (telegram No. 1432: 73/52699). See also document No. 384.

which areas it is willing to cede to Hungary with, and which without resettlement of the Szeklers.² (As I have learned, 14,000 square kilometers in the former case, and 27,000 in the latter.)

The difficulty in making progress even after submission of this map, however, is based on the diametrically opposed viewpoints of the two parties.

I. Minister de Bárdossy has declared that Hungary, having been Germany's faithful ally during the World War, had a claim to the entire area lost and was magnanimous in not demanding the Banat as well. *The Hungarian statesmen had brought back their right to this from the conferences in Munich.* He overlooks—and unfortunately I could not tell him this because of the restraint I was instructed to observe—the fact that Hungary has done little for us in this war; that her denial of transit for our troops during the Polish campaign³ was responsible for German casualties; that she showed no gratitude to the Führer for the accession of Ruthenian territory; that she has oppressed and Magyarized the Volksdeutsche; that her pro-Polish attitude (the Hungarian delegate, De Hory, while still in Warsaw accepted a Polish demonstration against Germany) as well as her pro-English attitude were intolerable; that Hungary has not refrained from attempts to drive a wedge between Rome and Berlin; and that, finally, her Jewish-plutocratic attitude and her old feudalistic system have prevented a spiritual rapprochement with the Third Reich.

II. On the other side, Valer Pop :

It had been the understanding of the Rumanian statesmen at the Obersalzberg⁴ that the Reich did not intend to compel them simply to cede Rumanian territory. The Führer had talked about the ethnic element which could not in the long run be denied reunion with the adjacent homeland. From that the Rumanian Government had drawn the conclusion that Germany would not require her to cede to Hungary territories with a purely Rumanian population solely because they had once belonged to Hungary. He believed, as before, that a solution could be achieved only on the basis of transferring the Hungarians toward the border, and the Rumanians into the interior. A voluntary cession of 2 million Rumanians to Hungary, as now demanded by Hungary, was insupportable. He asked me to ascertain from the Reich Government, prior to any further negotiations with Hungary, whether this was not also Germany's view, as the Rumanian statesmen remembered having understood it at the Berghof.

² The Rumanians had proposed resettling this minority, while the Hungarians insisted that the whole area inhabited by Szeklers should be ceded to Hungary (Bucharest telegram No. 1436 of Aug. 24 : 172/135482).

³ See vol. VIII, document No. 45.

⁴ See document No. 234.

I told him I did not believe that Berlin would make any statement on the subject because Hungary would interpret this as giving support to the Rumanian viewpoint. For the present Hungary and Rumania should continue their efforts to reach an agreement. Valer Pop rejoined that he would be satisfied if we could tell the Rumanians that now that Rumania had submitted a map we would not state a "recommendation" for the cession of an area, e. g., an additional half of the zone indicated thereon as still in dispute, for this would seriously impair the principle that Rumanian ethnic groups must not be ceded to Hungary.

I told him that I could only repeat to him that we had to refrain from taking a position. The fact that the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister had listened to the exposition of the Rumanian viewpoint must not be interpreted erroneously. Germany had taken no position in consequence of this, any more than Hungary had received any promises.

It is my opinion that the negotiations, the continuation of which has now been proposed by Hungary, will again lead to no results because Hungary, for reasons which are known to us, has become adamant on the question of the transfer of the Szeklers. If, however, the threat of a Russian invasion of Rumanian territory should become acute—which I cannot believe myself as yet, although certain concrete reports of our intelligence officers⁵ and especially of the Rumanian Intelligence Service point in that direction—it would be advisable to reconsider whether Germany ought not to drop a hint in Budapest and Bucharest as to the *quickest* way of reaching a basic agreement, in order that Rumania will be protected at the rear.

FABRICIUS

⁵ See document No. 389. Intelligence from both German and Rumanian sources concerning Soviet troop movements in northern Bucovina and southern Bessarabia had been reported in Bucharest telegrams Nos. 1440 and 1441 of Aug. 26 (172/135488-89). A further telegram from the Military Attaché in Bucharest on Aug. 27 reported that the Rumanian General Staff believed a Soviet attack to be imminent, but that preparations would still take a couple of days. As for his own evaluation of the reports the Military Attaché summarized his position as follows: "Although reports of the Rumanian General Staff are still to be regarded as much exaggerated, the concern about the situation at the Rumanian front is not unjustified, since some of the reports are confirmed by our own intelligence service." (No. 1450: 172/135495-96)

[EDITORS' NOTE. The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (August 1, 1940–November 30, 1940) contains this passage for August 26:

"The Führer further ordered the following . . .

"2. The Forces stationed in the General Government [of Poland] shall be further strengthened. For this purpose, about 10 divisions

are to be transferred to the east, without hampering the necessary shipments of goods too much. Furthermore about two armored divisions shall be transferred to the most southeastern part of the General Government, after repair of their equipment in Germany. The quartering of these new units will have to be arranged in such a manner that quick intervention to protect the Rumanian oil districts would be guaranteed if necessary."

A copy of OKW document No. W F St/Abt.L.Nr.33 247/40 g. K. Chefs. of August 27, transmitting the above order by Hitler is in the custody of the German Military Documents Section, Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office, U. S. Army, file OKW/1846.]

No. 397

8918/E051058

Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland

BERN, August 26, 1940.

Federal President Pilet-Golaz today made the following statement¹ with respect to the note handed him on August 13 regarding General Guisan's address: *

The Federal Council had taken cognizance of the note² and in so doing had expressed its desire to maintain the best relations with the German Government, just as our note had shown that the German Government attaches importance to not having the good relations between our two countries troubled. The General had declared before the Federal Council that the meaning read into his address of July 25 on Mt. Rütli and the subsequent order of the day did not by any means correspond with his intentions. It had been far from his mind to describe Germany as the possible attacker or to incite public opinion against Germany. The sole purpose of his address and the order of the day had been to exhort officers and men to the unqualified fulfillment of their duties.

KÖCHER

¹ In report No. 4321 of Aug. 26 (3918/E051055-57) Köcher gave an account of this conversation with Pilet-Golaz as well as of a conversation the same day between the Deputy Director of the Swiss Foreign Department, Feldscher, and Counselor of Legation Bibra concerning changes contemplated in the higher posts around General Guisan. Feldscher was quoted as saying: "Gentlemen will be placed in these positions who can converse more easily with Lieutenant-Colonel Ilsemann [the German Military Attaché in Switzerland]".

² See document No. 335.

* Marginal note in Köcher's handwriting: "my remonstrances."

No. 398

9824/E660981-82

*The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Embassy in the Soviet Union*

Telegram

URGENT
No. 1535BERLIN, August 26, 1940.
Sent August 27—3:15 a. m.
W IV 4754.

With reference to your telegram No. 1737.¹ Also for Nöldeke.²

In carrying out the resettlement from Latvia and Estonia two groups of Volksdeutsche remained behind; ³ first, those who remained because the safeguarding of economic positions was desired by the German Reich; and second, those who could not decide to resettle under the different circumstances at that time. As for the first group, the reason for remaining behind has, for the long run, ceased to exist. For the second group the situation has naturally fundamentally changed. We have nevertheless reservations about communicating the forementioned arguments to the Soviet Government. The statement, concerning the first group, that its remaining is no longer necessary could be interpreted as recognition that we no longer count on maintaining our special economic interests in both countries. This would be in contradiction to our other efforts to maintain these positions at least in part and for a certain length of time and also to continue the exchange of goods for the present in accordance with our old treaties with these countries. A statement respecting the second group that they just now, for the first time, want to leave, because otherwise they would be subject to the Soviet Union, would have the result probably that the Soviet Government would exclude precisely this group from leaving. In this situation we would like to avoid giving the Soviet Government precise and, especially, written justification for the wishes expressed in our memorandum.¹ If you should be spoken to about the matter, please say that a number of Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche at the time for various reasons—as, for example, winding up property interests, family matters, sickness, and the like—could not take part in the resettlement. Now that the Soviet Government had agreed that all Reich Germans and Volks-

¹ See document No. 807, footnote 3.

² Consul General Nöldeke had accompanied Minister Schnurre to Moscow to work out arrangements for dealing with the questions of resettlement and German property interests in the Baltic States. Schnurre was also reviewing the whole trade position with the Soviets. Talks had begun on Aug. 24.

³ See document No. 102, and footnote 2.

deutsche could also leave Lithuania and Bessarabia, we assumed that it would have no objections to the carrying out of complete evacuation from Latvia and Estonia. In case agreement can be reached with the Soviet Government—as we hope it will be—concerning the continuation of certain German enterprises—as, for example, the shale-oil industry, then the Germans engaged in this enterprise would of course remain behind. Please discuss the matter also with Schnurre.

CLODIUS

No. 399

172/135500-01

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 27, 1940.

At 5 o'clock this afternoon the Rumanian Minister, who had originally wished to talk to the Reich Foreign Minister himself, conveyed the following by direction of his Government as a matter of particular urgency:

The Rumanian Government requested that no faits accomplis be created in the Hungarian-Rumanian question. The Rumanian Minister President and the Rumanian Foreign Minister had already declared that they would accept an arbitration award of the Axis Powers,¹ and were maintaining that position. They assumed, however, that both parties would be heard in such a case, so that the decision could be arrived at on the basis of a knowledge of all the facts in the case. To that end it would be desirable if the Rumanian Foreign Minister were given the opportunity to present his case directly either to the Führer or to the Reich Foreign Minister. The aide-mémoire which Minister Fabricius was bringing with him² contained only a brief summary of the Rumanian viewpoint and was inadequate for that reason.

The Rumanian Government was also willing, however, to have a conference called between Hungary and Rumania under the chairmanship of representatives of the Axis Powers.

The Minister was distressed at not having been able to carry out his instruction with the Reich Foreign Minister himself, and asked that, if at all practicable, he be enabled to transmit a reply to his Government before the close of the day. He would be available at any time if the Reich Foreign Minister wished to convey this reply to him by telephone.³

WOERMANN

¹ See document No. 376.

² Not found.

³ Unsigned marginal note: "To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request for immediate transmittal to Fuschl by telephone."

No. 400

271/176470 ;
271/176472-74

The Director of the Political Department to the Foreign Minister

Teletype en clair

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 27, 1940.

For the Foreign Minister at Fuschl

To be submitted at once

Today at 6:00 p. m. the Hungarian Minister gave me the following memorandum which states that the Hungarian Government feels impelled to consider the idea of a military solution against Rumania, and which requests a clarification of the German position on three points.

WOERMANN

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, August 26, 1940.

MEMORANDUM

The Royal Hungarian Government may doubtless assume that the Government of the German Reich is informed in every detail about the negotiations in Turnu-Severin, and that it therefore had come to see just as clearly as the Hungarian Government did that the Rumanian delegation with its method of negotiation could only have the aim of protracting things and never at all intended to reach an amicable settlement in the question of revising the borders between the two countries.

On the other hand the Hungarian Government has been able to establish that the Rumanian Government has made alarming military preparations directed toward Hungary. It may simply be pointed out that the military situation of the Rumanian forces in Transylvania was as follows on August 24, 1940:

Up until the occupation of Bessarabia by the USSR there were in Transylvania eight divisions.

After this time and until the start of the Hungarian-Rumanian negotiations there arrived as reinforcements another 10 divisions.

From August 15 to 18 there arrived from the Dobruja an additional (the 4th and 25th) two divisions.

Since August 18 in transports from the interior (the 6th, 9th and 35th) three divisions.

Thus, there is a total of 20 divisions in Transylvania today, most of them deployed along the Hungarian-Rumanian border. Parts of three divisions are still being brought up. In the final analysis, therefore, 23 divisions (including cavalry, motorized, mountain, and engineer brigades and divisions).

The opinion of the Hungarian Government that the Rumanian Government is only trying to gain time by drawing out the negotiations so as to resort to arms afterwards seems to be justified by the above. There is an obvious parallel between this method and that employed by Rumania in 1917-18.

Time and again, German quarters have privately intimated to the Hungarian Minister in a friendly manner, that a military conflict between the two states could have far-reaching consequences which might influence the friendly relations between Hungary and the German Reich in an unfavorable way.

The German Minister in Bucharest informed the Hungarian Minister that Hungary could not recover the Szekler country in any event, since this was too far removed from the present border and the intervening area was settled by large masses of Rumanians. He said the only solution would be autonomy for Transylvania.

Nevertheless the Hungarian Government is trying every means to bring the Rumanian Government to negotiate once more, and directly after the first contact following the interruption of the negotiations in Turnu-Severin it invited the Rumanian delegation to go to Hungary the next Thursday. The Rumanian Government stated that it could not accept either the day or a location in Hungary as the place of negotiation. On the basis of this answer there seems to be no doubt that the Rumanian Government does not have the intention to enter into serious negotiations in the matter of border revisions.

In this situation the Hungarian Government feels impelled to give consideration to a military solution of the question; it must not wait until the situation has developed most favorably for Rumania, but must itself set the time for intervention.

With the emergence of the idea of a military solution of the question, however, it appears necessary to the Government to be completely clear about the following:

1. whether the friendly intimations privately communicated to the Hungarian Minister by various German quarters and also the message received by Minister Bárdossy in Bucharest represent the opinion of the Government of the German Reich;

2. whether in case of a military solution of the question the German Government would adopt a strict or benevolent neutrality toward Hungary; and

3. it would be particularly grateful to the German Government for information on what degree or what form of neutrality the German Reich would adopt toward Rumania.

His Excellency the Reich Foreign Minister and Count Ciano will recall very well that when the Axis Powers proposed direct negotiations to him the Hungarian Minister President expressed the opinion

that one also had to reckon with the ultima ratio in taking up negotiations on such a grave question.¹ Consequently it can also be assumed that the above communications do not come as a surprise to the Reich Government.

¹ See document No. 146.

No. 401

78/52710

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 27, 1940.

I told the Hungarian Minister upon his démarche of this afternoon ¹ that even before the memorandum he gave me for transmittal to the Foreign Minister had arrived there, the Foreign Minister had had the Hungarian Foreign Minister invited by telephone to come to Vienna on August 29, adding that the invitation also included another Hungarian personage. Count Ciano would arrive in Vienna tomorrow, August 28.

WOERMANN

¹ Document No. 400.

No. 402

172/135498

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 27, 1940.

I informed the Rumanian Minister by telephone today at 7:30 p. m. that the Foreign Minister has received his communication of this afternoon.¹ The Foreign Minister had been considering the idea of some sort of conference even before he received this communication. The Rumanian Foreign Minister had just been invited by telephone to come to Vienna on August 29; Count Ciano would also go there on August 28.² The Foreign Minister had been told that the invitation was also meant for the Minister President, if such was desired.

WOERMANN

¹ See document No. 399.

² *The Ciano Diaries*, entries for Aug. 26 and 27, 1940, indicate that the idea of a conference on the Transylvanian question was discussed in several telephone conversations between Ribbentrop and Ciano. No record of these conversations has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry.

No. 403

71/50692-700

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry

BERLIN, August 27, 1940.

Pol. VII 2614 g.

There was no time to show the enclosed memorandum on my talk with the private secretary of the Grand Mufti yesterday to anyone in the Ministry. At the suggestion of State Secretary Keppler, it is herewith directly submitted to the Foreign Minister.

Copies will be submitted to Counselor Melchers (Pol. VII), Under State Secretary Habicht, Deputy Director von Rintelen, Under State Secretary Woermann, and State Secretary von Weizsäcker.

The private secretary of the Grand Mufti remains in Berlin to wait for a reply. A telegraphic reply could be sent to the Iraq Minister President through the German Embassy and the Iraq Legation in Ankara, or through the Italian Embassy in Berlin.

GROBBA

[Enclosure]

The Grand Mufti's private secretary, Osman Kemal Haddad, who is known to me from Bagdad, arrived here yesterday morning and called on me in the afternoon. Under instruction from the Grand Mufti he set forth the following:

The rupture of relations with Germany by Nuri Said's regime was condemned by most of the other Ministers and the great majority of the Iraq people. Nuri Said was criticized for having, by the abruptness of the rupture of relations, denied to the other Ministers and political figures the possibility of giving careful consideration to the consequences of such a step. It was soon realized that this step had been a grave mistake. Nuri Said has been vehemently attacked for it in the Senate and Parliament. On the other hand, Iraq found herself at that time under some pressure, feeling threatened by the English troops present in the country, by Turkey, and by the [French] Army of the Orient.

A committee for collaboration among the Arab countries has been formed in Iraq under the chairmanship of the Grand Mufti, which includes, particularly, the following persons:

Of the present Iraq Cabinet: Minister President Rashid Ali al-Gailani; Minister of Finance Naji Suwaydi, and the Minister of Justice Naji Shawkat; in addition, the leading officers of the Iraq Army and Yunis Sabawi, a deputy. From Syria: Shükri Kuwatli, Zeki Khatib, and others. From Saudi Arabia: Ibn Saud's private

secretary, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin,¹ and the Royal Counselor Khalid Alhud. The Palestinian interests are represented by the Grand Mufti himself.

This committee had already decided some months ago that it should seek to establish contact with Germany. The sending of a confidential emissary to Germany was prevented by the fact that it was impossible to obtain a Turkish or Iranian transit visa for such a person.

About 2½ months ago, the Grand Mufti had a letter handed to the Italian Minister in Bagdad, requesting him to have it forwarded through the Italian Consul General in Geneva to Emir Chekib Arslan, in Lausanne. In that letter he asked Chekib Arslan on behalf of the committee, to convey to the German and Italian Governments the wish of the Iraq Government for a friendly cooperation and to go to Berlin and Rome for that purpose. No answer to this letter was received from Chekib Arslan. (The latter had not reported anything about this to us. Obviously he did not receive the letter.) Meanwhile there has been a radical change in the situation in Iraq:

1. Through the defeat of France and the elimination of the Army of the Orient.

2. Through the weakening of England and the withdrawal from Iraq of English troops and aircraft, which have for the most part been transferred to Egypt.

3. Through the reinforcement of the Iraq Army. The Army had a total of five divisions already, and the sixth division was being formed. It had obtained arms from England, America, India, and Japan; from England only a few cannons.

Iraq, in consequence, has taken an independent attitude toward England and rejected the demand for the transit of Anglo-Indian troops from the Bahrein Islands and India. On the Bahrein Islands, 60-100,000 Indian troops are assembled for shipment to Egypt via Iraq. Additional troops are to be brought in from India. Also the troops who escaped from British Somaliland to Aden were supposed to be transported to Egypt via Basra, because the route through the Red Sea was not safe any more. To the English protests that Iraq was violating the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of Alliance² by this refusal, the Iraq Government had replied that England had already violated that Treaty by her refusal to deliver arms.

The committee then decided on a new attempt to establish contact with Germany, by sending the Minister of Justice, Naji Shawkat to Herr von Papen in Ankara.³ His journey was camouflaged by simultaneously dispatching the Foreign Minister Nuri Said on a mis-

¹ See vol. v, document No. 589.

² Of 1930.

³ See document No. 125.

sion to negotiate with Turkey on the recognition of Syria's independence.

From Naji Shawkat's talk with Herr von Papen the committee had gained the impression that Germany was sympathetic toward the Arab aspirations, but that she would negotiate on the pertinent questions only in concert with Italy. That is the reason why he was sent now with instructions to negotiate first with the German and then with the Italian Government. The committee realized, moreover, that Italy occupied a predominant position in the eastern Mediterranean. The Iraq Premier Rashid Ali has informed the Italian Minister in Bagdad that a confidential envoy of his would shortly go to Rome. The Italian Minister, moreover, on instruction from the Italian Government, had already informed the Minister President in writing that it was the goal of the Italian Government that all Arab countries in the Near East which were under British or French Mandate or protection should become independent.

The wishes of the Arab committee are the following:

1. A joint declaration, or identical declarations of the German and Italian Governments, formulated roughly as in the annex. The inclusion of Syria is justified by the fact that this state owed its existence to the now defunct League of Nations, and that a revision of the status of Syria was therefore in order.

2. A declaration of the two Governments in writing that they are in accord with

- a) the expressed wish of the Iraq Government to restore diplomatic relations with Germany, with a view to establish a friendly collaboration between the two Governments in all questions of interest to both countries;

- b) the willingness of the Iraq Government to accord to Germany and Italy a preferred position with respect to the exploitation of Iraq mineral resources, especially petroleum, and the economic development of the country, with the understanding that the interests of each side in this regard are equally safeguarded;

- c) the willingness of the Iraq Government to offer its good offices to enable Germany and Italy to achieve a like understanding with the other Arab countries, especially Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, and Saudi Arabia.

After the official German-Italian declaration regarding 1 is made and the letter regarding 2 received, the Iraq Government will dismiss Nuri Said as Foreign Minister and replace him probably with Naji Shawkat.

The Iraq Government then proposes the conclusion of a secret agreement between it and the German and Italian Governments, in which would be laid down all the details of the friendly collaboration envisioned. The negotiations should be conducted in Ankara.

The Iraq Government proposes furthermore that Iraq and the countries declared independent (Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan) should declare their strict neutrality.

After that it is intended to start a general uprising in Transjordan and Palestine. Up to 10,000 men and the required number of officers will be made available. The preparations would have to be organized from Syria. Arms (rifles, machine guns, antiaircraft, and ammunition) would have to be supplied to the committee by Italy from the stocks of the French Army in Syria, which are to be surrendered to Italy in accordance with the French-Italian armistice agreement; if necessary, this could be arranged against payment. Financing of the uprising, especially in the early months, will require 30,000 pounds sterling, gold, of which one-third can be raised by the committee, while the rest would have to be supplied by Germany or Italy. There are still 30,000 to 40,000 English troops in Palestine, which the Arabs believe they can handle.

Tying down these troops in Palestine and preventing the shipment of Anglo-Indian troops from India, Bahrein, or Aden to Egypt will substantially relieve Italy's military situation in the eastern Mediterranean.

If England should interpret preventing the transit of Anglo-Indian troops or sending a German Minister to Bagdad as a provocation and reply by the use of force, Iraq is prepared to defend her neutrality against England with all means. The Iraq Government is prepared to admit to its country all German agents or experts necessary for the purpose. It would perhaps be expedient for the time being if they came on neutral passports.

GROBBA

[Subenclosure—Draft]

JOINT OR IDENTICAL DECLARATION OF THE GERMAN AND
ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS

I

The German and the Italian Governments recognize the full independence of the Arab countries which are already independent or are under French mandate (Syria and Lebanon) or under British mandate and protectorate (Transjordan, Palestine, the Arab countries on the coasts of the Arabian Peninsula—Kuwait, Oman, Masgat, Hadhramaut, South Yemen as part of the state of Yemen, and the other countries recognized as Arab countries on the basis of an Arab majority of the population).

Germany and Italy will make no use of any juridical or other means designed to abridge the independence of these Arab countries, e. g., by establishing mandates, that hypocritical device of the League of Nations and the democracies to disguise their imperialistic greed.

II

Germany and Italy recognize the right of all Arab countries to shape their national unity in accordance with their wishes. Germany and Italy will place no obstacles to the achievement of that unity or the enjoyment of full independence by these countries.

III

Germany and Italy recognize the right of the Arab countries to solve the question of the Jewish elements in Palestine and the other Arab countries in a manner that conforms to the national and ethnic interests of the Arabs, and to the solution of the Jewish question in the countries of Germany and Italy.

IV

Germany and Italy have no imperialistic designs with respect to Egypt and the Sudan, and recognize the independence of these two countries, as set forth under number I of this Declaration.⁴

V

Germany and Italy have no greater wish than to see each Arab nation enjoying abundant prosperity and taking its historical and natural place in the sun, both for the welfare of all mankind and for the purpose of economic cooperation with these countries in the mutual interest.⁵

⁴ On Sept. 7 Weizsäcker sent to Mackensen a detailed summary of the conversations with the Arab emissary and enclosed a French text of the proposed "Joint declaration" which differed considerably in two places from the version printed here but was otherwise identical except for style and arrangement (2281/481553-70). The paragraph which corresponds to section IV as printed here has the following additional passage: "The Axis Powers furthermore declare null and void the reservations directed against the independence of these two countries which were made by England. Italy merely reserves the right to safeguard her imperial routes across the Sudan between vital points of her colonial empire; this however will be by agreement with Egypt."

⁵ This final section in the French version of the declaration (see footnote 4) contains the following additional passage: "They [Germany and Italy] request the Arab countries to respect in Palestine and elsewhere the status quo in everything concerning the property of churches and Christian missions, the right to worship of the various Christian sects, welfare activities (hospitals, orphanages, homes for the blind) and freedom of conscience in the religious sphere."

No. 404

136/74315

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, August 27, 1940.

General Thomas informed me by telephone today as follows:

The Führer has spoken to Field Marshal Keitel about a telegram from the Embassy in Madrid, in which Spain's requirements of machinery, grain, etc., are indicated.¹ The Führer has ordered that the OKW examine these wishes to see what we can give. He, General Thomas, has been directed by Field Marshal Keitel to discuss the matter with the Reichsmarschall and then to give his reaction.²

When I learned that the Foreign Minister had decided, upon being informed to this effect, that the telegram might be passed on, I sent General Thomas a copy.

WOERMANN

¹ Cf. document No. 355.

² In a memorandum of Aug. 29, concerning a conference with Göring on that day (introduced at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals as document No. 1456-PS, but not included in the published collection), General Thomas recorded:

"Asked the Reichsmarschall for his position respecting the Führer's question, whether one can make large economic concessions to Spain in the event of her entering the war. They are asking especially for bread grain, motor fuel, coal, rubber, scrap, cotton, hemp, and jute. The Reichsmarschall states that such support to the extent desired is completely out of the question. Bread grain, cotton, hemp, also petroleum, are out of the question; as for the other points one could make concessions for small amounts. The Reichsmarschall takes the position that this commitment, however, does not look rewarding. He wants to discuss the matter further with the Führer."

The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Aug. 1-Nov. 30) contains the following entry for Sept. 2 based on statements made by General Jodl after a conference with Hitler:

"The economic demands which Spain has made as a condition for her entry into the war will not form an obstacle to carrying through the attack on Gibraltar. The quickest way to fulfill them would be by means of a victory."

See further Admiral Raeder's report of Sept. 6 printed in "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," *Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948*, pp. 132-136.

No. 405

F8/0097-0105;
F8/0175

Ambassador Stohrer to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop

TOP SECRET

MADRID, August 27, 1940.

DEAR HERR REICHSMINISTER: At the conversations in Berlin,¹ the adoption of a protocol regarding mutual obligations was contemplated

¹ See document No. 274.

in the event of a joint operation with Spain. The Führer declared himself in agreement with this.

The experiences of the Spanish Civil War make it appear advisable to fix in writing the details of the services to be asked of Spain in return. To give a better picture of the subject I have set forth, in the form of a preliminary draft protocol, the results of my provisional studies on Spanish contributions that would be valuable to us in return.

With reference to my report in person in Berlin and my memorandum of August 8,² I take the liberty in this connection of once more pointing out:

1) That Spain, weakened by the Civil War, will hardly be in a position, economically and with respect to internal policy—even with extensive military and economic support from us—to wage a long war, and that her entry into the war should therefore be as late as possible;

2) That nowhere near the same criterion can be applied to Spanish conditions as to German, in view of the totally different kind of mentality and the entirely different character of the Spaniards, whether in regard to precision in executing military measures and operations or in regard to other organizational measures, such as food rationing, etc., made necessary by the war;

3) That a cession of all of French Morocco or large parts of it may conjure up new and difficult problems for Spain. Spain is hardly in a position today to maintain orderly conditions in her own country and in the small Spanish Morocco zone. Ceding French Morocco to Spain would, moreover, in all probability lead to serious warlike complications, since the Moroccans are just as averse to a Spanish as to a French protectorate.

Heil Hitler!

Most obediently,

STOHRER

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF A PROTOCOL

On June . . . of this year through the Spanish Embassy in Berlin, the Spanish Government sent the Reich Government a memorandum in which it offers, on certain conditions, to enter the war against England on the side of the Axis Powers.*

In the event that hereafter the Spanish Government of its own desire and accord enters the war against England, the following arrangements shall enter into force between the German and Spanish Governments.

* Document No. 313.

* See vol. IX, document No. 488.

Article I

The Spanish Government shall take full responsibility for the decision to enter the war against England on the side of the Axis Powers. (Comment: May possibly be omitted because of the contents of the preamble.)

The Spanish Government, in accord with the Axis Powers, shall determine the time of entry into the war.

Article II

The conduct of Spain's military operations shall be the responsibility of Spain alone. They shall, however, be carried out in close accord with the German military authorities. The necessary permanent liaison organs shall be created for this. Germany is also prepared to furnish military advisers and specialists should this be desired by Spain or seem to her necessary.

Article III

The Reich Government is prepared to make available to the Spanish Government the necessary war material. The scope and the time of these deliveries, as well as all other details of a military nature shall be regulated by a military agreement which shall enter into force on the same day as this Treaty.

(Remark: Negotiations are in progress between Admiral Canaris and the Spanish General Vigón regarding the military equipment that seems to Spain necessary for the Gibraltar operation and for the prosecution of the war in general. Admiral Canaris has the appropriate data.)

Article IV

The Reich Government is also prepared for the duration of the war, so far as necessary, to assist Spain in an economic respect and to supply the raw materials, foods, and goods which are absolutely necessary and which she cannot obtain at home or abroad. Details on this subject are given in the enclosure (or: in a separate agreement entering into force on the same day as this treaty).

(Remark: Negotiations are to be conducted on this point with Señor Serrano Suñer, who has been asked to take along with him to Germany appropriate supporting data.)

Article V

In return for the deliveries provided for in the two preceding articles (or separate agreements) and for assistance in the conduct of the war, Spain obligates herself to recognize in a definitive way the Spanish war debts arising out of the Spanish Civil War (Remark: The sum necessary for the indemnification of the Germans resident

in Spain must be added to the actual war debts) and to pay them off in . . . years through deliveries of raw materials (Remark: possibly also through payments in cash or investments in Spain).

The Spanish Government will further agree to the transfer of . . . percent of present English and French mining property in Spain and Spanish Morocco which is shown in the enclosure (Remark: also such enterprises, circumstances permitting, in French Morocco and Oran) to Germany after the end of the war.

(Remark: The Secretariat of State Secretary Keppler is compiling the appropriate data.)

Article VI

The Reich Government assures the Spanish Government that it will very energetically and to the extent hereinafter set forth support the realization of the Spanish national claims, as cited in the memorandum mentioned in the preamble. In particular, it guarantees to Spain after the termination of the war with England, possession and free disposition of Gibraltar and the Tangier Zone. The Reich Government further obligates itself to effect in the peace treaty the cession by France of the territory of Oran (the boundaries are shown on the attached map⁴) and the cession of French Morocco (or: the part of French Morocco that appears on the attached map).

Article VII (tentative)

The Spanish Government takes note of the fact that the Reich Government intends to take possession of the portions (or ports with hinterland) of French Morocco that appear on the attached map.

Article VIII

(In this article Spain's claim to expansion of Spanish territories in the Sahara and in Guinea should be dealt with. Possibly an exchange of territory could be provided for, since Spanish Guinea lies to the fore of our former Cameroon colony and for this reason this Spanish demand can probably not be satisfied. Circumstances permitting, an expansion of the Cameroon or the cession of the Spanish island, Fernando Po, could even be requested in return for the large territorial gains that Spain will make in Morocco and Oran.)

Article IX

The Spanish Government agrees to Germany's participation to the broadest extent in the extraction of mineral resources and in other economic enterprises in the territories in Africa newly acquired by Spain, with the same rights as Spain. The Spanish Government therefore guarantees to the German Government not only the restitu-

⁴ Not found.

tion of the property, concessions, and other rights, of which German owners were divested through the Versailles Treaty, but it agrees also to the transfer of the property (Remark: or to the participation up to . . . percent) in the mineral resources in the newly acquired Moroccan territory and the territory of Oran, as set forth in the enclosure.

Article X

The two Governments declare their determination to continue, after the termination of the war against England, to develop friendly relations in all spheres, particularly in the military, economic, and cultural spheres, and to make them as close as possible. They will therefore proceed forthwith to the conclusion of a military convention and the ratification of the Cultural Agreement concluded on January 24, 1939.⁵

Article XI

(Here further demands regarding air transportation and shipping might possibly be dealt with. Also a coordination of German and Spanish propaganda work through press, news services, etc., abroad and particularly in South America might be provided for.)

Article XII

This Treaty and the special agreement annexed hereto shall not enter into force until the Royal Italian Government has declared to the two Governments that it has no objections to these agreements. (Remark: Or: until the Royal Italian Government has concluded an analogous agreement with the Spanish Government and has apprised the German Government thereof.)

⁵ See vol. III, document No. 716 and footnote 1.

No. 406

73/52720

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1775 of August 27

Moscow, August 28, 1940—11:30 a. m.

Received August 28—2:25 p. m.

The Hungarian Minister here called on me and told me that after the interruption of the Hungarian-Rumanian negotiations in Turnu-Severin he had informed Molotov of the situation and the negative outcome to date. Molotov had shown a great deal of interest and had asked in particular about the attitude of Germany and Italy, where-

upon the Minister had replied that Hungary is receiving friendly support from both Powers. In conclusion Molotov had reaffirmed the position known to you that the Soviet Government recognized the Hungarian claims on Rumania and agreed to their realization, but he had said nothing about further steps. The Minister was very well satisfied with Molotov's stand. He added that the Soviet Government was trying in general to activate its relations with Hungary and give them content, as approved in particular by the cooperative Soviet attitude in the economic negotiations which would be concluded satisfactorily here in the near future.

SCHULENBURG

No. 407

F18/111-115

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*¹

VIENNA, August 28, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND COUNT CIANO, IN THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTER V. RIBBENTROP, AMBASSADORS V. MACKENSEN AND ALFIERI, AND COUNSELOR OF LEGATION HEWEL, AT OBERSALZBERG, ON AUGUST 28, 1940

At the outset the Führer presented the situation from the German standpoint. He did not know whether the Hungarian threats were intended seriously. Perhaps they were only a bluff. Nevertheless it was necessary to make preparations as if they were intended seriously.²

¹ Marginal note: "[For] F[ührer]."

² The draft of entries by Helmuth Greiner in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Aug. 1-Nov. 30) contains this passage for Aug. 28:

"At 11:00 a. m. the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff [Jodl] informs the Chief of the National Defense Department [Warlimont] of the decision of the Führer, made a short time previously, that in view of the tension between Rumania and Hungary, which has led to new border incidents, thorough preparation should be made to be able to occupy the Rumanian oil districts immediately in case of the failure of renewed attempts at political mediation.

"After thorough discussion of the measures to be taken, it is determined that units, primarily mobile, which at present are stationed in Germany, come into question for this purpose. In all there are 5 armored and 3 motorized divisions, of which 4 armored and 2 motorized divisions are supposed to be ready for action again by Aug. 31. Furthermore, the commitment of parachute and air-landing troops is planned for the quick local protection of the most important parts of Rumania. In case of this contingency Hungary will be asked to agree to the march through Hungarian territory and most possibly also to transit by railroad. It is believed that a Rumanian agreement to the request to enter their country will be attained without difficulty. It will fall to the latter also to supply the German troops committed in Rumania.

"In order that these measures may be carried out expeditiously, the section leader of Section I (Luftwaffe) of the National Defense Department (Major Freiherr von Falkenstein) is sent in the afternoon of Aug. 28 to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff to discuss the necessary measures for air reconnaissance as well as fighter and antiaircraft artillery protection. The orders to the Army are issued by the Chief of the National Defense Department in a telephone conversa-

In that event, it was his opinion that the interests of Germany and Italy were vitally affected.

Several factors were to be considered in an appraisal of the general situation.

1. A purely material factor which was, however, of extraordinary importance for the prosecution of the war: the petroleum supply, which was extremely important for both Italy and Germany. According to the computations made by Germany, she would, if necessary, be able to get along even without Rumanian oil. Nevertheless such a loss would naturally entail added difficulty in the prosecution of the war and a great curtailment of the normal economic consumption.

Then there was also the Spanish question. Under certain circumstances the Spaniards might possibly be prepared to enter the conflict. In this case, however, they would have to receive, in addition to material assistance of other kinds, an additional allotment of 30,000–50,000 tons of petroleum a month. If she were to lose her imports from Rumania, Germany would in no circumstances be in a position to make this allotment. For Italy, the petroleum problem would probably develop in a similar way.

It was clear that at the first gunshot all petroleum shipments from Rumania to Germany and Italy would cease. A Rumania at war with Hungary could naturally no longer export her products via Yugoslavia or the Danube. This would create extremely serious problems for the further prosecution of the war, particularly with respect to the technical weapons needed in modern warfare.

2. A second element influencing the situation just as decisively was the question of the extension of the war. If the conflict started in the Balkans, it was entirely possible that Russia would likewise attempt to intervene. It was not known where the Russians would establish the boundary lines of their interests. They would in any case advance as far as circumstances permitted.

In this connection it was immaterial what the Russian political leaders said at the moment about the boundaries of their interests. As soon as the guns sounded and the armies were on the march, all this

Footnote (2)—Continued

tion during the afternoon with the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff. The date for a discussion between the High Commands of the Army and the Luftwaffe on their plans is fixed for Aug. 30.

"At 7:00 p. m. the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff reports that the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command has just returned from a meeting of the Führer with the political officers at the Berghof, with the result that the command of the Führer to start the movement for the protection of the Rumanian oil districts is to be expected as of Sept. 1. That makes it necessary to supplement the former directives. Preparations must be made to enable part of the forces to start on Sept. 1 if necessary. No troop displacements for this purpose should be made before Sept. 1, however, whereas the west-east movement, ordered by the directive of Aug. 27, should be speeded up."

would be meaningless and their previous statements (for instance, that Russia's interest went only up to Moldavia) would be scrapped by the triumphal march of the armies. This would result in greatly worsening Italy's and Germany's situation in the future.

3. Another element to be considered was the fact that if it came to armed conflict, Hungary might fight either alone or with foreign aid. If Hungary remained alone, then in view of the extent of her military preparedness and her situation in other respects, victory was by no means certain.

If Hungary did not remain alone but permitted other powers to help her, then the territories acquired in the past year and a half would surely be threatened. In the Carpatho-Ukraine sentiment was extremely hostile to Hungary and it was entirely possible that Russia would advance over the crest of the Carpathians.

The Hungarians believed they could crush Rumania in a kind of blitzkrieg. In view of the state of Hungary's preparedness, he (the Führer) was of the opinion, however, that such a blitzkrieg was an experiment one should look at twice before starting.

It was perfectly clear from the foregoing that a conflict in the Balkans could only be harmful to Germany and Italy and it was therefore in the interest of both countries to do everything in order to avoid such a conflict. This was also the opinion of the German generals, for they also did not consider a Hungarian victory such a foregone conclusion as the people in Budapest apparently did, and they, too, were conscious of the difficulties that would necessarily arise if the conflict between Rumania and Hungary deteriorated into a general conflagration in the Balkans. In that case the oil wells would not only be shut down for some months but would be destroyed forever.

It was for this reason that he (the Führer), after a lengthy talk with the Reich Foreign Minister, had requested the Duce to send his Foreign Minister to Germany. For him (the Führer) it was difficult to leave the country and it would not have been so easy, moreover, to invite the Rumanians and the Hungarians to Italy. It would now be a matter of the two Foreign Ministers first comparing the attitudes of their respective countries on the questions raised earlier and then agreeing upon the steps that had to be taken in order to avoid a conflict.

Count Ciano replied that he knew the views of the Duce on the problems previously discussed and could therefore state that the Duce was in absolute accord with the Führer. The outbreak of a conflict had to be avoided at all costs since its effects on Italy's supplies, especially of petroleum, would otherwise be extremely serious. Therefore he (Count Ciano) could subscribe to everything that the Führer had just stated. He had, moreover, come to Germany with full powers.

from the Duce to arrange with the Reich Foreign Minister the necessary measures for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The Führer replied that the solution of the problem was especially complicated by the fact that a territorial claim that was extremely popular psychologically in the Hungarian nation was confronted by an ethnographic claim which was surely incontestable.

The structure of the population in the contested area—taking the most favorable view of Hungary's position—was as follows: as against $1\frac{1}{2}$ million Hungarians there were 3 million Rumanians and 600,000–700,000 Germans. Since the Germans were completely disinterested in this conflict, the numerical ratio was therefore one-third Hungarians to two-thirds Rumanians. The problem was further complicated by the fact that the Rumanians were settled in the west and the Hungarians in the east of the contested area. Hungary's territorial claim amounted to 66,000 square meters [sic], that is, the Hungarians demand two-thirds of the area in dispute, which is, however, inhabited only one-third by Hungarians. This was the cause of the difficulties.

On the other hand, it was also clear that in the event of a conflict Rumania had nothing to gain and everything to lose. Should Rumania start the war it might possibly be her last war and lead to the complete disappearance of the state.

Regarding the inner attitude of the Balkan nations toward the Axis Powers, he said the Duce was absolutely justified when he wrote in his letter that Yugoslavia as well as Greece and Rumania were fundamentally foes of Italy and Germany.³ For the two latter countries it was simply a problem of expediency that was involved at the moment.

Rumania and Hungary therefore had to be impressed with the serious consequences that might arise for them if they persisted in an uncompromising attitude. It had to be made clear to them that a conflict would be disadvantageous to both countries and that Italy and Germany would in all circumstances protect their own interests if the need arose. It was therefore expedient for both countries to agree on a compromise. Hungary really ought to agree to any compromise, for she had not earned anything through her own efforts but owed her revisionist victories solely to Fascism and National Socialism.

It ought to be made clear to Rumania that a compromise with Hungary still meant salvaging a national territory which was, after all, still sizable.

Italy and Germany had to consider, moreover, whether it would not be appropriate to give an assurance with regard to the continued existence of the Rumanian State since, indeed, that country's [territory]

³ Document No. 388.

rial] integrity, after settlement of the dispute, was in Italy's and Germany's interest. Such an assurance from the Axis Powers would have extremely great significance and was the most valuable contribution that Germany and Italy could make to the future of Rumania.

It was important, however, to follow very prudent tactics here and for the time being to mention the guarantee only to Rumania. If Hungary obtained premature knowledge of the promise of a guarantee to Rumania, it is possible that she might not agree to any compromise at all since it was to be assumed that she would agree to a compromise solution only with the mental reservation that she would bring up the Rumanian question at a later date. The Rumanians, too, had to be advised in their own interest for the present not to let any word get out to the Hungarians of a German-Italian offer of a guarantee.

In reply to a question by the Führer as to whether Italy had already worked out a compromise proposal, Count Ciano stated that some maps had been prepared by the Italian Ministers in Budapest and Bucharest. The maps were then submitted by Count Ciano to the Führer. It was agreed, however, after a brief exchange of views as to the procedure to be adopted, that for the time being no map should be used as a basis of the conversations with either party and that at a certain time a joint German-Italian map with a definite boundary line no longer subject to discussion should then be submitted to the parties.

After some words of farewell, in which the Führer requested the Count, among other things, to convey his best regards to the Duce and promised an early reply to the latter's letter, the conversation ended after about an hour.⁴

SCHMIDT

⁴ Ciano's telegraphic summary of this conversation for Mussolini is printed in Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 581-583.

No. 408

F18/125-133

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

VIENNA, August 31, 1940.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND RUMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MANOILESCU, IN THE PRESENCE OF COUNT CIANO, AT THE HOTEL IMPERIAL IN VIENNA, ON AUGUST 29, 1940

After a few words of greeting the Reich Foreign Minister told Rumanian Foreign Minister Manoilescu that the question of Transylvania was a matter affecting not only the interests of the two countries

directly concerned, but, indirectly, also the interests of the Axis Powers. Germany and Italy, as they had already stated on several other occasions, wanted to be assured that the peace would be preserved in the Balkans. Germany wished to arrange for extensive trade with the Balkans, but that required tranquillity. Also, aside from this, she wished that her neighbor states should live in peace and tranquillity.

The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the development of the situation since the Rumanian Minister President and the Foreign Minister last visited Salzburg¹ and noted that whereas negotiation of the issues to be taken up with Bulgaria had gotten well under way, this unfortunately was not true of the Rumanian-Hungarian negotiations. The Führer had closely watched the development and quickly decided to try to bring about a definitive solution of the question when information was received of troop concentrations and border incidents between Hungary and Rumania. Rumania had repeatedly requested the Axis Powers to make an arbitration award in the revision question. Now the Führer and Mussolini had decided after consultation to comply with this request and to make the award. The Hungarian demands were clear, which was not the case with regard to the Rumanian offer. The Reich Foreign Minister recalled in this connection that he had already told the Rumanian Minister President on the occasion of his visit to Salzburg that the concessions which he had been assured Rumania was willing to make were inadequate, and that Rumania would have to name figures far different from those then advanced in Salzburg.

The Axis Powers would make an effort to arrive at a fair and just settlement and reconcile the interests of the two states in their arbitration award, for only thus could peace be preserved in the long run. But before it was possible to discuss any details, he had to ask the Rumanian Foreign Minister to give Germany and Italy an unequivocal assurance on behalf of his Government that Rumania would unconditionally accept the arbitration award that the Axis Powers would render after mature consideration.

Following this the Reich Foreign Minister spoke about the question of the guarantee, and asked that in Rumania's very own interest it be treated in strict confidence for the time being. The Führer and Mussolini had decided to guarantee Rumania's territorial integrity² after pronouncement of the arbitration award in the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute, and settlement of the Bulgarian revision demands.

Manoilescu asked at once whether this guarantee would apply only to the Rumanian-Hungarian border or to all Rumanian borders. The

¹ Document No. 233.

² See document No. 407.

reply was that it was a guarantee of the entire territory of the Rumanian State.

Continuing the Reich Foreign Minister remarked on certain strange utterances of the present Rumanian Ambassador in Moscow, former Foreign Minister Gafencu. According to absolutely reliable reports,³ Gafencu had stated that basically Rumania was still on England's side and considered a British victory possible, and that the shift in her policy toward friendship with the Axis was exclusively motivated by expediency. Moscow therefore should not take this friendliness toward the Axis too seriously.

The Reich Foreign Minister stated in this connection that he merely wished to bring this to Manoilescu's attention so as to enable him to put a stop to certain matters which were not in Rumania's interest, for utterances of this kind by the Rumanian Ambassador in Moscow were practically tantamount to encouraging Russia to further aggression against Rumania; the recent border incidents were in his opinion partly due to this attitude of Gafencu's, which amounted to a virtual invitation to Russia to invade Rumania.

In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister stressed that the Führer was envisaging a firm and lasting friendship between the Axis Powers and Rumania. Such a state of affairs, however, could be achieved only on the basis of a truly reasonable settlement of the Transylvanian question. Once this was accomplished, it would also be possible to meet the practical wishes recently expressed by Rumania, such as sending of a military mission to Bucharest, etc. First, however, Rumania had to give positive assurance that she would accept without any reservation the arbitration award to be made by the Axis Powers.

Count Ciano said that for his part he had very little to add to the eminently clear statements of the Reich Foreign Minister. He was able to corroborate that Italy, in agreement with her ally, desired an early and just solution of the question of Transylvania, as the Duce had already outlined in detail in the discussions in Rome some weeks previously.⁴ If no agreement were to be reached, a serious crisis would result for all concerned, but especially for Rumania.

Count Ciano also declared on behalf of the Italian Government that it was prepared to assume a guarantee of Rumania's territorial integrity and asked that this guarantee offer be treated confidentially for the time being. The situation was such, however, that action had to be taken without delay. Italy and Germany, to be sure, were confident (despite Gafencu's opinion to the contrary) that they would win the war against England, but it was necessary for them to direct all their energy toward that goal. His advice would therefore be, no less in Rumania's interest, to bring matters to a decision as soon as possible.

³ Not found.

⁴ See document No. 234, footnote 6.

Manoilescu first expressed his thanks for the invitation to Vienna. Rumania desired that no decision be made without her participation. The offer to render an arbitration award had surprised him, because both the Führer and the Duce had told the Rumanian Minister President only a few weeks ago that they were opposed to any arbitration award, and had instead recommended a very specific policy to Rumania. Rumania had done everything on her part to follow the recommendations of the Führer.

They had decided on an outright cession of territory to Bulgaria as recommended by the Führer in a note,⁵ the substance of which the Duce and Count Ciano confirmed as it were by their silence. This cession was a heavy sacrifice for Rumania, and difficult to justify before public opinion. Nevertheless, sufficient progress had now been made so that the agreement would be signed in Craiova. Wherever it was possible to yield, Rumania had done so a hundred percent. She had prepared public opinion just as the Führer and the Duce had recommended and had closely followed the advice of Germany and Italy in other respects as well.

When Manoilescu then brought up the matter of Gafencu mentioned by the Reich Foreign Minister, and stated that this "Gafencu incident" was of concern not only to the Minister President and the Foreign Minister, but to the entire regime, since it had caused unfavorable reflections on its sincerity, the Reich Foreign Minister and Count Ciano replied immediately that the remarks made in this connection by the Foreign Ministers of the Axis Powers were in no sense directed against the Rumanian Government.

Manoilescu explained why Gafencu had been sent to Moscow. Being a man of international note and a skilled politician, he was expected to flatter Moscow and reassure the Russians. But if he was not acceptable to the Axis Powers, he could be recalled within 24 hours.

The Reich Foreign Minister, seconded by Count Ciano, advised against giving the affair such a turn. His remarks had been intended merely to inform the Rumanian Foreign Minister about certain matters.

Manoilescu then brought up the main question, that of unconditional acceptance of the arbitration award. He stated that actually three questions were involved here: 1) the acceptance, 2) the principles on which the arbitration award would be based, and, finally, the procedure by which the award would be implemented.

As for the principle on which the award would have to be based, he would refer to a remark of the Duce's that "no worse ill must arise than that for which a cure was sought," and that the settlement would have to be so solid as to be able to resist the attrition of time. It had so

⁵ See document No. 253.

happened that history had intermingled the population groups in Transylvania. Both sides desired to make a clean separation. This could be achieved only by means of an exchange of populations. Therefore Rumania envisaged a solution on the basis of living space, through an exchange of populations. He would therefore request before committing himself to unconditional acceptance of the arbitration award that it be made on the basis of the ethnographic principle.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that it would be altogether inappropriate for Rumania on her part to present the Axis Powers with stipulations for their arbitration. The Reich Foreign Minister added that in these circumstances it would seem that arbitration was impossible and matters would have to take their own course. Hungary would attack Rumania. The war would spread quickly and also lead to Russian intervention, which would probably seal Rumania's doom. In fact, she was faced with the alternative of either losing not only all of Transylvania but in addition head for a political catastrophe, or else agreeing to a solution which was reasonable although it involved relatively heavy sacrifices. Moreover, the purely ethnographic principle could not alone form the basis of the solution. The Axis Powers would adhere to this principle only in so far as was practicable.

Count Ciano said that he agreed with these statements and merely added for his part a remark about the severe struggle in which Italy and Germany were now engaged. Countries desiring friendly relations with the Axis had to take this into account. If Rumania should create difficulties, Germany and Italy would not in the future forget that in a trying moment of its history that country had done them a bad turn. The arbitration award would naturally take account of the ethnographic factors, but the arbitrators could not permit Rumania to impose any obligations on them.

The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that a pure, 100 percent ethnographic solution was altogether impossible. The award could only be based on a synthesis between the principle of redress of a territorial wrong and the ethnographic principle. The solution would have to give consideration also to certain imponderables, among others the fact that a certain rural population had become so firmly attached to the soil in the disputed territory that an exchange of populations was here entirely out of the question. The Axis Powers, however, would render their award in a way that would make it possible even for the Rumanian Government to justify the acceptance of this award before its people.

Manoilescu took exception to these arguments. In the conversation with the Führer and the Duce, the ethnographic principle had been recognized as basic by both of them. Rumania had prepared public opinion accordingly. It now appeared that a shift had occurred in this question and that the solution was to be sought on the basis of

other principles. This created extremely great difficulties for the Rumanian Government in its own country.

When Manoilescu seemed to imply in another connection that Rumania had been taken by surprise by the arbitration offer, he was told emphatically by both the Reich Foreign Minister and Count Ciano that Germany and Italy had no desire whatsoever to obtrude themselves and would just as soon let things take their own course without arbitration. To be sure, the consequences would be grave, as previously stated.

In conclusion, a lengthy discussion developed on the question how much time should be given to Manoilescu for conveying the reply of his Government concerning unconditional acceptance of the award. Since the matter had to be submitted to the Crown Council and the Cabinet Council, Manoilescu suggested that the reply of the Rumanian Government would not arrive until the following day.

The Reich Foreign Minister declared that this was too late and asked that the decision be speeded as much as possible so that it would be received not later than 10 o'clock in the evening. After considerable talking back and forth Manoilescu finally declared himself willing to obtain the decision of his Government by 12 o'clock, and went to his hotel to inform his Government as quickly as possible by telephone and telegraph.*

SCHMIDT

* Concerning the Rumanian reply, see Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu* (Wiesbaden, 1954), p. 92, who cites private communications from Fabricius.

No. 409

F18/116

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

VIENNA, August 31, 1940.

RM 25.

RECORD OF THE BRIEF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND RUMANIAN MINISTER POP IN THE PRESENCE OF COUNT CIANO, AT THE HOTEL IMPERIAL IN VIENNA, ON AUGUST 29, 1940

At the request of Rumanian Foreign Minister Manoilescu, Minister Pop, now in Vienna as an alternate delegate, was briefly received by the Reich Foreign Minister and Count Ciano. Minister Pop merely asked several questions which in part concerned matters that had already been settled with M. Manoilescu. Thus, for instance, he asked once more whether the guarantee of Rumania's territorial integrity applied with respect to all of Rumania's neighbors. His entire attitude was much more constructive than Manoilescu's and he said on leaving that he would urge his King to give the assurance that Ru-

mania would unconditionally accept the arbitration award which is to be made by Germany and Italy.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

SCHMIDT

No. 410

F18/117-124

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

VIENNA, August 31, 1940.

RM 26.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, COUNT CSÁKY, IN THE PRESENCE OF COUNT CIANO AND THE HUNGARIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT, COUNT TELEKI, AT THE HOTEL IMPERIAL IN VIENNA, ON AUGUST 29, 1940

The Reich Foreign Minister welcomed the Hungarian gentlemen and informed them that the Führer and the Duce were willing, at their request, to pronounce an arbitration award in the question of revision between Hungary and Rumania. Germany and Italy for their part wished thereby to assist in reaching a peaceful settlement of this question. In all candor he first wanted to explain the German view on the situation, so as to exclude every possibility of a misunderstanding. As already stated by the Führer at the Munich meeting,¹ Germany wished peace to be preserved in the Balkans. As regards the question under discussion, namely, Hungarian-Rumanian revision, one should on the one hand be clear about the military consequences of a possible conflict for Hungary, and on the other hand consider the effects of such a conflict on the interests of the Axis Powers. In Munich the Führer had already expressed his doubts about the outcome of a Hungarian-Rumanian war. In the meantime he had once again reviewed the question with his generals and had come to the same opinion he had already expressed in Munich. It was extremely unlikely that Hungary would remain alone in the conflict with Rumania. Germany had certain information on the basis of which intervention by Russia must be regarded as almost certain.² Hungary would thereby be placed in an extremely serious situation, however, and would possibly even face a catastrophe, for it was easily possible that after having overrun the Rumanians the Hungarian Army would suddenly find itself face to face with Russian troops. He did not need to describe further the consequences of such a situation.

¹ See document No. 146.

² Cf. document No. 396 and footnote 5.

On the other hand the Axis Powers had full understanding for the Hungarian position and would like to have justice accorded that country. With the outbreak of an open conflict, however, the beginning could probably be foreseen, but the further course was doubtful and the end might be a catastrophe.

As far as the interests of the Axis Powers were concerned, one should take into account that they were involved in a life and death struggle with the British Empire. They would destroy this empire, and had already progressed rather far toward this objective. In the coming weeks severe blows would be struck against England. In these circumstances, however, they were not in a position to occupy themselves unduly with problems which were unconnected with this objective which was the only really decisive one. He (the Foreign Minister) did not want to conceal the fact that in this decisive struggle the Führer expected the nations friendly to Germany to subordinate their wishes to the great objective, the attainment of which would benefit them as well.

The Axis Powers were interested in demobilization as soon as possible, so that agricultural production in the Danube Basin could be resumed in a normal way, for these countries played a large role in their food supply. The Foreign Minister stressed emphatically that he did not wish to leave any doubt as to the fact that Germany would see that she received the necessary oil in all circumstances. In a conflict between Hungary and Rumania these oil wells would be endangered, the transportation of the oil would become impossible and the wells might be permanently destroyed. Germany could not and would not tolerate such a decisive interest being left out of consideration.

On the other hand Germany had full understanding for the wishes of her ally from the World War, and had after all already proved, not only in word but also in deed, that she was entirely sympathetic to Hungary. This sympathy had not been merely platonic on the part of the Axis Powers, but had had real practical effect, as shown 2 years ago by the Vienna Award on revision of the northern borders.³ This revision had been made possible only by reason of the Führer's bold policy toward Czechoslovakia. At that time the Reich Government had assumed—this had to be said in all candor—that the award would be received with satisfaction in Hungary. The Hungarians, had, after all, come off so well in the affair that the Slovaks had just recently again approached Germany with the request that she consider a new revision of this border, which had left 100,000 Slovaks on Hungarian territory.⁴

It had therefore been bitterly resented in Germany that not only the Army and German statesmen, but even the Führer himself had been

³ Vol. IV, document No. 99.

⁴ Cf. document No. 248.

subjected to a strange sort of criticism in Hungary. Shortly after the award was issued, moreover, the Hungarian delegate, Count Kánya, had also expressed his dissatisfaction in a very peculiar speech. He (the Foreign Minister) did not by any means want to rake up the past, but he did have to emphasize that without the strong policy of the Führer and the Duce the Hungarians would never have obtained a boundary revision.

In the present case Germany would try to carry out a reasonable and just settlement in the award.

Thereupon the Foreign Minister posed the question to the Hungarian delegates whether they were willing to accept the projected award by the Führer and the Duce without reservation as had been the case in the decision by Germany and Italy 2 years ago. It would mean a fair and just settlement between the interests of the two countries.

The Foreign Minister added that under the present war conditions he himself and Count Ciano had only little time at their disposal, understandably enough, for the settlement of such questions, and that therefore the Hungarian Government had to agree in the course of this very day to accept the award unconditionally, so that the award itself could be made tomorrow.

At the request of the Foreign Minister, Count Ciano for his part expressed himself on this question. He had little to add, he said, to the statements of his comrade, Ribbentrop. He, too, wanted to stress the desire of Italy to secure peace in the Balkans under all conditions during the hard and decisive struggle in which the Axis Powers were involved. Italy had set an example in this regard by setting aside certain problems which she had wished to solve, as she was convinced of the higher necessities of the war against England. Italy, too, had always been sympathetic toward Hungary, and not for reasons of expediency but from a deep feeling of friendship linking the two nations. Hungary had to be clear about the fact that to place the petroleum supplies in jeopardy in a Hungarian-Rumanian conflict would be a severe blow for the Axis Powers, though not a decisive one, and that therefore everything had to be done to avoid such a conflict. Italy was therefore willing to render an award, in agreement and in cooperation with her ally. But before the Axis Powers set out on this path they had to be sure that the award would be accepted unconditionally.

In conclusion Count Ciano also emphasized that Italy would have to regard a conflict with Rumania brought on by Hungary as a dangerous and inexplicable gesture on the part of Hungary, occurring, too, at a moment when the Axis Powers were involved in a grave struggle.

Count Csáky replied by describing the course things had taken since the Munich Conference. Even at that time the Hungarians had

expressed doubt as to the good faith of the Rumanians, and this had been entirely justified in the meantime. This was shown in all clarity in the exchange of notes with Rumania, for Hungary had purposely had all phases of the negotiations put down in writing so as always to be able to bring proof that Rumania did not wish to reach a settlement. Hungary did not want to bring about a revolution in Rumania and was herself interested in a victory by the Axis Powers, for she knew what fate awaited her if Germany and Italy were not victorious. Nevertheless, however, there were things that Hungary could not put up with. As a nation, she would rather die in honor than continue to live in dishonor.

Thereupon Count Teleki took the floor and once more set forth the Hungarian point of view in a lengthy statement which repeated the well-known Hungarian arguments and offered nothing substantially new. When he came to speak in this connection about the Vienna Award of 1938, the Foreign Minister reminded him once more most emphatically of the peculiar criticism which Hungary had voiced against this Award at that time, quite without justification, and in particular gave expression to his astonishment at Kánya's speech after the rendering of the Award.

He also held up to the Hungarian gentlemen the not very obliging attitude which they had taken on the occasion of a request by Germany regarding a railroad line leading to Poland, part of which had fallen to Hungary through the Vienna Award.⁵ At the time Germany had requested permission to route certain transports, among them transports of wounded soldiers, via this railroad.

When Teleki protested that actually transports of munitions and troops had been involved, the Foreign Minister, pointing to the obliging attitude of Slovakia during the Polish campaign, replied that if Hungary's attitude had really been friendly, such considerations should not have played any role. Teleki asserted that at the time Hungary had given permission for transports of matériel in closed cars and trains,⁶ but the Foreign Minister refuted this by remarking that he had personally telephoned Count Csáky in the matter from Headquarters, and that the attitude of Hungary, to his keen regret, had been such that at any rate the transports had not taken place.

At the conclusion of the conversation the Hungarians were again asked by the Foreign Minister and Count Ciano whether they would accept unconditionally the award to be rendered by Germany and Italy.

The first time the Foreign Minister put this question to Count Csáky, Count Teleki had tried to indicate to him by shaking his head

⁵ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 45 and 51.

⁶ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 45, 48, and 51.

that Hungary could not assume such an obligation of accepting the award unconditionally. He now gave cautious expression to this negative attitude and pointed out in particular that it was impossible for Hungary, for example, to agree to a solution that did not return the Szekler region to Hungary. When he seemed to hint in this connection that Hungary was agreeing to arbitration only under compulsion, the Foreign Minister replied to him emphatically that the Axis Powers did not by any means wish to impose themselves as arbitrators. If an arbitration award could not be obtained, then matters would take their course in the manner indicated previously. In no circumstances, would Germany tolerate even the slightest interference with her oil transports from Rumania.

Count Csáky expressed himself with a great deal more reserve than did Count Teleki on the subject of Hungary's assuming the obligation to accept the award by Germany and Italy unconditionally. He did not seem disinclined to assume such an obligation for Hungary. Finally the Hungarian representatives asked for a certain time for reflection and for the opportunity of contacting their Government.

Thereupon the conversation came to a close. Count Teleki then telephoned the Hungarian Minister of the Interior in Budapest from a room nearby.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

SCHMIDT

No. 411

121/119833

*Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Ministry*¹

Telegram

URGENT

No. 475 of August 29

PARIS, August 30, 1940—3:15 a. m.

Received August 30—3:35 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Introduced by us, Laval yesterday made his call on the Military Commander in France, Field Marshal Brauchitsch, and the Chief of the Military Administration, General Streccius, and today returned to Vichy.

Conversations with him in the Embassy conveyed the impression of a growing friendliness toward England discernible even in members of the French Cabinet professing a pronounced anti-English attitude. Today the general delegate of the Vichy Government in Paris, General de la Laurencie, made his first call; he emphasized the

¹ Marginal notation: "Transmitted to Vienna as No. 78 for the attention of Herr von Sonnleithner. Telegraph section. Aug. 30, 1940."

will to sincere collaboration and mentioned the proposed attempt to exert influence on the press in occupied France. Also today there was a talk with Flandin, who evidently would like to abandon the political reserve he has observed in the past and sharply criticized the passivity of the Vichy Government toward drastic reforms. Tomorrow Georges Bonnet will call.

ABETZ

No. 412

22/14024

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry on the Staff of the Reich Commissar in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

OSLO, August 29, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received August 30—8:45 p m.

Unnumbered of August 29

For Minister Schröder.

The Führer's order to secure to Quisling the leadership of the administration of the Norwegian State¹ will lead next week to the dissolution of the Norwegian Administrative Council, prohibition of all parties with the exception of the Nasjonal Samling, the founding of a German party and the assignment of commissioners in the Norwegian administration. In this way the taking over of the leadership of the state by Quisling is to be prepared and secured.

The Reich Commissar has on his own initiative directed me to take over the Commissariat of Economics and Supply and in view of this has rejected the order for my recall by the Foreign Ministry which had in the meanwhile arrived. Upon my representations that this assignment might prejudice my position as an officer of the Foreign Ministry, he merely promised to telephone the Foreign Minister in the matter.

WEBER

¹ Not found.

No. 413

2871/564870-74;
2871/564877-84;
2871/564891-93

Documents on the Second Vienna Award

VIENNA, August 30, 1940.

Pol. IV 2661 g.

PROTOCOL

At the conferences held in Vienna on August 29 and 30, 1940, by the representatives of Germany, Italy, Rumania, and Hungary

regarding the question at issue between Rumania and Hungary concerning the territories to be ceded to Hungary, the representatives of Rumania and Hungary, by virtue of their powers, requested the Reich Government and the Italian Government to settle this question by an arbitration award. The representatives of Rumania and Hungary stated at the same time that their Governments would at once recognize such an arbitration award as binding upon themselves.

The German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and the Foreign Minister of His Majesty the King of Italy and Albania and Emperor of Ethiopia, Count Galeazzo Ciano, on behalf and by direction of their Governments, thereupon declared their willingness to accede to the request of the Royal Rumanian and Royal Hungarian Governments, and having once more conferred with the Royal Rumanian Foreign Minister Michael Manoilescu and the Royal Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Stefan Csáky, they have today, at Belvedere Castle in Vienna, rendered the requested Award, a copy of which, together with an annex,¹ is attached to this Protocol, and presented it to the representatives of Rumania and Hungary in duplicate, in the German and Italian languages.

The Royal Rumanian Foreign Minister and the Royal Hungarian Foreign Minister have taken cognizance of the Award and the annex thereto, reiterating on behalf of their Governments that they accept the Award as a final settlement and undertake the obligation to implement it without qualification.

Done in the German and Italian languages, each in quadruplicate.

JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
CIANO
MANOILESCU
CSÁKY

¹ The annex has not been positively identified. It could be the map mentioned at p. 583 (see footnote 2).

VIENNA, August 30, 1940.

ARBITRATION AWARD

The Royal Rumanian and Royal Hungarian Governments have addressed to the Reich Government and the Royal Italian Government a request to settle by an arbitration award the question at issue between Rumania and Hungary, concerning the territory to be ceded to Hungary. Pursuant to this request and the accompanying declarations of the Royal Rumanian and Royal Hungarian Governments that they would at once recognize such an arbitration award as binding upon them, the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Minister of His Majesty the King of Italy and

Albania and Emperor of Ethiopia, Count Galeazzo Ciano, having once more conferred with the Royal Rumanian Foreign Minister Michael Manoilescu and the Royal Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Stefan Csáky, have today rendered the following Arbitration Award at Vienna:

1. The definitive boundary between Rumania and Hungary shall be the boundary traced on the attached map.² The precise delimitation of the boundary on the spot shall be left to a Rumanian-Hungarian commission.

2. The former Rumanian territory accordingly falling to Hungary shall be evacuated by the Rumanian troops within a period of 14 days and turned over to Hungary in an orderly condition. The successive stages of evacuation and occupation, together with the relevant procedures therefor, shall be immediately determined by a Rumanian-Hungarian commission. The Royal Rumanian and Royal Hungarian Governments shall take care that evacuation and occupation will proceed in an absolutely peaceful and orderly fashion.

3. All Rumanian nationals residing as of this date in the territory to be ceded by Rumania shall acquire Hungarian citizenship without further procedure. They shall have the right to opt for Rumanian citizenship within a period of 6 months. The persons who make use of their right of option must leave Hungarian national territory within a further period of 1 year and shall be received by Rumania. They may take their movable property with them without restriction. They shall furthermore be enabled to liquidate their immovable property prior to their departure and take the proceeds with them, also without restriction. If they do not succeed in liquidating this property, they shall be indemnified by Hungary. Hungary will follow a generous and conciliatory policy in all matters connected with the transfer of the optants.

4. The Rumanian citizens belonging to the Hungarian ethnic group who are residents of the territory ceded by Hungary to Rumania in 1919 and now remaining with Rumania are accorded the right to opt for Hungarian citizenship within a period of 6 months. The persons who avail themselves of such privilege of option shall be treated in accordance with the principles laid down under 3.

5. The Royal Hungarian Government assumes the solemn obligation with respect to the persons of Rumanian ethnic origin who acquire Hungarian citizenship by reason of this arbitration award to place them in all respects on a footing of parity with all other Hungarian citizens. The Royal Rumanian Government solemnly assumes the corresponding obligation with respect to the Rumanian citizens of Hungarian ethnic origin remaining in its territory.

6. The settlement of other details arising from the change in sovereignty shall be left to direct negotiations between the Royal Rumanian and the Royal Hungarian Governments.

² Not found in the files (see footnote 1). A detailed description of the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier as laid down in the Vienna Award is found in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (Berlin, 1943), vol. VIII, pt. 1, p. 387, footnote 1.

7. If difficulties or uncertainties should arise during the implementation of this award, the Royal Rumanian and Royal Hungarian Governments shall inform each other directly thereof. If they are unable to agree on an issue, they shall submit this issue to the Reich Government and Royal Italian Government for final settlement.

JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
CIANO

The Reich Foreign Minister to the Rumanian Foreign Minister

VIENNA, August 30, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: On behalf and by direction of the German Government I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following: Germany and Italy assume as of today the guarantee for the integrity and inviolability of the Rumanian national territory.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

RIBBENTROP

The Rumanian Foreign Minister to the Reich Foreign Minister

VIENNA, August 30, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: On behalf and by direction of the Royal Rumanian Government I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's note of today's date, whereby Germany and Italy, effective today, assume the guarantee for the integrity and inviolability of the Rumanian national territory. The Royal Rumanian Government has taken cognizance of this communication with satisfaction and herewith accepts the guarantee extended to Rumania.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

MANOILESCU

German-Hungarian Protocol

VIENNA, August 30, 1940.

The Government of the Reich and the Royal Hungarian Government, being desirous of regulating the status of the German ethnic group in Hungary in harmony with their relations of mutual friendship, have concluded the following agreement:

I

The Royal Hungarian Government will guarantee to the members of the German community the possibility of preserving their German ethnic heritage without any restriction. It will see to it that the

members of the German ethnic group suffer no discrimination of any kind or in any field whatsoever by reason of membership in the German ethnic group and professing the philosophy of National Socialism. Those persons shall be considered members of the ethnic group who profess attachment to the German community and are recognized as Volksdeutsche by the leaders of the League of Volksdeutsche in Hungary. In accordance with the foregoing principles the following has been determined in particular:

1. The members of the German ethnic group, subject to the relevant general regulations, shall have the right to organize and to establish associations for special purposes, such as youth activities, sports, cultural activities, and so forth.

2. The members of the ethnic group shall be free to practice all professions in Hungary on equal terms and conditions with other Hungarian citizens.

3. The members of the ethnic group, in proportion to their percentage share in the total population of Hungary, shall receive full consideration in appointments to the Hungarian Government service and to autonomous bodies, to the extent that such positions are filled by appointment. Volksdeutsch officials shall primarily be employed in government offices in areas settled by Volksdeutsche, or by the central authorities above these offices.

4. All children of the members of the ethnic group shall have the opportunity to receive an education in volksdeutsch schools, that is, in both secondary and primary schools, as also in trade schools, on the same terms obtaining for the Hungarian schools. The training of an adequate supply of competent volksdeutsch teachers shall be furthered in every way by Hungary.

5. The members of the ethnic group shall have the right to use their language freely in speech and writing, both in their personal and business relations and in public assemblies. The publication of daily newspapers, periodicals and other reading matter in the German language shall be subject to no restrictions which do not equally apply to similar publications in the Hungarian language. In all administrative areas where the members of the German ethnic group constitute no less than one-third of the total population, they may use the German language in their dealings with the Government offices in these districts.

6. The ethnic group shall be authorized to engage in economic self-aid and the expansion of its cooperative systems.

7. Hungary shall refrain from all measures calculated to accomplish compulsory assimilation, especially through Magyarization of volksdeutsch family names. Members of the ethnic group shall have the right to reassume names formerly borne by their families.

8. The members of the ethnic group shall have the right of free intercourse with the Greater German homeland in cultural matters.

II

The Reich Government and the Royal Hungarian Government are fully agreed that the foregoing principles shall in no way affect the obligation of the members of the ethnic group to be loyal to the Hungarian State.

III

For the members of the German ethnic group in the former Rumanian territories reincorporated into Hungary, the following separate agreement has been concluded :

The Royal Hungarian Government, upon their request will extend to the volksdeutsch residents of this area the possibility of emigrating to the German Reich. The Volksdeutsche who wish to make use of this right shall file their applications within a period of 2 years from the date of this agreement. In emigrating, the Volksdeutsche shall be free to take their movable property with them. They shall be allowed to liquidate their immovable property prior to their departure and take out or transfer the proceeds under conditions to be agreed upon by the banks of issue of the respective countries. The details of resettlement will be laid down in the near future by the Reich Government and the Royal Hungarian Government. Within the framework of this agreement a solution will also be found for the question of the conditions under which immovable property of owners, who do not succeed in liquidating it within the period provided for, shall be taken over by the Hungarian State. The two Governments, taking into account the special circumstances, will in this point be guided by the principle applied by the Reich Government and the Royal Italian Government in regulating the resettlement of the Volksdeutsche in South Tyrol.^a

For the Reich Government :

JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
Reich Foreign Minister

For the Royal Hungarian
Government :

COUNT STEFAN CSÁKY
*Royal Hungarian Foreign
Minister*

German-Rumanian Protocol

VIENNA, August 30, 1940.

The Government of the Reich and the Royal Rumanian Government, being desirous of regulating the status of the German ethnic group in Rumania in harmony with the relations of friendship between the German Reich and Rumania, have concluded the following agreement :

The Royal Rumanian Government undertakes the obligation to place the members of the German ethnic group in Rumania on a footing of equality with the members of the Rumanian national community in every respect, and to improve further the status of the

^a See vol. VI, document No. 562 and vol. VIII, document No. 275, footnote 1.

German ethnic group in conformity with the Karlsburg resolutions,⁴ to the end that their German nationality may be preserved.

For the Reich Government:

JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
Reich Foreign Minister

For the Royal Rumanian
Government:

MANOILESCU
*Royal Rumanian Foreign
Minister*

⁴In a cover note sent to various Missions with copies of these agreements relating to the Volksdeutsche it was explained that these resolutions had been adopted by a National Assembly for Transylvania that met on Nov. 18, 1918, in Karlsburg (Alba Julia). (172/135519-20)

The Rumanian Foreign Minister to the Reich Foreign Minister

VIENNA, August 30, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: In connection with the Award on the Hungarian-Rumanian boundary issue, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government and the Royal Bulgarian Government have already reached an accord in principle on the question of the cession of southern Dobruja in accordance with the recommendations of the Führer and the Duce, and that the Royal Rumanian Government will do everything to bring about the formal conclusion of this accord at the earliest possible time.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my high consideration.⁵

MANOILESCU

⁵Ribbentrop's acknowledgment of this communication is not printed (172-185733). In telegram No. 544 of Sept. 1 the Minister in Sofia was instructed to inform the Bulgarian Foreign Minister that Manolescu's note was the result of a German demand that the secondary issue of the boundary with Bulgaria be smoothly adjusted (172/135529).

No. 414

104/112486-87

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 1799 of August 30

Moscow, August 30, 1940—10:12 p. m.

Received August 31—12:10 a. m.

With reference to instruction W XII 5228 of August 9.¹

Last night Molotov asked me to see him and handed me a note verbale,² in which the attention of the German Government is called to activities of German authorities in the Memel Free Port Zone which violate rights and interests of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. Dis-

¹ Document No. 317.

² Not printed (1879/357802-03).

regarding the rights fixed in the German-Lithuanian Treaty of May 20 [1939] * concerning the Memel Free Port Zone (which are quoted in detail in the note verbale) German authorities had ordered German troops to enter the territory of the Free Zone on August 27, had discontinued the activities of the Customs Office, and had declared that all Lithuanian goods in this zone were to be removed. The German authorities had thereby seriously affected the economic situation and commercial possibilities of Lithuania, which now forms part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government was of the opinion that the Lithuanian Soviet Republic was entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by the German-Lithuanian Treaty as well as by the letters exchanged between Schnurre and Norkaitis on May 20, 1939, and that their validity could not be terminated by a unilateral act.

Molotov added orally that just as the German Government takes for granted the fulfillment of the commercial treaties concluded between Germany and the Baltic countries, so also must the Soviet Government demand the observance of the German-Lithuanian Treaty with regard to the Memel Free Port Zone which was likewise a commercial treaty.

Please enable me as soon as possible to answer the note verbale, the text of which will follow by the next courier.

Minister Schnurre will give his opinion * on this issue separately.

SCHULENBURG

* See vol. VI, document No. 445.

* In telegram No. 1800 of Aug. 30 Schnurre noted that the "premature broaching" of the question of the Memel Free Port would make his own negotiations with the Soviet Government concerning German economic interests in the Baltic States much more difficult, but that there was no alternative now except to state the German point of view and ask the Soviet Government to begin conversations on the subject. Schnurre requested that these talks be kept separate from those he was currently conducting in Moscow (104/112438).

No. 415

1379/857804-07

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1565 of August 30

BERLIN, August 31, 1940—3:12 a. m.

Received August 31—10:00 a. m.

Please call on M. Molotov and inform him orally of the Vienna conversations and the German-Italian Award in the Hungarian-Rumanian question approximately as follows:

As Molotov was previously informed,¹ both the Rumanian and the Hungarian Governments had some time ago solicited the advice of the Führer and the Duce, requesting their advice on the solution of the problem of territorial revision. The Führer and the Duce thereupon urgently advised both parties, as well as the Bulgarian Government, to come to an understanding as promptly as possible by way of direct, bilateral negotiations.

While the Bulgarian-Rumanian negotiations led relatively soon to an agreement in principle and now also give hope of an early formal conclusion of an agreement, it recently became more and more obvious that the Hungarian-Rumanian negotiations were running into very great difficulties and that no progress was discernible in reconciling the viewpoints of the two parties. Lately relations between Hungary and Rumania deteriorated to such an extent that the possibility of military complications had to be seriously faced. In compliance with the repeated requests of both the Hungarian and the Rumanian Governments, the Government of the Reich and the Italian Government considered it necessary in another personal discussion to exert influence on both parties directly in order to expedite an agreement. For this purpose the meeting in Vienna was agreed upon a few days ago on very short notice. Since, however, the attitude of the Rumanians and Hungarians held out no prospect of agreement by direct negotiations, and since both parties requested arbitration by Germany and Italy, the Government of the Reich and the Italian Government withdrew their previous objections to such arbitration and assumed the task of settlement by arbitration.

The Government of the Reich decided upon this course in agreement with the Italian Government, because it was evident that there was no further prospect of reaching a peaceful solution by other means, and because both Axis Powers have a fundamental interest in the maintenance of peace and order in these areas. This interest results primarily from the fact—on this there has always been agreement between the Soviet Government and us—that Germany and Italy are very closely involved with the Rumanian economy. So, for example, the extraction of Rumanian oil, its shipment to Germany, as well as the unimpeded importation to Germany of Rumanian grain, etc., will always be of vital importance to the Axis Powers. Hence an armed conflict in those areas, whatever its cause, could not have been tolerated by the Axis. Since the Soviet Government has peacefully settled its controversy with Rumania and the Rumanian-Bulgarian problem is also approaching a solution, it was imperative that now the last territorial problem still to be settled should not lead to an armed conflict. Because of the very complicated geographic and ethno-

¹ Document No. 258.

graphic conditions in Transylvania, the decision was not an easy one. However, we finally found a way out of the difficulties, which is based upon a just and impartial consideration of all the interests concerned. By their Award, which was accepted by both parties without reservation, Germany and Italy have now assured the peace that was threatened in the Danube area. But in order to forestall once and for all a repetition of differences which might easily arise in areas of such territorial and ethnographic complexity, the Axis Powers have undertaken to guarantee the territory of the Rumanian State where peaceful conditions have now been definitively established. Since the Award necessarily involved the cession of a considerable portion of Rumanian territory, Rumania naturally needed to be able to regard both her boundary with Hungary and her territory in general as now definitely secured.* Since the territorial demands made by the Soviet Government on Rumania have been settled by the cession of Bessarabia and since the Bulgarian demands are now in course of being met, and since Rumania has obtained her definitive boundary with Hungary through the Award, the Axis Powers could no longer entertain objections of any kind from this standpoint either to the granting of such a guarantee.

Please tell M. Molotov on my behalf that in view of the friendly relations between our countries, I attach great importance to informing the Soviet Government of these events.

We assume that, from the points of view set forth above, the Soviet Government, too, will welcome the settlement achieved by the Axis and regard it as a valuable contribution toward securing peace in the Danube region.

RIBBENTROP

*The Halder Diary contains the following passage at the entry for Aug. 31: "After lunch the Führer spoke with some of the Attachés. *Russia*: The Russians should know *a*) that Germany places especial value on Rumania, 'will not be frightened off by anything from protecting German interests,' 'Rumania untouchable'. . . ."

APPENDICES

Appendix I

ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY¹ **AUGUST 1940**

THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

von Ribbentrop

(a) Secretariat: Minister Dr. Schmidt (Paul Otto)
Senior Counselor Dr. Kordt (Erich)
Counselor Dr. von Sonnleithner
Secretary of Legation Dr. Bruns

For special assignments: Senior Counselor Bergmann

(b) Personal Staff: Head: Senior Counselor Hewel
Counselor Dr. Baron Steengracht von Moyland

Staff of the Foreign Minister:

Head: Counselor Braun
Counselor Gottfriedsen
Secretary of Legation Schweimer

For special assignments:

Counselor Likus
Consul General Stahmer

THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

Freiherr von Weizsäcker

Secretariat: Counselor Dr. Siegfried

THE HEAD OF THE AUSLANDSORGANISATION IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

State Secretary E. W. Bohle

Attached: Secretary of Legation Dr. Gossmann

STATE SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL DUTIES

W. Keppler

Attached: Minister Dr. Grobba

¹ This organization plan has been translated and condensed from a German Foreign Ministry organization circular of August 1940, filmed as serial 293, frames 183945-84. Similar tables for earlier periods are printed in the previous volumes of this series.

AMBASSADOR FOR SPECIAL DUTIES

Dr. Ritter³

Attached: Minister Eisenlohr
Minister Leitner
Counselor Mackeben

PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT

Diplomatic Corps in Berlin, foreign consuls in the German Reich, audiences with the Führer and Reich Chancellor, ceremonial, state visits, decorations:

Chief of Protocol: Minister Dr. Freiherr von Dörnberg

Deputy: Counselor Dr. von Halem

DEPARTMENT FOR GERMAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS (D)

Director of Department: Minister Luther

Personal Assistant: Secretary of Legation Büttner

Party Section: Business between the Foreign Ministry and the departments of the NSDAP. The Party Rally. Minister Luther

D II Matters affecting the Reichsführer SS, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, international police cooperation. Counselor Likus

D III Information for Foreign Missions about important internal political events. The Jewish question. Racial policy. Flags and insignia. National hymns. National holidays, etc. Secretary of Legation Rademacher

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT (Pers.)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Kriebel

Deputy Director: Minister Schroeder

Special duties: Minister Schroetter

Director for Budget and Financial Affairs: Senior Counselor Dr. Schwager

³ In a circular of Oct. 9, 1939, Ribbentrop notified the other Reich Ministers in Berlin that he had placed Ambassador Ritter in charge of all Foreign Ministry activities relating to economic warfare: general trade policy, economic warfare against the enemy and defense against economic warfare, blockades, contraband, blacklists, economic relations with neutrals, German property abroad and foreign property in territories controlled by Germany, etc. (1780/406615).

By a directive of Oct. 7, 1940, Ribbentrop further assigned to Ambassador Ritter the handling in the Foreign Ministry of all military questions affecting foreign policy, including those previously handled by Pol. I M. At the same time he was made immediately subordinate to the Foreign Minister or the State Secretary and personally responsible for keeping the Foreign Minister currently informed on questions of that nature (293/183950).

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (POL.)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Dr. Woermann

Deputy Director: Under State Secretary Habicht^a

Dirigent: Minister von Rintelen

Pol. I M	Military questions, armaments, national defense:	Secretary of Legation Kramarz
Pol. I Luft	Aviation questions:	Secretary of Legation Schultz-Sponholz
Pol. II	Western Europe (Great Britain, Ireland, British possessions—unless dealt with elsewhere—France—North Africa, Morocco, Tunisia—Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg):	Counselor Dr. Auer
Pol. III	Spain, Portugal, Vatican:	Secretary of Legation Dr. Haidlen
Pol. IV	Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy (Ethiopia, Libya), Yugoslavia, Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary:	Senior Counselor Dr. Heinburg
Pol. V	Eastern Europe (Poland, Soviet Union):	Senior Counselor Dr. Schliep
Pol. VI	Scandinavia and Baltic States (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania):	Minister Dr. von Grundherr
Pol. VII	Near and Middle East (Egypt, Afghanistan, Arabia, Ceylon, Cyprus, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, India, Iraq, Iran, Sudan):	Secretary of Legation Dr. Melchers
Pol. VIII	East Asia and Australia (Japan, Japanese mandated territories, China, Manchukuo, Mongolia, French Indochina, Siam, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Sea territories):	Secretary of Legation Dr. Knoll
Pol. IX	America (North, Central and South America):	Senior Counselor Frey- tag
Pol. X	Africa (except Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Italian possessions, Egypt, Sudan), mandate and colonial questions:	Senior Counselor Dr. Bielfeld
Pol. XI	War guilt questions:	Senior Counselor Dr. von Schmieden

^a By a directive of the Foreign Minister of Nov. 21, 1939, Under State Secretary Habicht, in addition to his duties as Deputy Director of the Political Department, was attached to the Foreign Minister personally for special duties and in that capacity was assigned to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. To insure cooperation with the Ministry of Propaganda in the field of foreign propaganda the Information Department and the Radio Section of the Cultural Policy Department were placed under Habicht's supervision (1780/406605).

On Sept. 19, 1940, upon Habicht's entry on military service, these latter functions were assigned to Minister Luther (1780/406584).

Pol. XII	Peace questions:	Secretary of Legation Count von Hohen- thal
Pol. Grenz	Frontier treaties and other technical questions concerning Reich frontiers which are the subject of negotiations with foreign governments:	Senior Counselor Dr. Roediger (Conrad)

ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT (W)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Wiehl

Deputy Director: Minister Dr. Clodius

	Liaison Officer with OKW (War Economy Staff):	Senior Counselor (un- assigned) Dr. Du- mont
W Frie	Economic questions related to the armistice treaties and the negotiation of the treaties of peace:	Senior Counselor (un- assigned) Dr. Du- mont
W I	General section for questions concerning economics and finance. Commercial and forestry attachés; German customs law, technical preparation of commercial treaties:	Consul General Doehle
W II	Western and Southern Europe (except Great Britain and Italy): Belgium, including colonies and mandated territories; France, including colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories; Luxembourg; Netherlands, including colonies: Switzerland; Portugal, including colonies; Spain, including colonies:	Senior Counselor Sa- bath Counselor Dr. Freiherr von Maltzan
W IIIa	Southeast Europe (except Rumania): Protectorate, Slovakia: Hungary, Yugoslavia: Bulgaria, Greece:	Counselor Schüller Minister Moraht Senior Counselor Dr. Hudeczek Oberregierungsrat Dr. Müller Counselor Dr. Busse
W IIIb	Italy, including colonies, Ethiopia and Albania; Rumania:	Counselor Dr. Junker
W IIIc	Near and Middle East (Afghanistan, Egypt, Arabia, Cyprus, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Transjordan, Sudan, Turkey, Yemen):	Counselor Dr. Ripken
W IV	Eastern Europe (Soviet Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, former Poland):	Minister Dr. Schnurre
W V	Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, economic questions affecting the Antarctic); whaling:	Counselor Dr. van Scherpenberg
W VI	Great Britain, British Dominions (except Canada), and British colonies. General questions of commercial and economic warfare:	Senior Counselor Rüter

W VII	East Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Manchukuo, Philippines, Siam, South Sea territories):	Senior Counselor Dr. Voss
W VIIla	North America (Canada, United States, Mexico), Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti; also Liberia:	Senior Counselor Dr. Davidsen
W VIIlb	South and Central America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela):	Secretary of Legation Dr. Pamperrien
W IX	Shipping (including care of crews and passengers of German ships in neutral countries):	Senior Counselor Dr. Bleyert
W X	Reich Office for Foreign Trade (economic news and information service; chambers of commerce abroad):	Senior Counselor Dr. Wingen
W XI	Raw materials, war industry, liaison for control for war economy of German ships in neutral ports:	Senior Counselor Dr. Bisse
W XII	Transport (except matters relating to deliveries):	Minister Dr. Martius

LEGAL DEPARTMENT (R)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Dr. Gaus

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Albrecht

CULTURAL POLICY DEPARTMENT (KULT.)

Director of Department: Minister Dr. von Twardowski

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Rühle

Attached to the Director of the Department
for Special Assignments:

Consul General Dr. Nöldeke

NEWS SERVICE AND PRESS DEPARTMENT (P)

Acting Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Schmidt (Paul K.)

Deputy Director: Minister Braun von Stumm

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

Director of Department: Minister Dr. Altenburg

Deputy Director: Counselor Dr. Rahn

Appendix II

LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED

The following table identifies the German file from which each document has been taken. The documents of the Foreign Ministry were bound into volumes by the Germans. As documents in these volumes have been microfilmed, each film of a file has been identified by a film serial number, while each page of the documents has been identified by a frame number stamped on the original at the time of filming. The documents published in this collection are identified by the film serial number and frame numbers in the upper left-hand corner of each document. By reference to the following table of film serial numbers the location in the German Foreign Ministry archives of the copy of the document used in this publication may be determined. In some few cases separate files, usually on closely related topics, have been filmed consecutively under a single serial number; these are marked by an asterisk (*). A number of serials are given as supplementary to earlier ones; these are cases where a re-examination of the file in question indicated that additional filming might be useful to scholars or, as is more often the case, where in the process of editing for publication the editors wished to provide a film record of documents of lesser importance to which references appeared in the documents selected.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
19	State Secretary: United States.
22	State Secretary: Norway.
30	Under State Secretary: Scandinavia.
35	State Secretary: United States.
51	Under State Secretary: Naval Warfare.
65	Reich Foreign Minister: Iran. State Secretary: Iran.*
66	Secret Files of Paul Schmidt.
71	State Secretary: Arabia, Saudi Arabia.
73	State Secretary: Hungary.
77	State Secretary: Morocco.
83	Reich Foreign Minister: Iraq. State Secretary: Iraq.*
91	State Secretary: Ireland. Under State Secretary: Ireland (Vessenmayer).*
103	State Secretary: Russia.
104	State Secretary: Russia.
115	Reich Foreign Minister: Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Latvia; Luxembourg; Memel, Austria.*
121	State Secretary: Franco-German Relations.
124	State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secretary with Officials of the Foreign Service.
129	State Secretary: Portugal.
136	State Secretary: German-Spanish Relations.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
141	State Secretary: Belgium.
143	State Secretary: German-American Consular Exchange; Intern- ment of Ships and Arrest of Seamen by Countries of Central and South America; the same by U.S.A., also Reprisals; South America.*
171	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with the Northern States.
✓ 172	State Secretary: Rumania.
174	State Secretary: Japan.
175	State Secretary: Rumania.
183	State Secretary: Switzerland.
205	State Secretary: Sweden.
215	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Internal Politics of the Soviet Union (Military, Naval, Air); Political Relations be- tween Germany and England (Encirclement Policy); Political Relations of Germany with the Balkan States (Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania) and Turkey; Russian Policy (Emigrants); International Political Problems—Bolshevism, Socialism.
216	State Secretary: Indochina.
230	State Secretary: Yugoslavia.
234	Under State Secretary: Indochina.
235	State Secretary: Brazil.
247	State Secretary: Denmark.
265	State Secretary: Turkey.
270a	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Secret Political Papers.
271	Under State Secretary: Southeast.
285	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Secret Political Papers.
319	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Sweden.
320	Ambassador Ritter: South America.
321	State Secretary: Lithuania.
323	State Secretary: Latvia.
328	State Secretary: Luxembourg.
365	State Secretary: Peace Negotiations with France.
371	Under State Secretary: Slovakia.
380	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with the Balkan States.
384	Pol. V: Political Relations of Russia with Germany.
406	State Secretary: Estonia.
407	Under State Secretary: Occurrences involving the Soviet Union and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
449	State Secretary: Greece.
459	State Secretary: Differences between Russia and Rumania.
490	State Secretary: The War 1939.
499	German Embassy in Spain: Reports from Spanish Representa- tives Abroad.
504	Pol. IV: Yugoslavia—Foreign Policy, General.
534	State Secretary: Holy See.
540	State Secretary: Africa.
585	State Secretary: Bulgaria.
617	State Secretary: Afghanistan.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
790	State Secretary: Memoranda by the State Secretary on Visits of Diplomats.
✓ 825	Special Section for Germany (Secret Papers) [Inland D II]: Ireland, Japan.
897	Information Department/Cultural Policy Department (Secret Papers): North America.
1001	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): German-French Armistice Commission—Economic Delegation.
1004	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): German-French Armistice Commission.
1053	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Brazil.
1084	Pol. I M: Secret Papers.
1221	Pol. IV: Political Relations between Yugoslavia and Russia.
1242	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): German-French Armistice Commission.
1379	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with Germany.
1504	Hewel Files: Germany, E-H.
1512	Special Section for Germany (Secret Papers) [Inland IIg]: Final Solution of the Jewish Question.
1632	Pol. IV: Political Relations between Rumania and the Soviet Union.
1754	Pol. I M: Agents and Espionage Reports.
2032	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Italy.
2074	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Italy.
2097	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Russia.
2140	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Hungary.
2143	Luther Files: Correspondence A-C, 1940.
2276	Political Department: Secret Papers—Slovakia.
2281	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers.
2319	Supplementary to 459.
2361	German Embassy in Turkey: Secret Instructions, Reports, Telegrams, etc., Armament Industry.
2768	Pol. VI: Political Relations of Denmark with Germany.
✓ 2871	Political Department: Treaties, 1936-1944.
2931	Pol. VIII: Political Relations between China and Japan.
3065	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): England.
3355	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Denmark.
3471	Pol. II: French Diplomatic and Consular Representation Abroad (except in Germany), and vice versa.
3485	German Embassy in France: Secret Political Papers.
3579	Special Section for Germany: Top Secret Papers.
3644	Economic Policy Department: Treaties, Finland.
3918	German Legation in Switzerland: Political Relations between Switzerland and Germany.
4050	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Switzerland.
4416	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Finland.
4449	Economic Policy Department: Treaties—Sweden.
4468	Aussenpolitisches Amt: Norway.
4469	Aussenpolitisches Amt: Norway.
4515	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): United States.
4546	Reich Chancellery: Baltic States, Belgium.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
5382	Supplementary to 4416.
5591	Economic Policy Department, Treaties: Treaties 3—Italy.
5626	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Rumania.
6956	New Reich Chancellery: Commerce.
8589	Navy Archives: OKW Directives.
8614	Economic Policy Department, IXb: Havana Conference.
9324	Economic Policy Department, V: Eastern Europe, Resettle- ment Lithuania. Post-resettlement Estonia, Latvia.
9498	Economic Policy Department, IVb: Rumania—Petroleum and other Mineral Oils in Rumania. Petroleum shares.
9501	Economic Policy Department, IVa: Trade 13, Hungary— Conditions with Respect to Commercial Treaty with Ger- many.
9906	German Embassy in Turkey: Economic Relations between Germany and Turkey.
B14	State Secretary: German-Italian Relations.
B15	State Secretary: German-English Relations.
B19	State Secretary: Finland.
F1, F2, F3, F6, F8, F9, F10, F12, F17, F18, F19:	German Foreign Ministry film of files of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat. (See the General Introduction to this series which was published in vols. I-IV.)

Appendix III

LIST OF PERSONS¹

- ABETZ**, Otto, representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Military Commander in France, July 1940; given rank of Ambassador, August 1940.
- AGA KHAN III**, Indian Head of Ismailian Mohammedans.
- ALBA and BERWICK**, Duke of, Jacobo María del Pilar Carlos Manuel Fitz-James Stuart, Spanish Ambassador in Great Britain, 1939-1945.
- ALFIERI**, Dino, Italian Ambassador to the Holy See, 1939-1940; Ambassador in Germany, May 1940-September 1943; member of the Fascist Grand Council.
- ALKEND**, Ferruch, Counselor of the Turkish Embassy in Germany.
- ALTENBURG**, Günther, Director of Information Department, German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1941.
- AMAU**, Eiiji, Japanese Ambassador in Italy, 1939-1941.
- ANDRIĆ**, Ivo, Yugoslav Minister in Germany, 1939-1941.
- ANFUSO**, Filippo, Chef de Cabinet to Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister.
- ANTONESCU**, Ion, General, Rumanian Head of State, September 1940-August 1944.
- ARANHA**, Oswaldo, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1938-1944.
- ARGETOLANU**, Constantin, former Rumanian Minister President; Foreign Minister, June 27-July 4, 1940.
- ARITA**, Hachiro, Japanese Foreign Minister in the Yonai Cabinet, January-July 1940.
- ATTOLICO**, Bernardo, Italian Ambassador to the Holy See, May 1940-February 1942.
- BADOGLIO**, Pietro, Marshal of Italy, Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, 1925-1940.
- BALBO**, Italo, Italian Governor General of Libya, 1933-June 1940.
- BÁRDOSY**, László de, Hungarian Minister in Rumania, 1934-1941.
- BAUDOUIN**, Paul, French Minister of State and member of the Council of Ministers, October 1940-January 1941.
- BEAVERBROOK**, William Maxwell Aitken, Baron, British newspaper publisher; Minister of Aircraft Production, May 1940-May 1941.
- BEIGREDER Y ATIENZA**, Juan, Spanish Foreign Minister, August 1939-October 1940.
- BERGEN**, Diego von, German Ambassador to the Holy See, 1920-1943.
- BERLE**, Adolf A., Jr., American Assistant Secretary of State, 1938-1944.
- BERNARD**, Hans Albert Wilhelm, German Minister in Slovakia, July 1939-August 1940.
- BIDDLE**, Anthony Joseph Drexel, Jr., American Ambassador with the Polish Government.
- BISMARCK**, Otto Christian, Prince von, Counselor of Embassy, later, Minister in the German Embassy in Italy, April 1, 1940-September 1, 1943.
- BLÜCHER**, Wipert Carl Wilhelm von, German Minister in Finland, 1935-1944.

¹ The biographical details given relate principally to the period and subjects covered by the documents in this volume.

- BÖTTICHER**, Friedrich von, German General, Military and Air Attaché in the United States, 1933-1941.
- BOHLE**, Ernst Wilhelm Hans, Gauleiter, Head of the Auslandsorganisation of the Nazi party, 1933-1945; also State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1941.
- BOISANGER**, Yves Breart de, Governor of the Bank of France; Chairman of the Economic Section of the French delegation to the German Armistice Commission.
- BOLAND**, Gerald, Minister of Justice of Ireland.
- BONNET**, Georges, French Foreign Minister in Daladier Cabinet, April 1938-September 1939; Minister of Justice, September 1939-March 1940.
- BOBAH**, William E., United States Senator from Idaho, 1907-1940.
- BOBOHERS**, Heinrich Franz Johannes, German Consul General at New York.
- BORIS III**, King of Bulgaria, 1918-1943.
- BOEMANN**, Martin, Reichsleiter, Chief of Staff to the Führer's Deputy, Hess.
- BOSSY**, Raoul, Rumanian Minister in Italy.
- BRAUCHITSCH**, Walther von, General, Commander in Chief of the German Army, 1938-1941.
- BRINON**, Count Fernand de, member of the French Senate; director of the *Comité France-Allemagne*.
- BÜCKNER**, Leopold, Captain, German Navy; Head of the Foreign Intelligence Branch in the Office of Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the OKW.
- BULLITT**, William C., American Ambassador in France, 1936-1940.
- BURCKHARDT**, Carl J., Swiss professor, League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig, 1937-1939; President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 1939-1945.
- BUTLER**, Richard Austen, British Conservative M. P. since 1929; Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1938-1941.
- CADERE**, Victor, Rumanian Ambassador in Yugoslavia.
- CANARIS**, Wilhelm, Admiral, Chief of the Office of Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.
- CAROL II**, King of Rumania, 1930-1940; abdicated September 1940.
- ČERNÁK**, Matúš, Slovak Minister in Germany.
- CHAMBERLAIN**, Neville, British Conservative M. P., 1918-1940; leader of the Conservative party; Prime Minister, May 1937-May 1940.
- CHIANG KAI-SHEK**, Generalissimo, Leader of Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist party); President of the Executive Yuan (Premier).
- CHRISTIAN X**, King of Denmark, 1912-1947.
- CHURCHILL**, Winston Spencer, British M. P. since 1900; First Lord of the Admiralty, September 5, 1939-May 10, 1940; Prime Minister, May 10, 1940-July 1945.
- CIANO DI CORTELLAZZO**, Count Galeazzo, son-in-law of Mussolini; Italian Foreign Minister, 1936-1943.
- CINCAR-MARKOVIĆ**, Aleksander, Yugoslav Foreign Minister, 1939-1941.
- CLODIUS**, Carl, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1943.
- COOPER**, Alfred Duff, British Conservative M. P., 1924-1945; Minister of Information, 1940-1941.
- CRAIGIE**, Sir Robert, British Ambassador in Japan, 1937-1941.
- CRIPPS**, Sir Stafford, British Labor M. P. and Jurist; Ambassador in the Soviet Union, June 1940-January 1942.
- CsÁKY**, Count István, Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1938-1941.

CVETKOVIĆ, Dragiša, Yugoslav Minister President, 1939-1941.

DALADIER, Édouard, President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister of National Defense, April 1938-March 1940; Minister of War, March-May 1940.

DE GAULLE, Charles André Joseph Marie, General, Under Secretary of National Defense, Reynaud Cabinet from June 6, 1940; departed France June 17 and organized Free French Movement.

DEGRELLE, Léon, leader of Belgian fascist Rex party.

DEKANOSOV, Vladimir Georgievich, Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; special emissary for the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union, June 1940.

DE VALERA, Eamon, Prime Minister of Ireland and Minister for External Affairs, 1937-1948.

DIECKHOFF, Hans Heinrich, German Ambassador in the United States, May 1937; recalled to Berlin for consultation, November 1938 and did not return to his post; on special assignment in the Foreign Ministry, 1938-1943.

DIES, Martin, United States Congressman from Texas; Chairman of the House of Representatives' Special Committee on Un-American Activities.

DÖNITZ, Karl, Admiral, Commander of the Submarine Arm, German Navy, 1936-1943.

DÖRNBERG, Alexander, Freiherr von, Minister, Director of the Protocol Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1938-1945.

DRAEGER, Friedhelm, German Consul at New York, 1934-1941.

DRAGANOV, Parvan, Bulgarian Minister in Germany, 1938-1942.

DUBČANSKÝ, Ferdinand, Slovakian Foreign Minister, March 1939-July 1940; also Minister of Interior, October 1939-July 1940.

EDEN, Anthony, British Conservative M. P. since 1923; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1935-1938; Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1939-1940; Secretary of State for War, January-December 1940.

ERRACH-SCHÖNBERG, Viktor, Prinz zu, German Minister in Greece, 1936-1941.

ERDMANNSDORFF, Otto von, German Minister in Hungary, 1937-1941.

ETZDORF, Hasso von, Senior Counselor, Representative of the German Foreign Ministry with the High Command of the Army, 1939-1945.

FABRICIUS, Wilhelm, German Minister in Rumania, 1936-1941.

FALKENHAUSEN, Alexander von, General, German Military Commander in the Netherlands, May 1940; in Belgium, May-June 1940; in Luxembourg, June-August 1940; and in Belgium and Northern France, June 1940-July 1944.

FILOV, Bogdan, Bulgarian Minister President, February 1940-September 1944.

FLANDIN, Pierre Etienne, Leader, French Left Republican party; Premier, 1934-1935.

FORD, Henry, American automobile manufacturer.

FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Francisco, Spanish Chief of State, President of the Government, and Generalissimo of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Nicolás, Spanish Ambassador in Portugal.

FRANÇOIS-PONCET, André, French Ambassador in Italy, November 1938-June 1940.

FRÖLICHER, Hans, Swiss Minister in Germany.

FROHWEIN, Hans, German Minister in Estonia, 1936-1940.

FUNK, Walther, German Minister of Economics, 1937-1945; President of the Reichsbank, 1939-1945.

GAFENCU, Grigore, Rumanian Minister in the Soviet Union, August 1940-June 1941.

GAILANI. See RASHID.

GAMELIN, Maurice Gustave, French General, Vice President of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, 1935-1940; Allied Commander in Chief, September 1939-May 1940.

- GAUS, Friedrich, Director of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1923-1943.
- GEORGE VI, King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, 1936-1952.
- GEREDE, R. Hüsrev, Turkish Ambassador in Germany, 1939-1942.
- GERSTENBERG, Alfred, Colonel in the Luftwaffe, German Air Attaché in Rumania.
- GIANNINI, Amedeo, Director of Commercial Affairs in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- GIGURTU, Ion, Rumanian Foreign Minister, May 31-June 27, 1940; Minister President, July 4-September 4, 1940.
- GÖRING, Hermann Wilhelm, President of the Reichstag, 1932-1945; Minister President of Prussia and Reich Minister for Air, 1933-1945; Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, 1935-1945; Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, 1936-1945; designated successor to Hitler, 1939; Reichsmarschall, July 19, 1940-1945.
- GORELKIN, Nikolay, Soviet Ambassador in Italy, June 1940-June 1941.
- GRAZIANI, Rodolfo, Marshal of Italy, Marchese di Neghelli, Italian Army Chief of Staff, 1939-1940; Commander of Italian Armed Forces in North Africa and Governor of Libya, July 1940-January 1941.
- GRAZI, Emanuele, Italian Minister in Greece.
- GREW, Joseph Clark, American Ambassador in Japan, 1932-1941.
- GROBBA, Fritz, Minister, on special assignments in the German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1941.
- GRUNDHEER, Werner von, Head of Political Division VI of the German Foreign Ministry, 1936-1945.
- GUARNASCHELLI, Giovanni Batista, Deputy Director, European and Mediterranean Division, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- GÜNTHER, Christian, Swedish Foreign Minister, 1939-1945.
- GUIBAN, Henri, General, Swiss Army Chief of Staff, 1939-1945.
- GUSTAF V, King of Sweden, 1907-1950.
- GYSSLING, Georg, German Consul at Los Angeles.
- HABICHT, Theodor, Deputy Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, with title of Under State Secretary, 1939-1940.
- HAGELIN, Wiljam, Quisling's representative in Germany, 1939-1940; Minister of Commerce and Supply in Quisling's Norwegian Government of April 1940.
- HÄGGLÖF, Gunnar, Counselor and head of the Commercial Policy Department in the Swedish Foreign Ministry.
- HALDER, Franz, German General, Chief of the Army General Staff, December 1938-October 1942.
- HALIFAX, Viscount, Edward Wood, British Conservative party leader; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February 1938-December 1940.
- HAMBERG, Carl Joachim, member of Norwegian Storting from 1919; President of the Storting, 1926-1940.
- HANSEN, Erich, General, head of the German Army mission in Rumania, October 1940-June 1941.
- HAUSHOFER, Albrecht, professor of political geography and geopolitics, University of Berlin; son of Karl Haushofer.
- HAUSHOFER, Karl, retired German General, President of Society for Geopolitics; lecturer at Munich University.
- HEERLEIN, Erich, Counselor of Embassy, German Embassy in Spain.
- HEEREN, Viktor von, German Minister in Yugoslavia, 1933-1941.
- HEMMEN, Hans Richard, Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions with the German Armistice Commission.

- HEMPFEL**, Eduard, German Minister in Ireland, 1937-1945.
- HENCKE**, Andor, Senior Counselor, temporary representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.
- HERTZOG**, James Barry M., South African politician and General; Prime Minister, 1927-1939; Nationalist leader.
- HESS**, Rudolf, German Nationalist Socialist leader, member of the Nazi party from 1920; Chairman of the Central Committee of the party from 1932; Hitler's Deputy, 1933-1941; member of the Secret Cabinet Council, 1933-1941.
- HEWEL**, Walther, Senior Counselor, personal representative of the Foreign Minister with the Führer, 1933-1945.
- HEYDRICH**, Reinhard, SS-Gruppenführer, Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service.
- HILGER**, Gustav, Counselor of Legation (1923-1939) and Counselor of Embassy (1939-1941) in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- HIMMLER**, Heinrich, Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, 1936-1945; Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German National Community, 1939.
- HITLER**, Adolf, leader of the German National Socialist party from 1921; Chancellor of the German Reich, January 30, 1933; Führer and Chancellor, 1934-1945; Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, 1938-1945.
- HOARE**, Sir Samuel, British Conservative M. P., 1910-1944; Lord Privy Seal, 1939-1940; Air Minister, April-May 1940; Ambassador in Spain, May 1940-1944.
- HOLT**, Rush, United States Senator from West Virginia, 1935-1941.
- HORTHY DE NAGYBÁNYA**, Miklos, Admiral, Regent of Hungary, 1920-1944.
- HOSHINO**, Naoki, Minister without Portfolio in the Japanese Cabinet of Prince Konoye and President of the Planning Board, July-December 1940.
- HOYNINGEN-HUENE**, Oswald Baron von, German Minister in Portugal, 1934-1944.
- HUENE**. See HOYNINGEN.
- HULL**, Cordell, American Secretary of State, 1933-1944.
- HUNTZIGER**, Charles-Léon, General, Head of French delegation to negotiate the armistice with Germany, June 1940; Chairman of French delegation to the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, June-September 1940; Secretary of State for War and Commander in Chief of the armed forces, September 1940-August 1941.
- HUSAYNI**, Haj Amin, al-, Mufti of Jerusalem; Arab leader.
- İNÖNÜ**, İsmet, General, President of the Turkish Republic, 1938-1950.
- JODL**, Alfred, General, Chief of the Operations Staff of the OKW, August 1939-1945.
- KEITEL**, Wilhelm, General, Chief of the OKW, 1938-1945.
- KENNEDY**, Joseph P., American Ambassador in Great Britain, January 1938-November 1940.
- KENT**, Duke of, George, brother of King George VI of Great Britain.
- KEPPLER**, Wilhelm Karl, State Secretary for special duties in the German Foreign Ministry.
- KIEWITZ**, W., Lieutenant Colonel, German Adjutant with the King of the Belgians.
- KILLINGER**, Freiherr Manfred von, Minister, Inspector of German Diplomatic Missions in the Balkans, December 1939-July 1940; German Minister in Slovakia, July 1940-January 1941.
- KING**, William Lyon Mackenzie, Canadian Liberal party leader; Prime Minister of Canada, 1921-1926, 1926-1930, and 1935-1948.
- KIVIMÄKI**, Toivo Mikael, Finnish Minister in Germany, July 1940-1944.
- KNOX**, William Franklin, American Secretary of the Navy, June 19, 1940-1944.

- KÖCHER**, Otto, German Minister in Switzerland.
- KÖRNER**, Paul, State Secretary and permanent deputy to Göring as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, 1936-1945; State Secretary, Prussian State Ministry, 1933-1945.
- KONOYE**, Prince Fumimaro, Japanese Prime Minister, 1937-1939; Minister without Portfolio, January-August 1939; President of Privy Council, January 1939-June 1940; Prime Minister, July 1940-July 1941.
- KORDT**, Erich, Senior Counselor, Foreign Minister's Secretariat of the German Foreign Ministry, 1938-1941.
- KORDT**, Theo, Counselor of Embassy in the German Legation in Switzerland, 1939-1945.
- KRAMARZ**, Hans, official in Political Division I of the German Foreign Ministry.
- KREWINSCH**, Edgars, Latvian Minister in Germany, 1938-1940.
- KRĖVĖ-MICKEVICIUS**, Vincas, Lithuanian Deputy Minister President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 1940.
- KROLL**, Hans Anton, Counselor of Embassy, German Embassy in Turkey, 1936-1943.
- KURUSU**, Saburo, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, December 1939-February 1941.
- LAMMERS**, Hans, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, 1934-1945, with the rank of State Secretary, 1934-1937, and Reich Minister, 1937-1945; member and Executive Secretary of the Secret Cabinet Council, 1938-1945.
- LANDON**, Alfred M., Governor of Kansas, 1933-1937; Republican candidate for the Presidency of the United States, 1936.
- LANGMANN**, Otto, German Minister in Uruguay, 1938-1942.
- LAVAL**, Pierre, President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1935-1936; Senator, 1926-1940; Vice President of the Council, June 23-July 11, 1940; Deputy Premier, July 12-December 1940; Minister of Foreign Affairs, October-December 1940.
- LEOPOLD III**, King of the Belgians, 1934-1951.
- LEWIS**, John L., American labor leader, president of the United Mine Workers of America.
- LEY**, Robert, Reichsleiter, Leader of the German Labor Front, 1933-1945; Director of the party organization of the NSDAP.
- LIKUS**, Rudolf, official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop from 1935, Counselor of Legation, member of the Personal Staff of the Reich Foreign Minister.
- LINDBERGH**, Charles A., Colonel, American aviator, United States Army Air Corps Reserve.
- LIPP-MANN**, Walter, American journalist, author of a syndicated newspaper column.
- LONDONDEBRY**, Marquess of, Sir Charles Stewart Henry Vane-Tempest-Stewart, British Secretary of State for Air, 1931-1935; Lord Privy Seal, 1935.
- LOTHIAN**, Marquess of, Philip Kerr, British Ambassador in the United States, 1939-1940.
- LUCAS**, Scott, United States Senator from Illinois, 1938-1951.
- LUTHER**, Martin, Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs of the German Foreign Ministry.
- MAČEK**, Vladimir, leader of the Croatian Peasant party; Deputy Minister President of Yugoslavia, August 1940-April 1941.
- MAOKENSEN**, Hans Georg von, German Ambassador in Italy, 1938-1943.
- MAGAZ Y PERS**, Antonio, Marquis de, Spanish Ambassador in Germany, 1937-September 1940.
- MALAN**, Daniel F., South African Nationalist party leader; member of the South African Parliament.

- MANIU**, Iulius, Rumanian politician; leader, National Peasant party; former Minister President.
- MANNERHEIM**, Baron Carl Gustaf Emil, Field Marshal, Commander of the Finnish Army.
- MANOILESCU**, Mihai, Rumanian Foreign Minister, July 4–September 14, 1940.
- MARIE JOSÉ**, Crown Princess of Italy, sister of King Leopold of the Belgians.
- MARQUET**, Adrien, Mayor of Bordeaux; Minister of State in Pétain Cabinet, June–July 1940; Minister of Interior, July–September 1940.
- MARTIUS**, Georg, Minister, Head of Division W XII (Transport) in the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- MASSIGLI**, René, French Ambassador in Turkey, 1938–1940.
- MATSUOKA**, Yosuke, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs in Konoye Cabinet, July 1940–July 1941.
- MAVROUDIS**, Nicholas, Under Secretary of State in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1936–1941.
- MEAD**, James M., United States Senator from New York, 1938–1947.
- MEISSNER**, Otto, Chief of the German Presidential Chancellery, 1934–1945; State Minister with the rank of Reich Minister, 1937–1945.
- MELCHERS**, Wilhelm, Counselor, German Foreign Ministry.
- MENEMENIOGLU**, Numan, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 1937–1942.
- METAXAS**, John, General, Greek Minister President; also Foreign Minister and Minister of War, Navy, and Air, 1936–1941.
- MIKOTAN**, Anastas Ivanovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union, 1938–1949; Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
- MILCH**, Erhard, Colonel General, State Secretary in the Reich Air Ministry, 1933–1944; Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, 1936–1945.
- MOHR**, Otto Carl, Director in the Danish Foreign Ministry.
- MOLOTOV**, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, 1930–1941; People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1939–1949.
- MONCKTON**, Sir Walter Turner, Deputy Director General, British Ministry of Information and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1940; Director General, Ministry of Information, 1940–1941.
- MOONEY**, James David, American industrialist, president, General Motors Overseas Corporation; vice president, General Motors Corporation.
- MORAHT**, Hans Ludwig, Minister, Head of Division W IIIa in the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- MORGENTHAU**, Henry, American Secretary of the Treasury, 1934–1945.
- MUSSOLINI**, Benito, founder of the Italian fascist party; Head of the Government and Prime Minister, 1922–1943; Commander of the Armed Forces, 1940–1943.
- NEUBACHER**, Hermann, Austrian National Socialist; Mayor of Vienna after the Anschluss; appointed special representative in charge of economic questions at the Legation in Bucharest, January 1940.
- NOACK**, Ulrich, German historian attached to the Legation in Norway.
- NUMAN**. See **MENEMENIOGLU**.
- NURI AS-SAID**, several times Minister President and Foreign Minister of Iraq; Foreign Minister in the Cabinet of Rashid Ali al-Gailani, March 1940.
- NYE**, Gerald P., United States Senator from North Dakota, 1925–1945.
- NYGAARDSVOLD**, Johan, Norwegian Minister President, 1935–1945.
- OSHIMA**, Hiroshi, General, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, November 1938–December 1939, and February 1941–1945.
- OTT**, Eugen, Major General, German Military Attaché in Japan, 1934–1938; Ambassador in Japan, 1938–1943.

- OUNANSKY**, Constantine Alexandrovich, Soviet Ambassador in the United States, 1939-1941.
- PAASIKIVI**, Juho K., Finnish Minister in Sweden, 1936-1940; chairman of Finnish delegation for negotiations with the Soviet Union, 1939; Minister without Portfolio, 1939-1940; chairman of Finnish peace delegation in Moscow, 1940.
- PAETS**, Konstantin, President of Estonia, 1938-1940.
- PAPEN**, Franz von, German Ambassador in Turkey, 1939-1944.
- PAUL**, Prince, Regent of Yugoslavia, 1934-1941.
- PEPPO**, Ottavio de, Italian Ambassador in Turkey, 1938-1940.
- PERSHING**, John Joseph, United States General of the Armies.
- PÉTAİN**, Henri Philippe, Marshal of France, President of the French Council of Ministers, June 16-July 11, 1940; Chief of State, July 11, 1940-1944.
- PIETRI**, François, French Minister of Communications, July-September 1940; Ambassador in Spain, October 1940-1944.
- PILGER**, Hans, German Minister in Afghanistan, 1937-1940.
- PILJA**, Milivoj, Secretary of State in the Yugoslav Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1939-1940.
- PIBOW**, Oswald, Minister of Defense of the Union of South Africa, 1938-1939; member of the South African Nationalist party and member of Parliament.
- PITTMAN**, Key, United States Senator from Nevada, 1913-1940.
- PIUS XII**, Pope, Eugenio Pacelli, elevated to the Papacy in March 1939.
- POP**, Valer, chairman of the Rumanian delegation to negotiate with Hungary concerning Transylvania, August 1940.
- POPOV**, Ivan Vladimir, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- PRÜFER**, Curt Max, German Ambassador in Brazil, 1939-1942.
- QUISLING**, Vidkun, Norwegian politician and official; leader of the Norwegian Nasjonal Samling party.
- RAEDER**, Erich, Admiral, Commander in Chief of German Navy, 1935-1943.
- RASHID ALI AL-GAILANI**, Iraq politician; Senator, Minister President, March 1940-January 1941.
- RENTHE-FINK**, Cecil von, German Minister in Denmark, 1936-1942.
- REYNAUD**, Paul, French Minister of Finance, November 1938-March 1940; President of the Council of Ministers, March-June 1940; Foreign Minister, March-May 1940.
- RIBBENTROP**, Joachim von, German Foreign Minister, February 4, 1938-1945.
- RICCARDI**, Raffaello, Italian Minister of Trade and International Payments, 1939-1940.
- RICHELT**, Arvid, Swedish Minister in Germany, 1937-1945.
- RIECHTHOFEN**, Herbert, Freiherr von, German Minister in Bulgaria, 1939-1941.
- RINTELEN**, Emil von, Minister, Dirigent in the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- RINTELEN**, Enno von, General, German Military Attaché in Italy, 1936-1943.
- RIPKEN**, Georg, Head of Division IIIc in the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1941.
- RITTER**, Karl, Ambassador on special assignment in the German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1945.
- RIZO-RANGABÉ**, Alexander, Greek Minister in Germany, 1933-1941.
- ROATTA**, Mario, General, Deputy Chief of the Italian Army General Staff.
- ROOSEVELT**, Franklin Delano, President of the United States of America, March 4, 1933-April 12, 1945.
- ROSENBERG**, Alfred, Reichsleiter, Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP, 1933-1945; deputy of the Führer for supervision of spiritual and ideological training of the NSDAP, 1934-1945.

ROSSO, Augusto, Italian Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1936-1941.

SABATH, Hermann Friedrich, Senior Counselor, Head of Division W II in the Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry.

SALAZAR, Antonio de Oliveira, Portuguese Minister President, also Minister of Finance, Minister of War, and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SARAOGLU, Sükrü, Turkish Foreign Minister, 1938-1941.

SATO, Naotake, former Japanese Foreign Minister 1937; Ambassador on special assignment.

SAYDAM, Refik, Turkish Minister President, 1939-1943.

SCAVENTIUS, Erik, Danish Foreign Minister, July 1940-1945, and Minister President, 1942-1945.

SCHACHT, Hjalmar, former President of the Reichsbank and Reich Minister of Economics, Reich Minister without Portfolio, 1937-1943.

SCHMIDT, Hans-Wilhelm, director of the department for Northern Europe of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.

SCHELLENBERG, Walter, SS-Sturmabführer, Head of Office IV E (counterespionage) of the Gestapo.

SCHICKEDANZ, Arno, Chief of Staff of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.

SCHMIDT, Paul Otto Gustav, Minister, interpreter in the German Foreign Ministry, 1923-1945; attached to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat from 1939.

SCHMUNDT, Rudolf, Colonel, Chief Wehrmacht Adjutant with Hitler.

SCHNURRE, Karl, Minister, Head of Division W IV in the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.

SOHOEN, Wilhelm, Freiherr von, German Ambassador in Chile, 1935-1943.

SCHOLS, Herbert, German Consul at Boston.

SCHULENBURG, Friedrich Werner, Count von der, German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1934-1941.

SERRANO SUÑER, Ramón, brother-in-law of General Franco, Spanish Minister of Interior, January 1938-October 1940; Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 1940-September 1942.

SHAWKAT, Naji, Iraq political leader; Minister of Justice in the Cabinet of Rashid Ali al-Gailani, March 1940.

SHKVARTSEV, Aleksander A., Soviet Ambassador in Germany, September 1939-November 1940.

SIDOR, Karel, Slovak Minister to the Holy See, 1939-1945.

SIEGFRIED, Herbert Ludwig, Counselor, official of the Secretariat of the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1943.

SIMA, Horia, Leader of Rumanian Iron Guard; Deputy Minister President, September 1940-January 1941.

SIMON, Sir John, Viscount, British Liberal and Liberal National M. P., 1906-1940; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1937-1940; Lord Chancellor, 1940-1945.

ŠKIRPA, Kazys, Lithuanian Minister in Germany, 1939-1940.

SKÖLD, Per Edvin, Swedish Minister of Defense.

SMUTS, Jan Christian, General, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Commander in Chief of South African Armed Forces.

SOBOLEV, Arkady A., Secretary General of the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

SPIEGEL, Karl Edgar, Freiherr von und zu Peckelsheim, German Consul at New Orleans.

STAHRMER, Heinrich, official in charge of Far Eastern questions in the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.

STALIN, Josef Vissarionovich, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union; member of the Politburo and Orgburo, 1922-1953.

- STAUNING**, Thorvald, Danish Minister President, 1924–1926 and 1929–1942.
- STIMSON**, Henry Lewis, American Secretary of War, June 19, 1940–1945.
- STOHRER**, Eberhard von, German Ambassador in Spain, 1937–1943.
- STÜLPNAGEL**, Karl-Heinrich von, General, Chairman, German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden, June–December 1940.
- SUÑER**. See **SEERANO**.
- SZTÓJAY**, Döme, General, Hungarian Minister in Germany, 1935–1944.
- TANNER**, Väinö, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 1939–March 1940.
- TATARESCU**, George, Rumanian Ambassador in France, 1939; Minister President, November 1939–July 1940.
- TELEKI**, Count Pál, Hungarian Minister President, February 1939–April 1941.
- TERBOVEN**, Joseph, Reich Commissar for occupied Norway, 1940–1945.
- THOMAS**, Georg, General, Head of the War Economy and Armaments Office (*Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt*) of the OKW.
- THOMSEN**, Hans, Counselor of Embassy, Chargé d'Affaires of the German Embassy in the United States.
- TIPPELSKIRCH**, Werner von, Counselor of Embassy (1935–1940) and Minister (1940–1941) in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- TISO**, Monsignor, Joseph, leader of Slovakian Peoples party; President of Slovakia, 1939–1940.
- TOJO**, Hideki, General, Japanese Minister of War in Konoye Cabinet, July 1940–October 1941.
- TUKA**, Vojtech, Slovakian Minister President, 1939–1945.
- URBŠYS**, Juozas, Lithuanian Foreign Minister, December 1938–June 1940.
- URDAREANU**, Ernest, Minister of the Rumanian Royal Court and Grand Chamberlain to the King.
- VAIDA** VOEVOD, Alexander, Rumanian Royal Councillor.
- VANSITTART**, Sir Robert, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Foreign Secretary, 1938–1941.
- VARGAS**, Getulio Dornelles, President of Brazil, 1934–1945.
- VEESENMAIER**, Edmund, expert in office of State Secretary Keppler, frequently employed on special assignments.
- VELTJENS**, J., Lieutenant Colonel, special representative of Göring for negotiations with Finland concerning armaments, 1940–1941.
- VIGÓN**, Juan, General, Chief of the Spanish Supreme General Staff under Franco, 1939–1940; Air Minister, 1940.
- VISCOONTI-PRASCA**, Sebastiano, General, Commander of Italian Armed Forces in Albania.
- VISHINSKY**, Andrey Januarievich, Vice Chairman, Soviet Council of People's Commissars; Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- VÖRNLE**, Janos, Hungarian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
- VON WIEGAND**, Karl, American journalist employed by Hearst news syndicate.
- WÄCHTER**, Gustav, District Governor of Lwow in the Government General of Poland, 1939–1945.
- WALDEN**, Rudolf, General, Finnish Minister of Defense.
- WALSHE**, Joseph Patrick, Secretary General of the Ministry for External Affairs of Ireland, 1922–1946.
- WANG CHING-WEI**, Chinese political leader; head of a Japanese sponsored Chinese Central Government at Nanking.
- WEISSÄCKER**, Ernst, Freiherr von, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, 1938–1943.
- WELCK**, Wolfgang, Freiherr von, Counselor, official in the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- WELLES**, Sumner, American Under Secretary of State, 1937–1943.

- WESTRICK, Gerhardt Alois, Commercial Counselor, German Embassy in the United States.
- WEYGAND, Maxime, General, French and Allied Commander in Chief, May-June 1940; Minister of National Defense, June-September 1940; Delegate General of the French Government in North Africa, September 1940-November 1941.
- WHEELER, Burton Kendall, United States Senator from Montana, 1923-1947.
- WHITE, William Allen, editor of *Emporia* (Kansas) *Gazette*; founder and chairman of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.
- WIED, Viktor, Prinz zu, German Minister in Sweden, 1933-1943.
- WIEDEMANN, Fritz, Captain, German Consul General at San Francisco, 1939-1941.
- WIEHL, Emil Karl Josef, Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1944.
- WILLKIE, Wendell, Republican candidate for the Presidency of the United States, 1940.
- WILSON, Hugh R., American Ambassador to Germany, 1938-1940, recalled to the United States for report and consultation, November 14, 1938, and did not return to his post.
- WINDSOR, Duke of, formerly King Edward VIII of Great Britain.
- WITTING, Rolf, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- WOERMANN, Ernst, Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry with the title of Under State Secretary, 1938-1943.
- WOHLTHAT, Helmut, Prussian State Councilor; Ministerialdirektor for special assignments in the Four Year Plan; Bank Commissioner in the Netherlands, 1940-1941.
- WOODRING, Harry Hines, American Secretary of War, 1936-1940.
- ZAHLE, Herluf, Danish Minister in Germany.
- ZAMBONI, Guelfo, Counselor, Italian Embassy in Germany.
- ZECH-BURKERSBODA, Julius von, Count, German Minister in the Netherlands, 1928-1940.
- ZECHLIN, Erich Wilhelm, German Minister in Lithuania, 1933-1940.

Appendix IV

GLOSSARY

OF GERMAN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS¹

AA, Auswärtiges Amt

Abteilung (Abt.), department, section

Abwehr, counterintelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the OKW

Adjutantur, staff of adjutants

Adjutantur des Führers, office of the Führer's adjutants

Angabe (Ang.), a designation given when action of more than one sort was to be taken on a paper. In such cases the relevant instructions were usually split up as Ang. I, II, etc., which designations followed the file numbers

AO, Auslandsorganisation

APA, Aussenpolitisches Amt

Aus., Ausl., Ausland

Ausland, foreign intelligence department of the OKW

Auslandsorganisation, foreign organization of the NSDAP concerned with German nationals living abroad

Aussenpolitisches Amt, foreign affairs office of the NSDAP; headed by Alfred Rosenberg

Auswärtiges Amt, German Foreign Ministry

Baumschule, code word for headquarters of the Foreign Minister

BRAM, Büro RAM

Brigadeführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Brigadier General

Büro RAM, office of the Reich Foreign Minister

Büro St.S., office of the State Secretary

Chefgruppe, main division, a unit in an organization

Chef OKW, the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

Chefsache, top secret military

Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (DNB), German News Agency, owned by the Ministry of Propaganda

Dienststelle Ribbentrop, office of Ribbentrop in his capacity as foreign affairs adviser to Hitler; of decreasing importance after his appointment as Foreign Minister

Dirigent, generally deputy head of a department

DNB, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro

e. o., ex officio; where this precedes the file number, it indicates that there are no previous papers on the subject bearing this number

Forschungsamt, literally, Research Office, a department of the Reich Air Ministry which included among its functions the monitoring of telephone conversations

Fremde Heere West, Foreign Armies West, a branch of the intelligence department (Oberquartiermeister IV) of OKH, dealing with armies of countries of Western Europe

Friedens-HWIX, telegraphic symbol used on messages sent from Wiesbaden by the representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Armistice Commission

g., geheim

G. A., Gehorsame Anzeige

Gau, the largest territorial administrative unit of the NSDAP

Gauamtsleiter, section head in a Gau organization of the NSDAP

Gauleiter, highest official in a Gau

geheim (geh.), secret

geheime Kommandosache, top secret military

¹ Abbreviations are explained by giving the full German terms. These terms are explained at their proper alphabetical listing.

geheime Reichssache, top secret

Gehorsame Anzeige, a memorandum submitted in accordance with directions

Gen. Qu., General Quartiermeister, staff officer and staff unit of OKH

Gen. St. d. H., Generalstab des Heeres, the General Staff of the Army

g. Kdos (g. K.), geheime Kommando-sache

g. Rs., geheime Reichssache

Gruppenführer, SA and SS rank, equivalent to Major General

HA, Handelspolitischer Ausschuss

Handelspolitischer Ausschuss, Commercial Policy Committee, an inter-departmental committee on commercial policy

HPA, Handelspolitischer Ausschuss

Inf., Informationsabteilung

Informationsabteilung, the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry

K, Kulturpolitische Abteilung

Kreisleiter, district leader of the NSDAP

Kult., Kulturpolitische Abteilung

Kulturpolitische Abteilung, Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry

L, Landesverteidigung

Landesgruppe, NSDAP organization for a foreign country, controlled by the Auslandsorganisation, headed by a Landesgruppenleiter

Landesgruppenleiter, leader of an NSDAP Landesgruppe

Landesverteidigung, the department of National Defense in the Wehrmachtführungsamt or Wehrmachtführungsstab

Ministerialdirektor, a grade in the Civil Service, usually the director of a department in a Ministry

Ministerialrat, Ministerial Counselor, a grade in the German Civil Service

Multex, a circular telegram

Nachrichten- und Presseabteilung, News Service and Press Department of the Foreign Ministry

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, National Socialist German Workers' party, the full title of the Nazi party

Nordische Gesellschaft, Nordic Society, an organization engaged in the promotion of cultural relations between Germany and the Scandinavian countries

NSDAP, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Oberführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Colonel

Obergruppenführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Lieutenant General

Oberkommando des Heeres, High Command of the Army

Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, High Command of the Navy

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, High Command of the Wehrmacht

OKH, Oberkommando des Heeres

OKM, Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine

OKW, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht

Ortsgruppe, subdivision of an NSDAP Kreis or district, headed by an Ortsgruppenleiter

Ortsgruppenleiter, head of an NSDAP Ortsgruppe

P, Nachrichten- und Presseabteilung

Pers., Personal- und Verwaltungs-Abteilung

Personal- und Verwaltungs-Abteilung, Personnel and Administrative Department of the Foreign Ministry

Pol., Politische Abteilung

Politische Abteilung, Political Department of the Foreign Ministry; sub-divided according to geographic areas, each designated by a Roman numeral, e. g., Pol. IV (see Appendix I)

Presse, Nachrichten- und Presseabteilung

R, Rechtsabteilung

RAM, Reichsaussenminister

Recht., Rechtsabteilung

Rechtsabteilung, Legal Department in the German Foreign Ministry

Referat, a section in a ministry or other organization

Referat Deutschland, also **Sonderreferat Deutschland**, special section for German internal affairs in the Foreign Ministry

Referent, drafting officer, expert, specialist, competent official

Regierungsrat, a grade in the German Civil Service
Reichsaussenminister, Reich Foreign Minister
Reichsbahn, the German State Railways
Reichsbahndirektor, an official of the German State Railways
Reichsbankdirektor, a director of the Reichsbank
Reichsdeutsche, Reich Germans, i. e., those Germans who were Reich subjects (see **Volksdeutsche**)
Reichsführer SS, Commander in Chief of the SS
Reichsgruppe Industrie, Reich Group Industry, an official organization for the control of German industry
Reichskommissar, Reich Commissar, a commissioner with special functions, a governor of an area occupied by Germany
Reichskreditkasse, Reich credit institution established in occupied territories; affiliated with the Reichsbank
Reichskreditkassenscheine, notes issued by the Reichskreditkasse, which served as occupation currency in occupied territories
Reichsleiter, highest NSDAP rank
Reichsluftfahrtministerium, Reich Air Ministry
Reichsmarschall, Reich Marshal, military rank given to Göring
Reichsminister, Reich Minister
Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Reich Main Security Office, office of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD
RLM, Reichsluftfahrtministerium
RM, Reichsminister
SA, Sturmabteilung
Schutzstaffel, elite corps of the NSDAP, used for military and police purposes
SD, Sicherheitsdienst
Seekriegsleitung, Naval War Staff
Seelowe, Sea Lion, code name for planned German operation against Great Britain

Sicherheitsdienst, security service; intelligence and counterintelligence agency of the SS
Skl., Seekriegsleitung
SS, Schutzstaffel
Staatssekretär, State Secretary, the highest career official of a Reich Ministry
St.S., Staatssekretär
Sturmabteilung, Storm Troops of the NSDAP (brown shirts)
Sturmabführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Major
Unterstaatssekretär, Under State Secretary
U. St.S., Unterstaatssekretär
Volksdeutsche, ethnic Germans, i. e., persons belonging to the German cultural community living outside the frontiers of the Reich and not Reich subjects
Volksgerichtshof, People's Court, Nazi court for political crimes
Volksgruppenführung, leadership of a Volksgruppe or German national group outside the Reich
W., Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung
Wehrmacht, designation of the German Armed Forces after 1935
Wehrmachtführungsamt, Wehrmacht Operations Staff, an office in the OKW engaged in operations planning; from August 1940 Wehrmachtführungsstab
Wehrmachtführungsstab, Wehrmacht Operations Staff, an office in the OKW engaged in operations planning
Wehrwirtschaftsstab, War Economy Staff, a division of OKW; title changed in 1939 to Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt, Military Economy and Armaments Office
WFA, Wehrmachtführungsamt
WFST, Wehrmachtführungsstab
Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry
zu, to, in connection with; where this precedes the file number it indicates that the previous papers on the subject have this number

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